Adebowale Ojo v. Eric Holder, Jr.

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: A095 154 515. [999755168]. [15-1138]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1138

ADEBOWALE OLOYEDE OJO,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH,
Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.

Argued:

December 8, 2015

Decided:

February 16, 2016

Before MOTZ, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition for review granted; vacated and remanded by published
opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and
Judge Keenan joined.

ARGUED: Henry Caleb Griffin, GRIFFIN AND GRIFFIN, Annapolis,
Maryland, for Petitioner. Stefanie A. Svoren-Jay, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
ON
BRIEF: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, John S. Hogan, Assistant Director,
Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

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KING, Circuit Judge:
Adebowale Oloyede Ojo, a native of Nigeria and the adopted
son of a United States citizen, petitions for review of the
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) denying
a motion to reopen his removal proceedings.

In so ruling, the

BIA relied on its administrative interpretation of a provision
in the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”) relating to
adopted children, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i).

That

provision

BIA,

is

not

ambiguous

in

the

way

asserted

by

the

however, and thus does not contain a gap that Congress has left
for the BIA to fill.

Moreover, the BIA’s interpretation — which

summarily disregards

facially

contrary to law.

valid

state

court

orders

—

is

We therefore grant the petition for review,

vacate the BIA’s decision, and remand for further proceedings.

I.
A.
Before addressing the particulars of Ojo’s case, we briefly
sketch the

relevant

statutory

for foreign-born children.

framework

governing

citizenship

Section 1431(a) of Title 8 provides

that “[a] child born outside of the United States automatically
becomes a citizen of the United States when [three] conditions”
are satisfied:

2

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•

•

Second, “[t]he child is under the age of eighteen
years”; and

•

An

First, “[a]t least one parent of the child is a
citizen of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization”;

Finally, “[t]he child is residing in the United
States in the legal and physical custody of the
citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for
permanent residence.”

adopted

child

qualifies

as

a

“child”

for

purposes

of

§ 1431(a) if he was “adopted by a United States citizen parent”
and

satisfies

§ 1101(b)(1).

the

relevant

requirements

of

8

U.S.C.

See § 1431(b).

Section 1101(b)(1)(E)(i), in turn, defines a child as “an
unmarried

person

under

twenty-one

years

of

age,”

who

was

“adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child has
been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting
parent or parents for at least two years.”

The INA does not

provide its own definition of the term “adopted,” specify any
requirements for a proper adoption, or contemplate the BIA’s
involvement in any adoption proceedings.
A

foreign-born

remains an alien.

child

who

fails

to

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).

obtain

citizenship

The Department of

Homeland Security (the “DHS”) — acting on behalf of the Attorney
General — has the power to order certain aliens removed from the
United

States,

including

“aggravated felony.”

any

alien

who

has

committed

See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
3

an
For

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purposes

of

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§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),

an

“aggravated

felony”

is

defined in § 1101(a)(43).
B.
1.
The pertinent facts of this case are not in dispute.

Ojo

was born in Nigeria on August 28, 1983, and he lawfully entered
the United States in August 1989.

Two weeks later, on September

14, 1989, when Ojo was just six years old, his uncle — a United
States citizen — became Ojo’s legal guardian.

More than ten

years later, on June 19, 2000, when Ojo was sixteen, Ojo’s uncle
and the uncle’s wife filed a petition to adopt Ojo.

On January

24, 2001, after Ojo had turned seventeen, the Circuit Court for
Montgomery

County,

Maryland

(the

“Maryland

state

court”),

entered a judgment of adoption.
Between

2009

and

2012,

Ojo

was

convicted

of

two

drug-

related offenses, either of which qualifies as an “aggravated
felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
light

of

Ojo’s

convictions,

and

alleging

On May 6, 2013, in
that

Ojo

had

not

derived citizenship as an adopted child under 8 U.S.C. § 1431
and

8

U.S.C.

removability

§ 1101(b)(1)(E),
from

the

United

the

DHS

States

charged
under

him
8

with
U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
On May 15, 2014, an immigration judge (the “IJ”) determined
that Ojo was removable from this country by clear and convincing
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The IJ explained that, because Ojo turned sixteen on

August 28, 1999, and was not adopted by his citizen uncle until
he was already seventeen years old, he did not qualify as an
adopted child under § 1101(b)(1)(E).
derived

citizenship

from

his

As a result, Ojo had not

adoptive

father

(his

biological

uncle) pursuant to § 1431.
On June 25, 2014, the BIA received Ojo’s notice of appeal
of the IJ’s decision.

On September 10, 2014, in support of a

request for a remand to the IJ, Ojo advised the BIA that his
adoptive

father

Maryland

state

would
court

seek

a

nunc

specifying

effective before he turned sixteen. 1

pro

that

tunc
Ojo’s

order

from

adoption

the

became

Ojo asserted that the court

would likely grant such an order because — between the time Ojo
entered the United States at age six in 1989 and the approval of
his adoption in 2001 — he had lived continuously as the child of
his adoptive father.
On October 31, 2014, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Ojo
was removable, recognizing that Ojo had the burden of proving
his citizenship claim and showing that his adoption occurred
before

his

sixteenth

birthday.

1

Relying

on

the

judgment

of

The Latin phrase “nunc pro tunc” translates literally as
“now for then.”
See John Gray, Lawyer’s Latin 100 (2002).
An
order entered nunc pro tunc has “retroactive legal effect
through a court’s inherent power.”
See Black’s Law Dictionary
1237 (10th ed. 2014).
5

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adoption

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of

January

24,

seventeen when adopted.

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2001,

the

BIA

ruled

that

Ojo

was

Accordingly, the BIA decided that he

did not qualify as an adopted child under § 1101(b)(1)(E) for
purposes of derivative citizenship under § 1431.
concluded

that

Ojo’s

representation

that

his

The BIA also

adoptive

father

would seek an order from the Maryland state court making Ojo’s
adoption effective nunc pro tunc to a date before he turned
sixteen did not warrant a remand to the IJ.

Consequently, the

BIA dismissed Ojo’s appeal.
On November 24, 2014, Ojo filed a timely motion to reopen
his

removal

proceedings,

supported

by

a

nunc

pro

tunc

order

entered on October 29, 2014, by the Maryland state court.

That

order made Ojo’s adoption effective on August 27, 1999, the day
before he turned sixteen.

By a decision of January 12, 2015,

the BIA denied Ojo’s motion to reopen, observing that it “does
not

recognize

reaches

the

nunc

age

pro

limit

petition and decree.”

tunc
for

adoption

both

the

decrees
filing

after

of

the

a

child

adoption

For that principle, the BIA relied on its

prior decisions in Matter of Cariaga, 15 I. & N. Dec. 716 (BIA
1976), and Matter of Drigo, 18 I. & N. Dec. 223 (BIA 1982).
2.
In its Matter of Cariaga decision, the BIA had established
a blanket rule that “[t]he act of adoption must occur before the
child

attains

the

age

[specified
6

in

the

INA],”

thereby

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precluding any consideration of a nunc pro tunc order entered
after the relevant birthday but made effective before that date.
See 15 I. & N. Dec. at 717.

According to the BIA, “[t]hrough

the imposition of an age restriction on the creation of the
adoptive

relationship,

Congress

has

attempted

to

distinguish

between bona fide adoptions, in which a child has been made a
part of a family unit, and spurious adoptions, effected in order
to

circumvent

statutory

restrictions.”

Id.

Thereafter,

in

Matter of Drigo, the BIA relied on its Cariaga decision and
rejected the

contention

that

“a

decree

of

adoption

is

fully

effective as of the date entered nunc pro tunc and is entitled
to recognition for immigration purposes.”
at 224.

The BIA’s Drigo decision emphasized that “[i]t was

Congress’

intent

that

the

age

restriction

§ 1101(b)(1)(E)(i)] be construed strictly.”
In

See 18 I. & N. Dec.

other

words,

on

the

premise

in

[8

U.S.C.

Id. 2

that

its

decisions

in

Cariaga and Drigo would deter fraudulent and spurious adoptions,
the BIA embraced an interpretation of § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) that
flouted the effective dates of adoptions set forth in facially

2

The version of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) applicable in
Cariaga and Drigo required that the putative child be adopted
before turning fourteen.
In 1981, Congress amended that
provision and changed age fourteen to age sixteen.
See
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1981, Pub L. No. 97–116,
§ 2(b), 95 Stat. 1611, 1611 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(1)(E)(i)).
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valid nunc pro tunc orders entered by the various state courts
of

this

country.

Multiple

federal

courts

thereafter

substantial doubt on the BIA’s Cariaga/Drigo rule.

cast

See, e.g.,

Cantwell v. Holder, 995 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Hong v.
Napolitano,

772

F.

Supp.

2d

1270

(D.

Haw.

2011);

Gonzalez-

Martinez v. DHS, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. Utah 2009).
Only one of our sister courts of appeals has heretofore
addressed the viability of the Cariaga/Drigo rule in a published
opinion.

In Amponsah v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit concluded

“that the BIA’s blanket rule against recognizing nunc pro tunc
adoption

decrees

§ 1101(b)(1)

constitutes

and

that

an

impermissible

case-by-case

consideration

tunc adoption decrees is required.”
(9th

Cir.

2013).

The

Ninth

construction
of

nunc

of
pro

See 709 F.3d 1318, 1326

Circuit

withdrew

its

Amponsah

opinion a few months later, in September 2013, after the BIA
advised the court that it was considering whether to overrule or
modify the Cariaga/Drigo rule.

See Amponsah v. Holder, 736 F.3d

1172 (9th Cir. 2013).
3.
In support of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings,
Ojo invoked several of the federal court decisions discrediting
the

Cariaga/Drigo

decisions
addressing

rule.

across-the-board
the

Ninth

The

BIA,

as

“not

Circuit’s
8

however,
binding.”

Amponsah

rejected

those

Specifically

opinion,

the

BIA

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observed that Ojo’s “reliance on [Amponsah] is misplaced as this
decision was withdrawn.”

The BIA did not acknowledge that the

Ninth Circuit withdrew its Amponsah opinion because of the BIA’s
assurance

to

that

court

in

2013

that

it

was

revisiting

the

Cariaga/Drigo rule — the very rule on which the BIA then relied
in January 2015 to refuse to reopen Ojo’s removal proceedings.
On

February

10,

2015,

Ojo

filed

a

timely

petition

for

review of the BIA’s decision denying his motion to reopen.

We

possess jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
4.
On July 8, 2015, during the pendency of this proceeding,
the

BIA

modified

the

Cariaga/Drigo

rule

in

its

precedential

decision in Matter of Huang, 26 I. & N. Dec. 627 (BIA 2015).
The

Huang

decision

restriction

in

8

related

U.S.C.

that

Congress

imposed

an

age

§ 1101(b)(1)(E)(i)

because

it

was

concerned about “fraudulent adoptions that have no factual basis
for the underlying relationship,” as well as adoptions that,
“despite

having

the

appearance

of

validity,

are

actually

motivated by a desire to circumvent the immigration laws.”
id. at 629-30.

See

Huang also explained, however, that “the blanket

rule [from Cariaga and Drigo] we have applied for many years is
too limiting in that it does not allow us to adequately consider
the interests of family unity.”

Id. at 631.

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Pursuant to the new Huang rule, the BIA will recognize a
nunc pro tunc order relating to an adoption “where the adoption
petition was filed before the beneficiary’s 16th birthday, the
State in which the adoption was entered expressly permits an
adoption decree to be dated retroactively, and the State court
entered such a decree consistent with that authority.”
I. & N. Dec. at 631.
of

the

Federal

See 26

On July 22, 2015, pursuant to Rule 28(j)

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure,

the

Attorney

General notified our Court of the Huang decision and asserted
that, “under the new framework set forth in [Huang], Petitioner
[Ojo] still did not derive citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1431.” 3

II.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen removal
proceedings for abuse of discretion.
F.3d

177,

petition

182
for

(4th
review,

Cir.
the

See Lin v. Holder, 771

2014).

For

BIA’s

decision

3

our

Court

must

be

to

grant

a

“arbitrary,

At oral argument, the Attorney General’s counsel
maintained that her client would be entitled to press an
additional contention if this matter were remanded:
that Ojo
cannot qualify for citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) because
he did not become a legal permanent resident (an “LPR”) prior to
turning eighteen.
The LPR issue was an alternative ground for
the IJ’s ruling that Ojo is a non-citizen removable from this
country. The BIA did not reach the LPR issue, so it is not ripe
for our review in this proceeding.
See Mulyani v. Holder, 771
F.3d 190, 196 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[R]eview of an IJ decision is
permissible only to the extent that the BIA adopted it.”).
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capricious, or contrary to law.”

See Nken v. Holder, 585 F.3d

818, 821 (4th Cir. 2009).

III.
The dispute presented here between Ojo and the Attorney
General centers on the statutory phrase, “adopted while under
the age of sixteen years.”

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i).

More specifically, we must determine whether the term “adopted”
plainly denotes the effective date of an adoption, or whether
that term is ambiguous and could instead signify the date that
the act of adoption occurred.

Only if the term “adopted” is

ambiguous may we accord Chevron deference to the BIA’s policy of
summarily

disregarding

nunc

pro

tunc

orders

relating

to

adoptions conducted in the various state courts of this country
— a policy engendered in the Cariaga/Drigo rule and recently
modified in Huang.

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
A.
Congress has charged the Attorney General, and in turn the
BIA, with administering significant portions of the INA.
Fernandez

v.

Keisler,

502

F.3d

337,

343-44

(4th

Cir.

See

2007).

Thus, we generally evaluate the BIA’s interpretations of the
INA’s provisions by following the two-step approach announced by
the Supreme Court in Chevron.

See Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d
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349, 354 (4th Cir. 2012).

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At Chevron’s first step, we “examine

the statute’s plain language; if Congress has spoken clearly on
the precise question at issue, the statutory language controls.”
Barahona, 691 F.3d at 354 (internal quotation marks omitted).
If Congress has not so spoken, in that “the statute is silent or
ambiguous,

we

reasonable.”

defer

to

the

agency’s

interpretation

if

it

is

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

To resolve the initial inquiry under Chevron’s first step,
we focus “purely on statutory construction without according any
weight to the agency’s position.”

See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v.

FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir. 2006).

That is so “because

‘[t]he traditional deference courts pay to agency interpretation
is not to be applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of
Congress.’”

Id.

at

274

(quoting

Bd.

of

Governors,

FRS

v.

Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986)).
Preparing

to

handle

the

tools

of

statutory

construction

prompts us to emphasize, as we have frequently, that “the plain
language of the statute is . . . the most reliable indicator of
Congressional intent.”

See, e.g., Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d

276, 281–82 (4th Cir. 2005).
the

plain

text,

“then,

this

judicial inquiry is complete.”

If Congress’s intent is clear from
first

canon

is

also

the

last:

See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,

534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As

the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, however, “the meaning
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— or ambiguity — of certain words or phrases may only become
evident when placed in context.”

See King v. Burwell, 135 S.

Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We

therefore must “read the words in their context and with a view
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”

Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).
B.
1.
We begin with the text of the relevant statute.
considered

a

“child”

for

purposes

of

derivative

To be

citizenship

under 8 U.S.C. § 1431, an adopted child must, in pertinent part,
be “adopted while under the age of sixteen years.”
§ 1101(b)(1)(E)(i).

See 8 U.S.C.

A child is “adopted,” of course, through an

“adoption.”
An

adoption

is

“[t]he

creation

by

judicial

parent-child relationship between two parties.”

order

of

a

See Black’s Law

Dictionary 58 (10th ed. 2014); see also Black’s Law Dictionary
49 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “adoption” as the “[l]egal process
pursuant to state statute in which a child’s legal rights and
duties toward his natural parents are terminated and similar
rights and duties toward his adoptive parents are substituted”);
Black’s Law Dictionary 63 (3d ed., rev. 1944) (similar).
formal

legal

act

of

adoption

“creates

a

The

parent-child

relationship between the adopted child and the adoptive parents
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the

rights,

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privileges,

attach to that relationship.”

and

responsibilities

that

See Black’s Law Dictionary 58

(10th ed. 2014).
In

short,

an

“adoption,”

as

defined

contemplates a formal judicial act.

and

commonly

used,

Furthermore, it is well

understood that, in the United States, our various state courts
exercise full authority over the judicial act of adoption.
Adoptive

Couple

v.

Baby

Girl,

133

S.

Ct.

2552,

2565

See

(2013)

(Thomas, J., concurring) (observing that “[a]doption proceedings
are adjudicated in state family courts across the country every
day,

and

regarded

domestic
as

a

relations

virtually

is

an

exclusive

area

that

province

has
of

long

the

been

States”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).
With those principles in mind, we discern no indication
from the text of § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) — or from any other aspect
of the statutory scheme created in the INA — that Congress
intended to alter or displace the plain meaning of “adopted.”
The term “adopted” thus carries with it the understanding that
adoption proceedings in this country are conducted by various
state courts pursuant to state law.

Plainly, therefore, a child

is “adopted” for purposes of § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) on the date that
a state court rules the adoption effective, without regard to
the date on which the act of adoption occurred.

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2.
Viewing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) in the broader context
within which Congress legislates confirms our plain reading of
the statute.
legislature

Although the Constitution commits to the federal
the

Naturalization,”

power
see

“[t]o

establish

Const.

art. I,

an

§ 8,

uniform

of

Johnson

cl. 4;

Rule

v.

Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 130 (4th Cir. 2011), it has long been a
hallmark of our federalism principles that full authority over
domestic-relations

matters

resides

government, but in the several States.
U.S.

586,

593-94

(1890)

(“The

whole

not

in

the

national

See Ex parte Burrus, 136
subject

of

the

domestic

relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”).
To that end, “the Federal Government, through our history,
has

deferred

to

state-law

domestic relations.”

policy

decisions

with

respect

to

See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.

2675, 2691 (2013) (relying on De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S.
570, 580 (1956), wherein the Supreme Court itself observed that,
“[t]o determine whether a child has been legally adopted, for
example,

requires

a

reference

to

state

law”);

see

also

Full

Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (codifying federal policy
of deference to state court orders).

It is not surprising,

then, that the federal courts might look suspiciously upon a
federal agency that treads on a traditional judicial domain of
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the various States.
U.S.

Army

of

that

the

congressional
alters

See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v.

Corps

(explaining

intent

the

Pg: 16 of 18

Eng’rs,

when

U.S.

expect

courts

531

a

an

federal-state

159,

“clear

172-73

indication”

“administrative

framework

by

(2001)
of

interpretation

permitting

federal

encroachment upon a traditional state power”).
Here, if Congress had intended a modified definition of the
term

“adopted”

for

purposes

of

federal

immigration

law

and

sought to place the interpretation thereof in the hands of an
administrative agency, such as the BIA, Congress would have made
that intention “unmistakably clear.”

See Gregory v. Ashcroft,

501

quotation

U.S.

452,

(acknowledging
powers

under

460

(1991)

that

“the

our

(internal
States

retain

constitutional

substantial

scheme,

Congress does not readily interfere”).

marks

powers

omitted)
sovereign

with

which

Congress did not, for

example, specify requirements in the INA that, if met, would
confer upon a child the status of “adopted” for purposes of
federal

immigration

law.

Nor

did

Congress

explicitly

circumscribe state authority over adoptions in the immigration
context, as it has elsewhere.
at

2557

(majority

opinion)

See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct.

(observing

that

the

Indian

Child

Welfare Act of 1978 “establishes federal standards that govern
state-court
children”).

child

custody

proceedings

involving

Indian

Nor did Congress expressly confer on the Attorney
16

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Pg: 17 of 18

General or the BIA any power to override the States’ traditional
control

over

adoptions.

See

8

U.S.C.

§ 1103(g)

(outlining

powers and duties of Attorney General under INA).
Instead, in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i), Congress chose the
simple phrase, “adopted while under the age of sixteen years.”
The inclusion of an age requirement in the statute — without
more — cannot be read to create some power of federal agency
review

over

state

court

adoption

orders.

Thus,

when

an

individual has been “adopted” under § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) depends
on

the

effective

relevant

state

date

court

of

the

adoption

instruments.

as

Cf.

set

forth

in

Carachuri-Rosendo

the
v.

Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 576-78 (2010) (explaining that federal
immigration
determine

court

must

look

whether

state

to

state

offense

is

conviction

“aggravated

itself

felony”

to

under

INA).
Put

succinctly,

§ 1101(b)(1)(E)(i)
facially

valid

the

plain

forecloses

nunc

pro

the

tunc

meaning
BIA’s

orders

conducted by the various state courts.

of

“adopted”

summary
relating

disregard
to

in
of

adoptions

Although the BIA — in

its recent Huang decision — has jettisoned the Cariaga/Drigo
rule’s absolute prohibition on giving any effect to such orders
in immigration matters, the BIA nonetheless has continued to
automatically deny recognition to some.
not

ambiguous

under

Chevron’s
17

first

The term “adopted” is
step,

and

the

BIA’s

Appeal: 15-1138

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Filed: 02/16/2016

interpretations

that

Pg: 18 of 18

circumscribe

reliance

on

nunc

pro

tunc

orders are not entitled to deference.
In these circumstances, it was contrary to law for the BIA
not to recognize the nunc pro tunc order in Ojo’s case.

As a

result, the BIA abused its discretion in denying Ojo’s motion to
reopen his removal proceedings. 4

IV.
Pursuant

to

the

foregoing,

we

grant

Ojo’s

petition

for

review and vacate the BIA’s decision denying Ojo’s motion to
reopen his removal proceedings.

We remand to the BIA for such

other and further proceedings as may be appropriate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED;
VACATED AND REMANDED

4

We need not reach any issue of whether the Attorney
General or the DHS is entitled to demonstrate that a particular
state court nunc pro tunc order evinces a fraudulent or spurious
adoption.
Importantly, the Attorney General conceded at oral
argument that there are no indications of fraud with respect to
the 2014 nunc pro tunc order relating to Ojo’s adoption in the
Maryland state court.
18