US v. Roland Ware
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:07-cr-00176-D-4 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999750733].. [14-4797]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4797
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ROLAND WARE, a/k/a Finesse, a/k/a Fetti,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:07-cr-00176-D-4)
Submitted:
January 28, 2016
Before MOTZ and
Circuit Judge.
KING,
Circuit
Decided:
Judges,
and
February 8, 2016
HAMILTON,
Senior
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Ronald Ware appeals from the revocation of his supervised
release and the imposition of a prison term of 36 months.
appeal,
Ware
argues
that
his
sentence
exceeds
the
On
statutory
maximum allowed for a revocation of supervised release, given
the 12 months previously served on his prior revocation.
He
contends that his plea agreement limited the aggregate total
amount
of
time
he
could
release to three years.
serve
upon
revocation
of
supervised
In the alternative, he argues that his
plea agreement was ambiguous as to whether the three-year limit
was an aggregate limit or a per-violation limit.
We affirm.
At the outset, we note that the parties disagree as to what
standard of review to employ.
The Government contends that Ware
did not raise this claim of error below, and thus it should be
reviewed
for
plain
error.
Ware
counters
that
his
counsel,
although agreeing with the policy statement range announced by
the
district
maximum.
court,
objected
to
the
three-year
statutory
Our review of the transcript confirms that defense
counsel objected to the statutory maximum.
However, he did not
articulate that his objection was based on violation of the plea
agreement
by
use
of
a
per-violation
statutory maximum sentence.
because
Ware’s
issue
does
basis
to
calculate
the
We need not resolve this dispute
not
survive
2
de
novo
review.
See
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United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 2013)
(questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo).
Ware’s
plea
agreement,
entered
into
in
November
2007,
specifies “Maximum term of supervised release: 5 years [and]
Maximum
term
release:
3
of
imprisonment
years.”
Ware
upon
revocation
therefore
argues
of
that
supervised
the
court’s
three-year second revocation sentence altered the terms of his
plea agreement.
A district court may revoke a term of supervised release
and
impose
a
term
preponderance
of
condition
supervised
(2012).
of
the
of
imprisonment
evidence
that
release.”
after
the
18
“find[ing]
U.S.C.
§
a
violated
defendant
by
a
3583(e)(3)
“[A] defendant whose term is revoked . . . may not be
required to serve on any such revocation more than . . . 3 years
in prison if such offense is a class B felony . . . .”
Under
a
prior
version
of
this
statute,
Id.
this
court
“assume[d] without deciding[] that § 3583(e)(3)’s maximum prison
term
limits
the
total
prison
time
that
may
be
imposed
for
multiple violations of supervised release.”
United States v.
Hager, 288 F.3d 136, 137 (4th Cir. 2002).
Section 3583 was
amended
in
2003,
however,
by
the
Prosecutorial
Remedies
and
Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003 (“PROTECT Act” or “Act”).
The Act added the phrase “on any
such revocation” to § 3583(e)(3).
3
Every Circuit to address the
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amended version of § 3583(e)(3) has concluded that “prior time
served
for
violations
of
supervised
release
is
not
credited
towards and so does not limit the statutory maximum that a court
may
impose
for
subsequent
violations
of
supervised
release.”
United States v. Perry, 743 F.3d 238, 241-42 (7th Cir. 2014)
(collecting cases); see also United States v. Tapia-Escalera,
356 F.3d 181, 188 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that, through the
PROTECT
Act,
“Congress
has
altered
the
statute
to
adopt
the
government’s position” that the terms of imprisonment do not
aggregate (emphasis omitted)).
We agree.
Ware’s plea agreement was executed well after the date of
enactment of the revised § 3583(e).
after
at
least
two
per-violation maximum.
Circuit
Court
Further, he entered into it
decisions
upholding
the
See Tapia-Escalera, 356 F.3d at 188;
United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 987, 989 (11th Cir. 2005),
abrogated on other grounds.
“Applying standard contract law, we
enforce a plea agreement’s plain language in its ordinary sense
and do not write the contracts of the parties retroactively, but
merely construe the terms of the contract the parties previously
signed.”
United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The
terms of the plea agreement were clear and Ware does not contend
that he would not have entered into it had he understood that
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the revocation sentence statutory maximum was per-violation and
not an aggregate of revocation sentences.
Ware’s
ambiguous
alternative
is
argument
likewise
that
his
unavailing.
plea
agreement
Nothing
in
the
was
record
indicates that his plea was unknowing or involuntary due to a
misunderstanding about the statutory maximum sentence applicable
on supervised release revocation.
revised
four
agreement.
years
prior
to
The statutory maximum was
Ware
entering
into
the
plea
At the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, Ware confirmed
that he understood the terms of his plea agreement.
ordinarily
considers
a
waiver
knowing,
“[T]he law
intelligent,
and
sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature
of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the
circumstances
specific
—
even
detailed
though
the
consequences
defendant
of
may
invoking
not
it.”
know
the
United
States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). The plea agreement
constituted
the
entire
understanding
between
the
parties
and
Ware confirmed at the Rule 11 hearing that there were no other
agreements between the parties.
Under these circumstances, we
determine that there was no ambiguity in the plea agreement such
that an interpretation that goes against the plain statutory
language and case law should be applied.
Thus,
we
conclude
that
the
district
court
properly
determined that Ware’s prior revocation sentence did not limit
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the statutory maximum available and, therefore, Ware’s sentence
does not exceed the statutory maximum or violate the terms of
his plea agreement.
facts
and
materials
legal
before
We dispense with oral argument because the
contentions
are
adequately
this
and
argument
court
presented
would
not
in
the
aid
the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6
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