Venus Springs v. Ally Financial Incorporated

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:10-cv-00311-MOC-DCK. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999897193]. [15-1244, 15-1888]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1244

VENUS YVETTE SPRINGS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALLY FINANCIAL INCORPORATED, f/k/a GMAC Incorporated; AMY
BOUQUE,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
KATHLEEN PATTERSON;
DAUTRICH,

YEQUIANG

HE,

a/k/a

Bill

He;

CYNTHIA

Defendants.

No. 15-1888

VENUS YVETTE SPRINGS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALLY FINANCIAL INCORPORATED, f/k/a GMAC Incorporated; AMY
BOUQUE,
Defendants - Appellees,
and

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KATHLEEN PATTERSON;
DAUTRICH,

YEQUIANG

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HE,

a/k/a

Bill

He;

CYNTHIA

Defendants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00311-MOC-DCK)

Submitted:

July 7, 2016

Decided:

July 26, 2016

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

No. 15-1244 remanded; No. 15-1888 vacated by unpublished per
curiam opinion.

Herman
Kaufman,
HERMAN
KAUFMAN,
ESQ.,
Old
Greenwich,
Connecticut, for Appellant. Venus Yvette Springs, SPRINGS LAW
FIRM PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, Appellant Pro Se.
Kirk
Gibson Warner, Clifton L. Brinson, SMITH, ANDERSON, BLOUNT,
DORSETT, MITCHELL & JERNIGAN, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Venus
affirming

Yvette
the

Springs

appeals

magistrate

the

judge’s

district

order

court’s

modifying

a

order
prior

protective order (No. 15-1244) and the court’s order denying in
part the motion for sanctions filed by Ally Financial, Inc., and
Amy Bouque (collectively, “Defendants”) and requiring Springs to
comply with the protective order (No. 15-1888).

The parties

raise several jurisdictional challenges on appeal.

We remand to

the district court for further proceedings in No. 15-1244 and
vacate the order in No. 15-1888.
I.
Defendants first argue that we lack jurisdiction over these
appeals.
and

We may exercise jurisdiction over only final decisions

certain

interlocutory

and

collateral

orders.

28

U.S.C.

§§ 1291, 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus.

Loan

decision

Corp.,

is

337

U.S.

typically

541,

one

by

545-47

(1949).

which

a

“A

district

final
court

disassociates itself from a case,” Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter,
558

U.S.

marks
leaves

100,

106

(2009)

omitted),

and

“ends

nothing

more

for

judgment.”

(alteration
the
the

and

litigation
court

to

internal
on

do

the
but

quotation

merits

and

execute

the

Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S.

863, 867 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude

that the district court’s orders are final, appealable orders
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for purposes of § 1291.

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Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield

Ass’n, 594 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2010); Solis v. Current Dev.
Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2009).
II.
Springs

challenges

the

district

court’s

subject

matter

jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ motions for a protective
order and for sanctions.

We review de novo a district court’s

determination of its subject matter jurisdiction.

Barlow v.

Colgate Palmolive Co., 772 F.3d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 2014) (en
banc).
Springs argues that Defendants’ motion did not present an
Article III case or controversy.

The Supreme Court, however,

has rejected the argument that the district court must have an
Article III case or controversy before it in order to consider
collateral issues.
(1992).

Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135-36

Because an order on a collateral issue “implicates no

constitutional concern[,] . . . it does not signify a district
court’s assessment of the legal merits of the complaint” and,
“therefore[,]

does

not

raise

the

issue

of

a

district

court

adjudicating the merits of a case or controversy over which it
lacks

jurisdiction.”

Id.

at

138

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
Springs

next

contends

that

the

motion

for

a

protective

order was not a proper collateral issue and, therefore, that the
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district

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court

lacked

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ancillary

jurisdiction.

“It

is

well

established that a federal court may consider collateral issues
after

an

action

is

no

longer

pending.”

Cooter

Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990).

&

Gell

v.

Proper collateral

issues “are independent proceedings supplemental to the original
proceeding and not a request for a modification of the original
decree.”

Id. at 395 (alteration and internal quotation marks

omitted).
We conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to
consider
order.

Defendants’

postjudgment

request

for

a

protective

Like disputes over attorney’s fees, costs, and sanctions

under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see id.
at

396,

adjudicating

Defendants’

request

for

a

postjudgment

protective order for materials gained during discovery in the
underlying litigation does not require that the district court
delve

into

the

merits

of

the

closed

litigation.

Moreover,

Defendants’ request clearly arises from—and is related to—the
underlying

litigation;

but

for

discovery

on

the

merits

of

Springs’ ultimately unsuccessful claims, Springs would not have
deposed

Bouque

nor

had

possession

of

the

video

of

Borque’s

deposition to later post on the internet.
Springs argues that her notice of appeal in No. 15-1244
divested

the

district

court

of

jurisdiction

sanctions order at issue in No. 15-1888.
5

to

enter

the

“Generally, a timely

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filed notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction of a case to the
court of appeals and strips a district court of jurisdiction to
rule

on

any

matters

Citizen,

749

F.3d

district

court

involved

246,

may

258

not

in

the

(4th

alter

appeal.”

Cir.

or

2014).

enlarge

the

Doe

v.

Pub.

“‘Although
scope

of

a

its

judgment pending appeal, it does retain jurisdiction to enforce
the judgment.’”

City of Cookeville v. Upper Cumberland Elec.

Membership Corp., 484 F.3d 380, 394 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
NLRB v. Cincinnati Bronze, Inc., 829 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir.
1987)).

We

jurisdiction

conclude
to

that

order

the

district

Springs

to

court

comply

with

therefore
the

had

original

protective order.
III.
Springs contends that a third party’s public dissemination
of the video rendered moot Defendants’ request for a protective
order.

The

Constitution

limits

the

jurisdiction

of

federal

courts to the adjudication of actual cases or controversies.
DeFunis

v.

Odegaard,

416

U.S.

312,

316

(1974)

(per

curiam).

“[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’
or

the

parties

outcome.”

lack

a

legally

cognizable

interest

in

the

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).

“A

case becomes moot, however, only when it is impossible for a
court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing
party.

As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however
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small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.”
Campbell-Ewald

Co.

v.

Gomez,

136

S.

Ct.

663,

669

(2016)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
We

conclude

that

the

request

was

not

moot.

While

the

district court could not order the third party to remove the
video, the

court

could

provide

some

remedy

to

Defendants

by

ordering Springs to use the videos only for purposes of the
litigation, thereby preventing her from using the deposition to
create new videos to post on the internet.
IV.
Finally,
authority

to

Springs
enter

challenges

an

order—rather

the

magistrate

than

a

judge’s

recommendation—on

Defendants’ postjudgment motion for a protective order.
Federal
U.S.C.

Magistrates
§§ 631-639

Act,

18

(2012),

U.S.C.

§§ 3401-3402

“delineates

and

scope of magistrate judges’ authority.

The

(2012),

circumscribes

28
the

In doing so, the Act

explicitly grants magistrate judges a number of specific powers,
. . .

[including]

pretrial

matter

the

authority

pending

before

‘to
the

hear
court,

and

determine

except’

for

any

eight

enumerated dispositive motions.”

United States v. Benton, 523

F.3d

2008)

424,

429-30

§ 636(b)(1)(A)).
for clear error.
[also]

may

be

(4th

Cir.

(quoting

28

U.S.C.

A district court reviews such determination
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
assigned

such

additional
7

“A magistrate judge
duties

as

are

not

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inconsistent
States.”

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with

the

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Constitution

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).

and

laws

of

the

United

Unlike a matter referred under

§ 636(b)(1)(A), review by the district court of a magistrate
judge’s discharge of duties under § 636(b)(3) is de novo.

In re

Application of the U.S. of Am. for an Order Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 2703(D) (“In re Application”), 707 F.3d 283, 289
(4th Cir. 2013).

In the absence of consent by the parties, a

magistrate

lacks

authority

merits

of

disposing

judge
of

the

enter

a

claim.

a

to

Fed.

R.

final
Civ.

order
P.

72;

Aluminum Co. of Am. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 663 F.2d 499,
501 (4th Cir. 1981).
Generally, a district court refers pretrial discovery to a
magistrate

judge

under

§ 636(b)(1)(A)

orders for clear error.

and

reviews

discovery

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Ocelot

Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1462 (10th Cir.
1988)

(“Discovery

is

§ 636(b)(1)(A)].”).

clearly

a

pretrial

matter

[under

Here, however, Defendants filed the motion

for a protective order after judgment was entered—not as part of
ongoing

discovery

in

an

open

case.

Neither

the

Federal

Magistrates Act nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address
whether

a

magistrate

judge

has

authority

to

adjudicate

postjudgment motions.
We conclude that the magistrate judge lacked authority to
enter an order on Defendants’ motion for a protective order.
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magistrate judge may not decide, postjudgment, a motion that
would be a proper pretrial motion under § 636(b)(1)(A) because
“resolution of such motions is dispositive of a claim.”
v.

City

of

Ferndale,

7

F.3d

506,

510

(6th

Cir.

Massey

1993);

see

Rajaratnam v. Moyer, 47 F.3d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 1995); Aluminum
Co.

of

Am.,

663

F.2d

at

501

(holding

that

motion

to

quash

subpoena “was not a ‘pretrial matter’ but set forth all of the
relief requested”).

Therefore, the district court was required

to provide de novo review; its order makes clear, however, that
it reviewed only for clear error.

In re Application, 707 F.3d

at 289; Aluminum Co. of Am., 663 F.2d at 501-02.

“Although this

standard is not necessarily inconsistent with the requirements
of a de novo determination, the district judge did not clearly
indicate that he afforded the parties a de novo determination.
In order to satisfy the [Federal Magistrates] Act, he must do
so.”

Aluminum Co. of Am., 663 F.2d at 502.
V.
Accordingly, we remand the order in No. 15-1244 for a de

novo review of the magistrate judge’s order.

Because the order

in No. 15-1888 depends on the existence of the protective order,
we vacate the portion of the sanctions order requiring Springs
to comply with the protective order.

We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

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presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
No. 15-1244 REMANDED;
No. 15-1888 VACATED

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