Laura McFeeley v. Jackson Street Entertainment
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:12-cv-01019-DKC. [999846852]. [15-1583]
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1583
LAURA MCFEELEY, On Behalf of Herself and All Others
Similarly situated, a/k/a Dynasty; DANIELLE EVERETT, a/k/a
Jasmine; CRYSTAL NELSON; DANNIELLE ARLEAN MCKAY; JENNY
GARCIA; PATRICE HOWELL,
Plaintiffs − Appellees,
and
EBONY WASHINGTON; FERRIS PACE; SHANIEKA DANIELS; SCHARLENE
ALUGBUO; NICOLE PRECIOUS GRAY; TARSHEA JACKSON; CLEMENTINA
IBE, as personal representative of the Estate of Scharlene
Alugbuo,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JACKSON STREET ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, d/b/a Fuego Exotic Dance
Club, d/b/a Club Extasy Exotic Dance Club; RISQUE, LLC,
d/b/a Fuego Exotic Dance Club; QUANTUM ENTERTAINMENT GROUP,
LLC, d/b/a Fuego Exotic Dance Club; NICO ENTEPRISES, INC.,
d/b/a Fuego Exotic Dance Club; XTC ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, LLC,
d/b/a Fuego Exotic Dance Club; UWA OFFIAH,
Defendants − Appellants.
--------------------------------------SECRETARY OF LABOR,
Amicus Supporting Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District
Judge. (8:12-cv-01019-DKC)
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Argued:
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May 11, 2016
Decided:
June 8, 2016
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion.
Judge Wilkinson wrote
opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Diaz joined.
the
ARGUED: Michael Lloyd Smith, SMITH GRAHAM & CRUMP, LLC, Largo,
Maryland, for Appellants.
Gregg Cohen Greenberg, ZIPIN, AMSTER
& GREENBERG, LLC, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellees.
Katelyn Jean Poe, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington,
D.C., for Amicus Curiae.
ON BRIEF: Michael K. Amster, ZIPIN,
AMSTER & GREENBERG, LLC, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellees.
M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, Jennifer S. Brand,
Associate Solicitor, Paul L. Frieden, Counsel for Appellate
Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C.,
for Amicus Curiae.
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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
In this case, exotic dancers have sued their dance clubs
for failure to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act and
corresponding Maryland wage and hour laws. The district court
held that plaintiffs were employees of the defendant companies
and not independent contractors. The court properly captured the
economic reality of the relationship here, and we now affirm its
judgment.
I.
Plaintiffs,
as
noted,
are
exotic
dancers
who
worked
at
Fuego Exotic Dance Club (Fuego) and Extasy Exotic Dance Club
(Extasy) in Prince George’s County, Maryland for various periods
between April 2009 and April 2012. Defendant Uwa Offiah owns and
manages both Fuego and Extasy. No other party has a financial
interest in them.
Plaintiffs
similarly
situated
misclassified
club
alleged
them
employees
and
on
that
as
behalf
of
defendant
independent
accordingly
themselves
clubs
and
contractors
had
failed
to
and
others
Offiah
rather
pay
than
them
had
as
the
minimum wage required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29
U.S.C. § 201, et seq., the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MHWL),
Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401, et seq. (West 2014), and
the Maryland Wage Payment and Wage Collection Law (MWPWC), Md.
Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501, et seq. (West 2014). They sued
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defendants both for unpaid wages and liquidated damages. The
clubs
denied
their
working
which
were
that
plaintiffs
relationship
were
employees
and
for
unsuccessful,
raised
breach
at
any
point
of
all
of
counterclaims,
of
contract,
unjust
enrichment, conversion, and fraud.
We shall summarize at the outset the working relationship
between the dancers and the clubs. Anyone wishing to dance at
either club was required to fill out a form and perform an
audition. Defendants asked all hired dancers to sign agreements
titled
“Space/Lease
Rental
Agreement
of
Business
Space”
that
explicitly categorized dancers as independent contractors. The
clubs began using these agreements after being sued in 2011 by
dancers
who
claimed,
as
plaintiffs
do
here,
to
have
been
employees rather than independent contractors. Defendant Offiah
thereafter
consulted
an
attorney,
who
drafted
the
agreement
containing the “independent contractor” language.
Plaintiffs’ duties at Fuego and Extasy primarily involved
dancing on stage and in certain other areas of the two clubs. At
no point did the clubs pay the dancers an hourly wage or any
other form of compensation. Rather, plaintiffs’ compensation was
limited
to
performance
fees
and
tips
received
directly
from
patrons. The clubs also collected a “tip-in” fee from everyone
who entered either dance club, patrons and dancers alike. The
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dancers
and
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clubs
dispute
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other
aspects
of
their
working
relationship, including work schedules and policies.
On January 3, 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial
summary judgment, and defendants countered with a cross-motion
for
summary
judgment.
The
district
court
granted
plaintiffs’
motion in part, finding that plaintiffs were employees and not
independent contractors under both federal and state law. In
drawing that conclusion, the district court applied the sixfactor “economic realities” test for classifying employees and
independent contractors. The court placed special emphasis on
“the degree of control that the putative employer has over the
manner in which the work is performed,” Schultz v. Capital Int’l
Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304-05 (4th Cir. 2006), observing that
defendants “exercised significant control over the atmosphere,
clientele, and operations of the clubs.” J.A. 996-97.
The court reserved various disputes over monetary recovery
for
the
limine
about
jury.
seeking
their
Prior
to
to
trial,
prohibit
income
tax
plaintiffs
defendants
records,
filed
from
a
asking
performance
fees,
motion
in
plaintiffs
and
tips.
After conducting a hearing, the court granted the motion.
The case was tried before a jury from February 3 to 5,
2015. The trial court rejected the clubs’ objections to the jury
instructions and the verdict sheet. The jury found in favor of
plaintiffs
and
awarded
them
5
damages
for
unpaid
wages.
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Separately, the district court heard testimony on the issue of
liquidated damages and defendants’ proffered good-faith defense.
The court found that defendants had consulted an attorney in
September
2011
regarding
classifying
dancers
as
independent
contractors and thereafter reasonably believed that they were
not violating the FLSA. The court awarded liquidated damages to
each of the plaintiffs only for the period prior to September
2011. Defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law
and/or for a new trial. Both motions were denied on May 5, 2015.
This appeal followed.
II.
Appellants seek review as to five questions: (1) whether
plaintiffs were employees or independent contractors under the
FLSA and related state laws; (2) whether defendants acted in
good faith prior to September 2011 and were therefore not liable
to pay liquidated damages for that time period; (3) whether the
district
court
erred
in
barring
defendants
from
presenting
evidence related to plaintiffs’ income taxes, performance fees,
and tips; (4) whether the district court erred in formulating
its jury instructions and verdict sheet; and (5) whether the
trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for judgment as
a matter of law and/or for a new trial. We shall address these
issues seriatim.
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A.
Whether
a
worker
is
an
employee
or
an
independent
contractor under the FLSA is ultimately a legal question subject
to de novo review. Schultz, 466 F.3d at 304. We agree with the
district court that, based on the totality of the circumstances
presented here, the dancers at Fuego and Extasy were employees
covered by the FLSA and analogous state laws. They were not
independent
contractors.
Because
plaintiffs’
claims
under
Maryland labor laws run parallel to their claims under the FLSA,
our analysis of federal law extends as well to the state law
claims.
Congress enacted the FLSA to protect “the rights of those
who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of their freedom
and talents to the use and profit of others.” Benshoff v. City
of Va. Beach, 180 F.3d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Tenn.
Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590,
597 (1944)). In keeping with those “remedial and humanitarian”
goals, id. (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 321 U.S. at
597), Congress applied the FLSA broadly, as reflected in the
Act’s definitions of “employee” (“any individual employed by an
employer”),
“employer”
(“any
person
acting
directly
or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee”), and “employ” (“to suffer or permit to work”). 29
U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (e)(1), & (g). The statute mandates a minimum
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wage and overtime pay for all covered employees. Id. §§ 206 &
207.
To
FLSA,
determine
courts
relationship
Schultz,
whether
look
to
between
466
F.3d
a
the
the
at
worker
an
“‘economic
worker
304.
is
The
and
the
employee
under
realities’
putative
touchstone
of
the
of
the
the
employer.”
“economic
realities” test is whether the worker is “economically dependent
on the business to which he renders service or is, as a matter
of economic [reality], in business for himself.” Id. Application
of the test turns on six factors:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
[T]he degree of control that the putative employer has
over the manner in which the work is performed;
the
worker’s
opportunities
for
profit
or
loss
dependent on his managerial skill;
the worker’s investment in equipment or material, or
his employment of other workers;
the degree of skill required for the work;
the permanence of the working relationship; and
the degree to which the services rendered are an
integral part of the putative employer's business.
Id. at 304-05. “No single factor is dispositive,” id. at 305 –all six are part of the totality of circumstances presented. See
Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675
(1st Cir. 1998). While a six-factor test may lack the virtue of
providing definitive guidance to those affected, it allows for
flexible
application
relationships
words,
the
that
court
to
exist
must
the
in
adapt
myriad
different
the
national
economy.
its
analysis
to
8
the
working
In
other
particular
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working
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relationship,
the
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particular
workplace,
and
the
plaintiffs
and
particular industry in each FLSA case.
B.
Here,
defendants
as
in
offer
so
many
competing
FLSA
disputes,
narratives
of
their
working
relationship. The exotic dancers claim that all aspects of their
work at Fuego and Extasy were closely regulated by defendants,
from their hours to their earnings to their workplace conduct.
The clubs, not surprisingly, portray the dancers as free agents
that came and went as they pleased and used the clubs as nothing
but a rented space in which to perform. The dueling depictions
serve
to
remind
us
that
the
employee/independent
contractor
distinction is not a bright line but a spectrum, and that courts
must
struggle
with
matters
of
degree
rather
than
issue
categorical pronouncements.
Based on the totality of the circumstances presented here,
the relationship between plaintiffs and defendants falls on the
employee side of the spectrum. Even given that we must view the
facts in the light most favorable to defendants, see Ctr. for
Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 279 (4th Cir.
2013), we cannot accept defendants’ contrary characterization,
which cherry-picks a few facts that supposedly tilt in their
favor
and
downplays
the
weightier
and
more
numerous
factors
indicative of an employment relationship. Most critical on the
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facts
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of
this
realities”
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case
test:
is
the
the
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first
degree
of
factor
control
of
the
that
“economic
the
putative
employer has over the manner in which the work is performed.
The
clubs
insist
they
had
very
little
control
over
the
dancers. Plaintiffs were allegedly free in the clubs’ view to
determine their own work schedules, how and when they performed,
and whether they danced at clubs other than Fuego and Extasy.
But the relaxed working relationship represented by defendants –
-
the
kind
little
that
support
described
and
perhaps
in
the
the
every
record.
district
worker
To
court
dreams
the
about
contrary,
found
the
--
finds
plaintiffs
following
plain
manifestations of defendants’ control over the dancers:
•
Dancers were required to sign in upon arriving at the club
and to pay the “tip-in” or entrance fee required of both
dancers and patrons.
•
The
clubs
dictated
each
dancer’s
work
schedule.
As
plaintiff Danielle Everett testified, “I ended up having a
set
schedule
Thursdays
once
there,
I
and
started
Mondays,
at
Fuego’s.
Tuesdays
and
Wednesdays,
Fridays,
and
Saturdays at Extasy.” J.A. 578 (Everett’s deposition). This
was typical of the deposition testimony submitted in the
summary judgment record.
•
The clubs imposed written guidelines that all dancers had
to
obey
during
working
10
hours.
J.A.
769-77
(clubs’
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rulebook).
banning
These
rules
drinking
while
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went
into
working,
considerable
smoking
in
detail,
the
clubs’
bathroom, and loitering in the parking lot after business
hours. They prohibited dancers from leaving the club and
returning later in the night. Dancers were required to wear
dance shoes at all times and could not bring family or
friends to the clubs during working hours. Violations of
the clubs’ guidelines carried penalties such as suspension
or
dismissal.
enforce
the
employer’s
Although
rules,
as
‘potential
the
the
defendants
district
power’
to
claimed
court
enforce
put
its
not
it,
to
“[a]n
rules
and
manage dancers’ conduct is a form of control.” J.A. 997
(quoting Hart v. Rick’s Cabaret Int’l, Inc., 967 F.Supp.2d
901, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
•
The clubs set the fees that dancers were supposed to charge
patrons for private dances and dictated how tips and fees
were handled. The guidelines explicitly state: “[D]o not
[overcharge] our customers. If you do, you will be kicked
out of the club.” J.A. 771.
•
Defendants personally instructed dancers on their behavior
and conduct at work. For example, one manager stated that
he “‘coached’ dancers whom he believed did not have the
right attitude or were not behaving properly.” J.A. 997.
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Defendants managed the clubs’ atmosphere and clientele by
making
all
decisions
regarding
advertising,
hours
of
operation, and the types of food and beverages sold, as
well as handling lighting and music for the dancers. Id.
Taking the above circumstances into account, the district
court
found
that
the
clubs’
“significant
control”
over
how
plaintiffs performed their work bore little resemblance to the
latitude normally afforded to independent contractors. J.A. 997.
We agree. The many ways in which defendants directed the dancers
rose to the level of control that an employer would typically
exercise over an employee. To conclude otherwise would unduly
downgrade the factor of employer control and exclude workers
that the FLSA was designed to embrace.
None
of
this
is
to
suggest
that
a
worker
automatically
becomes an employee covered by the FLSA the moment a company
exercises
any
control
over
him.
After
all,
a
company
that
engages an independent contractor seeks to exert some control,
whether expressed orally or in writing, over the performance of
the contractor’s duties and over his conduct on the company’s
premises. It is rather hard to imagine a party contracting for
needed
wherever
services
you
with
want,
an
and
insouciant
however
you
“Do
whatever
please.”
A
you
company
want,
that
leases space or otherwise invites independent contractors onto
its property might at a minimum wish to prohibit smoking and
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littering
or
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to
set
the
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hours
of
use
in
order
to
keep
the
premises in good shape. Such conditions, along with the terms of
performance and compensation, are part and parcel of bargaining
between parties whose independent contractual status is not in
dispute.
If any sign of control or any restriction on use of space
could convert an independent contractor into an employee, there
would soon be nothing left of the former category. Workers and
managers alike might sorely miss the flexibility and freedom
that independent-contractor status confers. But the degree of
control
the
clubs
exercised
here
over
all
aspects
of
the
individual dancers’ work and of the clubs’ operation argues in
favor
of
an
employment
relationship.
Each
of
the
other
five
factors of the “economic realities” test is either neutral or
leads us in the same direction.
Two of those factors relate logically to one other: “the
worker’s
opportunities
for
profit
or
loss
dependent
on
his
managerial skill” and “the worker’s investment in equipment or
material, or his employment of other workers.” Schultz, 466 F.3d
at 305. The relevance of these two factors is intuitive. The
more the worker’s earnings depend on his own managerial capacity
rather
than
the
company’s,
and
the
more
he
is
personally
invested in the capital and labor of the enterprise, the less
the worker is “economically dependent on the business” and the
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more he is “in business for himself” and hence an independent
contractor. Id. at 304 (quoting Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal
Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 570 (10th Cir. 1994)).
The clubs attempt to capitalize on these two factors by
highlighting that dancers relied on their own skill and ability
to
attract
clients.
They
further
contend
that
dancers
sold
tickets for entrance to the two clubs, distributed promotional
flyers, and put their own photos on the flyers. As the district
court
noted,
‘hustle’
to
universally
however,
“[t]his
increase
their
rejected.”
J.A.
argument
profits
999
---
that
has
(collecting
dancers
been
cases).
can
almost
It
is
natural for an employee to do his part in drumming up business
for his employer, especially if the employee’s earnings depend
on it. An obvious example might be a salesperson in a retail
store who works hard at drawing foot traffic into the store. The
skill
that
the
employee
exercises
in
that
context
is
not
skill
and
from
the
managerial but simply good salesmanship.
Here,
investment
the
lion’s
normally
share
of
the
managerial
expected
of
employers
came
defendants. The district court found that the clubs’ managers
“controlled the stream of clientele that appeared at the clubs
by setting the clubs’ hours, coordinating and paying for all
advertising, and managing the atmosphere within the clubs.” J.A.
1001. They “ultimately controlled a key determinant –- pricing 14
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ability
to
make
a
profit.”
Id.
In
terms of investment, defendants paid “rent for both clubs; the
clubs’
bills
insurance;
such
and
as
for
water
radio
and
and
electric;
print
business
advertising,”
liability
as
well
as
wages for all non-performing staff. Id. at 1002. The dancers’
investment was limited to their own apparel and, on occasion,
food and decorations they brought to the clubs. Id. at 1002-03.
On balance then, plaintiffs’ opportunities for profit or
loss depended far more on defendants’ management and decisionmaking
than
on
their
own,
and
defendants’
investment
in
the
clubs’ operation far exceeded the plaintiffs’. These two factors
thus fail to tip the scales in favor of classifying the dancers
as independent contractors.
As with the control factor, however, neither of these two
elements
should
be
overstated.
Those
who
engage
independent
contractors are often themselves companies or small businesses
with employees of their own. Therefore, they have most likely
invested
in
the
labor
business,
taken
on
managerial
skill
in
and
capital
overhead
ways
that
necessary
costs,
affect
and
the
to
operate
exercised
the
their
opportunities
for
profit of their workers. Those fundamental components of running
a company, however, hardly render anyone with whom the company
transacts business an “employee” under the FLSA. The focus, as
suggested by the wording of these two factors, should remain on
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contribution
to
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managerial
decision-making
and
investment relative to the company’s. In this case, the ratio of
managerial
towards
skill
the
and
operational
clubs
to
support
support
an
tilts
too
heavily
independent-contractor
classification for the dancers.
The final three factors are more peripheral to the dispute
here and will be discussed only briefly: the degree of skill
required
for
the
work;
the
permanence
of
the
working
relationship; and the degree to which the services rendered are
an integral part of the putative employer’s business. As to the
degree of skill required, the clubs conceded that they did not
require dancers to have prior dancing experience. The district
court properly found that “the minimal degree of skill required
for
exotic
dancing
at
these
clubs”
supported
an
employee
classification. J.A. 1003-04. Moreover, even the skill displayed
by
the
hardly
most
by
accomplished
itself
be
dancers
in
sufficient
to
a
ballet
denote
company
an
would
independent
contractor designation.
As to the permanence of the working relationship, courts
have generally accorded this factor little weight in challenges
brought
by
exotic
dancers
given
the
inherently
“itinerant”
nature of their work. J.A. 1004-05; see also Harrell v. Diamond
A Entm’t, Inc., 992 F.Supp. 1343, 1352 (M.D. Fla. 1997). In this
case, defendants and plaintiffs had “an at-will arrangement that
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could be terminated by either party at any time.” J.A. 1005.
Because
this
type
of
agreement
could
characterize
either
an
employee or an independent contractor depending on the other
circumstances of the working relationship, we agree with the
district court that this temporal element does not affect the
outcome here.
Finally, as to the importance of the services rendered to
the company’s business, even the clubs had to concede the point
that an “exotic dance club could [not] function, much less be
profitable, without exotic dancers.” Secretary of Labor’s Amicus
Br. in Supp. of Appellees 24. Indeed, “the exotic dancers were
the
only
source
especially
food.”
of
entertainment
considering
J.A.
1006.
that
for
neither
Considering
all
customers
club
six
served
.
.
.
alcohol
factors
.
or
together,
particularly the defendants’ high degree of control over the
dancers,
the
totality
employer-employee
of
circumstances
relationship
speak
between
clearly
to
plaintiffs
an
and
defendants. The trial court was right to term it such.
III.
A.
Based
on
their
view
that
they
were
employees
and
not
independent contractors, the dancers sued defendants for unpaid
wages and liquidated damages. The clubs tried to avoid liability
in two ways. First, they raised a good faith defense to shield
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themselves from liquidated damages. Second, they characterized
performance
fees
and
tips
that
patrons
paid
to
dancers
as
offsets to any compensation the clubs were obligated to pay.
Other than the good faith and offset defenses, the amount of
monetary relief awarded to each plaintiff is not in dispute.
We review the district court’s award of liquidated damages
for abuse of discretion. Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650
F.3d 350, 375 (4th Cir. 2011). The FLSA allows covered employees
to sue for “their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime
compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal
amount
as
liquidated
damages.”
29
U.S.C.
§
216(b).
This
provision for liquidated damages is an additional penalty on
non-compliant employers. If an employer were instead liable for
only unpaid wages and overtime pay, it might roll the dice by
underpaying employees, reasoning all the while it would be no
worse off even if the employees eventually prevailed in court.
As
a
potential
defense
to
liquidated
damages,
however,
employers may seek to show that they acted in “good faith” and
“had
reasonable
grounds
for
believing
that
[their]
act
or
omission was not a violation of the [FLSA].” 29 U.S.C. § 260.
Here, the district court held that defendants had a valid good
faith defense after September 2011 but not prior to that date.
In
September
consulted
an
2011,
Offiah,
attorney
in
the
owner
response
18
to
of
a
Fuego
lawsuit
and
Extasy,
by
dancers
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claiming to be employees rather than independent contractors.
The
attorney
agreements
onward
Offiah
designating
acknowledging
Offiah’s
advised
the
reliance
to
to
require
themselves
therefor.
on
attorney’s
constitute
good
dancers
independent
reasons
the
all
faith
The
and
sign
contractors
district
advice
to
and
court
that
from
found
point
reasonable
belief
of
compliance with the FLSA.
Defendants now claim the good faith defense for the period
prior
to
September
2011.
When
defendant
Offiah
took
over
management of the Fuego and Extasy dance clubs in 2007 and 2009,
respectively, he changed nothing about the way they had been
operated.
Since
the
dancers
had
always
been
classified
as
independent contractors, Offiah assumed that classification was
appropriate. He made no effort to look into the law or seek
legal advice until he faced a lawsuit in September 2011. If mere
assumption
amounted
to
compliance,
no
itself
proactively
and
employer
good
faith
and
reasonable
would
have
any
incentive
conform
to
governing
belief
to
labor
of
educate
law.
The
district court did not err in rejecting defendants’ good faith
defense
for
the
period
prior
to
September
2011
and
awarding
plaintiffs liquidated damages for that period.
B.
Appellants’ second attack on their liability for damages
targets the district court’s alleged error in excluding from
19
Appeal: 15-1583
trial
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evidence
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regarding
Pg: 20 of 24
plaintiffs’
income
tax
returns,
performance fees, and tips. The clubs contend that fees and tips
kept by the dancers would have reduced any compensation that
defendants owed plaintiffs under the FLSA and MWHL. According to
defendants, the fees and tips dancers received directly from
patrons exceeded the minimum wage mandated by federal and state
law. Had the evidence been admitted, the argument goes, the jury
may have awarded plaintiffs less in unpaid wages.
We disagree. The district court found that evidence related
to plaintiffs’ earnings was irrelevant or, if relevant, posed a
danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury. See Fed.
R. Evid. 403. Proof of tips and fees received was irrelevant
here because the FLSA precludes defendants from using tips or
fees
to
offset
the
minimum
wage
they
were
required
to
pay
plaintiffs. To be eligible for the “tip credit” under the FLSA
and corresponding Maryland law, defendants were required to pay
dancers the minimum wage set for those receiving tip income and
to notify employees of the “tip credit” provision. 29 U.S.C.
203(m); Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-419 (West 2014). The
clubs paid the dancers no compensation of any kind and afforded
them no notice. They cannot therefore claim the “tip credit.”
The clubs are likewise ineligible to use performance fees
paid
by
patrons
to
the
dancers
to
reduce
their
liability.
Appellants appear to distinguish performance fees from tips in
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their argument, without providing much analysis in their briefs
on a question that has occupied other courts. See, e.g., Hart,
967
F.Supp.2d
at
926-34
(discussing
how
performance
fees
received by exotic dancers relate to minimum wage obligations).
If
performance
fees
do
constitute
tips,
defendants
would
certainly be entitled to no offset because, as noted above, they
cannot
claim
any
“tip
credit.”
For
the
sake
of
argument,
however, we treat performance fees as a possible separate offset
within
the
FLSA’s
“service
charge”
category.
Even
with
this
benefit of the doubt, defendants come up short.
For
purposes
of
the
FLSA,
a
“service
charge”
is
a
“compulsory charge for service . . . imposed on a customer by an
employer’s establishment.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.55(a). There are at
least
offset
two
to
prerequisites
an
to
employer’s
counting
minimum-wage
“service
charges”
liability.
The
as
an
service
charge “must have been included in the establishment’s gross
receipts,” Hart, 967 F.Supp.2d at 929, and it must have been
“distributed
531.55(b).
by
the
These
employer
requirements
to
its
are
employees,”
necessary
to
29
C.F.R.
ensure
§
that
employees actually received the service charges as part of their
compensation as opposed to relying on the employer’s assertion
or say-so. See Hart, 967 F.Supp.2d at 930. We do not minimize
the
recordkeeping
burdens
of
the
21
FLSA,
especially
on
small
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businesses,
but
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some
such
Pg: 22 of 24
obligations
have
been
regarded
as
necessary to ensure compliance with the statute.
Neither condition for applying the service-charge offset is
met here. As conceded by defendant Offiah, the dance clubs never
recorded or included as part of the dance clubs’ gross receipts
any payments that patrons paid directly to dancers. J.A. 491-97
(Offiah’s deposition). When asked about performance fees during
his deposition, defendant Offiah repeatedly stressed that fees
belong solely to the dancers. Id. Since none of those payments
ever went to the clubs’ proprietors, defendants also could not
have
distributed
any
part
of
those
service
charges
to
the
dancers. As a result, the “service charge” offset is unavailable
to defendants. Accordingly, the trial court correctly excluded
evidence showing plaintiffs’ earnings in the form of tips and
performance fees.
C.
The clubs object next to the jury instructions and verdict
sheet used during trial. They argue that the trial court should
have instructed the jury on the purpose of the FLSA as they
requested and should have given the jury a more detailed verdict
form. In denying both requests, the district court acted well
within its discretion. The jury instructions given included the
relevant components of the FLSA and corresponding Maryland laws.
The verdict form used informed the jury of how to calculate the
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unpaid wage damages owed to plaintiffs. A general statement of
the FLSA’s purpose or more detail in the verdict form would not
have aided the jury in reaching a sounder outcome.
Finally, the clubs fault the district court for failing to
grant their motion for judgment as a matter of law and/or for a
new trial. A new trial is appropriate if the verdict is “against
the clear weight of the evidence” or “is based on evidence which
is false” or “will result in a miscarriage of justice.” Buckley
v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306, 317 (4th Cir. 2008). Here, the sole
basis for appellants’ demand for a new trial is the district
court’s alleged skepticism about certain plaintiffs’ testimony
regarding dates and hours worked. Mere challenges to witness
credibility on appeal, however, fall well short of the standard
for granting a new trial. Moreover, the district court found
that “[n]either party has provided financial records,” and so
the
best
evidence
recollection,
which
available
came
from
the
duly
considered
jury
plaintiffs’
along
own
with
defendants’ objections to its accuracy. J.A. 1018-19. It would
impede the goals of the FLSA to penalize employees for their
employers’
grounds
for
inadequate
reversal
recordkeeping.
in
the
clubs’
In
short,
quibbles
we
with
find
the
no
jury
instructions, the verdict sheet, or the denial of its new trial
motion.
23
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IV.
We
must
be
mindful
in
the
end
that
we
are
applying
a
statute which Congress thought was necessary to provide “fair
labor
standards”
for
employees,
including
those
marginalized
workers unable to exert sufficient leverage or bargaining power
to
achieve
adequate
wages
in
the
absence
of
statutory
protections. To rule for the clubs under the circumstances here
would run too great a risk of undercutting the Act’s basic aim.
Accordingly, and for the reasons given above, the judgment of
the district court is
AFFIRMED.
24
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