Eileen Hylind v. Xerox Corporation

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:03-cv-00116-PJM Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999716657]. Mailed to: Eileen M. Hylind. [15-1425, 15-1438]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1425

EILEEN M. HYLIND,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
XEROX CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.

No. 15-1438

EILEEN M. HYLIND,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
XEROX CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:03-cv-00116-PJM)

Submitted:

October 30, 2015

Decided:

Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

December 11, 2015

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Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eileen M. Hylind, Appellant/Cross-Appellee Pro Se.
Marcuss, Adam Thomas Simons, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP,
Maryland, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Elena D.
Baltimore,

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Eileen M. Hylind successfully sued Xerox Corp. (“Xerox”)
for gender discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1),
2000e-3(a) (2012).

In a previous appeal, we affirmed most of

the district court’s rulings, but vacated the back pay award and
remanded to the district court for it to re-assess its offset
determinations in light of Sloas v. CSX Transp., Inc., 616 F.3d
380, 389–90 (4th Cir. 2010).

Hylind v. Xerox Corp., 481 F.

App’x 819, 825 (4th Cir. 2012).
held

that

payments

Xerox

made

On remand, the district court
to

Hylind

pursuant

to

disability plan did not offset Hylind’s back pay award.

its
Xerox

appeals this ruling, and Hylind cross-appeals several elements
of

the

district

court’s

calculation

of

her

back

pay

and

interest.
Xerox argues that most of Hylind’s claims are barred by the
mandate rule.
part

or

for

We agree.
a

limited

When a judgment is vacated only in

purpose,

the

mandate

rule

“forecloses

relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the
appellate court,” as well as “issues decided by the district
court but foregone on appeal or otherwise waived, for example
because they were not raised in the district court.”

United

States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation

marks

omitted).

We
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previously

rejected

Hylind’s

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claims that the district court erred in determining the number
of years of lost wages to which she was entitled and the pay
rate for those wages.

Hylind, 481 F. App’x at 824-25 & n.2.

Accordingly, the mandate rule bars us from reconsidering that
decision in the present appeal.

Likewise, because Hylind failed

to challenge the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest
on

her

compensatory

damages

and

costs

awards

in

appeal, we cannot consider these challenges now.

her

first

Finally, we

affirm the district court’s decision to deny Hylind’s motion to
alter

or

amend

the

judgment

to

increase

the

benefits

amount

included in her back pay award because that motion was barred by
the mandate rule.
We turn next to Xerox’s claim that the district court erred
by denying it an offset for the payments it made to Hylind under
its disability plan.

“The collateral source rule holds that

compensation from a collateral source should be disregarded in
assessing

. . .

damages.”

quotation marks omitted).

Sloas,

616

F.3d

at

389

(internal

“We . . . consider a benefit to be

from a collateral source unless it results from payments made by
the employer in order to indemnify itself against liability.”
Id. at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In determining that Xerox’s disability payments constituted
a collateral source, the district court applied the five factors
set forth in Allen v. Exxon Shipping Co., 639 F. Supp. 1545,
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1548

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(D.

Filed: 12/11/2015

Me.

assessment

of

1986).
these

district court.
is

clear

that

We

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agree

factors

for

with
the

the

district

reasons

stated

court’s
by

the

Moreover, viewing the evidence as a whole, it
Xerox’s

disability

plan

was

designed

as

an

employee benefit, and not to indemnify Xerox against liability.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s back pay award.
Hylind

appeals

several

interest computations.

aspects

of

the

district

court’s

First, Hylind argues that the district

court erred by using Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) to alter its November
8,

2013

order

that

postjudgment

interest

on

Hylind’s

compensatory damages award would run from June 29, 2007.
if

we

were

to

conclude

that

the

corrective action is necessary.

district

court

Even

erred,

no

The compensatory damages award

was affirmed in all respects by our decision in the earlier
appeal

of

this

case.

Thus,

the

district

court

was

without

authority to alter any aspect of the compensatory damages award.
The court’s April 23, 2014 order merely restored that award to
the state that was affirmed in our prior decision, and thus
requires no correction.
Hylind

also

argues

that

the

district

court

erred

by

assessing postjudgment interest on her back pay award from the
date of the judgment prior to remand rather than the date of the
judgment following remand.

We conclude that the district court

did not err, as our prior decision vacated the back pay award to
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permit the district court to reconsider its application of the
collateral source rule—but did not affect Hylind’s entitlement
to

at

appeal.

least

the

quantum

of

back

pay

awarded

prior

to

that

Thus, the date of the prior judgment awarding back pay

was the proper date for commencement of postjudgment interest.
See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827,
835-36 (1990).
Hylind further argues that the district court should have
amended its calculation of prejudgment interest on her back pay
award pursuant to Rule 60(a).

However, the record does not

indicate that the district court’s calculations were the product
of a mathematical error rather than a deliberate decision to
estimate Hylind’s salary as accruing on September 17 of each
year.

Accordingly, we find that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Hylind’s Rule 60(a) motion.
Finally,

Hylind

challenges

the

district

court’s

order

denying her motion for an order requiring postjudgment interest
after

July

reiterates

31,
that

2014.
Hylind

This
is

order

entitled

stated:
to

“The

simple

[c]ourt

postjudgment

interest at the federal legal rate from the date of judgment
until paid.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

. . .

Simple postjudgment

interest at the federal legal rate continues to accrue after
July 31, 2014 until paid.”

Hylind correctly notes that she is

entitled to compound interest, not simple interest.
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28 U.S.C.

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§ 1961(b) (2012).
intend

this

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It appears that the district court did not

language

to

constitute

an

order

that

simple

postjudgment interest accrue following July 31, 2014, but was
merely observing that the law already provided that postjudgment
interest

would

accrue

after

that

date.

Nonetheless,

for

purposes of clarity, we modify the district court’s order to
clarify that compound, rather than simple, postjudgment interest
applies.
In sum, we modify the district court’s March 25, 2015 order
to state that postjudgment interest is compound interest, rather
than simple interest, and affirm that order as modified.

We

affirm the district court’s rulings in all other respects. ∗

We

dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

∗

We deny Hylind’s request for a ruling that district
court’s calculation of her benefits amount does not have a
preclusive effect on future litigation should Xerox engage in
future illegal acts. See Scoggins v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners
Ass’n, 718 F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A] claim is not ripe
for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that
may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

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