Cynthia Lee v. Fairfax County School Board

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion--denying as moot Motion to reconsider [999631406-2]. Originating case number: 1:14-cv-01116-AJT-TCB. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999642174] [15-1050]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1050

CYNTHIA LEE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; Dr. JACK DALE, former
Superintendent;
Dr.
PHYLLIS
PAJARDO,
Assistant
Superintendent; JAMEY CHIANETTA, Principal,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Anthony J. Trenga,
District Judge. (1:14-cv-01116-AJT-TCB)

Submitted:

August 10, 2015

Before KING and
Circuit Judge.

THACKER,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

and

August 18, 2015

DAVIS,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher E. Brown, THE BROWN LAW FIRM, PLLC, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant. Mary McGowan, Robert M. Falconi,
BLANKINGSHP & KEITH, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Cynthia Lee challenges the district court’s order granting
the

Fairfax

County

Public

School

(FCPS)

Board’s

motion

for

summary judgment and dismissing Lee’s complaint alleging that
the FCPS Board and FCPS employees (collectively, “Appellees”)
violated
(2012),

Lee’s
and

Fourteenth

civil

her

under

procedural

Amendment,

termination

rights

under

and

due

42

U.S.C.

process

§§

rights

engaged

in

defamation

state

Virginia

1981,

law.

Lee

under

and

argues

1983
the

wrongful
that

her

claims are not barred by her prior settlement agreement with
FCPS

because

she

entered

the

agreement is unconscionable.

agreement

under

duress

and

the

We affirm.

We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo.
Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d
324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
are

viewed

party.”
(4th

Cir.

“in

the

light

All facts and reasonable inferences
most

favorable

to

the

non-moving

Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330
2012).

Summary

judgment

is

only

appropriate

when

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

Fed. R.

“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not

suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the nonmoving party’s] case.”

Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power

2

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Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We first review Lee’s claim that her settlement agreement
should be set aside because she entered it under duress.

Under

Virginia law, “[d]uress is not readily accepted as an excuse,
and

must

be

proven

Pelfrey v.

Pelfrey,

(internal

quotation

defendant

commits

by

487

S.E.2d

marks
a

clear

and

281,

284

omitted).

wrongful

act

convincing
(Va.

“Duress

evidence.”

Ct.

App.

exists

sufficient

1997)
a

prevent

to

when

a

plaintiff from exercising his free will, thereby coercing the
plaintiff’s
S.E.2d

consent.”

450,

particularly

452

Goode

(Va.

hesitant

v.

Burke

1993).
to

Virginia

accept

pressure as a form of duress.

Town

the

Plaza,
courts

exertion

Inc.,
have

of

436
been

economic

See id. at 452-53 (“Because the

application of economic pressure by threatening to enforce a
legal

right

is

not

a

wrongful

act,

it

cannot

constitute

duress.”); Seward v. Am. Hardware Co., 171 S.E. 650, 662 (Va.
1933) (“A contract reluctantly entered into by one badly in need
of money without force or intimidation and with full knowledge
of the fact is not a contract executed under duress.”).
We
duress.

have

reviewed

the

record

and

found

no

evidence

of

Lee fails to show that FCPS engaged in any wrongful

conduct in the negotiation of the agreement, and her financial

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hardship,

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standing

alone,

Pg: 4 of 5

is

insufficient

to

invalidate

a

contract due to duress under Virginia law.
We next consider whether the settlement agreement should be
invalidated as unconscionable.

Traditionally, for a contract to

be unconscionable, it must have been “such as no man in his
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as
no honest and fair man would accept on the other.”
Chaplain,

682

S.E.2d

108,

113

quotation marks omitted).

(Va.

Ct.

App.

Chaplain v.

2009)

(internal

In other words, “‘[t]he inequality

must be so gross as to shock the conscience.’”

Id. (quoting

Smyth Bros. v. Beresford, 104 S.E. 371, 382 (Va. 1920)).
Unconscionability
element.
the

has

Id. at 114.

value

faith

exchanged.”

in

concealments,

“the

a

substantive

and

procedural

The former requires a “gross disparity in
Id.

quotation marks omitted).
bad

both

at

113

(internal

alterations

and

The latter necessitates inequity and

accompanying

incidents

misrepresentations,

undue

.

.

.

advantage,

,

such

as

oppressions

on the part of the one who obtains the benefit, or ignorance,
weakness

of

necessities,

mind,
and

sickness,

the

like.”

old

age,

Id.

at

incapacity,

114

(internal

pecuniary
quotation

marks omitted).
We

conclude

settlement

that

agreement

neither

before

element

this

court.

is

present
In

in

the

exchange

for

releasing her claims against Appellees, Lee avoided termination
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for incompetence (for which she could have lost her teacher’s
license), retained a position at FCPS, wiped her record clean,
received a neutral reference from FCPS, and could resign with
only five-days notice if she were to obtain new employment.

In

negotiating these benefits, Lee was represented by counsel.

As

a result, the district court properly refused to invalidate the
settlement agreement due to unconscionability.
Because Lee does not contend that any of her claims were
beyond

the

scope

of

her

settlement

district court’s judgment.
reconsider
dispense

our
with

contentions

are

order
oral

we

affirm

the

We also deny as moot her motion to

denying
argument

adequately

agreement,

her

motion

because

presented

in

to

the
the

expedite.

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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