US v. Brandon Beeson

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:14-cr-00005-JPB-JSK-2 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999589530].. [14-4884]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4884

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
BRANDON MICHAEL BEESON,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Elkins.
John Preston Bailey,
District Judge. (2:14-cr-00005-JPB-JSK-2)

Submitted:

March 30, 2015

Decided:

May 26, 2015

Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant.
William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Stephen D. Warner, Assistant United States
Attorney, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Brandon Michael Beeson entered a conditional plea of guilty
to

possession

of

materials

used

in

the

manufacture

of

methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 843(a)(6), (d)(2) (2012). Beeson
reserved his right to appeal the district court’s order denying
his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop.
Beeson was sentenced to 51 months in prison.

He now appeals,

claiming that the district court wrongly denied the suppression
motion.

We affirm.
I

On March 11, 2013, a person called 911 to report suspicious
activity at a nearby paving company.
dark, and the business was closed.

It was 9:45 p.m., it was

The caller stated that there

was a truck parked on the premises and persons with flashlights
were going back and forth from the truck.

Officers arrived

within three minutes of being dispatched to the location.
they

arrived,

a

pickup

truck

with

attempting to leave the property.
suspicious
engaged

activity,

the

driver

stopped
in

the

three

persons

When

inside

was

The officers, who observed no
truck.

conversation,

While

another

license and registration check on the truck.

one

officer

officer
ran

a

As he was doing

so, he observed Beeson, a passenger, reach down several times.
Concerned that Beeson might be attempting to retrieve a weapon,
the officer approached the passenger door, opened it, and shone
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a flashlight inside.
the

manufacture

of

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He observed items he knew to be used in
methamphetamine

on

the

floorboard

around

Beeson’s feet.
Beeson was charged with conspiracy to manufacture, possess
and

distribute

methamphetamine

and

multiple

related

offenses.

He moved to suppress items seized from the vehicle, but the
district court denied the motion.
his conditional guilty plea.

Beeson subsequently entered

He now appeals, claiming that the

stop of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment.
II
When

reviewing

the

denial

of

a

suppression

motion,

“we

review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and
its legal conclusions de novo.”

United States v. Green, 740

F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 207 (2014).
We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, the prevailing party below.

See United States v.

Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir. 2013).
A temporary detention of the occupants of an automobile,
even

for

a

limited

time

and

purpose,

constitutes

a

Fourth

Amendment seizure.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10

(1996).

a

Because

routine

traffic

stop

is

more

like

an

investigative detention than a custodial arrest, we evaluate the
legality of a traffic stop by applying the two-prong test of

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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

United States v. Green, 740

F.3d at 279 (4th Cir. 2014).
In Terry, the Court held that an officer may, consistent
with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop
when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion based
on his experience that criminal activity is afoot.

Terry, 392

U.S. at 30; see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
Under

this

vehicle

test,

must

sufficiently

the

be

police

both

“limited

officer’s

“justified

both

in

scope

decision

at
and

its

to

stop

inception”

duration.”

the
and

United

States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506-07 (4th Cir. 2011).
Whether there is reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry
stop depends upon the totality of the circumstances, including
the

information

inferences

to

known

be

drawn

to
at

the
the

officer
time

of

and
the

any

reasonable

stop.

United

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002); United States v.
Foster,

634

F.3d

243,

246

(4th

Cir.

2011).

The

reasonable

suspicion determination is a “commonsensical proposition,” and
deference is accorded police officers’ determinations based on
their

practical

experience

and

training.

Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 782 (4th Cir. 2004).

United

States

v.

“The ‘reasonable

suspicion’ necessary to justify [a Terry] stop ‘is dependent
upon both the content of information possessed by the police and
its degree of reliability.’”

Navarette v. California, 134 S.
4

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Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,
330 (1990)).
In Navarette, the Court addressed the issue of an anonymous
tip giving rise to a Terry stop.

Four factors were especially

significant to the Court’s determination that the stop did not
violate the Fourth Amendment:

(1) the caller claimed eyewitness

knowledge of allegedly dangerous activity, lending “significant
support to the tip’s reliability,” id. at 1689; (2) the caller
made

a

statement

about

an

event

“soon

after

perceiving

that

event,” rendering the statement “especially trustworthy,” id.;
(3) the caller used the 911 system, which “has some features
that allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide
some safeguards against making false reports,” id.; and (4) the
caller’s report created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing and
dangerous

crime—in

that

case,

drunk

driving—and

was

isolated episode of past recklessness,” id. at 1690.

not

“an

The Court

distinguished the tip in Navarette from bare-bones tips where
there

is

no

indication

that

the

tipster

actually

witnessed

potentially criminal activity and “[t]here [is] no indication
that the tip . . . was contemporaneous with the observation of
criminal activity or made under the stress of excitement caused
by a startling event.”

Id. at 1689, 1692.

Applying these principles, and based on the totality of the
circumstances,

we

conclude

that
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the

district

court

correctly

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denied Beeson’s suppression motion.
that

the

tip

came

from

an

In this regard, we note

eyewitness

activity at a nearby paving company.

who

reported

unusual

The call was placed soon

after the caller observed the suspicious activity, and officers
arrived at the scene within three minutes of being dispatched to
the area.
the

Additionally, the caller used the 911 system to make

report.

Finally,

the

reported

activity—a

vehicle

at

a

paving company after hours and people with flashlights going
back and forth from the vehicle—was suspicious.
III
We

accordingly

affirm.

We

dispense

with

oral

argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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