US v. Alexander Robbin
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:14-cr-00025-FL-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999634723].. [14-4783]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4783
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALEXANDER ROBBINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (7:14-cr-00025-FL-1)
Submitted:
June 29, 2015
Decided:
August 5, 2015
Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Alexander Robbins challenges the substantive reasonableness
of the 71-month sentence imposed by the district court following
his
conviction,
pursuant
to
a
guilty
plea,
for
knowingly
possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, in violation of
18
U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2)
(2012).
In
imposing
the
sentence, the district court departed upward from the Sentencing
Guidelines
category
range,
concluding
“substantially
that
Robbins’
underrepresent[ed]
criminal
the
history
seriousness
of
[his] criminal history or the likelihood that [he] will commit
other crimes.”
(2013).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3, p.s.
We affirm.
We
review
deferential
a
sentence
for
abuse-of-discretion
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).
does
not
attention
assert
to
the
reasonableness,
standard.”
applying
Gall
v.
“a
United
Where, as here, the defendant
procedural
sentencing
error,
substantive
reasonableness
of
we
turn
the
sentence,
“take[] into account the totality of the circumstances,”
our
id.,
at 51, and consider “whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied
the
standards
set
forth
in
[18
U.S.C.]
§
3553(a)
[(2012)],”
United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir.)
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 305
(2014), and cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 384 (2014).
2
“An appellate
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court owes ‘due deference’ to a district court’s assessment of
the § 3553(a) factors, and mere disagreement with the sentence
below
is
court.’”
‘insufficient
to
justify
reversal
of
the
district
United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 531 (4th Cir.
2014) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51); see id. at 529 n.8; see
also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52.
Robbins first contends that the district court abused its
discretion by upwardly departing under § 4A1.3, p.s., because
his
criminal
misdemeanor
offenses.
included
history,
though
convictions,
not
We
note,
numerous
lengthy,
violent
however,
that
misdemeanor
primarily
felonies
Robbins’
included
or
firearm
criminal
convictions
for
history
assaultive
behavior and for crimes against property and a felony conviction
for possession of a firearm as a felon — all of which received
no criminal history points.
p.s.,
prevented
the
Nothing in the language of § 4A1.3,
district
court
from
relying
on
these
unscored convictions, and we conclude that it did not abuse its
discretion by doing so.
Second, Robbins argues that his departure sentence creates
unwarranted
sentencing
disparities
between
him
and
those
who
have been convicted under § 922(g)(1) and have received withinGuidelines sentences after being accorded the same total offense
level
and
criminal
history
category
as
Robbins.
On
the
contrary, we conclude that the Sentencing Commission’s adoption
3
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of the § 4A1.3, p.s., departure renders the resulting sentencing
disparity
between
warranted.
54.
Robbins
and
his
putative
comparators
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); cf. Gall, 552 U.S. at
Although a sentencing disparity based on a § 4A1.3, p.s.,
departure
might
be
unwarranted
inappropriately
applied,
itself,
be
cannot
the
grounds
if
imposition
for
the
of
concluding
the
that
departure
is
departure,
by
the
resulting
disparity is unwarranted.
Next, Robbins contends that the district court’s rationale
for imposing its sentence was unreasonable because his criminal
history shows he was predominantly a drug user and not in the
habit of using firearms as part of his criminal conduct and
that, therefore, he presented a danger to himself more than to
the
public.
See
18
U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(C).
Robbins’
characterization of his criminal history is deeply flawed.
As
the district court noted, his convictions exhibit a pattern of
assaulting others, injuring their property, and placing their
safety
at
risk
regulations.
by
his
criminal
disregard
for
motor
vehicle
His claim that he has generally, but not always,
refrained from using a firearm while engaging in conduct that
harms or endangers the public is largely irrelevant.
event,
the
sentencing
violently
language
court’s
harms
the
of
§ 3553(a)(2)(C)
consideration
public,
and
4
to
the
does
not
criminal
possession
In any
limit
conduct
and
the
that
use
of
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illicit
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drugs
are
by
no
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means
harmless
to
society.
See
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002-03 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
Finally,
sentence
was
deterrence
Robbins
unreasonable
when
irrationally,
punishment.
contends
is
he,
not
as
that
the
it
relied
because
a
drug
amenable
district
addict
to
the
on
the
need
compelled
deterrent
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
court’s
for
to
act
effect
of
We have found no
case in which a court of appeals has concluded that deterrence
is an inappropriate sentencing factor on the ground that the
defendant
is
a
drug
addict,
and
Robbins
points
to
none.
Moreover, we note that Robbins’ reasoning appears to be at odds
with the conclusions reached by the Supreme Court in Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
Because Robbins has offered no meritorious reason why we
should not defer to the district court’s judgment, we conclude
that
the
sentence
reasonable.
judgment.
legal
before
imposed
Accordingly,
on
we
Robbins
affirm
the
is
substantively
district
court’s
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions
this
court
are
adequately
and
argument
presented
would
not
in
aid
the
the
materials
decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
5
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