James Raynor v. G. Pugh
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cv-01117-LMB-JFA. [999776286]. [14-7746]
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-7746
JAMES HERMAN RAYNOR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
G. PUGH, Housing Unit #1 Manager,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
HAROLD W. CLARK,
MARIE VARGO, Ms.,
Director
of
Department
of
Corrections;
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:13-cv-01117-LMB-JFA)
Argued:
December 8, 2015
Decided:
March 17, 2016
Before MOTZ, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the
opinion, in which Judge King joined.
Judge Keenan wrote a
separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
ARGUED: Brian David Schmalzbach, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant.
Trevor Stephen Cox, OFFICE OF THE
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: John D. Adams, Katherine Mims Crocker, MCGUIREWOODS
LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Mark R. Herring,
Attorney General of Virginia, Cynthia E. Hudson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General, Linda L. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General,
Public Safety & Enforcement, Richard C. Vorhis, Senior Assistant
Attorney
General,
J.
Michael
Parsons,
Assistant
Attorney
General, Stuart A. Raphael, Solicitor General of Virginia,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.
2
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DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
James Herman Raynor, an inmate at a Virginia correctional
facility,
(2012),
brought
alleging
this
that
action
a
pursuant
prison
to
official
42
U.S.C.
violated
§
the
1983
Eighth
Amendment by failing to protect Raynor from an attack by another
inmate.
The district court granted the official’s motion for
summary judgment.
For the reasons that follow, we vacate and
remand for further proceedings.
I.
Raynor, an inmate at Sussex II State Prison, suffers from
medical ailments, including seizures, blackouts, “blood issues,”
“heart issues,” and “breath[ing] issues.”
Raynor,
who
was
housed
with
inmate
K.
In November 2012,
Mullins,
asked
prison
officials to move him to a different cell with a “caretaker”
inmate
who
had
conditions.
with
G.
That
day,
volunteered
to
assist
him
with
his
health
On January 10, 2013, Raynor renewed his request
Pugh,
Pugh
the
Prison
informed
Housing
Mullins
Manager
that
he,
for
Raynor’s
instead
of
unit.
Raynor,
would have to relocate to a different cell.
According
to
Raynor,
Mullins
then
threatened
Raynor
in
front of Pugh, saying, “it’s on,” that they were both “going to
seg[regated
housing],”
and
that
[Raynor].”
Raynor alleges that, in response, Pugh stated that
3
he
“would
physically
assault
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he did not care what Mullins did and ordered both men back into
their cell.
Soon after, Mullins smashed Raynor’s television and
punched him in the face multiple times, knocking him to the
ground.
Raynor alleges that Pugh watched the entire assault and
did not call for assistance or take any action until after the
attack
had
ended.
Raynor
also
alleges
significant injury from the assault.
that
he
sustained
a
In addition to temporary
facial injuries and bruising, when Mullins knocked him to the
ground, the impact assertedly damaged his spine and tailbone.
As
a
result
of
that
spinal
injury,
he
alleges
that
he
now
suffers constant and severe pain, numbness, and loss of control
of his legs, and will be confined to a wheelchair for the rest
of his life.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Raynor filed
this
complaint
pursuant
Raynor
alleges,
and
Pugh’s
deliberate
to
42
realleges
U.S.C.
in
indifference
to
an
§
1983
amended
Raynor’s
against
Pugh. 1
complaint,
safety,
and
that
the
resulting injuries, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
1
Raynor also named as defendants Director of the Virginia
Department of Corrections Harold Clarke and Sussex II Warden
Marie Vargo.
The district court dismissed the claims against
these defendants because Raynor had failed to allege facts
supporting supervisory liability.
Raynor does not appeal those
dismissals.
4
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As
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evidence
submitted
a
of
verified
Pugh’s
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deliberate
complaint
and
a
indifference,
corroborating
from another inmate, who had witnessed the assault.
Raynor
affidavit
To support
his claim of serious injury, Raynor offered copies of several
requests for medical attention for severe spinal pain, numbness,
and uncontrollable falling after January 10th, some of which
attribute these issues to the assault.
Raynor also submitted
six doctors’ reports describing spinal x-rays before and after
the assault, which he maintains describe damage to a different
section of his spine post-assault than had already been injured.
In an effort to further substantiate his claim, Raynor moved for
production
of
the
following
materials
from
the
prison:
the
security video of the incident, all prison reports related to
the assault, any prison policies or procedures detailing staff
responsibility for inmate safety, and any documents from the
prison’s investigation of the incident.
Although
Pugh
not
dispute
According to Pugh, Mullins made no threatening comments
inmates
had
gotten
before
along
the
in
other
assault,
the
past,
anticipate one would attack the other.
and
he
fact
attacked
Raynor.
presence
every
Mullins
he
Pugh’s
essentially
that
Raynor,
in
disputes
does
alleged
because
had
no
the
by
two
reason
to
Pugh contends that he
was in a different part of the housing unit during the alleged
assault and was only “later informed” of an “altercation.”
5
Pugh
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also
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maintains
that,
even
if
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he
had
been
present
during
an
attack, prison policy would have prevented him from physically
intervening without additional guards.
He maintains that Raynor
suffered only minor facial abrasions, as reflected in the “mild
abrasions”
noted
in
the
assault.
Pugh
argues
medical
that
report
Raynor
from
suffered
the
day
of
ongoing
the
spinal
problems due to a 2005 accident, so that to the extent Raynor
does currently suffer from chronic back pain, that pain is not
attributable to the asserted assault.
Finally, Pugh points to
the lack of any written grievances or medical forms from Raynor
complaining of back pain before August 2013, seven months after
the assault.
Pugh moved for summary judgment, arguing that “Raynor did
not suffer a serious or significant physical injury for which
Pugh would be liable under the Eighth Amendment,” that “Pugh did
not have a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” and that Pugh
was entitled to qualified immunity.
On the same day, Pugh also
moved for a protective order to stay discovery based on his
qualified
immunity
defense.
Raynor
opposed
both
motions,
reasserted his discovery requests, and filed a motion for an
examination by a back specialist.
The
district
court
denied
Raynor’s
motions
and
granted
Pugh’s discovery protective order without reaching the merits of
the
qualified
immunity
defense.
6
Seven
months
later,
still
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without resolving the issue of Pugh’s asserted immunity from
suit or ordering any discovery, the district court granted Pugh
summary
judgment.
The
court
acknowledged
that
the
parties
“dispute[d]” both “defendant’s motivation in not breaking up the
fight
between
plaintiff
and
Mullins”
and
whether
“suffered a severe injury to his spinal cord.”
concluded
asserted
that
lack
these
of
disputes
were
evidentiary
not
support
However, it
“genuine,”
for
Raynor
due
Raynor’s
to
an
claims.
Raynor timely noted this appeal.
II.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual
punishments” imposes certain basic duties on prison officials.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
These include
maintaining
including
humane
conditions
of
confinement,
the
provision of adequate medical care and, relevant to this case,
“reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”
Id.
(internal
corrections
violence
quotation
officers
at
the
have
hands
“a
of
marks
duty
other
omitted).
to
Specifically,
protect
prisoners
prisoners,”
for
from
“[b]eing
violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty
that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”
Id.
at
832,
834
(internal
quotation
omitted).
7
marks
and
alterations
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However, “not every injury suffered by a prisoner at the
hands of another translates into constitutional liability for
prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.”
Makdessi
v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks
omitted).
A
plaintiff
must
satisfy
a
two-part
test,
consisting of both an objective and a subjective inquiry, for
liability to attach.
First, the inmate “must establish a serious deprivation of
his rights in the form of a serious or significant physical or
emotional injury,” or a substantial risk thereof.
Stansberry,
772
F.3d
340,
346-47
(4th
Cir.
2014)
Danser v.
(internal
quotation marks omitted); see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
This
objective inquiry “requires a court to assess whether society
considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose
anyone unwillingly to such a risk.”
Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 36 (1993).
Second, an inmate must show that the prison official had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which, in this context,
consists
of
“deliberate
511
indifference
U.S.
at
834
to
inmate
(internal
health
quotation
or
safety.”
Farmer,
marks
omitted).
This subjective inquiry requires “evidence suggesting
that the prison official had actual knowledge of an excessive
risk to the plaintiff’s safety.”
8
Danser, 772 F.3d at 347.
The
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defendant must “be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must
also
draw
(emphasis added).
actual
knowledge
the
inference.”
Farmer,
511
U.S.
other
words,
837
An inmate can, however, prove an official’s
of
a
substantial
risk
“in
the
including inference from circumstantial evidence.”
In
at
“a
factfinder
may
conclude
usual
ways,
Id. at 842.
that
a
prison
official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the
risk was obvious.”
However,
Id.
“prison
officials
who
actually
knew
of
a
substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free
from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk.”
at 844.
Id.
In failure-to-protect cases, “prison guards have no
constitutional duty to intervene in the armed assault of one
inmate upon another when intervention would place the guards in
danger of physical harm.”
Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d 1005, 1008
(8th Cir. 1995); see also Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 532
(4th
Cir.
1997)
(en
banc)
constitutionally required.”).
(“[S]uch
heroic
measures
are
not
But “completely failing to take
any action” to stop an ongoing assault on a prisoner can amount
to
deliberate
indifference.
Winfield,
106
F.3d
at
532;
see
also, e.g., Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 773 (4th
Cir. 2003) (“[A] correctional officer who stands by as a passive
observer and takes no action whatsoever to intervene during an
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assault violates the [Eighth Amendment] rights of the victim
inmate.”); Williams v. Mueller, 13 F.3d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir.
1994) (“A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to
an inmate’s safety when the official is present at the time of
an assault and fails to intervene or otherwise act to end the
assault.”);
deliberate
cf. Prosser,
indifference
70
F.3d
where
prison
at
1008-09
guard
ran
(finding
to
get
immediately after inmate threw first punch at plaintiff).
courts
have
found
that
“a
corrections
officer’s
no
help
Thus,
failure
to
intervene in a beating can be the basis of [§ 1983] liability”
if the officer had a reasonable opportunity to act and “simply
refused to do so.”
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d.
Cir. 2002).
III.
With
these
principles
in
mind,
we
consider
whether
the
district court ignored genuine disputes of material fact and so
erroneously
granted
summary
judgment
to
Pugh.
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
We
review
a
PMB Prods., LLC v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011).
Summary
judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
56(a).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact
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exists, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and
all
justifiable
inferences
are
to
be
drawn
in
his
favor.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
For
the
objective-injury
prong,
Raynor
alleges
specific
facts describing the facial trauma and spinal injury caused by
Mullins’ attack.
Raynor also submitted his verified complaint,
describing the assault and his injuries in detail; several of
written
requests
to
the
prison
for
medical
attention,
complaining of severe back pain and numbness; and six medical
reports interpreting x-rays of his spine before and after the
assault. 2
He
offered a witnessing inmate’s affidavit, which
describes the impact from Mullins’ final blow that allegedly
caused Raynor’s spinal injury.
The witness swore that Raynor
“fell backwards and hit the floor on his buttocks.
He hit so
hard he bounced off the floor and then landed again after going
about
three
or
four
inches
off
2
the
floor.
Mr. Raynor
then
Our friend in concurrence suggests that Raynor “has not
yet raised a genuine dispute” regarding his injury because his
x-ray reports would be difficult for a lay person to interpret.
However, when faced with documents purportedly related to a
material issue but inscrutable to the court, we cannot
“eliminate the possibility that genuine issues of material fact
exist.”
Matherly v. Andrews, No. 14-7691, slip op. at 20 (4th
Cir. March 16, 2016).
Rather, summary judgment “should be
granted only when it is perfectly clear that no issue of
material fact exists.”
Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., 252 F.3d
696, 702 (4th Cir. 2001).
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proceeded to slowly get up off the floor and had a dazed, pain
[sic] look on his face.”
Of course, Pugh does not concede the truth of these facts.
Rather, Pugh maintains that Raynor suffered no more than “mild
abrasions on [his] face and cheeks.”
Appellee’s Br. at 6.
Pugh
contends that, to the extent Raynor does suffer chronic back
pain, it is attributable to a 2005 accident.
Pugh also points
to the lack of written complaints about back pain from Raynor in
the first seven months following the assault, suggesting that
Raynor began concocting a written record of this pain only after
he filed his § 1983 complaint in August 2013.
might
ultimately
contrary
agree
evidence
as
with
to
Pugh,
material
but
A fact finder
Raynor
facts
has
offered
concerning
the
seriousness of his injury which, at present, preclude the grant
of summary judge to Pugh on this prong.
Similarly, as for the subjective inquiry -- whether Pugh
acted with deliberate indifference –- Raynor has also offered
evidence
preventing
the
grant
of
3
summary
judgment. 3
In
his
Part and parcel of our review of the district court’s
grant of summary judgment is Raynor’s claim that the court
improperly disregarded most of Raynor’s evidence. We agree that
the court erred in doing so.
For example, in assessing the
deliberate-indifference
prong,
the
court
ignored
Raynor’s
factual assertions about Mullins’ comments, concluding that
“nothing in plaintiff’s evidentiary submissions [] show[s] that
Pugh knew that Mullins posed a risk to plaintiff’s health or
safety.”
The court then stated that, “[i]n fact, Pugh stated
(Continued)
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verified complaint, Raynor alleges two independent grounds for
establishing Pugh’s subjective knowledge of the risk of assault.
First, in his verified complaint, Raynor alleges that Mullins
told Pugh he was going to attack Raynor and that Pugh responded
that he did not care what Mullins did.
as
true,
establishes
that
Pugh
had
This allegation, taken
“actual
excessive risk to the plaintiff’s safety.”
knowledge
of
an
Danser, 772 F.3d at
347; see e.g., Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir.
2000); Street v. Corr. Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 815-16
(6th Cir. 1996).
Independent of this fact, Raynor also alleges that Pugh had
actual knowledge of the attack as it was happening because Pugh
watched the entire incident.
Because he did so without radioing
for assistance or taking any other action, in Raynor’s view Pugh
did not respond reasonably to the substantial risk to Raynor’s
safety.
The witnessing inmate’s affidavit corroborates Raynor’s
allegations, stating that during the assault Pugh stood watching
that the plaintiff had never mentioned having any problems with
Mullins, and that the two men ‘got along well’” -- apparently
crediting
only
Pugh’s
factual
assertions
while
ignoring
Raynor’s.
But, of course, the nonmoving party is entitled “to
have . . . his version of all that is in dispute accepted, all
internal conflicts in it resolved favorably to him, [and] the
most favorable of possible alternative inferences from it drawn
in his behalf.” Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406,
414 (4th Cir. 1979).
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“behind the first set of chase doors smil[ing] with a two way
radio in his hand . . . which he never used.”
Pugh again disputes this version of events.
He asserts
that he was outside of the housing unit during the assault and
saw no part of it.
But where “affidavits present conflicting
versions of the facts which require credibility determinations,”
summary
judgment
cannot
lie.
Davis,
600
F.2d
at
459-60
(reversing summary judgment where inmate alleged that “the guard
watched the knifing attack without acting to protect him,” but
the
guard
claimed
he
was
not
present);
see
also
Pressly
v.
Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987). 4
In sum, genuine disputes of material fact underlie both
prongs
of
Raynor’s
claim.
See
Anderson,
477
U.S.
at
248
(explaining that factual disputes are “genuine” “if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
4
These factual disputes also defeat Pugh’s claim to
qualified immunity at this early stage, for Raynor has alleged
facts that make out a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right.
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
232 (2009).
Long before this 2013 attack, we had specifically
determined that a prison official who passively watches an
inmate assault without taking any action in response “violates
the rights of the victim inmate.”
Odom, 349 F.3d at 773; see
also, e.g., Winfield, 106 F.3d at 532; Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of
Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010); Davis v. Zahradnick,
600 F.2d 458, 459-60 (4th Cir. 1979); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d
1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978).
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nonmoving party”).
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Thus, on this record, the district court
erred in granting summary judgment to Pugh. 5
IV.
For the forgoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the
district
court
and
remand
the
case
for
further
proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
5
Raynor also argues that the district court erred in
denying him any discovery. Generally, a court should not grant
summary judgment when, as here, outstanding discovery requests
on material issues exist. See Ingle ex rel. Estate of Ingle v.
Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2006).
The district
court stayed Raynor’s discovery requests pending resolution of
Pugh’s qualified immunity defense, in accord with Crawford-El v.
Britton. See 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998). But, without ruling on
the (meritless at this stage) qualified immunity claim, the
court granted summary judgment on evidentiary grounds, faulting
Raynor for “not provid[ing] any evidence, other than his own
affidavit, to support his allegations.” In so doing, the court
erred.
On remand the district court should permit appropriate
discovery before entertaining any additional motions for summary
judgment.
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BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the district
court
erred
because
Raynor
should
have
been
afforded
an
opportunity to conduct discovery, and because a genuine dispute
exists regarding whether Pugh acted with a culpable state of
mind.
I write separately to state my view that given Raynor’s
complex
medical
history
causation
opinion,
regarding
the
he
cause
and
has
of
his
not
his
improper
yet
reliance
raised
alleged
a
injury.
genuine
on
lay
dispute
Nevertheless,
because that defect may be remedied during the course of future
discovery in this case, Raynor is entitled to have the district
court’s summary judgment award vacated.
I do not think that a reasonable jury could conclude from
the
present
record
that
Mullins’
attack,
rather
factors, caused Raynor’s alleged back injury.
than
other
Raynor’s complex
medical history includes seizures, cardiovascular issues, and a
back impairment that existed long before the attack.
Prior to
that event, Raynor had fallen multiple times, seeking medical
treatment for his back pain.
both
before
and
after
the
Moreover, various medical reports
attack
describe
Raynor’s
back
condition as being “degenerative” in nature.
A nonmoving party seeking to prevent summary judgment must
show a genuine dispute of fact using admissible evidence, not
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merely conclusory or speculative statements.
P. 56(c).
See Fed. R. Civ.
Raynor’s own interpretation of his x-ray reports, and
his speculation regarding the causes of his back pain and his
falls after the attack, constitute conclusory and inadmissible
lay opinion on issues requiring “scientific, technical, or other
specialized
knowledge.”
Fed.
R.
Evid.
701(c).
A
layperson
could not determine whether the “multilevel spondylosis” and the
“facet arthropathy” described in a post-attack report differs
from
the
“multilevel
lower
lumbar
facet
arthrosis”
“spondylosis” described in pre-attack reports.
expert
testimony,
a
lay
juror
would
be
and
the
Thus, without
unable
to
determine
whether any change in Raynor’s spinal condition was attributable
to Mullins’ attack.
Although, in many cases, an inference of causation may be
drawn based on temporal proximity between violent contact and a
particular
Raynor’s
injury,
medical
such
an
history
is
inference
is
sufficiently
unavailable
complex
that
here.
a
lay
juror could not rationally infer the cause of his existing back
problems.
Unlike an injury that appears immediately following a
violent impact, Raynor’s degenerative spinal condition existed
before the attack and worsened after multiple falls during the
seven
months
following
the
attack.
Nothing
in
the
record
indicates that this type of spinal condition can be caused by
acute physical trauma.
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Nevertheless, evidence revealed during future discovery may
yet
establish
causation.
material
facts
supporting
Raynor’s
claim
of
Therefore, I respectfully concur in the judgment in
this appeal.
18
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