Nancy Morris v. Andrew Bland

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:12-cv-03177-RMG. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999968987]. [15-1115]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1115

NANCY MORRIS, as personal representative of the Estate of
David Allan Woods,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANDREW J. BLAND; RICHARD T. BURKHOLDER, SGT, officially
individually;
LEEMON
E.
CARNER,
PFC,
officially
individually; JERRY SPEISSEGGER, JR., PFC, officially
individually;
PRISCILLA
GARRETT,
SGT,
officially
individually,

and
and
and
and

Defendants – Appellants,
and
THE HOPE CLINIC, LLC; TEMISAN ETIKERENTSE; SUE BRABHAM,
R.N., officially and individually; H. WAYNE DEWITT, Berkeley
County Sheriff, officially and individually; JAMES M.
BROPHY, PFC, officially and individually; PATRICIA D.
COLLINS, SGT, officially and individually; CHARLES A.
DESANTO, CPL, officially and individually; ASHLEY A. HARBER,
PFC,
officially
and
individually;
KANSAS
DAAB,
PFC,
officially and individually; JOHN DOES, officially and
individually; CLIFFORD L. MCELVOGUE, Director, officially
and individually; BERKELEY COUNTY; BERKELEY COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT;
KENDRA
MOORE,
Staff
SGT,
officially
and
individually,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg.
Richard M. Gergel, District
Judge. (5:12-cv-03177-RMG)

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Argued:

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September 20, 2016

Decided:

November 16, 2016

Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Harold C. Staley, Jr., ELROD POPE LAW FIRM, Rock Hill,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Eugene P. Corrigan,
III, Amanda K. Dudgeon, CORRIGAN & CHANDLER LLC, Charleston,
South Carolina; James A. Stuckey, Jr., Alissa C. Lietzow,
STUCKEY LAW OFFICES, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellants. Garrett B. Johnson, ELROD POPE LAW FIRM, Rock Hill,
South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
This appeal arises from a plaintiffs’ verdict in connection
with the death of David Allan Woods during his incarceration at
the Hill-Finklea Detention Center (“HFDC”) in South Carolina.
The jury awarded substantial damages based on its finding that
Andrew J. Bland, Richard T. Burkholder, Leemon Carner, Priscilla
Garrett,

and

“Appellants”),
weekend

of

indifferent

Jerry
five

Woods’s
to

Speissegger,

HFDC

employees

present

incarceration,

Woods’s

serious

Jr.

had

medical

(collectively,
during

been
needs,

the

final

deliberately
and

thereby

deprived him of rights guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

On appeal, Appellants challenge various evidentiary

rulings, the punitive damages award, the setoff calculation, and
the denial of several post-trial motions.

Finding no error, we

affirm. *
I.
We detail the facts in the light most favorable to the
jury’s findings and conclusions.

David Allan Woods, then 50

years old, was incarcerated at HFDC from October 12 to November
8,

2010.

At

the

time

of

Woods’s

incarceration,

HFDC

had

contracted with Hope Clinic, LLC to provide medical services to
*

Although counsel for Appellants did not appear for oral
argument in this case, we have fully considered the arguments
set forth in the brief filed on their behalf.

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inmates.

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Medical personnel did not generally work onsite after

5 p.m., before 9 a.m., or over the weekend.
medical

issue

arose

after

hours,

a

Accordingly, if a

shift

sergeant

was

responsible for alerting on-call medical staff.
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on Friday, November 5, 2010, in
response

to

a

call

from

the

central

tower,

Shift

Sergeant

Garrett found Woods shaking on the floor of his cell.

Garrett

asked Woods what was wrong, if he could walk, and if he could
stand up.

Woods responded “I don’t know” to each question.

J.A. 487-88.

Garrett helped Woods to his feet and directed him

to a cell in M-Pod, a medical observation unit with cameras that
fed to the front control station.

Privates were assigned to the

front desk and were responsible for monitoring the video feed
during four-hour shifts.
Once in his M-Pod cell, Woods was unsteady on his feet and
needed assistance from his new cell mate, Freeman Ingraham, when
taking

off

his

uniform,

sitting

on

the

toilet,

and

drinking

water from a cup.

On several occasions, Ingraham attempted to

contact

the

desk

Garrett

returned

believed

he

front

saw

to

through

the

blood

cell,

in

the

intercom

Ingraham

Woods’s

system.

informed

stool.

her

Because

When
that

Woods

he
and

Ingraham had flushed the toilet, Garrett was unable to verify
the presence of blood.

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At 4:28 a.m. on Saturday, November 6, Speissegger entered
the

cell

to

administer

Woods’s

medication.

Woods

did

respond when asked if he would take his medication.

not

Woods’s

hands were visibly shaking and, despite instructions from both
Speissegger and Ingraham, Woods was unable to cup his hand to
accept the medication.

After the medication fell to the ground,

Speissegger left and noted in his log that Woods had refused the
medication.
At
sergeant.

5:30

a.m.,

Burkholder

relieved

Garrett

as

shift

Garrett notified Burkholder of Ingraham’s report of

blood in Woods’s stool, but Burkholder did not call the nurse or
attempt to observe any continued presence of blood.

Burkholder

testified that he visited Woods once during this shift, during
which he “saw [Woods] walking” and believed Woods “was fine.”
J.A. 634.
The record contains several clips of Woods taken during
Burkholder’s shift.

In one, Woods stands swaying in the middle

of his cell before falling backward onto his bunk.

In another,

Woods is lying on his bunk with a dark substance covering the
lower half of his uniform and bed.

Burkholder noted in his log

that Woods was “lying in his own feces and refused to shower.”
J.A. 650, 1165-66.

Garrett returned to duty at 5:30 p.m., and

she received and read the above log entry.

5

Another video clip

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from approximately 12:20 a.m. on Sunday, November 7, shows that
Woods’s condition remained unchanged.
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on November 7, Garrett arranged
for

a

work

crew,

including

Carner

and

Speissegger,

Woods’s cell and escort Woods to the showers.
that

Woods

stood,

walked,

undressed,

and

to

clean

Carner testified
bathed

without

assistance.

However, Garrett observed that Woods’s uniform was

soiled

a

with

noticed

dark,

he

was

black,

and

shaking,

hardened

substance,

disoriented,

and

and

she

unsteady.

Approximately 30 minutes after he returned to his cell, Woods
appeared disoriented and struggled to put on his uniform.

Three

hours later, when Carner brought Woods his breakfast, Woods was
lying naked on the floor.

Woods was disoriented, shivering, and

barely able to stand, and he required assistance when putting on
his uniform.

Carner believed that Woods’s symptoms were the

result of waking up on the cold floor, not from any need for
medical attention.
Garrett and Burkholder changed shifts at approximately 5:30
a.m., at which point Garrett told Burkholder he may want to call
the nurse to treat Woods.

Burkholder responded that he would

contact the nurse later on in his shift, but he did not do so.
At approximately 6:00 a.m., another HFDC employee, James Brophy,
interacted

with

Woods.

Brophy

noticed

that

Woods

had

wet

himself, and he and another officer assisted Woods in changing
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his uniform.

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Brophy prepared a written incident report wherein

he noted that Woods was disoriented, was “not able to stand but
for a short period of time,” “did not respond to any question
asked [of] him,” and “didn’t know where he was or why he was
here.”

J.A. 597-98, 1171.

passed to Burkholder.
on

Woods,

talking,”

Woods
and

The incident report was ultimately

Burkholder testified that when he checked

“was

up

Burkholder

walking

believed

with Mr. Woods at that time.”

around,

“[t]here

J.A. 659.

coherent,
was

nothing

[and]
wrong

Burkholder did not

call the nurse, but he copied the incident report and left it
for superior officers and medical staff to receive on Monday
morning.
At 5:30 p.m. on Sunday, November 7, Burkholder and Garrett
again changed shifts.

Garrett checked on Woods shortly after 6

p.m. and found him sitting naked in his cell.

She asked Woods

to put on his uniform to avoid the cold, and she asked if Woods
was in pain or had any complaints.
questions
Woods

was

with

grunts.

being

Garrett

“defiant,”

Woods responded to all her
testified

though

she

that

she

admitted

believed

having

knowledge of any past, uncooperative behavior from Woods.

no
J.A.

504-05.
At 10:19 p.m., Bland was at the front desk and observed
Woods lying naked on the cell floor.

Through the intercom,

Bland instructed Woods to get dressed.

Woods stood up, walked

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to the uniform lying on his bunk, and urinated onto it.

Woods

then stood, trembling violently, as he held onto the wall for
support.

At 2:15 a.m. on Monday, November 8, Bland entered

Woods’s cell to give him his medication.

Woods was again unable

to properly cup his hand, and Bland noted in his log that Woods
had refused his medication.
Woods was being “difficult.”

Bland testified that he believed
J.A. 729, 737.

After a new sergeant came on duty on Monday, November 8,
the staff nurse was called to examine Woods.

Woods was then

released with his sentence time-served and was transported to
Trident Medical Center, where he was found to be “stuporous” and
“hypotensive”

with

“a

hemoglobin

of

4.”

J.A.

450-51,

1257.

Woods’s “prognosis was felt to be bleak” when he was admitted.
J.A. 1258.
bleeding

Woods then underwent several procedures to address

ulcers

in

his

duodenum.

Woods

suffered

a

cardiac

arrest during the first procedure, but he was resuscitated.

On

November 11, 2010, Woods suffered another major intestinal bleed
above his stomach.
11,

2010.

An

gastrointestinal
esophageal
varices,

autopsy
bleeding

ulcers,
and

Woods passed away at 4:50 p.m. on November
revealed

his

from

duodenal

cirrhosis

cardiac

a

of

arrest

the

liver

secondary

bleeding.

8

cause

to

of

ulcer,
with

death

as

bleeding
esophageal

gastrointestinal

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Appellee

Nancy

Morris,

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as

personal

representative

of

Woods’s estate, filed this survival and wrongful death action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Morris filed the action against

eighteen defendants: the Hope Clinic and two of its employees
(collectively, the “Hope Defendants”), as well as Appellants,
Berkeley County, its Sheriff’s Office, and eight other county
employees
trial,

(collectively,

the

district

the

court

“County
approved

Morris and the Hope Defendants.

Defendants”).
a

to

reached

settlement

Prior

by

Ten of the County Defendants

were also dismissed voluntarily or by summary judgment.
case

then

indifference

proceeded

to

trial

claim

against

only

on

Morris’s

Appellants.

During

The

deliberate
trial,

the

parties were limited to presenting evidence that related to the
period

between

November

5

and

8,

2010,

deliberate indifference allegedly occurred.

when

Appellants’

The district court

also prohibited Appellants from introducing evidence regarding
the Hope Defendants, the settlement, their prior treatment of
Woods, or Woods’s history of alcohol use.
The jury determined that Appellants had been deliberately
indifferent to Woods’s serious medical needs during his last
weekend of incarceration.

The jury awarded compensatory damages

of $500,000 jointly, punitive damages of $150,000 each against
Bland,

Carner,

and

Speissegger,

and

punitive

$1,000,000 each against Burkholder and Garrett.
9

damages

of

The district

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court

then

resolved

Appellants.
judgment

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a

number

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of

post-trial

motions

filed

by

The district court denied Appellants’ motions for

as

a

matter

of

law,

new

trial,

and

remittitur.

However, it granted in part Appellants’ motion for setoff and,
upon applying portions of the Hope settlement proceeds, reduced
the compensatory damages award to $171,875.
appealed.

Appellants timely

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.
II.
We

begin

challenges.

by

addressing

Appellants’

various

evidentiary

This Court reviews the district court’s rulings on

the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.

Minter

v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.3d 339, 349 (4th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted).
Appellants first argue that the district court improperly
excluded

evidence

settlement,
2010.

and

related

their

Appellants

to

treatment

contend

the
of

this

Hope

Woods

Defendants,

before

evidence

is

the

November
relevant

5,
to

determining causation and the subjective state of mind required
for

deliberate

indifference.

However,

the

district

court

correctly noted that the central dispute at trial was whether
Woods’s

need

for

medical

treatment

over

his

last

weekend

of

incarceration was obvious to a layperson such that Appellants
should

have

reported

his

symptoms
10

to

medical

personnel.

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Appellants repeatedly testified they had no knowledge of Woods’s
medical history.

Nor did they provide any evidence to suggest

they relied on the Hope Defendants’ treatment history when they
observed

and

failed

to

adequately

respond

deteriorating health over the November 5-8 period.
considerations,
alleged

we

negligence

agree
in

that

the

treating

Hope

Woods

to

Given these

Defendants’

before

this

irrelevant to the deliberate indifference claim.

Woods’s

role

period

or
was

See, e.g.,

Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the

paramedics’

negligence

“could

not

have

constituted

an

‘intervening’ cause” where the plaintiff’s “claim was based on
defendants’ deliberate indifference to his . . . suffering after
the time of the initial paramedic exam.”).

Accordingly, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
aforementioned evidence.
Appellants also contend that the district court improperly
excluded evidence of Woods’s alcohol and drug use as well as its
impact on his medical condition.

However, Appellants provide

nothing but mere speculation when they argue that Woods’s use of
alcohol

and

drugs

“accelerat[ed]”

the

deterioration

of

his

health such that “no act or omission by Appellants proximately
caused

his

prejudicial

death.”
effect

Appellants’
of

such

Br.

evidence,

48.
and

Given

the

likely

given

Appellants’

failure to articulate the relevance or probative value of this
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evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in its exclusion under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Finally,

Appellants

argue

that

the

district

court

erred

when it “prohibited” Appellants from soliciting expert testimony
from Morris’s qualified medical expert, Dr. Jack Raba, as well
as

Appellants’

two

fact

Contrary

to

their

latitude

to

vigorously

testimony,
therefore

witnesses.

assertion,

discern

no

Appellants

cross-examine

especially

as

it

abuse

Appellants’
were

Dr.

pertained

of

discretion

44.

permitted

Raba
to

Br.

regarding

causation.

as

wide

to

this

his
We

expert

testimony.
We

similarly

find

no

abuse

of

discretion

as

to

the

examination of Appellants’ two fact witnesses, Dr. John Sanders
and

Dr.

Ellen

Reimers.

Dr.

Sanders

was

Woods’s

treating

physician before and after his incarceration at HFDC, and Dr.
Reimers

was

the

Notably,

however,

pursuant

to

pathologist
neither

Federal

who

witness

Rule

of

conducted
prepared

Civil

Woods’s
an

Procedure

autopsy.

expert

report

26(a)(2)(B).

Numerous courts have held that a physician is exempt from this
written report requirement only as to opinions formed during the
course of treatment.
Superstore,

LLC,

(collecting cases).

See, e.g., Goodman v. Staples The Office

644

F.3d

817,

824-26

(9th

Cir.

2011)

Here, both Dr. Sanders and Dr. Reimers were

fully permitted to discuss their examination of Woods and their
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diagnoses or findings.

Pg: 13 of 20

Their testimony was disallowed only to

the extent Appellants sought to “offer [expert] opinions as to
proximate

cause”

that

were

not

formed

during

the

course

of

treatment and thereby fell outside the scope of their opinions
as mere fact witnesses.

J.A. 380; see Fed. R. Evid. 701.

Under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), a party who fails to
provide information as required by Rule 26(a), including a Rule
26(A)(2)(B) expert report, is subsequently “not allowed to use
that information . . . at a trial” and may be sanctioned for
this

failure.

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

37(c)(1).

Accordingly,

the

district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
above testimony from Dr. Sanders and Dr. Reimers.
III.
Appellants

next

contend

that

Morris

failed

to

provide

adequate evidence to support the jury’s finding of deliberate
indifference

and,

as

a

result,

the

district

court

erred

in

denying their Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law
and their Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial.
the denial of a Rule 50(b) motion.

We review de novo

Durham v. Jones, 737 F.3d

291, 298 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

“If, viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there
is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found in
[the non-moving party’s] favor, we are constrained to affirm the
jury verdict.”

First Union Commercial Corp. v. GATX Capital
13

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411

551,

Corp.,

F.3d

556

Pg: 14 of 20

(4th

Cir.

2005)

(alteration

in

original) (quoting Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, 240 F.3d 255, 259
(4th Cir. 2001)).

The denial of a Rule 59(a) motion is reviewed

for abuse of discretion, and it “will not be reversed ‘save in
the most exceptional circumstances.’”

FDIC v. Bakkebo, 506 F.3d

286, 294 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d
625, 641 (4th Cir. 2002)).
To

prevail

on

an

Eighth

Amendment

claim

of

inadequate

medical care, a plaintiff must establish both a subjective and
an objective component to her claim.
225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008).
the

[prison]

officers

“The plaintiff must demonstrate that

acted

with

inmate’s

‘deliberate
‘serious

indifference’

(subjective)

to

(objective).”

Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976)).

the

Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d

medical

needs’

A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed

by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.”
F.3d

839,

846

(7th

Id. (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196

Cir.

1999)).

To

satisfy

the

subjective

component, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer had
“actual knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate” and that
the officer “recognized that his actions were insufficient to
mitigate the risk of harm . . . arising from [the inmate’s]
medical needs.”

Id. (internal quotation marks, citations, and
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emphasis

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omitted).

Whether

Pg: 15 of 20

an

officer

“had

the

requisite

knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to
demonstration

in

the

usual

circumstantial evidence.”

ways,

including

inference

from

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842

(1994) (citations omitted).
Upon viewing the trial testimony and evidence provided by
the

parties,

finding

of

we

a

find

serious

that

the

medical

evidence
need.

supports

The

videos

the
of

jury’s
Woods’s

conditions, Ingraham’s recognition of Woods’s need for medical
attention, and Brophy’s testimony and incident report suggest
that Woods’s medical need was “so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (citation omitted).

There is also ample

circumstantial evidence to support the subjective component of
this claim.

Based on the obviousness of an inmate’s medical

need, a jury is permitted to conclude that the prison officers
knew of the risk of harm to the inmate.
842.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at

Moreover, “a factfinder may conclude that the official’s

response . . . was so patently inadequate as to justify an
inference

that

the

official

actually

recognized

that

his

response to the risk was inappropriate under the circumstances.”
Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir.
2004).
the

As described, testified to, and captured in the record,

obviousness

of

Woods’s

medical
15

need

and

Appellants’

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inadequate
jury’s

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reactions

finding

of

to

Pg: 16 of 20

Woods’s

deliberate

symptoms

amply

indifference.

support

the

Accordingly,

we

discern no error in the district court’s denial of Appellants’
motions for relief under Rule 50(b) and Rule 59(a).
IV.
Appellants
award.

next

challenge

the

jury’s

punitive

damages

Appellants contend that the evidence did not support a

finding of punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, that the

punitive

damages

award

excessive,

that

awards

against

the

was

unconstitutionally

Garrett

and

Burkholder

—

and

which

were

almost seven times the awards against the remaining Appellants —
indicate the jury erred by holding the shift sergeants liable
for the conduct of their subordinates.

Appellants seek review

of the denials of their 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of
law, motion for remittitur, and 59(a) motion for new trial on
the above bases.
We

review

de

novo

the

denial

of

a

50(b)

motion

on

a

punitive damages award, and we review de novo the denial of a
motion for remittitur on a punitive damages award alleged to be
constitutionally excessive.

EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 513

F.3d 360, 370-71 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

We review

the denial of a 59(a) motion for abuse of discretion.

Gregg v.

Ham, 678 F.3d 333, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

16

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Punitive

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damages

are

Pg: 17 of 20

available

in

§

1983

actions

“for

conduct that involves ‘reckless or callous indifference to the
federally protected rights of others,’ as well as for conduct
motivated by evil intent.”

Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948

(4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)).
Based

on

the

deliberate

record

before

indifference

us,

to

we

conclude

Woods’s

that

serious

Appellants’

medical

needs

satisfies the requirement that their conduct involve reckless or
callous indifference to Woods’s federally-protected rights.

See

id.

for

(finding

punitive

that

damages

the

is

“callous

essentially

indifference
the

same

as

required
the

deliberate

indifference required for a finding of liability on the § 1983
claim” for inadequate medical care).
Moreover, we do not find the punitive damages award to be
constitutionally

excessive.

Contrary

to

Appellants’

contentions, the factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), and State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003),
support

the

jury’s

punitive

damages

award.

First,

given

Appellants’ repeated and deliberate indifference over a threeday

period,

Woods’s

physical

vulnerability,

and

Woods’s

resulting physical harm, we find that Appellants’ misconduct was
sufficiently
further

“reprehensible

sanctions

[beyond

as

to

warrant

compensatory
17

the

imposition

damages]

to

of

achieve

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punishment or deterrence.”

Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (citation

omitted).

total

Second,

approximately

five

the

times

the

punitive

damages

compensatory

damages

award

is

award,

and

single digit ratios generally do not present a constitutional
issue.

Id. at 425.

Appellants emphasize that the individual

punitive awards against Burkholder and Garrett reflect a 10-to-1
ratio,

but

a

high

ratio

may

nonetheless

“comport

with

due

process where ‘a particularly egregious act has resulted in only
a small amount of economic damages.’”

Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the compensatory damages award was deflated due to Woods’s
lack of lost wages.
not

use

the

damages

low

Based on the facts of this case, we “will

economic

award

that

reprehensibility

of

damages

was

award

to

otherwise

[Appellants’]

limit

that

the

punitive

damages

behavior.”

award

punitive

justified

in

by

the

Siggers-El

Barlow, 433 F.Supp.2d 811, 819 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
note

a

this

v.

Third, we

case

is

inconsistent with similar deliberate indifference cases.

not
See,

e.g., Murphy v. Gilman, 551 F. Supp. 2d 677, 685-86 (W.D. Mich.
2008)

(upholding

against

each

indifference

a

punitive

prison

over

a

damages

officer

five-day

award

defendant

period

during

of

$1.25

for
which

million

deliberate
an

inmate

received no medical care and little food and water, resulting in
his death).

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Finally, we find Appellants’ argument regarding supervisory
liability to be without merit.
that

Burkholder

Speissegger,

and

and

The evidence supports a finding

Garrett

Carner

in

were
their

Woods’s serious medical needs.

more

culpable

deliberate

than

Bland,

indifference

to

Thus, the record in this case

supports Burkholder and Garrett’s larger share of the punitive
damages award.

We therefore discern no error in the punitive

damages award or in the district court’s denial of Appellants’
post-trial motions.
V.
Finally,

Appellants

challenge

calculation of the setoff amount.

the

district

court’s

A district court’s decision

to set off a damage award is reviewed for clear error.

Atlas

Food Sys. and Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d
587, 596 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
“[S]tate law governs the substantive right to setoff.”
Under

South

Carolina

law,

“[a]

non-settling

defendant

Id.
is

entitled to credit for the amount paid by another defendant who
settles for the same cause of action.”

Rutland v. S.C. Dep’t of

Transp., 734 S.E.2d 142, 145 (S.C. 2012) (citation omitted).
Here, given that Morris’s settlement with the Hope Defendants
divided the settlement proceeds 50/50 between the survival and
wrongful

death

claims,

the

district

court

applied

division with respect to the jury’s § 1983 verdict.
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the

same

Because

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Woods could experience only one wrongful death, the court fully
offset the $250,000 of the jury verdict attributable to wrongful
death.

The district court then considered the survival portion

of Morris’s claims.
interacted

with

interactions

The court observed that the Hope Defendants

Woods

were

over

limited

29

to

days

Woods’s

whereas
last

Appellants’

four

days

of

incarceration, which amounted to only 14% of the settlement time
period.

However,

the

district

court

also

noted

that

Woods

experienced more pain and suffering during his last weekend of
incarceration.

Accordingly,

the

court

allocated

25%

of

the

survival settlement proceeds to the survival portion of the jury
verdict.

This

determination

resulted

in

a

total

setoff

of

$328,125.
The above calculation is reasonably based on the evidence
and fairly advances the policy of preventing double recovery.
Accordingly, we discern no clear error or abuse of discretion in
the district court’s calculation.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.

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