Carla Calobrisi v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:14-cv-00996-AJT-MSN. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999915296].. [15-1331, 15-1399]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1331

CARLA CALOBRISI,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
-----------------------AARP,
Amicus Supporting Appellant.

No. 15-1399

CARLA CALOBRISI,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, INC.,
Defendant - Appellant.
-----------------------AARP,
Amicus Supporting Appellee.

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Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Anthony J. Trenga,
District Judge. (1:14-cv-00996-AJT-MSN)

Argued:

March 24, 2016

Before GREGORY,
Judges.

Chief

Decided:

Judge,

and

MOTZ

and

August 23, 2016

KEENAN,

Circuit

Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Linda Marie Correia, CORREIA & PUTH, PLLC, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Stephen William Robinson,
MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Tysons Corner, Virginia, for Appellee/CrossAppellant. ON BRIEF: Amber C. Trzinski Fox, Jonathan C. Puth,
CORREIA & PUTH, PLLC, Washington, D.C.; John R. Ates, ATES LAW
FIRM,
Alexandria,
Virginia,
for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Melissa
L.
Taylormoore,
Sarah
A.
Belger,
MCGUIREWOODS
LLP, Tysons
Corner,
Virginia,
for
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Daniel B. Kohrman, Laurie A. McCann, Dara S. Smith, AARP
FOUNDATION LITIGATION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
This case principally involves Carla Calobrisi’s contention
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
Booz

Allen

Hamilton,

Inc.

on

her

age-

and

gender-based

employment discrimination and retaliation claims.
Booz Allen is a professional services consulting firm with
offices throughout the country and around the globe.

Beginning

in 2000, Calobrisi worked in the company’s Law Department.

In

2004, Booz Allen promoted her to Principal, and she remained in
that position and gained more responsibility over the years,
until 2011.
On
demote

January

20,

Calobrisi

2011,

(then

her

age

supervisors

fifty-five)

met

back

and
to

agreed
the

to

Senior

Associate level and to transfer many of her responsibilities to
two younger women.

At a meeting on January 26, her supervisors

informed her of the demotion, explaining that it was due to
workload changes and not her performance; they also told her
that the demotion was non-negotiable.
Calobrisi remained in her position.

Although disappointed,

Shortly after her demotion

she sought Principal positions in other Booz Allen departments
but was informed that her reputation had been ruined by the
demotion.
the

result

After Calobrisi raised concerns that her demotion was
of

age

and

gender

discrimination,

her

supervisor

suggested that she transition out of Booz Allen if she harbored
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such concerns.
The

company

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Calobrisi left Booz Allen on October 31, 2011.

selected

a

thirty-one-year-old

male

to

fill

2013,

Calobrisi

filed

complaint

Columbia

Superior

Court

her

in

the

position.
On

May

District

31,

of

a

alleging

sex-based

discrimination under Title VII, age-based discrimination under
the

Age

Discrimination

in

Employment

Act,

violations

of

the

District of Columbia Human Rights Act, and retaliation claims
associated with each of these claims.

Booz Allen removed the

case to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia

where,

after

discovery

on

jurisdictional

and

venue

issues, the court dismissed the Human Rights Act claims.

The

court then transferred the case to the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia because most of the alleged acts
took place in McLean, Virginia.
court

granted

Calobrisi’s

Booz

Allen’s

discrimination

On March 24, 2015, the district

motion

and

for

summary

retaliation

claims,

Booz Allen’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

judgment
but

on

denied

Both parties noted

appeals to this Court.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo,

viewing

nonmoving

the

party

facts

and

in

making

the

light

most

all

reasonable

favorable

to

the

inferences

in

her

favor.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50

(1986).

To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must establish
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a genuine dispute of material fact supporting her claims.

Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
(1986).
grant

We affirm, on the reasoning of the district court, the
of

summary

judgment

to

Booz

Allen

on

Calobrisi’s

retaliation claim and to Calobrisi on Booz Allen’s request for
sanctions.
grant

of

For the following reasons, however, we reverse the
summary

judgment

to

Booz

Allen

on

Calobrisi’s

discrimination and constructive discharge claims.
Calobrisi
McDonnell

has

Douglas

chosen

to

pursue

burden-shifting

her

claims

framework.

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
steps to the McDonnell Douglas framework:

See

under

the

McDonnell

There are three
(1) the plaintiff

starts with the burden of establishing a prima facie employment
discrimination case; 1 (2) once the plaintiff meets that burden,

1

To establish a prima facie case of gender-based employment
discrimination under Title VII, Calobrisi must show “(1) she is
a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered adverse
employment action; (3) she was performing her job duties at a
level that met her employer’s legitimate expectations at the
time of the adverse employment action; and (4) the position
. . . was filled by similarly qualified applicants outside the
protected class.”
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt.,
Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
The same
analysis is conducted for age discrimination claims, except that
the replacement employee need only be “substantially younger”
rather than outside the protected class.
Dugan v. Albemarle
Cty. Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d 716, 721 (4th Cir. 2002).
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the employer must articulate 2 a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for taking the adverse employment action at issue; (3)
finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the stated reason for the adverse employment action is a mere
pretext for a true discriminatory purpose.

Tex. Dep’t of Cmty.

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
step,

“the

burden

to

demonstrate

pretext

In the third

merges

with

the

ultimate burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has
been

the

victim

of

intentional

discrimination.”

Hill

v.

Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th
Cir.

2004)

(en

banc)

(alteration

in

original)

(internal

quotation marks omitted).
The parties and the district court agree that Calobrisi
established a prima facie case and that Booz Allen presented a
non-discriminatory justification.

The determinative question,

therefore, is did Calobrisi produce sufficient evidence for a
jury to conclude that the stated reason for her demotion was
pretext disguising a discriminatory purpose.
Calobrisi

alleges

that

Booz

Allen

maintained

a

glass

ceiling that prevented female employees, particularly those who
were

older

or

in

higher

ranking

2

positions,

from

advancing.

The burden at this step is one of production, not
persuasion. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 142 (2000).
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According to Calobrisi, her demotion resulted from her running
headfirst into

that

glass

ceiling.

To

support

this

theory,

Calobrisi offers “other employee” evidence, 3 which consists of
the testimony of seven former Booz Allen employees, all middleaged women, who contend that they had been targeted for adverse
employment actions similar to those that Calobrisi experienced.
The

district

employee

court,

evidence

summarily

would

not

concluding

be

admissible

that
at

this

trial,

other

did

not

consider this evidence when ruling on Booz Allen’s motion for
summary judgment.
The Supreme Court, however, has held that other employee
evidence “is neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible.”
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 381 (2008).
Rather,

a

court

must

engage

in

the

standard

inquiry for each piece of other employee evidence.

admissibility
That is, the

court must determine if the evidence is relevant under Rule 401,
and, if so, whether it should nevertheless be excluded under
Rule

403.

Id.

at

387-88.

The

question

of

whether

other

employee evidence is relevant “is fact based and depends on many
factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the
plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.”

3

Id. at 388.

The parties and district court have referred to this
testimony as “me-too,” “other employee,” and “pattern and
practice” evidence.
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factors

admissibility

that

courts

this

of

discriminatory

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evidence

behavior

consider

when

include:

described

“is

determining

whether

close

in

the

time

the
other

to

the

events at issue in the case, whether the same decisionmakers
were

involved,

whether

the

witness

and

the

plaintiff

were

treated in a similar manner, and whether the witness and the
plaintiff

were

otherwise

similarly

situated.”

Griffin

v.

Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 599 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elion v.
Jackson, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008)).

“As a general

rule, the testimony of other employees about their treatment by
the

defendant

is

relevant

discriminatory intent.”

to

the

issue

of

the

employer’s

Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150,

1156 (10th Cir. 1990).
The district court did not individually analyze each piece
of other employee evidence pursuant to factors like those listed
in Griffin.

Nor did the court determine “how closely related

the evidence [was] to [Calobrisi’s] circumstances and theory of
the

case.”

sentence,

Sprint,
the

552

court

U.S.

at

conducted

388.
very

Rather,

in

a

nearly

its

single
entire

admissibility analysis, calling the witnesses “former employees
who held a variety of jobs, at a variety of times between 2007
and 2014, under a variety of managers, in different aspects of
the Booz Allen organization.”
similar

treatment

This analysis ignores both the

experienced

by
8

Calobrisi

and

the

other

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employee witnesses and the overlap of several decisionmakers at
Booz Allen.

This approach is not the one contemplated by the

Supreme Court in Sprint.
The district court also placed too much emphasis on its
concern with “mini-trials.”

While this concern “is legitimate,”

accommodating it in every case “would tend to exclude any ‘other
acts’ evidence, regardless of how closely related it is to the
plaintiff’s circumstances.”

Griffin, 689 F.3d at 600.

Rather,

a court should analyze whether the probative value of the other
employee evidence outweighs the potential for distraction.
On

remand,

the

district

court

may

find

that

some

of

Calobrisi’s proffered other employee evidence is admissible, and
thus relevant for summary judgment purposes.
court

could

testimony

determine

is

relevant

that

some

of

on

the

based

For example, the

the

other

common

employees’

decisionmakers

involved in the witnesses’ departures and the similarities of
the departures’ circumstances.
Allen’s

all-male

“Leadership

For example, members of Booz
Team”

triggered

several

of

the

departures and each featured an abrupt demotion or revocation of
responsibilities after years of positive reviews, leading to a
separation

from

Booz

Allen

employment

that

the

company

characterized as voluntary but that the witnesses characterized
differently.

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From our vantage point, this evidence appears relevant but
“because the inquiry required by [Rules 401 and 403] is within
the province of the [d]istrict [c]ourt in the first instance,”
Sprint, 552 U.S. at 388, we remand the case to that court.

On

remand, the court can determine whether this evidence would be
admissible at trial and whether it creates a genuine dispute of
material

fact

such

that

Calobrisi’s

discrimination

and

constructive discharge claims should survive summary judgment. 4

AFFIRMED IN PART AND
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

4

On remand, the district court should also reconsider the
other evidence of discrimination Calobrisi presented. Calobrisi
proffered evidence that Booz Allen’s reasons for her demotion
shifted, that those reasons were false, that Booz Allen
attempted
to
obfuscate
the
decisionmaker,
and
other
circumstantial evidence.
When considered along with the other
employee evidence, and in the light most favorable to Calobrisi,
this circumstantial evidence of intent may present a genuine
dispute of material fact that precludes summary judgment.
10