US v. Heydar Sadeghi

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:11-cr-00070-JCC-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999614601].. [14-4829]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4829

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
HEYDAR SADEGHI, a/k/a Heydar ‘Ed’ Sadeghi, a/k/a Aeydar
Zadeghi, a/k/a Heidar Sadeghi, a/k/a Mir Goharbar, a/k/a
Mir Sadegh Goharbar,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00070-JCC-1)

Submitted:

May 27, 2015

Before AGEE and
Circuit Judge.

DIAZ,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

and

July 6, 2015

HAMILTON,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Kevin R. Brehm, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United
States Attorney, Catherine S. Ahn, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Heydar Sadeghi appeals the district court’s order revoking
his

term

of

probation

imprisonment.

and

sentencing

him

to

12

months’

On appeal, Sadeghi argues that the district court

abused its discretion in finding that he violated his probation
by

committing

the

Virginia

offense

of

abduction,

as

the

testimony presented at the revocation hearing was insufficient
to establish the elements of that offense.

For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.
We

review

for

abuse

of

discretion

decision to revoke probation.

the

district

United States v. Williams, 378

F.2d 665, 665 (4th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
revoke

probation

probation

has

revocation.

when

been

it

violated

court’s

determines
and

that

that
the

The court may
a

condition

violation

of

warrants

Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985).

A

judge’s order revoking probation does not require the level of
proof

necessary

to

support

a

criminal

conviction.

States v. Ball, 358 F.2d 367, 370 (4th Cir. 1966).

United

Rather, the

district court need only find a violation of a probation term by
a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Bujak, 347

F.3d 607, 609 (6th Cir. 2003); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)
(2012) (supervised release standard); United States v. Copley,
978 F.2d 829, 831 n.* (4th Cir. 1992) (“Supervised release and
probation differ only in that the former follows a prison term
2

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and the latter is in lieu of a prison term.”).

This burden

“simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence
of

a

fact

is

more

probable

than

its

nonexistence.”

United

States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation

marks

district

court’s

revocation.

omitted).
factual

We

review

findings

for

clear

underlying

error

a

the

probation

See United States v. Padgett, Nos. 14-4625, 14-

4627, 2015 WL 3561289, at *1 (4th Cir. June 9, 2015) (supervised
release).
An

individual

commits

the

Virginia

offense

of

abduction

when he “by force, intimidation or deception, and without legal
justification or excuse, seizes, takes, transports, detains or
secretes another person with the intent to deprive such other
person of his personal liberty.”

Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-47(A)

(2014).

Government

Sadeghi

argues

that

the

failed

to

prove

either that he used force or intimidation against the victims,
or that he intended to deprive the victims of their personal
liberty.
We find Sadeghi’s arguments unpersuasive.

Viewed in the

light most favorable to the Government, the evidence presented
at the revocation hearing established that Sadeghi was driving
two

individuals

noticed

a

police

Sadeghi

briefly

(“the

victims”)

car

parked

slowed

but

in
did
3

toward
front
not

their
of

fully

home

their
stop

when

he

destination.
his

car;

he

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ordered the victims out, but drove off with them at a high rate
of speed. *

Sadeghi refused repeated requests from one of the

victims and a telephoned appeal from a police officer to take
the

victims

home.

Moreover,

although

he

slowed

the

car

on

several occasions and demanded that the victims get out of his
car, he did not stop the car to permit them to exit safely until
he abandoned his flight at a gas station two miles away.
Sadeghi notes that one of the victims testified that she
wanted to be taken home, not merely let out of the car, and that
both victims could have left the unlocked car when Sadeghi told
them to do so.

However, in light of Sadeghi’s failure to fully

stop the car, testimony regarding one victim’s frantic demeanor,
and

the

victims’

inability

to

leave

the

vehicle

safely,

Sadeghi’s conduct constitutes a use of force or intimidation
adequate

to

support

Commonwealth,

324

a

charge

S.E.2d

of

665,

abduction.
670

(Va.

See
1985)

Sutton v.
(defining

“intimidate”); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 643 S.E.2d 166, 171-72
(Va.

2007)

(defining

“force”);

Clanton

v.

Commonwealth,

673

S.E.2d 904, 911 & n.12 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing that, in

*

Sadeghi urges us not to rely on testimony and findings
beyond those specifically enumerated or used by the district
court. However, our review is not limited to the grounds relied
upon by the district court, as we are entitled to affirm on any
basis apparent from the record.
United States v. Smith, 395
F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005).

4

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appropriate circumstances, abduction may be accomplished through
minimal force).
Sadeghi also argues that his repeated attempts to slow the
car and his demands that the victims get out preclude a finding
that

he

intended

to

deprive

the

victims

of

their

personal

liberty.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,

however,

his

“intended

to

restraint.”

conduct
deny

the

supports

an

inference

victim[s]

[their]

that

freedom

Sadeghi

from

bodily

Burton v. Commonwealth, 708 S.E.2d 892, 894 (Va.

2011); see also Chatman v. Commonwealth, 739 S.E.2d 245, 250
(Va. Ct. App. 2013) (“The specific intent to commit a crime may
be inferred from the conduct of the accused if such intent flows
naturally from the conduct proven.” (internal quotation marks
and

alteration

omitted));

cf.

Commonwealth

v.

Herring,

758

S.E.2d 225, 234 (Va. 2014); Joyce v. Commonwealth, 170 S.E.2d 9,
11 (Va. 1969).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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