US v. Louis Martin

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:13-cr-00273-RWT-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999930726].. [14-4779]

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 1 of 22

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4779

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LOUIS MARTIN,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:13cr-00273-RWT-1)

Argued:

May 12, 2016

Decided:

September 16, 2016

Before TRAXLER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and Norman K. MOON,
Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: William A. Mitchell, Jr., BRENNAN MCKENNA MANZI SHAY
LEVAN CHARTERED, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.
Leah
Bressack, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States
Attorney,
OFFICE
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
ATTORNEY,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 2 of 22

PER CURIAM:
Louis

Martin

was

convicted

by

a

jury

of

one

count

of

unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, see 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1),

and

was

sentenced

to

210

months’

imprisonment.

Martin appeals, raising various challenges to his conviction and
sentence.

We vacate his conviction and sentence and remand for

a new trial.
I.
In

2013,

the

FBI

obtained

an

order

authorizing

the

interception of the telephone communications of Russell Battle.
Some of the monitored calls were between Battle and Martin, and
those

calls

ultimately

led

the

FBI

to

obtain

an

order

authorizing the FBI to monitor Martin’s calls as well.
Based on the monitored conversations, the FBI believed that
Martin was planning a robbery of an armored car.

The FBI also

heard Martin first seeking Battle’s help in obtaining a gun and
later telling Battle that he had “stumbled up on something” and
no longer needed Battle’s help.

J.A. 383, 897.

Based on the

information in the intercepted conversations, the FBI obtained a
search

warrant

for

Martin’s

home.

Law

enforcement

officers

executed the warrant early in the morning of April 24, 2013.
During the execution of the search, Martin admitted to FBI
agents that he had been trying to buy a gun from Battle and
telling others that he was planning a robbery.
2

While the search

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 3 of 22

was ongoing, the officers permitted Martin to get dressed and go
to his job.

Sometime after Martin left, officers searching one

of the closets in the master bedroom found a .40 caliber pistol
tucked inside a stack of folded pants.

The closet where the gun

was found contained only men’s clothes; the clothes belonging to
Martin’s wife were in a different closet.
Martin was subsequently arrested and charged with unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon.
played

recordings

conversations,

of

many

including

the

At trial, the government

of

the

monitored

conversation

where

telephone

Martin

told

Battle that he had “stumbled up on something” and no longer
needed Battle’s help.
effectively

serving

Battle also testified for the government,
as

a

translator

of

the

frequently

coded

conversations.
Martin’s defense was that the gun belonged to his wife and
that he had no knowledge of it until his wife called him while
the search was ongoing and told him that the officers had found
her gun.

Martin’s wife testified that she bought the gun for

protection in 2011, when Martin was incarcerated, and that she
had not told Martin about the gun.

She explained that she hid

the gun in Martin’s closet rather than hers because she slept on
the left side of the bed, and his closet was easier to reach
from that position.

Mrs. Martin’s testimony about the gun was

supported by the testimony of a friend who was with her when she
3

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 4 of 22

first tried (unsuccessfully) to buy a gun and by the testimony
of another friend who was with Mrs. Martin when she later bought
the gun on the street from an acquaintance.
Martin also testified at trial, and he insisted that he did
not

know

about

the

gun

before

it

was

found

in

his

closet.

Martin acknowledged asking Battle to get a gun for him, but he
contended that the gun was for someone else.
that

he

used

the

“stumbled

up

on

Martin explained

something”

phrasing

when

talking to Battle because he never told Battle that the gun was
for someone else and he needed to maintain the fiction that he
had been seeking the gun for himself.
The government argued to the jury that the gun found in the
closet

was

government

in

fact

contended

the
that

gun

bought

Martin

by

told

Mrs.
Battle

Martin.
that

The

he

had

stumbled on something because Martin had found the gun and thus
taken knowing possession of it.

See Rebuttal Closing Argument,

Trial Transcript pp. 1006-008.
The jury rejected Martin’s defense and found him guilty.
Martin thereafter filed a motion seeking a new trial.

In the

motion, Martin re-argued evidentiary issues that had been raised
at trial and also alleged that a court employee exerted undue
influence over a juror during deliberations.

After conducting a

hearing, the district court denied the motion in an oral ruling

4

Appeal: 14-4779

from

Doc: 84

the

Filed: 09/16/2016

bench.

At

a

Pg: 5 of 22

subsequent

sentencing

hearing,

the

district court sentenced Martin to 210 months’ imprisonment.
II.
Over Martin’s objection, the district court permitted the
government to introduce in its case-in-chief evidence of three
prior

convictions

Evidence. 1

under

Rule

404(b)

of

the

Federal

Rules

of

Martin argues on appeal that the evidence of his

prior convictions was not admissible under Rule 404(b) because
it was not relevant or necessary to prove the charged offense.
Martin also argues that, in any event, the evidence should have
been excluded as unfairly prejudicial.

See Fed. R. Evid. 403

(“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is

substantially

prejudice,
delay,

outweighed

confusing

wasting

the

time,

by

a

issues,

or

danger

of

misleading

needlessly

.

.

the

.

jury,

presenting

unfair
undue

cumulative

evidence.”); United States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197, 206 (4th Cir.
2011) (“[T]he probative value of [Rule 404(b)] evidence must not
be

substantially

outweighed

by

1

its

prejudicial

effect,

which

Two of the convictions were for armed bank robberies
occurring in 1997 and 1998. The third was a 2006 conviction for
unlawful possession of a firearm, a charge that arose after
Martin crashed his car into a light pole and was seen throwing a
gun into bushes while walking away from the scene.

5

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 6 of 22

involves a Rule 403 determination.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

We find no reversible error.

“Rule 404 generally prohibits evidence of other crimes or
bad

acts

to

prove

the

defendant’s

accordance with his character.”

character

and

conduct

in

United States v. McLaurin, 764

F.3d 372, 380 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842
(2015), and cert. denied sub nom. Lowery v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 1843 (2015).
‘for

another

“Such evidence, however, may be admissible

purpose,

such

as

proving

motive,

opportunity,

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.’”
404(b)).

Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid.

To be admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence of

prior bad acts “(i) must be relevant to an issue other than
character, such as identity or motive; (ii) must be necessary to
prove an element of the crime charged or to prove context; and
(iii) must be reliable.”

Byers, 649 F.3d at 206 (citations,

internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
The

district

court

admitted

the

prior

convictions

as

evidence of Martin’s knowledge and intent to possess the gun.
After

reviewing

the

record,

we

cannot

say

that

the

court’s decision was “arbitrary or irrational.”
v.

Faulls,

evidentiary

821

F.3d

rulings

502,
for

508

abuse

(4th
of

Cir.

United States

2016)

discretion,

district

(“We

and

review

will

not

reverse a district court’s decision to admit prior acts evidence
6

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 7 of 22

unless it was arbitrary or irrational.”

(citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).
Martin’s not-guilty plea and the defense he presented at
trial

put

at

possess it.

issue

his

knowledge

of

the

gun

and

intent

to

See United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 196

(4th Cir. 1997) (“A not-guilty plea puts one’s intent at issue
and thereby makes relevant evidence of similar prior crimes when
that evidence proves criminal intent.”).

The prior convictions

bear sufficient similarity to the present case to make evidence
of

the

intent. 2

prior

convictions

relevant

to

Martin’s

knowledge

and

See United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 996 (4th Cir.

1997) (“[I]n order for repeated actions to have probative value,
the earlier actions must be similar in nature to the charged

2

While the prior convictions are not recent, the
convictions
nonetheless
remain
relevant
since
Martin
was
incarcerated for much of the time between those convictions and
the events giving rise to this charge.
See United States v.
Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 998 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding nine-year-old
bad-act evidence relevant despite lapse of time “particularly
when the defendant has spent many of those intervening nine
years in prison”); accord United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d
951, 960 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[B]ecause Williams was incarcerated
for such a significant amount of time—approximately 12 of the 18
years since his 1995 conviction—the total number of years
separating the prior offenses and the charged offense did not
significantly diminish the probativeness of the evidence.”
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1450 (2016).

7

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 8 of 22

acts.”). 3

Given the dearth of other evidence showing Martin’s

state

mind,

of

likewise

the

necessary.

evidence
See

of

id.

at

the
998

prior

convictions

(“Evidence

is

was

necessary

where, considered in the light of other evidence available to
the government, it is an essential part of the crimes on trial,
or

where

it

furnishes

part

of

the

context

of

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
evidence

was

reliable,

as

it

consisted

of

the

crime.”

Finally, the

certified

court

records and statements of fact agreed to by Martin at the time
of those convictions.
Accordingly,

we

see

no

error

in

the

district

court’s

decision to admit evidence of Martin’s prior convictions under
Rule 404(b).

See United States v. Walker, 470 F.3d 1271, 1274

(8th Cir. 2006) (“Evidence that a defendant possessed a firearm
on a previous occasion is relevant to show knowledge and intent,
and Walker’s prior conviction for armed robbery addresses the
material issue of his knowledge of the presence of the firearm
3

For purposes of Rule 404(b), the necessary “similarity may
be demonstrated through physical similarity of the acts or
through the defendant’s indulging himself in the same state of
mind in the perpetration of both the extrinsic offense and
charged offenses.” Queen, 132 F.3d at 996. Given the evidence
connecting Martin’s efforts to obtain a gun to his stated plans
to rob an armored truck, Martin’s prior armed bank robberies
bear factual similarities to this case.
Moreover, all of the
prior convictions share state-of-mind similarities to the
present case, as all involve the knowing possession or use of a
firearm.

8

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 9 of 22

and his intent to possess it.”); accord United States v. Moran,
503 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Jernigan,
341 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Cassell,
292 F.3d 788, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
We likewise reject Martin’s claim that the probative value
of the prior convictions was substantially outweighed by the
unfair prejudice of the details of the underlying crimes that
were read to the jury by the government.
The government’s pre-trial motion seeking admission of the
prior

convictions

did

not

address

the

manner

in

which

the

government intended to prove the convictions, and Martin did not
object when the government read the facts of the crimes to the
jury.

Accordingly, we review this claim for plain error only.

See United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir.
1996) (“[M]otions in limine may serve to preserve issues that
they raise without any need for renewed objections at trial,
just so long as the movant has clearly identified the ruling
sought

and

the

trial

court

has

ruled

upon

it.”

(emphasis

added)); id. (reviewing for plain error where “motion in limine
was not based upon nor did it seek a ruling on the precise issue
[the defendant] now seeks to raise” (emphasis added)).
“To obtain relief under plain-error review, [the defendant]
must first establish that the district court erred, that the
error was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights.”
9

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 10 of 22

McLaurin, 764 F.3d at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
“Even when this burden is met, we have discretion whether to
recognize

the

error,

and

should

not

do

so

unless

the

error

seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of

judicial

proceedings.”

Id.

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
While Martin contends that the government gave the jury
“in-depth descriptions” of the underlying convictions, Brief of
Appellant

at

23,

the

government’s

presentation

of

each

conviction was brief, with concise descriptions of the facts
presented in neutral, non-inflammatory language.
facts

of

the

underlying

crimes

were

not

Moreover, the

significantly

more

violent than the armored-car robbery the jury heard Martin plan.
Under these circumstances, Martin has failed to show plain error
in the government’s manner of proving the prior convictions.
See United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 349, 350-51 (4th
Cir. 1998) (in case where defendant was charged with kidnapping,
concluding that defendant’s prior convictions for kidnapping and
rape were admissible under Rule 404(b) and finding no Rule 403
error in proving the prior convictions through the testimony of
the victim “detailing her kidnapping and sexual assault”).

10

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 11 of 22

III.
We turn now to Martin’s challenge to the district court’s
exclusion of a telephone conversation between Martin and James
Laidler.
A.
The Martin-Battle “stumbled up on something” conversation
played for the jury by the government was a call-waiting call
that

interrupted

a

conversation

between

Martin

and

Laidler;

Martin put Laidler on hold, talked to Battle, and then returned
to his conversation with Laidler.
Martin-Laidler

conversation,

Laidler

In the first part of the
told

Martin

“straightened out” an unidentified situation.

that

J.A. 923.

he

had

Martin

then switched over to Battle’s incoming call and told Battle he
had

“stumbled

up

on

something,”

J.A.

923,

understood to mean Martin no longer needed a gun.

which

Battle

When Martin

returned to his conversation with Laidler, he explained that the
other call was from the “dude right there,” the “dude that was
doing a favor for me.”

J.A. 924.

After Martin told Laidler

that he told the “dude” (i.e., Battle) that Martin was “all
right,” Laidler responded, “Yeah, that’s right cause I don’t
need it now. . . .”

J.A. 924.

At trial, Martin repeatedly sought to introduce the MartinLaidler

conversations

that

bracketed

something” conversation with Battle.
11

his

“stumbled

up

on

Martin argued that the

Appeal: 14-4779

Laidler

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

conversations

were

Pg: 12 of 22

necessary

to

put

the

Battle

conversation used by the government in context and to support
his claim that he was never looking for a gun for himself.

The

district court excluded the before-and-after conversations with
Laidler as hearsay.
B.
On

appeal,

Martin

contends

the

district

court

excluding evidence of the Laidler conversations.

erred

by

According to

Martin, the statements made in the Laidler conversations are not
hearsay

because

matters

they

asserted

801(c)(2) (2012). 4

in

were
the

not

offered

for

conversation.

the

See

truth
Fed.

R.

of

the

Evid.

Martin contends the improper exclusion of the

evidence requires a new trial because the Laidler conversations
undercut the central premise of the government’s case -- that
Martin told Battle he had stumbled on something because Martin
found his wife’s gun hidden in the closet.

We agree.

Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement that is
offered

“to

statement.”

prove
Id.

the

truth

Statements

of

the

that

matter

are

asserted

offered

to

in

the

prove

the

effect of the statement on the listener are not offered for

4

Rule 801 was amended effective December 1, 2014. Because
Martin’s trial took place before the effective date of the
amendments, we apply the version of the rule in effect at the
time of trial.

12

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 13 of 22

their truth and therefore do not fall within the definition of
hearsay.

See United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840, 842 (4th

Cir. 1978).
being

offered

In this case, the Laidler conversations were not
for

the

truth

of

the

matter

asserted

in

the

conversation -- in essence, that Laidler no longer needed the
gun that Martin was asking Battle to obtain. 5

Instead, the

conversations

of

were

offered

statements on Martin:

to

show

the

effect

Laidler’s

Immediately upon learning that Laidler no

longer needed a gun, Martin told Battle that he no longer needed
a gun -- that he had “stumbled up on something.”
Laidler

actually

conversations

with

needed

a

Laidler,

gun
Martin

is

Whether or not

irrelevant;

believed

that

after
Laidler

the
no

longer needed a gun, which explains why Martin told Battle that

5

Counsel for Martin made oral proffers of the substance of
the Laidler conversations at trial, and submitted a transcript
of the conversation as an exhibit in connection with his motion
for a new trial. See J.A. 923-24.
Like the conversations between Martin and Battle, the
conversations between Laidler and Martin use guarded, cryptic
language, and the word “gun” never appears.
Nonetheless, when
Laidler said, “that’s right cause I don’t need it now,” J.A.
924, it was in response to Martin’s explicit reference to the
“stumbled up on something” conversation he had just had with
Battle.
Thus, when the Laidler conversations are considered
together with the Battle conversation, the Laidler conversations
can reasonably be understood as establishing that Laidler had
previously asked Martin to get a gun for him, that Martin turned
to Battle to get the gun for Laidler, and that Martin told
Battle he no longer needed a gun as soon as Martin learned that
Laidler no longer needed a gun.

13

Appeal: 14-4779

he

no

Doc: 84

longer

Filed: 09/16/2016

needed

a

gun.

Pg: 14 of 22

The

Laidler

conversations

were

therefore being offered to prove their effect on Martin -- to
explain his motive in setting Battle on, and later calling him
off of, the gun quest.

See United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d

715, 720 (4th Cir. 1981) (statement to defendant about use of
returned funds was not hearsay because it was not offered to
prove

that

the

money

was,

in

fact,

used

as

described

to

defendant; its purpose was to show that the defendant believed
that the funds were being used legitimately); Jenkins, 579 F.2d
at

842

(“Insofar

as

elements

of

the

taped

conversations

not

directly expressing Johnson’s intent were offered to prove that
intent, they were not hearsay, for the import of them was their
effect on her and not their truth.” (emphasis omitted)); see
also United States v. Leonard-Allen, 739 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir.
2013) (“A witness’s statement is not hearsay if the witness is
reporting what he heard someone else tell him for the purpose of
explaining what the witness was thinking at the time or what
motivated him to do something.

In those circumstances, the out-

of-court statement is not being offered as evidence that its
contents are true.”).

14

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 15 of 22

Because the Laidler conversations were not offered for the
truth of the matters asserted in the conversations, 6 we agree
with Martin that the district court erred by excluding evidence
of the conversations as hearsay.
C.
Having concluded that the district court erred by excluding
evidence of the Laidler conversations, we must determine whether
this error requires reversal.
Preliminarily, we reject the government’s claim that Martin
failed to preserve the not-hearsay issue he raises on appeal.
Counsel for Martin premised his arguments for admission of the
Laidler conversations on many grounds; while his focus may have
been elsewhere, counsel nonetheless sufficiently raised at trial
the not-hearsay argument now raised on appeal.

See J.A. 752

(“Your Honor, it explains why it is that Mr. Martin made the
6

This analysis applies to both sides of the Laidler
conversations -- the statements made by Martin were offered not
for their truth, but to show their effect on Laidler, just as
the statements made by Laidler were offered to show their effect
on Martin.
In any event, as Laidler’s statements in the
conversations are clearly admissible, Martin’s side of the
conversations would nonetheless be admissible to provide the
context for Laidler’s statements to Martin and Martin’s
statements to Battle. See United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715,
720 n.6 (4th Cir. 1981) (“Leake’s [admissible, non-hearsay]
testimony regarding his conversation with Graham would be
meaningless unless both sides of the conversation were recounted
to the jury.
Graham’s statements to Leake were admissible,
therefore, as necessary to explain the context in which Leake
made the statements revealing his state of mind.”).

15

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 16 of 22

request of Mr. Battle which is what we have been talking about
this entire time. . . .”).

Because the issue was raised below,

it is preserved for appeal and subject to harmless-error, not
plain-error, review.

See United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d

522, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2003) (issues preserved below are reviewed
for harmless error on appeal); United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d
1137,

1144

(4th

Cir.

1995)

(applying

plain-error

review

to

argument asserting basis for admission that was not argued to
district court).

And under harmless-error review, we believe

that reversal is required.
To

prove

conversations

that
was

the

improper

harmless,

“the

exclusion
Government

of

the

must

Laidler

demonstrate

that the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”
v.

Ibisevic,

675

F.3d

342,

349

(4th

Cir.

United States

2012)

(internal

quotation marks omitted).
An appellate court does not inquire into whether
absent the error sufficient evidence existed to
convict, but rather whether we believe it highly
probable that the error did not affect the judgment.
Thus, [to find an error harmless,] we must be able to
say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that
happened without stripping the erroneous action from
the whole, that the judgment was not substantially
swayed by the error.
Id.

at

350

(citation

and

internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

When undertaking the harmlessness calculus, we consider “(1) the
centrality of the issue affected by the error; (2) the steps
16

Appeal: 14-4779

taken

Doc: 84

to

Filed: 09/16/2016

mitigate

the

Pg: 17 of 22

effects

closeness of the case.”

of

the

error;

and

(3)

the

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the error went to the central issue in the case.

As

noted above, the government argued to the jury that Martin found
the gun that Martin’s wife had hidden in the closet, which is
why Martin told Battle that he had “stumbled up on something”
and

no

longer

district

needed

court

went

a

gun.

directly

The
to

evidence

this

excluded

issue,

by

by

the

providing

an

alternate explanation for Martin’s seeking a gun from Battle -he

wanted

it

for

interpretation

of

Laidler,
the

not

himself

“stumbled

up

on

--

and

an

something”

alternate
comment

--

Laidler no longer needed the gun, and Martin needed to maintain
the fiction that he had been seeking the gun for himself.

The

exclusion of the Laidler conversations thus deprived Martin of
the only evidence that could corroborate his testimony about why
he initially sought a gun from Battle and why he stopped looking
for one.

See id. at 351 (centrality-of-issue factor weighed

against finding improper exclusion of evidence harmless because
“the excluded testimony was the only evidence that would have
corroborated

the

defendant’s

own

testimony

of

assertedly

innocent conduct”).
As

to

evidentiary
leeway

to

the

steps

ruling,
inform

taken

the

the

to

mitigate

district

jury

of
17

court

the

the

did

effects

give

existence

of

of

Martin
the

its
some

Laidler

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

conversations.

Pg: 18 of 22

For example, Martin testified that the gun he

was seeking from Battle was not for him, see J.A. 758, and the
district court permitted Martin to testify that he asked Battle
for a gun “[a]s a result of [a] conversation I had with Mr.
Laidler.”
to

J.A. 755.

explain

to

The district court also permitted Martin

the

jury

that

he

was

talking

to

Laidler

immediately before the “stumbled up on something” conversation
with Battle, and that “[a]s a result of the conversation that I
was

having,

I

told

[Battle]

that

stumbled up on something.”

I

didn’t

J.A. 761.

need

it,

that

I

We disagree with the

government, however, that this limited discussion of Martin’s
conversations

with

Laidler

suffices

to

render

the

improper

exclusion of the evidence harmless.
Evidence

of

the

Laidler

conversations

would

have

corroborated Martin’s claim that the gun he sought from Battle
was not for him, and it would have explained to the jury why
Martin would have told Battle he “stumbled up on something” if
he had not found his wife’s gun.
that

Martin

was

able

to

present

critical information to the jury.

The bare-bones information
simply

did

not

convey

this

The evidence heard by the

jury thus was not an adequate substitute for the evidence that
would have been heard by the jury had the Laidler conversations
not been improperly excluded.

Cf. United States v. Kohan, 806

F.2d

(remanding

18,

22

(2d

Cir.

1986)

18

for

new

trial

when

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

improperly

Filed: 09/16/2016

excluded

testimony

Pg: 19 of 22

“would

have

corroborated

[defendant’s] statements to law enforcement officials, thereby
helping to diminish the effect of their self-serving nature”).
The final factor relevant to our harmlessness inquiry is
the closeness of the case.

See Ibisevic, 675 F.3d at 350.

We

recognize that the government’s evidence was relatively strong.
The evidence included testimony about Martin apparently planning
to rob an armored car, and Battle’s testimony that Martin asked
Battle to procure a gun for him but later told Battle that he
did not need the gun.

Moreover, the gun was found hidden in a

stack of men’s pants in Martin’s closet, and the FBI agents
involved in the search testified that Martin told them “that he
knew that the gun was in his bedroom closet when the F.B.I.
searched his house.”
Martin,

J.A. 218; see also J.A. 458.

however,

reasonably

contested

evidence on the most important points.

the

government’s

Martin and his wife

testified that he had no knowledge of the gun until she called
him during the search and told him that the gun had been found.
Martin testified that he owed money to Battle and that he only
talked about possible robberies in order to convince Battle that
Martin would eventually be able to pay the debt.

Martin also

testified that the gun he sought from Battle was actually for
someone else and that he used the “stumbled up on something”
phrasing when telling Battle he no longer needed the gun because
19

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 20 of 22

Battle did not know that the gun was for someone else and Martin
needed to maintain the fiction that he had been seeking the gun
for himself.
Thus,
Laidler

even

without

conversations,

government’s

evidence

the
the

may

corroborating
case

have

was
been

not

evidence
one-sided.

sufficient

to

of

the
The

support

Martin’s convictions, but the question before us is “whether
[the government’s evidence] is sufficiently powerful in relation
to the excluded testimony to ensure the error did not affect the
outcome.”

Ibisevic, 675 F.3d at 354 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

As noted, the excluded evidence directly challenged

the government’s interpretation of the evidence central to its
case -- Martin’s statement to Battle that he had “stumbled up on
something” and no longer needed a gun.

The excluded testimony,

therefore, had it been heard and credited by the jury, would
have

substantially

weakened

the

government’s

case

while

simultaneously strengthening Martin’s defense.
In sum, the excluded evidence went to the central issue in
the case; the truncated evidence that Martin was permitted to
introduce did not convey the same information that would have
been conveyed by the excluded evidence; and the government’s
evidence of Martin’s guilt was far from overwhelming.

Under

these circumstances, we cannot say with any degree of certainty
that the district court’s error in excluding evidence of the
20

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

Filed: 09/16/2016

Pg: 21 of 22

Laidler conversations did not affect the judgment.

Because the

exclusion of the evidence was not harmless, we must therefore
vacate Martin’s conviction and remand for a new trial. 7
IV.
Martin also challenges his 210-month sentence.
the

statutory

maximum

sentence

for

a

§

922(g)

Although

conviction

is

generally ten years, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), the district
court

concluded

that

Martin

qualified

as

an

armed

career

criminal, which subjected Martin to a mandatory minimum sentence
of at least fifteen years, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
As

part

sentencing

of

its

under

§

conclusion

924(e),

the

that

Martin

district

court

qualified
held

for

that

a

Maryland robbery conviction was a predicate conviction under the
“residual

clause”

that,

light

in

of

of

§
the

924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Supreme

Court’s

The

parties

invalidation

agree

of

the

residual clause in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551,
2563

(2015),

Martin

no

longer

7

qualifies

as

an

armed

career

In light of our conclusions that the Laidler conversations
should have been admitted and that a new trial is required, we
decline to consider Martin’s argument that the district court
should have permitted him to cross-examine one of the FBI agents
about the Laidler conversations.
Should the issue arise again
in the new trial, the parties may address the issue anew and the
district court is free to consider the issue de novo.
Our
conclusion that a new trial is required also makes it
unnecessary to address Martin’s claim that a court employee
exerted undue influence over a juror.

21

Appeal: 14-4779

Doc: 84

criminal.
district

Filed: 09/16/2016

Should
court

Martin

must

be

Pg: 22 of 22

convicted

sentence

again

Martin

on

within

remand,
the

the

ten-year

statutory range established by § 924(a)(2).
V.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby vacate
Martin’s

conviction

and

sentence

and

remand

for

a

new

trial

consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED

22