Calvin Norton v. Jeffrey Rosier
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:14-cv-00260-BO Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999731490]. Mailed to: Calvin Norton. [15-1383]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1383
CALVIN TYRONE NORTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JEFFREY ROSIER,
WHITEVILLE,
in
his
individual
capacity;
CITY
OF
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.
Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (7:14-cv-00260-BO)
Submitted:
November 24, 2015
Decided:
January 7, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Calvin Tyrone Norton, Appellant Pro Se.
CROSSLEY MCINTOSH COLLIER, Wilmington,
Appellees.
Clay Allen Collier,
North Carolina, for
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Calvin Tyrone Norton filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action
against Jeffrey Rosier, Chief of Police of Whiteville, North
Carolina,
and
the
“Defendants”).
City
of
Whiteville
(collectively,
Norton alleged that Rosier violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by conducting a traffic stop of his vehicle in
South Carolina, without justification or lawful authorization as
a certified police officer, and that the City of Whiteville had
facilitated
Rosier’s
Defendants’
motion
actions.
to
The
dismiss,
district
concluding
court
that
the
granted
alleged
encounter with Rosier was so de minimis as to fail to constitute
a
constitutional
violation;
that
Norton
failed
to
allege
an
official policy, practice, or custom of Whiteville that would
permit
municipal
liability
under
§ 1983;
and
that
it
lacked
jurisdiction over Norton’s pendent state law claims.
On appeal, Norton challenges the dismissal of his § 1983
claim against Rosier and Whiteville.
As a threshold matter, we address the jurisdictional issues
raised by Defendants in their informal brief, which rely on a
prefiling
injunction
imposed
Carolina state courts.
against
Norton
in
See Home Buyers Warranty
Corp. v. Hanna, 750 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 2014).
in
the
district
North
We review questions of law related to
subject matter jurisdiction de novo.
error
the
court’s
2
conclusion
that
We find no
neither
the
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Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine nor the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (2012), deprived the court of authority to decide
Norton’s claims.
See Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 464 (4th
Cir. 2006) (discussing Rooker-Feldman); Davani v. Va. Dep’t of
Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 718 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); Davenport v.
N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 3 F.3d 89, 92 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing
Full Faith and Credit Act).
Turning to the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
determination, we review de novo the dismissal of a complaint
for failure to state a claim, accepting factual allegations in
the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party.
Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t
v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012).
survive
a
motion
to
dismiss,
the
complaint’s
To
“[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative
level”
and
to
plausible on its face.”
“state
a
claim
to
relief
that
is
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 570 (2007).
The temporary detention of an individual during a traffic
stop, even if only for a limited time or purpose, constitutes a
Fourth Amendment seizure.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
1
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);
Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
3
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809-10 (1996).
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Because a routine traffic stop is more like an
investigative detention than a custodial arrest, we evaluate a
traffic stop under the test set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968).
United States v. Green, 740 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 207 (2014).
Under this inquiry, the
officer’s decision to stop the vehicle must be both “justified
at
its
inception”
duration.”
adequately
“limited
both
in
scope
and
United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506-07
(4th Cir. 2011).
Terry
and
stop
only
articulable
A police officer is entitled to initiate a
where
suspicion
criminal activity.”
it
is
that
“supported
the
person
by
a
seized
reasonable
is
and
engaged
in
United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In his complaint, Norton alleged that Rosier stopped him
despite the fact that he was not speeding or violating any law
at the time of the stop.
Moreover, he alleged that Rosier did
not
him
charge
Accepting
him
these
or
warn
allegations
that
as
he
true,
as
had
we
violated
must
on
a
law.
a
Rule
12(b)(6) motion, we conclude that Norton has alleged a violation
of
the
Fourth
Amendment.
See
Digiovanni,
650
F.3d
at
506
(noting that a vehicle stop must be “justified at its inception”
to satisfy the Fourth Amendment); id. (noting that stopping an
automobile is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if there is
a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred).
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While we have reviewed the alternative arguments Defendants have
proffered
in
support
of
the
dismissal
of
Amendment claim, we find them unpersuasive.
Norton’s
Fourth
Thus, we conclude
that the district court’s dismissal of Norton’s § 1983 claim
against Rosier must be vacated.
We
find
conclusion
no
that
error,
Norton
however,
failed
to
in
the
allege
an
district
court’s
official
policy,
practice, or custom sufficient to state a claim against the City
of Whiteville.
Cir.
1999).
See Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th
Additionally,
we
note
that
Norton’s
state
law
claims were dismissed solely due to the absence of a cognizable
federal claim; as we reinstate the federal claim against Rosier,
dismissal of the pendent state law claims on this basis cannot
stand.
In reinstating Norton’s state law claims, we express no
opinion as to the merits of these claims or the propriety of
exercising
supplemental
jurisdiction
over
them,
leaving
that
determination to the district court in the first instance.
Accordingly,
we
affirm
the
district
court’s
judgment
in
part, insofar as it exercises subject matter jurisdiction over
the action and dismisses Norton’s § 1983 claim against the City
of Whiteville; vacate the district court’s judgment in part,
insofar as it dismisses Norton’s § 1983 claim against Rosier and
his
pendent
state
law
claims;
5
and
remand
for
further
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before
this
court
and
argument
would
not
aid
the
decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
2
We have reviewed Norton’s supplemental reply briefs but
find no basis for imposing sanctions against Defendants or their
counsel.
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