Joshua Rich v. US
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cv-00137-GMG-RWT. [999726132]. [14-7204]
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
Pg: 1 of 18
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-7204
JOSHUA RICH,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg.
Gina M. Groh,
District Judge. (3:13-cv-00137-GMG-RWT)
Argued:
October 27, 2015
Decided:
December 29, 2015
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published
opinion.
Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn
and Judge Diaz joined.
ARGUED: Jay Thornton McCamic, MCCAMIC, SACCO & MCCOID, PLLC,
Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Alan McGonigal, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: William J. Ihlenfeld, II, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
Pg: 2 of 18
BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:
While serving a fifty-seven year sentence at the United
States
Penitentiary
in
Bruceton
Mills,
West
Virginia
(USP
Hazelton), Joshua Rich was attacked in a recreation area, or
“cage,” by several other inmates.
stabbed
several
recovered
at
including
times.
the
liver
A
He was severely beaten and
nine-inch-long
scene.
Rich
laceration,
which
homemade
suffered
required
knife
serious
numerous
was
injuries,
invasive
surgeries.
Rich sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), alleging that prison officials
had been negligent in failing to protect him from the attack.
The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA applied both to the
prison
officials’
attackers,
as
well
decision
as
to
not
the
to
manner
separate
in
which
Rich
the
from
his
officials
searched other inmates prior to placing them with Rich in the
recreation cage.
Upon our review, we affirm the district court’s holding
that
the
prison
officials’
discretionary
decision
not
to
separate Rich from his attackers is subject to the discretionary
function exception of the FTCA, depriving us of jurisdiction
over that claim.
However, with regard to Rich’s claim that
2
Appeal: 14-7204
prison
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
officials
did
not
Pg: 3 of 18
perform
the
searches
properly,
we
remand for additional discovery because jurisdictional facts are
intertwined with the merits of that claim.
I.
In 2008, the United States District Court for the District
of Utah sentenced Rich to fifty-seven years’ imprisonment for
armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d),
and for using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Rich entered the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in September 2008. 1
According to Rich, he immediately was targeted in prison by
a
white
supremacist
group,
the
“Aryan
Brotherhood,”
for
his
refusal to follow that group’s rules and to participate in the
group’s criminal schemes.
different
penitentiaries,
continually
by
the
Aryan
Although transferred frequently to
Rich
contends
Brotherhood
that
and
he
was
required
targeted
separation
from the group. 2
1
Unless otherwise indicated, the facts in Section I are
undisputed.
2
The government disputes Rich’s account of his time at the
various penitentiaries and the reasons for his separation from
other inmates, arguing that Rich’s prior Special Housing Unit
placements were unrelated to the Aryan Brotherhood.
As we
explain in Section II.B., this dispute of fact is immaterial to
our conclusions.
3
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
Pg: 4 of 18
In February 2011, Rich was transferred to USP Hazelton and,
on August 5, 2011, five inmates attacked him in a recreation
cage within the Special Housing Unit (SHU).
Rich and stabbed him repeatedly.
The attackers beat
A knife measuring about nine
inches in length was recovered from the scene. 3
Rich suffered
serious injuries and underwent numerous surgeries, including a
bronchoscopy for respiratory failure, a laparotomy to repair a
laceration to his liver, and open-heart surgery to repair the
right atrium of his heart.
Rich sued the United States under the FTCA, alleging one
count
of
failed
negligence
to
protect
asserting
him
from
that
the
harm.
prison
Rich
officials
alleged
that
had
the
officials should have kept him separated from his attackers, and
that
the
officials
failed
to
screen,
“wand,”
or
search
the
inmates properly prior to placing them in the recreation cage.
The government moved to dismiss Rich’s complaint on the
basis that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA,
which limits the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity for
certain
kinds
of
discretionary
3
conduct,
applied
both
to
the
The government does not dispute the size of the knife
recovered from the scene of the attack, though its exact size is
nowhere in the record.
Although the government refers to the
investigative report for Rich’s attack as in the record on page
169 of the joint appendix, we are unable to locate page 169.
Nor is the investigative report included in any other part of
the record.
4
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
Pg: 5 of 18
prison officials’ decision whether to separate Rich from his
attackers
and
to
the
manner
in
searched the attacking inmates.
which
the
prison
officials
To support its position, the
government included several exhibits with its motion to dismiss.
These attachments included portions of Rich’s prison file and
declarations from the prison officials, who stated that they
performed patdowns and searches properly on all inmates before
the attack.
The attachments also included various “Post Orders”
in effect at USP Hazelton on August 5, 2011. 4
The
Post
Orders
relating
to
the
SHU
require
that
an
inmate’s hands be restrained behind his body whenever leaving
his cell for recreation.
Additionally, the Post Orders state
that “inmates will be pat searched and screened with the handheld
metal
detector
recreation cages.”
before
entering
and
upon
exiting
the
The Post Orders do not otherwise describe
how a patdown should be performed.
However, the BOP “Program
Statement” applicable to all prisons, including USP Hazelton,
provides that “[a]ny pat search shall be conducted as outlined
4
“Post Orders” are specific to each institution, based on
BOP policy, and state each post’s duty hours as well as any
special instructions unique to that post. See U.S. Dep’t of
Justice Program Statement No. 5500.14, section 103 (2012),
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5500_014.pdf (describing post
orders).
5
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
Pg: 6 of 18
in the Correctional Services Manual.” 5
Moreover, according to
the Post Orders, when an inmate has a prior history of weapons
possession, prison officials must perform a “visual search” of
the inmate, including a search of the inmate’s body cavities,
prior to his entry into a recreation cage.
After
agreed
reviewing
with
the
these
attachments,
government
that
the
the
district
discretionary
court
function
exception applied to the prison officials’ decisions regarding
inmate separation and the manner in which the prison officials
performed the patdowns and searches. 6
The court found that the
Post Orders “do not mandate a specific course of conduct” for
the officers to follow in performing the required searches.
court
also
officials
is
concluded
consistent
that
with
the
discretion
the
public
afforded
policy
of
The
prison
granting
prison officials deference in implementing and executing their
security measures.
The
entitled
district
to
any
court
further
discovery
concluded
regarding
that
Rich
whether
was
not
additional
directives mandated a particular method for performing patdowns
5
The Correctional Services Manual is not a part of the
record before this Court.
6
The district court noted that Rich only objected to the
report and recommendation of the magistrate judge with respect
to whether the prison officials performed their searches
properly.
Accordingly, the court simply adopted the magistrate
judge’s conclusion regarding separation.
6
Appeal: 14-7204
and
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
searches.
government’s
jurisdiction.
Accordingly,
motion
to
Pg: 7 of 18
the
dismiss
district
for
lack
court
of
granted
subject
the
matter
This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, Rich challenges the district court’s conclusion
that the discretionary function exception applies to the prison
officials’ conduct.
He argues that the officials had a non-
discretionary duty to maintain and monitor both his prison files
and the files of other inmates.
Rich contends that if the
officials had taken these security measures, they would have
known about Rich’s history with the Aryan Brotherhood and the
need to keep him separated from the group’s members.
Rich also
argues that the Post Orders and other policies imposed mandatory
directives that the prison officials search and patdown inmates
prior to placing them in the recreation cage, thereby precluding
application
of
the
discretionary
function
exception.
Rich
contends that, at a minimum, he should have been allowed the
opportunity for discovery before the district court determined
that the discretionary function exception applied.
In response, the government contends that the officials’
decision not to separate Rich from his attackers, as well as the
manner in which the searches were performed, are matters within
the discretionary function exception.
7
The government asserts
Appeal: 14-7204
that
Doc: 47
there
Filed: 12/29/2015
are
no
Pg: 8 of 18
directives
governing
the
separation
of
prisoners or the proper procedure for performing patdowns and
searches.
The government argues that, therefore, the prison
officials’ discretion in these areas implicates public policy
considerations
that
function exception.
justify
application
of
the
discretionary
The government further asserts that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to
grant Rich discovery, because no additional information could be
uncovered
that
would
establish
the
district
court’s
jurisdiction.
A.
We review a district court’s decision dismissing a case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.
Taylor v. Kellogg
Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 408 (4th Cir. 2011).
We
review
discretion.
a
denial
of
jurisdictional
discovery
for
abuse
of
Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d 296, 307 (4th
Cir. 2013).
Although the United States typically is immune from suit,
the FTCA provides a waiver of this sovereign immunity when the
federal
government
“would
be
liable
to
the
claimant
in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred” for certain torts, such as negligence, committed by
federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.
28
U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1).
However,
8
under
the
FTCA,
the
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
Pg: 9 of 18
discretionary function exception limits that waiver of immunity
in
situations
involving
“the
exercise
or
performance
or
the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
. . . whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”
28
U.S.C. § 2680(a).
To
determine
discretionary
test.
whether
function
First,
a
conduct
exception,
court
qualifies
courts
considers
apply
whether
for
the
a
two-pronged
the
challenged
governmental conduct involves an element of judgment or choice.
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991).
When a
statute, regulation, or policy prescribes a specific course of
action, there is no discretion and the exception does not apply.
Id.
Second, if the challenged conduct does involve an element
of judgment, the court must then determine whether the judgment
was one that the exception was designed to protect, namely, a
judgment based on considerations of public policy.
Id. at 322-
23.
A
defendant’s
assertion
that
the
discretionary
function
exception applies is an assertion that the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.
States,
569
F.3d
subject
matter
See Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. United
175,
180
jurisdiction,
(4th
a
Cir.
2009).
defendant
may
In
challenging
raise
a
facial
challenge that, even if all the alleged facts are true, the
9
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
complaint
Filed: 12/29/2015
nonetheless
fails
to
Pg: 10 of 18
establish
jurisdiction.
See
Durden, 736 F.3d at 300.
Alternatively, a defendant may dispute the allegations in a
complaint
that
could
establish
subject
matter
jurisdiction.
Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
In
that situation, the court may go beyond the allegations in the
complaint and “in an evidentiary hearing determine if there are
facts to support the jurisdictional allegations.”
Id.
Under
such circumstances, the complaint’s allegations ordinarily are
not afforded a presumption of truthfulness.
Id.
If, however,
the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the facts central
to the merits of the complaint, “a presumption of truthfulness
should
attach
to
the
plaintiff’s
allegations.”
Id.
at
193.
And, most relevant here, the court “should resolve the relevant
factual disputes only after appropriate discovery.”
In re KBR,
Inc.,
Cir.
Burn
Pit
Litig.,
744
F.3d
326,
334
(4th
2014)
(citation omitted).
B.
We
first
address
whether
the
discretionary
function
exception applies to the prison officials’ placement of Rich in
the recreation cage with his attackers, and whether Rich was
entitled to discovery on this claim.
To do so, we consider
whether the challenged governmental conduct involves an element
of judgment or choice and, if so, whether that judgment was
10
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
Pg: 11 of 18
based on considerations of public policy.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at
322–23.
The
BOP
is
“safekeeping,”
required
to
provide
“care”
of
“all
and
for
the
persons
“protection,”
charged
convicted of offenses against the United States.”
4042(a)(2), (3).
retains
Cir.
or
18 U.S.C. §
Under the statute’s broad directives, the BOP
discretion
mandates.
with
regarding
the
implementation
of
those
Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th
1998).
This
discretion
is
evident
in
the
regulations
regarding the proper handling and review of the Central Inmate
Monitoring (CIM) files.
The CIM system is the mechanism by which the Bureau of
Prisons monitors and controls the transfer, temporary release,
and community activities of certain inmates who present special
needs for management, including the need to separate certain
inmates from others based on their past behavior.
§
524.70–76.
Although
28
C.F.R.
§ 524.72(d)
See 28 C.F.R.
provides
that
inmates “may require separation from a specific disruptive group
[such
as
a
prison
gang]”
(emphasis
added),
nothing
in
this
regulation requires that any specific action be taken by the
various
prison
officials.
Instead,
prison
officials
must
consider several factors and exercise independent judgment in
determining
C.F.R.
§
whether
524.72(f).
inmates
may
Given
require
this
11
separation.
general
language
See
in
28
the
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
Pg: 12 of 18
regulations, we conclude that prison officials exercise broad
discretion in this regard and, thus, that the first prong of the
discretionary function exception is satisfied.
We turn to consider the second element of the discretionary
function
policy
exception,
are
namely,
implicated
in
whether
the
considerations
discretion
given
of
public
to
prison
officials in their decisions about the separation of prisoners.
See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322–23.
Although this is an issue of
first impression in this Court, other federal appellate courts
have held that prisoner placement and the handling of threats
posed by inmates against one another are “part and parcel of the
inherently
policy-laden
endeavor
of
maintaining
preserving security within our nation’s prisons.”
order
and
Cohen, 151
F.3d at 1344; see also Alfrey v. United States, 276 F.3d 557,
563-65 (9th Cir. 2002); Calderon v. United States, 123 F.3d 947,
951
(7th
Cir.
1997).
proper
classification
levels
are
“inherently
economic policy.”
Factors
of
such
inmates,
grounded
as
and
in
available
resources,
appropriate
social,
security
political,
and
Dykstra v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 140 F.3d
791, 796 (8th Cir. 1998); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
547-48 (1979) (“Prison administrators . . . should be accorded
wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies
and
practices
that
in
their
judgment
12
are
needed
to
preserve
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
internal
Filed: 12/29/2015
order
and
Pg: 13 of 18
discipline
and
to
maintain
institutional
security.”).
We agree with the reasoning of our sister circuits.
Prison
officials are afforded discretion in determining where to place
inmates
and
separated
several
whether
from
policy
one
to
keep
another.
considerations
certain
Because
for
individuals
these
prison
or
decisions
gangs
invoke
administrators,
they
are precisely the kind of determinations that the discretionary
function exception is intended to protect.
that
the
discretionary
function
We therefore hold
exception
shields
the
prison
officials from liability with respect to whether they should
have separated Rich from his attackers.
We also conclude that Rich is not entitled to discovery on
this issue.
his
Even accepting all of Rich’s allegations regarding
history
discretionary
decisions
of
with
the
function
the
Aryan
Brotherhood
exception
officials
still
regarding
ultimately depriving us of jurisdiction.
that
Rich
could
uncover
in
as
would
true,
apply
prisoner
to
the
the
placement,
And because no facts
discovery
would
establish
jurisdiction, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing Rich discovery regarding the officials’
decision to not separate Rich from his attackers.
736 F.3d at 307-08.
13
See Durden,
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
Pg: 14 of 18
C.
We reach a different conclusion regarding the availability
of discovery with respect to Rich’s allegations that the prison
officials did not search his attackers properly before placing
them in the recreation cage.
Unlike the allegations underlying
Rich’s claim regarding the prison officials’ duty to separate
Rich from his attackers, which failed on their face to establish
subject matter jurisdiction, disputed jurisdictional facts are
intertwined
with
the
merits
execution of the patdowns.
For
example,
in
of
Rich’s
claim
regarding
the
See Kerns, 585 F.3d at 193.
support
of
the
government’s
motion
to
dismiss, the prison officials provided declarations that they
did in fact perform patdowns of the inmates involved on the date
of the incident.
Those declarations stand in direct contrast to
Rich’s allegation that the officials “failed to properly screen,
‘wand,’ or search inmates entering the SHU and/or SHU recreation
cages.”
That allegation is relevant not only to whether the
discretionary function exception applies and, thus, whether we
have subject matter jurisdiction over this claim, but also to
the merits of Rich’s negligence allegation.
We find no merit in the government’s argument that Rich did
not
allege
that
the
prison
officials
completely
failed
to
patdown or “wand” his attackers, but alleged only that these
searches were not done properly.
14
Rich’s complaint can be read
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
Pg: 15 of 18
fairly to allege both that the officials did not perform the
searches properly, and that the officials failed to perform the
searches
in
any
manner.
throughout the litigation.
Rich
maintained
this
position
A period of discovery would afford
Rich the opportunity to challenge these officials’ assertions
concerning their performance of the searches.
Even
if
we
accept
the
prison
officials’
uncontested
declarations, the fact that they performed patdowns does not
resolve
the
question
whether
the
officials
performed
those
patdowns properly.
The BOP’s Program Statement provides that
“[a]ny
shall
pat
search
be
conducted
as
outlined
in
the
Correctional Services Manual,” suggesting the existence of more
specific directives.
Rich should be permitted the opportunity
for discovery of that Correctional Services Manual to determine
whether
more
specific
directives
exist
concerning
the
performance of patdowns. 7
7
We do not decide whether, even in the absence of more
specific mandates, the manner in which a patdown is performed
qualifies for the discretionary function exception.
We note,
however, that the government offers no limiting principle to its
rationale as to when the exception should apply.
There is
always some level of discretion regarding the performance of
even the most specific of mandates, which under the government’s
argument would mean that the discretionary function exception
would always apply. Moreover, the government could only suggest
reasons of “security” generally as the policy consideration
involved in the manner of performing patdowns.
15
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
Pg: 16 of 18
Additionally, when inmates have a prior history of weapons
possession, the Post Orders require a “visual search” of those
inmates, involving a search of the body cavity, prior to their
entry into a recreation cage.
Discovery could uncover whether
any of Rich’s attackers had a history of weapons possession that
would have triggered this visual search requirement.
Such an
additional mandate would affect any analysis concerning whether
the prison officials properly performed searches as required. 8
Finally,
jurisdiction
we
observe
even
if,
that
Rich
under
may
be
typical
able
to
establish
circumstances,
the
discretionary function exception applies to the manner in which
prison
officials
perform
patdowns.
The
Second
Circuit
has
acknowledged that discretionary conduct cannot be grounded in a
policy
decision
when
that
conduct
is
marked
by
individual
carelessness or laziness.
See Coulthurst v. United States, 214
F.3d
2000)
(concluding
would
not
106
function
(2d
Cir.
exception
apply
that
to
a
the
discretionary
prison
official’s
inspection of faulty weight equipment that caused plaintiff’s
injuries
if
that
inspection
was
8
performed
in
a
“carelessly
At oral argument, the government contended that providing
certain types of information to inmates, such as camera
placements and security methods employed by prison officials,
would present serious safety risks by allowing inmates to
uncover any potential holes in prison safety procedures. We are
confident that the district court can implement appropriate
measures during the course of discovery to prevent any
unnecessary disclosure of critical security information.
16
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
Filed: 12/29/2015
inattentive” manner).
Pg: 17 of 18
The fact that a nine-inch-long knife was
recovered at the scene of Rich’s attack, in spite of the prison
officials’ averments that each performed the required searches
properly,
at
least
inattention.
shielded
by
suggests
the
possibility
of
careless
In that case, the prison officials would not be
the
discretionary
function
exception
because
no
when
a
consideration
of
policy considerations would be implicated.
Discovery
jurisdictional
merits-based
provides
inquiry
evidence.
a
procedural
would
require
See
Kerns,
585
safeguard
the
F.3d
at
193.
This
safeguard does not disappear simply because the plaintiff is a
prisoner.
Of course, courts frequently apply the discretionary
function exception to prison officials’ efforts to ensure the
safety of prisoners under difficult circumstances, e.g., Cohen,
151 F.3d at 1344; Alfrey, 276 F.3d at 564-67; Calderon, 123 F.3d
at 949-51, and that may be the ultimate outcome here as well.
Nevertheless, we conclude that Rich is entitled to the safeguard
of discovery before his complaint is dismissed.
Because the jurisdictional facts regarding the propriety of
the prison officials’ patdowns are intertwined with the merits
of Rich’s allegations, the district court “should resolve the
relevant factual disputes only after appropriate discovery.”
re KBR, Inc., 744 F.3d at 334 (citation omitted).
In
Accordingly,
we vacate in part, and remand, to allow Rich to proceed to
17
Appeal: 14-7204
Doc: 47
discovery
on
Filed: 12/29/2015
the
Pg: 18 of 18
issue
and
whether
how
the
prison
officials
performed the patdowns and searches, and whether more specific
directives
existed
regarding
the
manner
of
performing
the
patdowns and searches.
III.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision
that the discretionary function exception applies to the prison
officials’ decision not to separate Rich from his attackers.
However, we vacate the district court’s judgment with respect to
the issue of the prison officials’ performance of the patdowns
and searches, and remand for additional proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
18
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?