Charles Richey v. Leroy Cartledge

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:13-cv-01329-MGL. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999864781]. [14-7438]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-7438

CHARLES E. RICHEY,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
LEROY CARTLEDGE, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg.
Mary G. Lewis, District Judge.
(5:13−cv−01329−MGL)
Argued:

January 27, 2016

Decided:

June 23, 2016

Before DUNCAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and Loretta C. BIGGS,
United States District Judge for the Middle District of North
Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED:
Milligan
Grinstead
Goldsmith,
MCGUIREWOODS,
LLP,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Melody Jane Brown,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Matthew Allen
Fitzgerald,
MCGUIREWOODS,
LLP,
Richmond,
Virginia,
for
Appellant.
Alan Wilson, Attorney General, John W. McIntosh,
Chief Deputy Attorney General, Donald J. Zelenka, Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

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GENERAL OF
Appellee.

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SOUTH

CAROLINA,

Pg: 2 of 21

Columbia,

South

Carolina,

for

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Charles
South

Earl

Carolina,

Richey

of,

convenience store.

was

among

convicted

other

in

things,

Greenville
armed

County,

robbery

of

After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Richey

sought post-conviction relief in South Carolina state court.
relevant

here,

ineffective

(the

argued

assistance

incriminating
arrest

he

a

by

statement

that

failing

Richey

“post-arrest

his

trial

to

statement”)

move

to

gave

the

counsel

on

to

the

provided

suppress

police

As

an

after

his

that

the

ground

statement was taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent.
Finding no relief in the state courts, Richey petitioned,
pro se, for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court
for the District of South Carolina.
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
arrest statement.

There, he again pressed his
claim

regarding

the

post-

He also argued, for the first time, that his

trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move to suppress—
this

time

on

Sixth

Amendment

grounds—another

incriminating

statement that Richey made to law enforcement after his bond
hearing (the “post-bond statement”).
The

district

court

denied

the

petition,

and

we

affirm.

Even assuming that trial counsel’s performance fell below an
objectively reasonable standard under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), Richey fails to show Strickland prejudice.

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Thus, he cannot establish that (1) he is entitled to relief on
the post-arrest-statement claim under the deferential standard
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),

28

U.S.C.

§ 2254(d),

or

(2) his

post-bond-statement

claim is sufficiently “substantial” under Martinez v. Ryan, 132
S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012), to excuse his procedural default.

I.
A.
1.
On the morning of November 2, 2002, a masked man committed
an

armed

robbery

of

the

Greenville, South Carolina.

BP

Pantry,

a

convenience

store

in

Although the store clerk, Sherri

Greene, could not see the robber’s face, she described him as a
black man wearing blue jeans, white sneakers, “a burgundy shirt
with something white on it,” a black baseball cap, and a black
bandana used as a mask.

The robber was armed with a black

revolver.
At some point during the robbery, the robber removed his
mask, and a Pantry customer, David Lee Durham, saw the robber’s
face twice.

The first time, Durham was about to enter the

Pantry through the front doors when the robber exited through
them.

Durham was “[a]bout six to eight feet” away from the

robber, J.A. 236, who covered the bottom half of his face with a

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black sweater and a blue Bi-Lo grocery bag, leaving the top half
of

his

face

exposed.

Durham

cigarettes in the Bi-Lo bag.

also

noticed

that

there

were

The robber then walked around the

side of the building and behind the Pantry.
Durham walked to the telephone booth outside the Pantry to
call 911.

At that point, the robber returned from behind the

store

with

and,

his

face

completely

exposed,

stood

“[a]bout

[ten] feet” in front of Durham, staring, for “at least a minute
to two minutes.”

J.A. 237, 241.

Durham observed that the

robber was a black man wearing blue jeans, a burgundy t-shirt, a
black ball cap, with a black sweater wrapped around his hand. 1
After the robber had fled the scene and Durham had called
911 from the telephone booth, Greene called 911 from inside the
Pantry. 2

1

At trial, Durham initially remembered the robber as
wearing a black t-shirt with a burgundy sweater, rather than a
burgundy shirt with a black sweater.
See J.A. 235–36, 238–39.
But toward the end of his direct examination, the state
refreshed his memory by showing him his written statement to
police.
J.A. 238–39.
While the statement was not introduced
into evidence, the trial testimony indicates that Durham
described the robber to the police as wearing a burgundy shirt
with a black sweater wrapped around his hand.
See J.A. 239,
247.
And
on
cross-examination,
Durham
confirmed
this
description. See J.A. 247.
2

Greene twice alerted law enforcement prior to this 911
phone call.
During the robbery, she pulled the silent alarm
from one of the offices in the back of the Pantry. Later, she
called 911, leaving the phone on the office desk.

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In

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total,

the

robber

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stole

six

cartons

of

Newport

cigarettes, the Pantry’s cordless phone, money from the cash
register in one-, two-, five-, and ten-dollar denominations and
at least two money tubes 3 from the safe, all together totaling
over $100.

Greene recalled the robber putting the money taken

from the cash register into his pocket.
Officers

responded

to

the

searching the area for the robber.

emergency

call

and

began

Several blocks away from the

Pantry, Officer Emily Lybrand spotted a man (later identified as
appellant Charles Richey) matching the robber’s description and
running across a field, and she relayed that information via
radio.

In the brush nearby, which was “swaying as if somebody

had just come through,” she found a “cotton twill gray men’s
jacket”
down.”

that

“looked

J.A.

254–55.

like

it

Not

had

just

knowing

recently

whether

the

been

thrown

jacket

was

relevant to the robbery, Lybrand picked up the jacket and put it
into property and evidence.
Officer Trace Skardon arrived near the field where Lybrand
spotted Richey.

At the edge of the field, Skardon found a black

ball cap lying on the ground.

Shortly after, he saw Richey and

tried to confront him, but Richey fled.

Skardon radioed other

units and, joined by Detective Bobby Carias and Officer William
3

Money tubes are two- to four-inch-long clear or white
plastic tubes that are meant to hold twenty dollars’ worth of
bills.
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Albert,

pursued

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Richey

couple hundred yards.

by

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foot

through

a

wooded

area

for

a

Throughout the pursuit, Skardon called to

Richey, ordering him to stop, but Richey continued running.
During the chase, Carias observed that Richey was holding a
gun.

On Carias’s orders, Richey tossed the gun aside, but he

continued running.

Shortly after, Richey fell, and Carias and

Albert apprehended him.
Albert handcuffed and, with Skardon’s assistance, searched
Richey.

The officers found in Richey’s right front pants pocket

three

money

packs

of

tubes,

Newport

totaling

sixty

cigarettes.

dollars,

After

and

two

Richey’s

unopened

arrest,

law

enforcement returned to collect the black ball cap and revolver
from along Richey’s flight path.
Lybrand then drove Richey to the Pantry to conduct an inperson

identification

During

the

show-up,

(or
Richey

“show-up”)
stood

in

with

Greene

and

Durham.

the

parking

lot

by

the

police car, Durham stood outside about ten feet away, and Greene
remained inside the store.
hear

one

identified

another
Richey

from
as

Greene and Durham could not see or

where
the

they

robber.

were

standing,

Although

and

Greene

both
later

testified that Richey was not wearing a burgundy shirt during
the show-up, 4 other witnesses confirmed that Richey was in fact

4

She testified that, instead, Richey was wearing a “tee
shirt.” J.A. 231.
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wearing blue jeans and a burgundy shirt, but not a ball cap,
black jacket, or bandana-mask.

Durham subsequently identified

the ball cap Officer Skardon found as that worn by the robber.
The bandana-mask, Bi-Lo bag, remaining cigarette cartons, and
cordless phone were never recovered.
Once
Lybrand

Greene

and

Durham

positively

searched

him,

finding

in

identified

Richey’s

left

Richey,

front

pants

pocket $52.75 in quarters, one-, two-, five-, and ten-dollar
bills.

Lybrand then transported Richey to the law enforcement

center.
2.
Captain Edward Blackburn met Officer Lybrand at the law
enforcement

center

interrogation room.

and,

together,

they

placed

Richey

in

an

Not long after, Blackburn read Richey his

Miranda 5 rights and presented a Waiver of Rights form, which
Richey refused to initial or sign.

After being advised of his

rights, Richey “stated that he did not have anything to say.”
J.A. 487.
Subsequently, Richey began speaking to Blackburn about the
events leading up to his arrest.

Although Richey said he would

not sign anything, he confessed to the robbery.

Specifically,

Richey stated that he “had been out smoking crack with a girl”

5

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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all night, that he and the girl needed money, and that “he
didn’t think [the robbery] would work” but he “went out there
and

that’s

what

happened.”

J.A.

180,

313.

Blackburn

then

reduced Richey’s oral confession to writing, which Richey also
refused to sign.
Later

that

day,

a

magistrate

judge

held

a

bond

where Richey was advised of his right to counsel.

hearing

The record

does not show whether Richey invoked his right to counsel at
that time; rather, Detective Carias’s supplemental police report
says only

that

the

detective

obtained

warrants

and

magistrate judge set Richey’s bond at $35,000.

that

the

See J.A. 35.

Richey was held overnight in the Greenville Detention Center.
The next day, on November 3, 2002, Detective W.C. Bruce met
with

Richey

at

the

detention

center.

Bruce

told

Richey

he

wanted to talk to him about several cases, including the instant
one.

Richey said “he didn’t have no problem with [speaking with

Bruce],” and after being escorted to the law enforcement center,
Richey was again read his Miranda rights.

J.A. 185.

Richey

replied that “he understood his rights” and that “he wouldn’t
sign [a waiver form], but he would talk to [Bruce].”
During

the

questioning,

Richey

again

J.A. 186.
confessed.

Specifically, he said that “he did go up [to the Pantry] and
robbed it” because he and a girlfriend “needed some money to go

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get some more crack.”

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J.A. 187.

Richey offered to talk to

Bruce about other cases but refused to sign anything.
B.
1.
Richey was indicted for armed robbery, resisting arrest,
pointing and presenting a firearm, kidnapping, and possession of
a weapon by a person convicted of a crime of violence.
Before trial, the defense challenged both the post-arrest
and post-bond statements on involuntariness grounds.

Counsel

urged

confess

that

Richey

did

not

knowingly

and

voluntarily

because he was under the influence of crack-cocaine.
ruled

that

Richey

was

“[c]learly”

in

custody

The court
and

being

interrogated, but determined that whether the statements were
voluntarily,
question.

knowingly,

J.A. 193.

and

intelligently

given

was

a

jury

Accordingly, the post-arrest and post-bond

statements were admitted. 6
The state’s evidence centered on proving that Richey was
the person identified by the eyewitnesses.
in-court

identification

of

Richey

as

the

Ms. Greene made an
robber,

and

she

identified the clothes Richey was wearing when he was arrested
as the clothes worn by the robber.

Greene also testified that

the gun and baseball cap found in the field where Richey fled

6

Counsel
moved
successfully
to
suppress
a
third
incriminating statement that is not relevant to this appeal.
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were the same items she had seen on the day of the robbery.

Mr.

Durham testified that he was “absolutely sure” that Richey’s
burgundy shirt was the shirt he saw the robber wearing.
249.

J.A.

The jury also heard the voice recordings of the 911 calls,

and saw the videotape of the robbery captured on the Pantry’s
security camera.
After a two-day trial, Richey was convicted on all charges
and sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment without
parole for the armed robbery and kidnapping charges, and to a
total of seven years’ imprisonment on the remaining charges.
2.
After

Richey’s

direct

appeal

was

dismissed,

State

v.

Richey, No. 2008-UP-686, 2008 WL 9848530 (S.C. Ct. App. Dec. 11,
2008) (per curiam), he sought state post-conviction relief.

In

addition to other arguments, Richey asserted that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the post-arrest
statement on the ground that it was obtained in violation of his
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
The state court held an evidentiary hearing in which Richey
and

his

trial

counsel

testified.

In

its

order

denying

and

dismissing Richey’s application with prejudice, the state court
determined that Richey failed to show that his trial counsel
performed

deficiently

and

that

11

he

suffered

prejudice

as

a

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result.

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Richey v. State (Richey I), No. 2009-CP-23-0702, slip

op. at 6, 8, 10–11 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 22, 2009).
Thereafter,

Richey

petitioned

for

a

writ

of

certiorari,

which was denied.
C.
Richey

then

sought

federal

habeas

relief.

As

relevant

here, he again raised the ineffective-assistance claim regarding
the post-arrest statement.

Richey also raised, for the first

time, another ineffective-assistance claim regarding the postbond statement.

As to this second claim, Richey contended that

he “was formally charged and appointed counsel as an indigent”
on November 2, 2002—referring to the bond hearing—so the next
day’s questioning by Detective Bruce, without a lawyer present,
violated Richey’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

J.A. 26–27.

Richey acknowledged that the claim was procedurally defaulted,
but he argued that his post-conviction-relief counsel’s failure
to

raise

should

the

excuse

claim
the

before

default

the

under

post-conviction-relief
Martinez.

Richey

court

sought

an

evidentiary hearing on the defaulted claim.
The

state

filed

a

motion

for

summary

judgment.

A

magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the
state’s

motion

prejudice.
that

the

and

dismiss

Richey’s

habeas

petition

with

On the post-arrest-statement issue, the judge found
post-conviction-relief

12

court’s

Strickland-performance

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determination
“contrary

“was

to,

supported

nor

an

Pg: 13 of 21

by

the

record”

unreasonable

established federal law.”

and

application

was

neither

of,

clearly

Richey v. Cartledge (Richey II), No.

5:13-cv-01329-MGL-KDW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124238, at 37–38
(D.S.C. Apr. 22, 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
post-bond-statement

issue,

the

judge

found

that

On the
Richey’s

“conclusory allegations concerning an arraignment that allegedly
took

place

establish

on
that

adequately

November
his

2,

2002,

is

insufficient

[post-conviction-relief]

raise

‘substantial’

counsel

claims

pointed

to

objected

to

the

Report

Detective

Carias’s

failed

concerning

admissibility of th[e post-bond] statement.”
Richey

evidence

to
to
the

Id. at 28.

and

Recommendation

supplemental

police

and

report

as

evidence that Richey “was arraigned on November 2, 2002,” where
he

was

“giv[en]

accepted.”

his

right[s]

and

offered

counsel

which

he

J.A. 625.

The district court denied Richey’s motion for a hearing,
overruled

Richey’s

magistrate
summary

judge’s

judgment,

prejudice.
Richey’s

objections,
report,
and

adopted

granted

dismissed

and

the

incorporated

state’s

Richey’s

motion

petition

for
with

The court added only a brief discussion related to
objections

regarding

the

alleged

arraignment

invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel:
found

the

that

“[Detective]

Carias’s

13

report

shows

and

The court

neither

that

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[Richey] was arraigned on November 2, 2002, nor that he was
offered and [that] he accepted counsel on that date.”

Richey v.

Cartledge (Richey III), No. 5:13-1329-MGL-KDW, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 123955, at 7 (D.S.C. Sept. 5, 2014).

Rather, the police

report “states only that (1) Carias obtained and served what
appears

to

be

arrest

warrants

on

[Richey]

and

magistrate judge] set bond for [Richey] at $35,000.
says

nothing

counsel.”

about

an

arraignment

or

the

(2) [the
The report

appointment

of

Id.

This appeal followed.

II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment,

Bostick

v.

Stevenson,

589

F.3d

160,

163

(4th

Cir.

2009), to determine whether the state demonstrated that “there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [state] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
See Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2011).
When the state post-conviction-relief court adjudicates a
habeas petitioner’s claim on the merits, our review under AEDPA
is “highly constrained” and based on the record before the state
post-conviction-relief
700,

707

(4th

Cir.

court.
2008).

Lawrence
We

“shall

v.

Branker,

not”

grant

517

F.3d

Richey’s

petition unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or

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involved

an

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unreasonable

Pg: 15 of 21

application

of,

clearly

established

Federal law, as determined by the [U.S.] Supreme Court,” or if
the decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.”

§ 2254(d).

When, on the other hand, a habeas petitioner raises a claim
in

his

federal

petition

conviction-relief

court,

not
the

raised
claim

before

is

the

barred

state

for

post-

procedural

default.

See § 2254(b).

If the petitioner shows sufficient

cause

his

raise

for

failure

prejudice

resulting

claim.

Coleman

to

from

v.

that

the

claim

failure,

Thompson,

501

we

U.S.

below
may

and

actual

consider

722,

750

the

(1991).

“Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral
proceedings

may

establish

cause

for

a

prisoner’s

procedural

default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial,” but the
petitioner

“must

also

demonstrate

that

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel

claim

one”—that is, that it has “some merit.”

the
is

a

underlying
substantial

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at

1315, 1318.
We review Richey’s ineffective-assistance claim regarding
the

post-arrest

statement

under

AEDPA’s

deferential

and the post-bond-statement claim under Martinez.
to Richey’s post-arrest-statement claim.

15

standard,

We turn first

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A.
“At
claim[]
Frye

the

threshold,

[is]

v.

premised

Lee,

§ 2254(d)).

235

we

on

F.3d

must

‘clearly
897,

903

It certainly is.

consider

whether

[Richey’s]

established

Federal

(4th

2000)

Cir.

law.’”

(quoting

Under Strickland, Richey must

show both that his trial counsel’s representation “fell below an
objective

standard

and

“there

that

of

is

reasonableness”

a

reasonable

(deficient

probability

performance)

that,

but

for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different” (prejudice).

466 U.S. at 688, 694.

We conclude that, even assuming Richey could establish his trial
counsel’s

deficient

performance,

he

cannot

show

that

such

performance prejudiced him.
Richey’s theory of prejudice turns on what he perceives as
the weakness of the state’s case against him if the post-arrest
statement had been excluded.

To show this supposed weakness,

Richey argues that: (1) Ms. Greene’s and Mr. Durham’s in-court
descriptions of what the robber was wearing were “flawed and
confusing”;

(2) the

description

of

the

robber

was

not

“particularly specific” and none of the arresting officers saw
Richey wearing a black ball cap, a black jacket, or a mask;
(3) the arresting officers found Richey in the field near an
apartment complex rather than “near the Pantry;” and (4) “key”
evidence was never found or admitted into evidence, i.e., the

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robber’s bandana-mask, the stolen cordless phone, the Bi-Lo bag,
the remaining stolen cigarettes, or the robber’s black jacket.
Appellant’s Br. at 26–30.

Accordingly, the argument goes, but

for counsel’s failure to move to suppress the statement, there
is

a

reasonable

probability

that

Richey

would

not

have

been

convicted.
Prejudice, however, must be analyzed with the “totality of
the evidence” in mind.
without

the

overwhelming

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.

post-arrest
evidence

of

statement,
Richey’s

the
guilt,

state

Even

presented

foreclosing

any

reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s error, the trial’s
result would have been different.
Richey overstates the impact of the alleged weaknesses in
the state’s case.

Although there were some discrepancies in

Durham’s and Greene’s recollections at trial of the robber’s
dress, these were either corrected or rendered immaterial in
light

of

the

overwhelming

following

the

robbery,

evidence

Durham

and

of

guilt.

Greene

Immediately

provided

matching

descriptions of the robber: a black man wearing blue jeans, a
burgundy shirt, and a black ball cap—most of which Richey was
wearing when police spotted him nearby the Pantry just minutes
after the robbery. 7

7

That Greene later suggested Richey was not

Durham also noted that the robber was wearing a black

jacket.
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wearing a burgundy shirt when she saw him at the show-up is of
little moment, given that Durham and the officers all recalled
that Richey was in fact wearing a burgundy shirt.

Moreover, the

witnesses’ matching descriptions of what the robber was wearing
during

the

robbery,

which

were

provided

to

law

enforcement

separately, are more probative than one witness’s memory of the
robber’s clothing during a later identification.
Additionally, both Greene and Durham identified, in court,
the burgundy shirt worn by Richey on the day of his arrest as
the shirt worn by the robber.

And in broad daylight, within

half an hour of the robbery, Greene and Durham identified Richey
as the robber, with Durham having seen the robber’s face without
a mask for at least one minute from within ten feet. 8
made

an

robber.
saw

additional

in-court

identification

of

Greene

Richey

as

the

Plus, the jury heard recordings of the 911 calls and

video

opportunity

footage
to

of

weigh

the
any

robbery

and

inconsistencies

therefore
in

the

had

ample

witnesses’

after-the-fact recollections against those recordings.
That

Richey

was

later

spotted

by

the

police

wearing

somewhat generic clothes and without the ball cap, black jacket,
or bandana-mask does not minimize the weight of the state’s case
8

Richey argues that the show-up identifications were
“influenced by the police.”
Appellant’s Br. at 28.
We are
satisfied, however, that the show-up was properly conducted and
that any statements by police beforehand did not influence the
witnesses’ identifications of Richey.
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Rather, that Richey’s appearance matched (and in

no way contradicted) the description of the robber is compelling
probative evidence of his guilt.

Moreover, contrary to Richey’s

assertion, Officer Lybrand spotted him walking-distance from the
store minutes after the robbery, and immediately after Officer
Skardon attempted to engage with him, he fled.
importantly,
distinct

when

items

the

officers

reported

searched

stolen

Perhaps more

Richey,

during

the

they

found

offense:

most

memorably, two-dollar bills, money tubes, and unopened packs of
Newport cigarettes.

A jury would not likely cast aside such

evidence as the product of a series of coincidences.
Officers also found in Richey’s pocket—where Greene saw the
robber put the money from the cash register—other bills in the
precise

denominations

Greene

recalled

being

in

the

cash

register.

The black ball cap identified as that of the robber

was

abandoned

found

along

Richey’s

flight

path,

and

Officer

Lybrand found a gray jacket (albeit not a black one) in the
field where Richey was first found running.

Significantly, too,

Richey’s gun was identified by Greene as the one used in the
robbery.
In sum, even without the post-arrest statement, the state’s
case against Richey was robust.
a

reasonable

probability

Thus, Richey has failed to show

that,

19

but

for

counsel’s

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performance regarding that statement, the outcome of trial would
have been different.
B.
Turning

to

Richey’s

belated

ineffective-assistance

claim

regarding the post-bond statement, recall that Richey must show
cause to excuse his procedural default by demonstrating that the
underlying
1318.

claim

is

“substantial.”

Martinez,

132

S.

Ct.

at

He cannot; even assuming that trial counsel performed

deficiently, Richey cannot show prejudice.
As
direct

we

have

and

summarized,

the

circumstantial

conviction.

Even

without

state

presented

evidence
the

overwhelming

supporting

post-bond

Richey’s

statement—indeed,

without any confessions—the strength of the remaining evidence
forecloses

the

reasonable

probability

that

Richey’s trial would have been different.
ineffective-assistance

claim

is

therefore

must be rejected for procedural default.

the

result

of

Richey’s underlying
not

substantial

and

See id. at 1319 (“When

faced with the question whether there is cause for an apparent
default, a State may answer that the ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claim is insubstantial . . . .”). 9

9

Richey also argues that his Fifth Amendment rights were
violated when Detective Bruce spoke with him on November 3. But
because Richey did not raise this issue in the district court,
we decline to consider it.
Pruett v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 1560,
1574 (4th Cir. 1993).

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III.
The district court properly granted the state’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissed Richey’s habeas petition.

We

therefore
AFFIRM.

21