Stanley Jones v. Lanna Chandrasuwan

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cv-00385-WO-JLW. [999806697]. [15-1110]

Appeal: 15-1110

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1110

STANLEY JONES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LANNA CHANDRASUWAN; BRIAN HOLBROOK,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cv-00385-WO-JLW)

Argued:

December 8, 2015

Decided:

April 28, 2016

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion.
Judge Floyd wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Gregory and Judge Duncan joined.

ARGUED: S. Luke Largess, TIN, FULTON, WALKER & OWEN, P.L.L.C.,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Joseph Finarelli,
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Roy Cooper, North Carolina Attorney
General, Kimberly D. Grande, Assistant Attorney General, NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees.

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FLOYD, Circuit Judge:
Appellees
Holbrook

Lanna

Chandrasuwan

(Holbrook),

both

North

(Chandrasuwan)

Carolina

and

probation

Brian

officers,

sought Appellant Stanley Jones’s (Jones) arrest for allegedly
violating

conditions

of

his

probation.

This

case

raises

questions regarding the application of the Fourth Amendment to
the

seizure

Appellees’

of

probationers.

motion

for

The

summary

district

judgment

on

court

granted

Jones’s

Fourth

Amendment claim, finding that they were entitled to qualified
immunity.

While

we

disagree

with

the

district

court’s

discussion at step one of the qualified immunity analysis, we
affirm because the right at issue was not clearly established at
the time Jones was arrested.

I.
In

October

2009,

Jones—at

the

time

a

teacher

and

North

Carolina resident—was arrested and charged with two counts based
on

an

charges

inappropriate
were

relationship

pending,

Jones

with

resigned

a

student.

and

began

While

working

the
as

a

salesman for Prime Communications (Prime) in Greensboro, North
Carolina.

Jones

was

promoted

twice

and,

in

April

2010,

transferred to a position with Prime in Augusta, Georgia.
On

July

7,

2010,

Jones

returned

to

North

Carolina

and

pleaded guilty in state court to two counts of taking indecent
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liberties with a student and was sentenced to a minimum of 6
months and maximum of 8 months in prison.

The sentence was

suspended, and Jones was placed on supervised probation for 24
months.

As one of the conditions of his probation, the state

court required that Jones pay $471.50 in court costs and fines
pursuant

to

officer.

a
The

supervision

of

schedule
state
his

to

court

be

determined

also

probation

to

allowed

by

his

Jones

Georgia

if

probation

to

transfer

accepted

by

the

Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (the Compact),
an agreement between all 50 states allowing for the transfer of
probation supervision of adult offenders between member states.
Under the Compact, the sending state—in this case, North
Carolina—retains jurisdiction over the offender for purposes of
probation

revocation,

and

the

Georgia—supervises probation.

receiving

state—in

this

case,

Additionally, the sending state

is responsible for collecting any financial obligations imposed,
and, upon notification from the sending state that the offender
is not complying with payments, the receiving state must inform
the

offender

that

he

is

in

day

he

entered

violation

of

the

conditions

of

supervision.
The

same

his

plea,

Jones

reported

to

a

probation office in Greensboro and met with Judicial Services
Coordinator

Latonia

Williams

(Williams).

Jones

completed

an

application for transfer of supervision pursuant to the Compact.
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the

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application,

Jones

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agreed

to

reside

at

the

residence

listed until allowed by supervising authorities to change it, to
comply with the terms and conditions of supervision placed on
him by both North Carolina and Georgia, and that if he did not
comply with those terms and conditions, such a failure would be
considered a violation of probation and he could be returned to
North Carolina.

Williams and Jones disagreed about whether he

would have to register as a sex offender, which could impact
whether Georgia accepted his transfer application.

Jones left

to see his lawyer and Williams later determined that Jones would
not be required to register as a sex offender.
The next day, Jones again met with Williams.
Williams

signed

a

DCC-2

form,

which

the

Jones and

North

Carolina

Department of Community Corrections (DCC) uses to set a schedule
for payment of financial obligations. 1
the

parties

signed

was

However, the DCC-2 form

incomplete—it

omitted

information

regarding the payment rate, due date, and the total amount of
Jones’s financial obligation.

This information was apparently

omitted because DCC had not yet received the criminal judgment,
which is required to establish the parameters of supervision.
The DCC-2 form was never completed.

1

While Jones asserts in his affidavit that he did not sign
a DDC-2 form, he concedes in his brief that he did, in fact,
sign the form.
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Jones’s

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application

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for

transfer

of

his

probation

supervision was approved and Jones arrived in Georgia on July
13,

2010.

The

next

day,

North

Carolina

probation

officers

forwarded the terms of Jones’s sentence to Georgia authorities
through the Interstate Compact Offender Tracking System (ICOTS),
a

system

facilitating

communications

states’ Compact offices.
the

Augusta,

Georgia

between

Compact

member

On July 15, 2010, Jones reported to

probation

office.

Throughout

Jones’s

residency in Georgia, there were no reported violations of his
probation

by

Georgia

authorities.

In

December

2010,

Prime

offered Jones a promotion to a position located in Savannah,
Georgia.

At

Jones’s

request,

Georgia

probation

officers

transferred his supervision to a probation office in Savannah.
DCC policy requires that when a probationer is supervised
in another state under the Compact, a review is undertaken 180
days before his discharge.

In January 2012, DCC employee Jay

Lynn (Lynn) conducted this 180-day review and determined that
Jones had not paid any of the costs and fines required by the
judgment.

Lynn

informed

North

Carolina

Interstate

Compact

District Coordinator Karl Waller (Waller) of this and instructed
him to confirm it with Holbrook, the chief probation and parole
officer

in

Greensboro.

After

confirming

with

Holbrook

that

Jones had not paid his costs and fines, Waller sent a Compact
Action Request on January 25, 2012 to the Georgia Compact office
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through ICOTS, requesting that Jones be instructed to pay the
costs and fines by February 1, 2012.

On February 4, 2012, the

costs and fines remained unpaid and Waller completed a violation
report, which Lynn approved, stating that Jones was in violation
of the terms and conditions of his probation.
On February 9, 2012, Jones met with his probation officer
in Savannah, who introduced him to the Savannah office’s Compact
representative.

The Compact representative explained that she

had received a notice from North Carolina that Jones had failed
to pay his costs and fines.

Jones indicated that he knew he

still owed money, that the sum was due before his probation was
terminated in July, and that he would check with his lawyer
about arranging for payment.

The same day, Waller received two

responses to his Compact Action Request.

The first stated that

Jones had been instructed by his supervision officer to make
payment and that Jones was going to contact his lawyer about the
amount owed.

The second response stated that Jones had been

instructed to make his payment and that he stated that he would
pay the balance by the end of the month.
On

February

15,

2012,

Waller

returned

Jones’s

probation

file to Holbrook for “case management and collection of fines
and court costs.”

J.A. 34.

Holbrook forwarded the file to

Chandrasuwan—a probation officer under his supervision in the
Greensboro office—and instructed her to follow up with Jones.
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March

8,

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Chandrasuwan

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attempted

to

contact

Jones

at

two

telephone numbers on file, but was unable to reach him.

On

March 12, Chandrasuwan prepared a violation report recounting
that

Jones

had

violated

the

conditions

of

his

probation

failing to timely pay court costs and fines.

by

The same day,

Chandrasuwan attempted to notify Jones by mail of the need to
contact her or return to the Greensboro probation office within
two

weeks

to

pay

the

outstanding

fine.

On

March

26,

when

Chandrasuwan had not heard from Jones, she filed the March 2012
violation report with the clerk of court.
On March 27, Chandrasuwan’s correspondence—which was sent
to

Jones’s

address

in

Augusta—was

returned.

The

same

day,

Chandrasuwan prepared an addendum violation report stating that
Jones had absconded and was avoiding supervision.

Chandrasuwan

and Holbrook reached this conclusion without contacting Compact
officials or the Georgia probation office.
Chandrasuwan

appeared

before

a

Also the same day,

magistrate

judge

in

North

Carolina state court to secure an order for Jones’s arrest based
on

his

multiple

probation

violations. 2

2

At

the

hearing,

North Carolina law provides that an order for arrest may
be issued when “[a] defendant has violated the conditions of
probation.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-305(b)(4).
Section 15A1345(a) provides that “[a] probationer is subject to arrest for
violation of conditions of probation by a law-enforcement
officer or probation officer upon either an order for arrest
issued by the court or upon the written request of a probation
(Continued)
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Chandrasuwan presented the violation report and addendum and the
magistrate judge issued an order for Jones’s arrest.
file

was

then

transferred

to

another

probation

Jones’s

officer

to

execute the arrest order.
On May 1, the United States Marshals Service arrested Jones
at his home in Savannah and he was held in a Georgia county
jail.
May

The next day, Jones’s wife paid the $471.50 in full.
7,

Holbrook

secured

an

order

dismissing

the

On

probation

violations and recalling the arrest order and transmitted the
order

to

custody

authorities

on

employment

May

8.

because

incarceration.

in
In

he

Georgia.
in

Jones

was

Prime

terminated

interim,

could

not

work

due

to

released

his

from

Jones’s

arrest

and

After a period of unemployment, Jones and his

family moved back to North Carolina.
In March 2013, Jones filed this action in North Carolina
state

court,

Amendment
prosecution

bringing

rights
under

federal court

and

claims

under

42

state

for

law.

moved

for

U.S.C.

violation
§ 1983

Appellees
summary

of

and

removed

judgment.

his

for

Fourth

malicious

the

case

to

The

district

court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, finding
that they were entitled to qualified immunity.

The district

officer, accompanied by a written statement signed by the
probation officer that the probationer has violated specified
conditions of his probation. . . .”
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court

denied

prosecution

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supplemental
claim

and

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jurisdiction

dismissed

the

over

claim

Jones’s
without

malicious
prejudice.

Jones timely appealed.

II.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.

Evans v.

Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir.
1996).

“Summary

genuine

dispute

judgment
as

to

is

any

appropriate

material

fact

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
760

F.3d

352,

370

(4th

Cir.

quotation marks omitted).
jury

could

return

a

2014)

when
and

‘there

no

movant

the

is

is

Bostic v. Schaefer,

(citation

and

internal

“A dispute is genuine if a reasonable
verdict

for

the

nonmoving

party.”

Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir.
2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“A fact

is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing

law.”

Id.

omitted).

“We

are

justifiable

inferences

(citation
required

and
to

arising

internal
view

therefrom

favorable to the nonmoving party . . . .”
so,

we

must

determinations.

not

weigh

of

evidence

in

facts
the

light

Id. at 312.
or

make

and

marks
all
most

In doing

credibility

Mercantile Peninsula Bank v. French, 499 F.3d

345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007).
disputes

the

quotation

fact

in

favor

“[C]ourts may not resolve genuine
of
9

the

party

seeking

summary

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judgment.”

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Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per

curiam).

III.
Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights,
but

rather

provides

constitutional

and

a

method

statutory

for

vindicating

rights.

42

U.S.C.

federal

§

1983;

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (citation omitted).
Qualified immunity, an affirmative defense to liability under
§ 1983,

protects

all

government

officials

except

those

who

violate a “statutory or constitutional right that was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct.”
Carman,

135

qualified

S.

Ct.

immunity

348,
is

350

(2014).

appropriate

Carroll v.

Determining

is

a

two-step

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

whether
inquiry.

First, a court

must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has shown make
out a violation of a constitutional right.
court

must

consider

whether

the

right

at

Id.
issue

established” at the time of the alleged misconduct.

Second, the
was

“clearly

Id.

While courts have the discretion to decide which of the
steps to address first, based on the facts and circumstances of
the case at hand, the two-step procedure is “often appropriate”
and

“beneficial”

because

constitutional precedent.”

it

“promotes

Id. at 236.
10

the

development

of

Indeed, “our regular

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of

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avoidance”

often

Pg: 11 of 23

“threatens

official conduct permanently in limbo.”
S. ct. 2020, 2024 (2011).

to

leave

standards

of

Camreta v. Greene, 131

To prevent that problem, the Supreme

Court permits “lower courts to determine whether a right exists
before

examining

whether

it

was

clearly

established.”

Id.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court instructs courts to “think hard,
and then think hard again, before turning small cases into large
ones.”

Id. at 2023.

After thinking hard about it twice, we determine that the
two-step

procedure

is

appropriate

in

this

case

in

order

to

clearly establish the standard that probation officers must meet
in

order

to

arrest

a

probationer

who

allegedly

violated

the

conditions of his probation.

A.
Jones contends that Appellees violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by seeking his arrest for alleged probation violations.
We first determine what level of suspicion Appellees must have
had in order to arrest Jones for allegedly violating the terms
of his probation.

Then we determine whether Appellees had that

level of suspicion here.

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1.
Jones contends that Appellees violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by seeking his arrest for alleged probation violations
without

reasonable

suspicion

or

probable

cause.

The

Fourth

Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, and “this usually
requires the police to have probable cause or a warrant before
making an arrest.”
(2009).

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136

Probationers such as Jones, however, “do not enjoy the

absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only
. . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of
special [probation] restrictions.”

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483

U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted,

alteration

in

repeatedly

acknowledged

recidivism

and

citizenship
intrusions
Fourth

thereby

among
that

that

a

The

State’s

promoting

probationers

would

Amendment.”

original).

not

Samson

and

parolees
be

Court

interests

reintegration

otherwise
v.

Supreme

in

reducing

and

positive

warrant

tolerated

California,

547

“has

U.S.

privacy

under

the

843,

853

(2006).
Ultimately, “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness” and the reasonableness of a search or seizure is
determined “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
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it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”
112,

118–19

(2001)

omitted).

A

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.

(citation

and

person’s

internal

status

as

quotation
a

marks

probationer

informs both sides of this reasonableness balance: the intrusion
upon an individual’s privacy and necessity to promote legitimate
governmental interests.

See id. at 119.

Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has announced the
level of suspicion required under the Fourth Amendment to arrest
a probationer for a suspected probation violation.

The Supreme

Court faced an analogous issue in Knights—the level of suspicion
required for searches of probationers—which provides guidance in
the arrest context.

In Knights, the Supreme Court determined

that, where a probationer was subject to a probation condition
that

his

person

or

property

could

be

searched

at

any

time

without a warrant, reasonable suspicion that the probationer is
engaged

in

criminal

reasonable.
After

activity

is

enough

to

make

a

search

534 U.S. at 121.
Knights,

suspicionless

search

it

remains

of

a

an

open

probationer

can

question
be

whether

a

constitutional.

United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 625 (4th Cir. 2007);
Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 n.6.
has

upheld

suspicionless

Additionally, the Supreme Court

searches
13

of

parolees

pursuant

to

a

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state statute allowing for such searches.

Samson, 547 U.S. at

850 (noting that parolees have fewer expectations of privacy
than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment
than

probation

is

to

imprisonment).

However,

the

privacy

interests and governmental interests implicated in arrests and
searches are sufficiently different to foreclose the possibility
of a constitutional suspicionless arrest of a probationer.

Cf.

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984) (“Different
interests

are

(collecting

implicated

cases)).

by

a

seizure

Suspicionless

than

arrests

by

a

search.”

implicate

obvious

privacy concerns while doing little to advance the government’s
“two

primary

goals

of

probation—rehabilitation

society from future criminal violations.”

and

protecting

Knights, 534 U.S. at

119.
On the other hand, these goals are advanced when probation
officers

seek

the

arrest

of

a

probationer

they

believe has violated the terms of his probation.

reasonably

The government

has strong interests both in ensuring that probationers adhere
to

the

conditions

of

their

probation

and

in

redressing probation violations if they do not.

effectively

These interests

are strengthened by the fact that probation is often imposed in
lieu of incarceration and that conditions of probation are often
intended to prevent future criminal conduct.
concerns

implicated

by

an

arrest
14

are

While the privacy

certainly

substantial,

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balancing

the

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governmental

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and

private

interests

supports

a

degree of suspicion lower than probable cause for arresting a
probationer for an alleged probation violation.
534

U.S.

at

121

requires

the

‘probable

cause,’

(“Although

degree
a

of

the

Fourth

probability

lesser

degree

Cf. Knights,

Amendment

embodied

satisfies

ordinarily

in

the

the

term

Constitution

when the balance of governmental and private interests makes
such

a

standard

reasonable.”).

Therefore,

we

hold

that

probation officers must have reasonable suspicion before seeking
the arrest of a probationer for allegedly violating conditions
of his probation.
“The concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause,
is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules.”

United

(citation

and

Court
exists

held

criminal

v.

quotations

that

where

States

conduct

omitted).

reasonable

there

is

is

“a

Sokolow,

490
In

suspicion

occurring

to

make

individual’s privacy interest reasonable.”
121.

1,

Knights,

in

sufficiently

U.S.

the

high
the

7

(1989)

the

Supreme

search

context

probability
intrusion

on

that
the

Knights, 534 U.S. at

Relying on Knights, we hold that reasonable suspicion in

the arrest context is present when there is a sufficiently high
probability that a probationer has violated the terms of his
probation

to

make

the

intrusion

interest reasonable.
15

on

the

individual’s

privacy

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2.
With a reasonable suspicion standard in hand, we next must
determine
case

whether

that

Jones

Appellees
had

had

violated

reasonable
the

terms

suspicion
of

his

in

this

probation.

Appellees contend that they had reasonable suspicion that Jones
violated the terms of his probation in two ways: by failing to
pay

his

costs

admittedly
totality

a

and
close

of

the

fines
case,

and

by

we

conclude

circumstances,

suspicion of either violation.
(holding

that

determined

by

absconding.

there

this

considering

was

not

is
the

reasonable

See Knights, 534 U.S. at 118

reasonableness

under

“examining

totality

the

that

While

the

Fourth
of

the

Amendment

is

circumstances”

(citation and quotations omitted)).
Whether Appellees had reasonable suspicion that he violated
a probation condition by failing to pay costs and fines turns
largely on application of the North Carolina probation statute.
North

Carolina

law

provides

that

as

a

regular

condition

of

probation, a defendant must pay court costs and any fine ordered
by the court.
may

delegate

determine

to

the

probationer

N.C. Gen. Stat. §
a

probation

payment

“must

be

officer

schedule.”
given

15A-1343(b)(9).

a

Id.
written

“[T]he court

the

responsibility

§

15A-1343(g).

statement

to
A

explicitly

setting forth the conditions on which he is being released.”
Id. § 15A-1343(c).

Additionally, a probationer “must be given a
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written

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statement

setting

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forth”

any

modification

conditions of his probation that is subsequently made.
North

Carolina

courts

have

read

the

written

requirement of § 15A-1343(c) quite strictly.
the

sentencing

probation

to

surrender

his

months.

court
add

modified
special

a

driver’s

the

condition

license

and

terms

the

Id.
statement

In State v. Suggs,
of

the

that

the

operate

not

to

a

373 S.E.2d 687, 687 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).

defendant’s
defendant
car

for

6

However, a

written statement setting forth this condition was not given to
the

defendant

and

after

being

charged

with

violating

that

condition, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge because he
had not received a written copy of the modification.

Id.

The

North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the provision of §
15A-1343(c)

requiring

written

notice

of

a

modification

was

“obviously . . . mandatory” and that the court had “no authority
to rule otherwise.”

Id. at 688.

The court rejected the state’s

argument that oral notice was a satisfactory substitute for a
written statement, holding that such a reading would “render the
statute nugatory.”
purported

Id.

modification

Therefore, the court concluded that the
“was

of

no

effect.”

Id.

The

North

Carolina Court of Appeals confirmed this reading of § 15A-1343
in

State

v.

Seek,

finding

that

17

an

oral

modification

was

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similarly unenforceable. 3

Pg: 18 of 23

566 S.E.2d 750, 751 (N.C. Ct. App.

2002).
In a case with similar facts to those here, a probationer
was ordered to perform community service and pay court costs and
fines

as

conditions

of

his

probation.

S.E.2d 371, 371 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
the

defendant’s

payments

and

State

v.

Boone,

741

Although the schedule for

community

service

was

to

be

established by the probation officer, there was no evidence that
a schedule had been established.

Id. at 371–73.

The probation

officer filed a violation report alleging that the defendant had
violated

his

probation

by

failing

to

complete

his

community

service and failing to pay the entire amount of costs owed.
at

371–72.

At

a

revocation

hearing,

the

ordered the defendant’s probation revoked.

sentencing
Id. at 372.

Id.
court
The

North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, basing its ruling on
the lack of a schedule for payment or community service and the

3

Suggs and Seek both considered modifications of probation
conditions rather than original conditions, and there is some
disagreement between the parties about whether the DCC-2 form—
had it been completed and given to Jones—would be an original
condition of probation or a modification.
Jones did receive a
Criminal Bill of Costs, which listed the due date for the costs
and fines as July 7, 2012—the day his probation was to end.
However, we need not decide whether this Bill of Costs was a
condition of probation that the DCC-2 form would have modified
or whether the DCC-2 form itself would have been an original
condition of probation.
Section 15A-1343(c) requires that a
probationer “must be given a written statement” of either an
original condition or a modification.
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fact

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that,

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at

the

time

of

the

Pg: 19 of 23

violation

remained on the defendant’s probation.

report,

Id. at 372.

six

months

Although

not explicitly relying on § 15A-1343(c), the Boone court held
that

in

the

absence

of

a

payment

schedule,

there

was

insufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant
had violated the terms of his probation.

Id.

Based on the plain language of § 15A-1343(c)—as well as the
North Carolina Court of Appeals’ holdings in Suggs, Seek, and
Boone—it

is

clear

that

a

payment

plan

is

a

condition

of

probation that must be provided to a probationer in writing and,
if a payment plan is not provided to the probationer in writing,
it is unenforceable. 4

It is undisputed that Jones was never

presented with any writing indicating that his costs and fines
were due before the end of his probation.

Therefore, Appellees

could not have had reasonable suspicion that Jones violated a
condition of probation by failing to pay his costs and fines

4

The district court invoked Pullman abstention to avoid
determining whether § 15A-1343 gives probation offers discretion
whether to put a payment plan in writing.
However, we are
convinced
that
§ 15A-1343(c)
requires
all
conditions
of
probation to be in writing in order to be enforceable.
While
§ 15A-1343(g) allows a court to delegate to a probation officer
the responsibility to determine a payment schedule, it does not
give the probation officer the discretion to not set a payment
plan or to not provide that payment plan in writing to the
defendant.
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because there was no enforceable condition requiring him to pay
the costs and fines before the termination of his probation. 5
In

seeking

Jones’s

arrest,

Appellees

Jones had absconded from supervision.

also

claimed

that

This was based on several

attempts by Chandrasuwan to reach Jones by phone and mail.

As

an initial matter, we note that this absconding charge was based
entirely on Appellees’ attempts to contact Jones regarding a
probation violation they unreasonably believed he had committed.
In other words, if Appellees had realized that there was no
enforceable payment condition, they never would have attempted
to contact him and the absconding charge would not have come
about.
Nevertheless, Appellees did not have reasonable suspicion
that Jones had absconded.

Their attempts to reach Jones were

completely outside of the Compact.

5

They had no communications

Appellees
base
their
reasonable
suspicion
on
a
communication from the Georgia Compact office stating that a
Georgia probation officer told Jones that he needed to pay the
costs and fines and that Jones said would pay “by the end of the
month.”
J.A. 46.
As an initial matter, Waller issued a
violation report before he heard back from Georgia and there is
no evidence that Appellees saw the communication indicating that
Jones would pay his costs and fines by the end of February.
Moreover, even if Appellees saw this communication from Georgia,
there was still no enforceable written condition requiring Jones
to pay the costs and fines by the end of the month. See Seek,
152 N.C. App. at 239 (“[O]ral notice is not a satisfactory
substitute for the written statement that the statute requires.”
(citation, quotations, and alteration omitted)).

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with Georgia probation officials, who Appellees acknowledge were
supervising

Jones’s

probation. 6

Both

DCC

and

Compact

Rules

require that communications regarding violations be transmitted
between the Compact offices of the sending and receiving states.
See J.A. 100 (Compact Rule 2.101(d) providing that “[v]iolation
reports or other notices regarding offenders under this compact
shall be transmitted only through direct communication of the
compact offices of the sending and receiving states.”); Addendum
to Appellant’s Br. 39-40 (Chapter D Section .0300 of DCC policy
providing that if the North Carolina probation office wants the
offender
violation

to

return

report

to

should

North
be

Carolina

submitted

for

through

a

hearing,

ICOTS).

the
Quite

simply, there was not a sufficiently high probability that Jones
absconded

because

no

effort

was

made

to

contact

the

office

responsible for supervising Jones’s probation.
Therefore,

Appellees

violated

Jones’s

Fourth

Amendment

rights by seeking his arrest for alleged probation violations
without reasonable suspicion.

6

It seems especially odd that Appellees—who assert that
they relied on communications from the Georgia compact office
indicating that Jones would pay his costs and fines by the end
of the month—would not contact the Georgia Compact office to
determine Jones’s whereabouts, especially when they knew Georgia
probation officials had been in contact with Jones only a month
earlier.
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B.
Even

after

finding

that

Appellees

violated

Jones’s

constitutional rights by seeking his arrest without reasonable
suspicion,

we

still

clearly established.

must

determine

whether

that

right

was

We hold that it was not.

“A right is clearly established only if its contours are
sufficiently clear that ‘a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.’”

Carroll, 135 S.

Ct. at 350 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)).

While “a case directly on point” is not required,

“existing

precedent

must

have

placed

constitutional question beyond debate.”

the

statutory

or

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011).
As

discussed

above,

neither

the

Supreme

Court

nor

this

Court had announced the level of suspicion required under the
Fourth

Amendment

to

probation violation.

arrest

a

probationer

for

a

suspected

In other words, precedent had not placed

the level of suspicion required to arrest a probationer “beyond
debate.”

Id.

The district court acknowledged that “this area

of the Fourth Amendment is particularly murky.”
“murkiness”
originally

is

also

argued

demonstrated

that

Appellees

by

the

violated

J.A. 133.

fact
his

that

This
Jones

rights

by

arresting him without probable cause, before later settling on a
reasonable suspicion standard.

As discussed above, precedent
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not

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definitively

ruled

Pg: 23 of 23

out

suspicionless

arrests

of

probationers.
Therefore, we conclude that the standard required by the
Fourth

Amendment

established

at

to

the

arrest
time

a

probationer

Appellees

sought

was

Jones’s

not

clearly

arrest

for

allegedly violating the terms of his probation.

IV.
Although

we

find

that

Appellees

violated

Jones’s

Fourth

Amendment rights, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that
they are entitled to qualified immunity because the right at
issue was not clearly established at the time Appellees sought
Jones’s arrest.
AFFIRMED

23