Gerard Ousley v. Robert McDonald

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cv-00031-WO-LPA Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999823232].. [15-1482]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1482

GERARD OUSLEY,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
ROBERT A. MCDONALD, Secretary of the Department of Veterans
Affairs,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:12-cv-00031-WO-LPA)

Submitted:

April 27, 2016

Decided:

May 16, 2016

Before KING, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James E. Hairston, Jr., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Sharon C. Wilson, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Gerard Ousley appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment,

which

Department

dismissed
Veterans

of

his

complaint

Affairs

alleging

engaged

that

in

the

race-based

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act,

42

U.S.C.

§§ 2000e

to

2000e-17

(2012).

Specifically,

Ousley alleged that he was wrongly removed from his position as
Police

Chief

at

the

Department

of

Veterans

Center in Durham, North Carolina (“DVAMC”).
argues

that

permitting

the
only

district
limited

court

Medical

On appeal, Ousley

abused

discovery

Affairs

its

before

discretion

granting

in

summary

judgment and erred, as a matter of law, in granting summary
judgment.
We

We affirm.

review

a

district

court’s

decision

to

grant

judgment without discovery for abuse of discretion.

summary

See Harrods

Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir.
2002).
the

Generally, “summary judgment [should] be refused where

nonmoving

party

has

not

had

the

opportunity

information that is essential to his opposition.”
Liberty

Lobby,

reviewing

the

discretion
limited

in

Inc.,
record
the

discovery

judgment motion.

477
in

U.S.
this

district
before

242,
case,

court’s

ruling

on

250
we

n.5

the

discover

Anderson v.

(1986).

discern

decision

to

to

no

After

abuse

permit

Secretary’s

of

only

summary

The parties engaged in substantial discovery
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before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, where Ousley
was represented by counsel.

Further, Ousley fails to specify

the manner in which additional discovery would alter the result
in this case.
We next review the merits of the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party.

Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of

Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2015).

Summary judgment

is only appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”
“the

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

nonmoving

allegations,

party

mere

must

In opposing summary judgment,

rely

speculation,

the

on

more

building

than
of

one

conclusory
inference

upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.”
Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
Title VII prohibits federal employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of race.
(2012).

Every

treatment

on

ultimate

case

the

question:

in

basis

which
of

“whether

intentional discrimination.”

a

a

plaintiff

protected

the

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
alleges

trait

plaintiff

was

disparate

poses

the

same

the

victim

of

Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics,

354 F.3d 277, 286 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation
marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds, Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).
3

To

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that end, an individual alleging racial discrimination must show
that

the

protected

employer’s

trait

influence

decisionmaking
on

the

“actually
process

outcome.”

Id.

played

and

a
a

had

(internal

role

in

determinative

quotation

the

marks

omitted).
Determining
adverse

the

employment

actual
action

decisionmaker
can

be

responsible

paramount

to

for

determining

whether the protected trait played a role in the decision.
at 286-87.

the

Id.

Generally, employers are liable only for the acts of

employees with supervisory authority who are empowered to make
“tangible employment decisions.”

Id. at 287.

But form does not

triumph over substance:
When a formal decisionmaker acts merely as a cat’s paw
or rubber-stamps a decision, report, or recommendation
actually made by a subordinate, it is not inconsistent
to
say
that
the
subordinate
is
the
actual
decisionmaker or the one principally responsible for
the contested employment decision, so long as he
otherwise
falls
within
the
parameters
of
the
discrimination statute’s definition of an employer or
agent of the employer.
Id. at 290.
We concur with the district court’s identification of the
actual
William

decisionmaker
Dale

in

Hendley,

this

whom

case.

Ousley

The
charges

record
as

the

shows

that

puppeteer

behind his demotion, merely acted as a consultant for Ralph T.
Gigliotti, DVAMC’s Director, who had the sole power to make the
contested decision.

As a result, the district court properly
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focused

on

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Gigliotti’s

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motivations

in

considering

whether

to

grant summary judgment.
With this threshold issue decided, we turn to the two means
by which a plaintiff can establish discrimination under Title
VII: (1) “through direct and indirect evidence,” also known as
the

“mixed-motive”

framework;

or

(2)

“through

the

burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 [(1973)],” also known as the “pretext” framework.
Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249
(4th Cir. 2015).
Under the “mixed-motive” framework, a plaintiff succeeds if
he “demonstrates that race . . . was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice.”
F.3d

310,

omitted).

317

Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416
(4th

The

Cir.

plaintiff

circumstantial evidence.
display

a

2005)
may

(internal
do

so

Id. at 318.

“discriminatory

quotation

through

marks

direct

or

This evidence must both

attitude”

and

bear

relationship with the adverse employment action.

a

causal

Warch v. Ohio

Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 520 (4th Cir. 2006).
The

materials

before

us

offer

insufficient

direct

or

indirect evidence to suggest that race was a motivating factor
in

Ousley’s

demotion.

The

record

5

reflects

little,

if

any,

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“discriminatory attitude” toward Ousley’s race.

Therefore, the

district court properly dismissed his mixed-motive claim.
Under

the

“pretext”

framework,

the

plaintiff

bears

the

initial burden to show a prima facie case of discrimination.
Laing v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 2013).
If he does so, the burden shifts to the employer, who must
proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.

Id.

If the employer does so, the burden

shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s
proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination.

Id.

When evaluating pretext, it is not within our purview to
question whether the employer’s proffered basis for the disputed
action “was wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as
it truly was the reason for” the action.
quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 722 (internal

In order to succeed at this stage,

the plaintiff must “show both that the reason advanced was a
sham and that the true reason was an impermissible one under the
law.”

Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1235 (4th Cir.

1995).
In

that

DVAMC’s

proffered bases for demoting Ousley were pretextual.

Ousley

fails

to

demotion

this

show
were

case,

that

the

the

anything

evidence

dual
but

does

not

investigations

independent

and

show

resulting
unbiased.

in

his

These

investigations concluded that Ousley exercised poor judgment and
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that

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his

Therefore,

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department
the

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suffered

district

from

court

properly

numerous
concluded

deficiencies.
that

Ousley

failed to support his burden of showing pretext.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting
summary judgment.
facts

and

materials

legal
before

We dispense with oral argument because the
contentions

are

adequately

this

and

argument

court

presented

would

not

in

the

aid

the

decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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