Chriselda Guerrero v. Eric Holder, Jr.
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cv-00729-TSE-IDD. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999636409]. [15-1054]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1054
CHRISELDA GUERRERO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
T. S. Ellis, III, Senior
District Judge. (1:13-cv-00729-TSE-IDD)
Submitted:
July 23, 2015
Decided:
August 7, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew C. Simpson, Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin
Islands, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney,
Antonia Konkoly, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Chriselda Guerrero filed a complaint in the district court
alleging several violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of
1964,
42
U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e(17)
(2012),
and
the
Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”), Pub L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat.
1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
The district court ruled in favor of the United States Marshals
Service (“USMS”), and Guerrero appeals.
We affirm.
First, Guerrero argues that the district court erred in
granting the USMS’s motion to dismiss Count One of her complaint
for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.
We review a
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim “de novo
and
focus
only
on
the
legal
sufficiency
of
the
complaint.”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008).
We
view “the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d
261, 264 (4th Cir. 2012).
claim for relief.”
The complaint must state a “plausible
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
A federal employee must begin EEO counseling “within 45
days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or,
in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective
date
of
the
action.”
29
C.F.R.
§ 1614.105(a)(1)
(2010).
Guerrero does not contest the fact that she failed to initiate
counseling within 45 days of the personnel action, but argues
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that she had no reason to suspect the action was discriminatory
at the time.
However, the time limitation starts from when the
discriminatory
act
occurred,
not
when
it
was
discovered.
Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86, 87-88 (4th Cir. 1990)
(en
banc).
Moreover,
while
the
limitations
period
may
be
waived, Jakubiak v. Perry, 101 F.3d 23, 27 (4th Cir. 1996), we
find no waiver on the facts of this case.
Second, Guerrero argues that the district court erred in
dismissing Count Three of her complaint when it found that she
was on probationary status at the time of her demotion.
The
CSRA provides no relief to federal employees who are serving a
probationary period.
1571,
1573
Hardy v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 13 F.3d
(Fed.
§ 7511(a)(1)(A)(i)
jurisdictional
Cir.
(2012).
findings
intertwined
with
plaintiff’s
1994);
the
claims
of
We
fact
facts
under
the
see
“review
on
any
central
a
5
U.S.C.
district
court’s
issues
to
clearly
also
are
not
merits
the
that
of
the
erroneous
standard
of
review and any legal conclusions flowing therefrom de novo.”
United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 348 (4th
Cir. 2009).
Here,
Guerrero’s
probationary
with the merits of her claim.
-
whether
procedural
she
was
safeguards
demoted
-
the
status
was
not
intertwined
Before it could reach the merits
in
accordance
district
3
with
court
the
first
CSRA’s
had
to
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determine whether she was on probation.
Guerrero’s SF-50 stated
that she was subject to a probationary period, the SF-50 was
dated prior to her demotion, and the vacancy announcement for
the position clearly stated that the selectee could be subject
to a probationary status.
rejecting
Guerrero’s
The district court did not err in
contention
to
the
contrary.
Thus,
the
district court correctly dismissed Guerrero’s CSRA claim.
Finally, Guerrero argues that the district court erred in
granting
summary
judgment
retaliation
concerning
allegations
she
review
de
judgment.
novo
an
claimed
a
to
the
internal
improper
district
USMS
on
affairs
travel
court’s
her
claim
of
investigation
into
reimbursements.
We
order
granting
summary
Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d
562, 565 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015).
“A district court ‘shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’”
P. 56(a)).
Id. at 568 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
In determining whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists, “we view the facts and all justifiable inferences
arising therefrom in the light most favorable to . . . the
nonmoving
omitted).
party.”
Id.
at
565
n.1
(internal
quotation
marks
However, “[c]onclusory or speculative allegations do
not suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the nonmoving party’s] case.”
Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power
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Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We
apply
the
familiar
McDonnell
Douglas ∗
framework
plaintiffs who lack direct evidence of retaliation.
Univ.
of
Md.-E.
Shore,
787
F.3d
243,
250
(4th
for
Foster v.
Cir.
2015).
Guerrero must first establish a prima facie case that (1) she
engaged
in
a
protected
activity,
(2)
her
employer
took
an
adverse action, and (3) there was a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse action.
Id.
Once a
prima
must
show
facie
case
is
established,
the
USMS
then
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action.
Id.
a
If there
is such a reason, then Guerrero has the burden to show that the
reason was a pretext for retaliation.
Id.
Guerrero’s evidence of pretext amounts to nothing more than
impermissible speculation.
Additionally, the allegations were
substantiated following an investigation.
shielded
from
discipline
activity under Title VII.
merely
by
An employee is not
engaging
in
protected
See Glover v. S.C. Law Enf’t Div.,
170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Employers retain . . . the
right to discipline or terminate employees for any legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason.”).
∗
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense
with
contentions
are
oral
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
the
facts
We
and
legal
materials
before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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