Clayland Farm Enterprises, LLC v. Talbot County, Maryland

Filing

UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:14-cv-03412-JFM. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999979600].. [15-1755]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1755

CLAYLAND FARM ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
TALBOT COUNTY, MARYLAND; TALBOT COUNTY PLANNING & ZONING
COMMISSION; TALBOT COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
ADVISORY BOARD; THOMAS HUGHES, in his individual and
official capacity; MICHAEL SULLIVAN, in his individual and
official capacity; JOHN WOLFE, in his individual and
official capacity; JACK FISCHER, in his individual and
official capacity; MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING,
Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:14-cv-03412-JFM)

Argued:

September 23, 2016

Decided:

December 2, 2016

Before TRAXLER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Reversed by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Traxler joined.
Judge Floyd wrote an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

ARGUED: Mark Frederick Gabler, RICH AND HENDERSON, P.C.,
Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant.
Paul J. Cucuzzella, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland;
Victoria
M.
Shearer,
KARPINSKI,
COLARESI
&
KARP,
P.A.,

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Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Warren K. Rich,
Aminah Famili, RICH AND HENDERSON, P.C., Annapolis, Maryland,
for Appellant.
Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee Maryland Department of Planning.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

Clayland Farm Enterprises, LLC appeals the district court’s
order dismissing its claims against Talbot County, Maryland, and
other defendants for lack of ripeness. Because Clayland Farm’s
claims are ripe, we reverse.
I.
Clayland

Farm

is

a

106

acre

property

located

in

Talbot

County, Maryland. At all relevant times, Clayland Farm has been
zoned as a “Village Center,” which is generally the “preferred
location”

in

rural

areas

for

“single

and

multi-family

residential development.” J.A. 15–16. 1
The owners of Clayland Farm cannot pursue their land use
goals, however, because of three Talbot County ordinances, two
that are moratoriums on development, and one that limits sewer
availability. Bill Nos. 1214 and 1257, enacted in 2012 and 2014,
have

indefinitely

prohibited

certain

types

of

development

in

areas zoned as Village Centers, including Clayland Farm. The
moratoriums prohibit owners from seeking or obtaining approval
to subdivide their property. They also impose more restrictive
zoning density rules by prohibiting subdivision of properties

1

Because we are reviewing a motion to dismiss, we describe
the facts as alleged in Clayland Farm’s complaint. See Aziz v.
Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011).

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zoned as “Village Centers” into more than two lots. The affected
property owners, including Clayland Farm, have no ability to
seek a variance from, or a waiver to, the moratoriums and are
otherwise unable to challenge them outside of court.
The third challenged ordinance established a classification
method that determines the availability, if any, and type of
sewer system for a property. The Talbot County Council adopted
Bill

No.

1229

in

2012,

pursuant

to

the

Maryland

Sustainable

Growth and Agricultural Preservation Act of 2012 that required
each county to map existing property and designate it in one of
seven

“tiers.”

A

property’s

tier

designation

determines

the

property’s allowed type of subdivision and allowed wastewater
treatment

system.

J.A.

26.

Talbot

County

placed

all

but

six

acres of Clayland Farm in Tier IV, which is property intended
for natural resources protection and without sewer access. The
County took

this

action

even

though

Clayland

Farm

had

sewer

access prior to this new designation and despite the advice of
the

Maryland

County

in

a

Department
private

of

Planning, 2

letter

that

2

which

Clayland

informed
Farm

had

Talbot
been

The Maryland Department of Planning is a state agency that
serves as “an advisory, consultative, and coordinating agency”
on a variety of issues related to land use and planning. See Md.
Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. § § 5-201, 5-302.

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improperly designated as a Tier IV area. Talbot County did not
take any action in response to the department’s advice. 3
In response to these ordinances, Clayland Farm filed suit
in state court against Talbot County, various county officials,
and

the

Maryland

Department

of

Planning.

Clayland

Farm’s

complaint asserted seven claims, arising under state and federal
law. Counts I–III assert federal claims against Talbot County
for violations of Clayland Farm’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights

under

the

United

States

Constitution,

pursuant

to

42

U.S.C. § 1983. Count I asserts a regulatory takings claim that
the moratorium is facially unconstitutional. Count II alleges
that Talbot County deprived Clayland Farm of their procedural
due process rights by enacting the moratoriums with no postdeprivation remedies, and Count III alleges that Talbot County
deprived Clayland Farm of its substantive due process rights by
enacting the ordinances.
Count IV asserts a § 1983 conspiracy claim against Talbot
County and its officials for violating Clayland Farm’s Fifth and
Fourteenth

Amendment

rights.

declaratory

judgment

claims

Counts
against

3

V

and

various

VI

assert

defendants,

state
and

Had the Maryland Department of Planning sent a formal,
rather than informal, letter, Talbot County would have been
required to hold a public hearing on this issue.

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Count VII seeks injunctive relief against various defendants to
enjoin the violations alleged in the other counts.
Talbot County removed the case and then moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion “on the ground that the
issues

raised

by

[Clayland

Farm]

are

not

yet

ripe

for

adjudication. It is beyond the province and competence of this
court to make zoning decisions . . . . The record does not
suggest that the Talbot County Council has yet denied any of
[Clayland Farm’s] constitutional rights.” J.A. 72. Clayland Farm
timely appealed.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss, Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 2012),
accepting the facts as alleged in Clayland Farm’s complaint. See
Aziz, 658 F.3d at 390. For the following reasons, we reverse the
district court’s dismissal of Clayland Farm’s complaint because
all of these claims are ripe.
Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine intended to prevent
the
See,

courts
e.g.,

from

entangling

National

Park

themselves

Hospitality

in

premature

Ass’n

v.

disputes.

Department

of

Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807–08 (2003). “The ripeness doctrine is
drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and
from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.”
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). A claim should
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be dismissed for lack of ripeness if the plaintiff has not yet
suffered

injury

and

any

future

impact

“remains

wholly

speculative.” Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 361
(4th Cir. 1996). In determining ripeness, “[a] case is fit for
judicial decision when the issues are purely legal and when the
action

in

controversy

is

final

and

not

dependent

on

future

uncertainties.” Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir.
2006)

(internal

citation

omitted).

We

now

address

Clayland

Farm’s claims under this standard.
Count I is a facial challenge to the moratoriums and is
thus clearly ripe. See Complaint at 27, J.A. 34 (“Talbot County
has deprived and continues to deprive [Clayland Farm] of its
Fourteenth
Village

Amendment

Growth

inequitable

rights

Moratorium,

regulatory

by

enacting

and

an

illegal,

taking.”)

(emphasis

perpetuating
illegitimate
added);

see

the
and
also

Appellant’s Br. at 22–28. 4 When an ordinance on its face is
alleged to have effected a taking, as in Count I, the claim
accrues

when

the

ordinance

interferes

in

a

clear,

concrete

fashion with the property’s primary use. National Advertising
Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1163 (4th Cir. 1991).
4

Clayland Farm also made this point clear at oral argument.
Oral Argument at 3:45, Clayland Farm Enterprises, LLC v. Talbot
County,
Maryland
et
al.
(No.
15-1755),
available
at
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oralarguments (“These are facial challenges.”).

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Facial takings challenges to a regulation are “generally ripe
the moment the challenged regulation or ordinance is passed . .
. .” Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,
736, n. 10 (1997). 5
Clayland Farm suffered concrete and certain injury as soon
as

the

moratoriums

were

enacted;

the

ordinances

prohibit

Clayland Farm from subdividing more than one additional lot from
its property and from developing more than one dwelling unit on
the lot, which had previously been allowed. The possibility that
Talbot County may enact future zoning or planning ordinances
that affect Clayland Farm’s ability to develop its property does
not call into question the finality of the three ordinances that
currently

restrict

Clayland

Farm.

Thus,

Count

I’s

facial

challenge is ripe. 6

5

Speaking to Count I, Talbot County admitted that “[t]o the
extent it’s a facial challenge, the district court would have
jurisdiction to address it because it’s ripe.” Oral Argument at
20:52, Clayland Farm Enterprises, LLC v. Talbot County, Maryland
et al. ( No. 15-1755), available at http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/
oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments (emphasis added).
6

Talbot
County
argues
that
Clayland
Farm’s
just
compensation claim is not ripe because Clayland Farm did not
pursue the state remedy of inverse condemnation. However, the
state-litigation requirement for takings claims “does not apply
to facial challenges to the validity of a state regulation.” See
Holliday Amusement Co. v. South Carolina, 493 F.3d 404, 407 (4th
Cir. 2007). As to any as-applied just compensation claim for an
otherwise valid regulatory taking, Clayland Farm has satisfied
the state-litigation requirement by filing this action in state
court; Maryland
does
not
have
a
separate
statutory
or
(Continued)
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For

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Count

II,

Clayland

Pg: 9 of 20

Farm

asserts

a

procedural

due

process claim, asserting that the enactment of an indefinite
moratorium

without

any

post-deprivation

remedies

facially

“violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”
J.A. 37. Because Clayland Farm claims a concrete injury and has
been provided no means to address that injury, Count II is ripe.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (fundamental
requirement of procedural due process is the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner); see also
Doe v. Virginia Dep’t of State Police, 713 F.3d 745, 758–59 (4th
Cir.

2013).

Count

III

asserts

that

the

moratorium

and

the

designation of the Clayland Farm property as Tier IV property
were so arbitrary that they facially violate the Constitutional
guarantee of substantive due process. See, e.g., Beacon Hill
Farm Assoc. v. Loudoun County Bd. of Sup’rs, 875 F.2d 1081,
1084–85 (4th Cir. 1989) (substantive due process requires that

administrative inverse condemnation remedy to challenge an
alleged regulatory taking of property. See, e.g., Duke Street
Ltd. P’ship v. Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Calvert Cnty., 684 A.2d
40,
49
(Md.
Ct.
Spec.
App.
1996).
Thus,
any
claimed
noncompliance with the state-litigation requirement would be
excused because it was the County’s removal of the case that
prevented the state court from addressing Clayland Farm’s
‘inverse condemnation’ type claim contained in this case. See
Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 544 (4th Cir.
2013).

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regulation cannot be clearly arbitrary and without substantial
relationship to general welfare). Count III is therefore ripe.
Count

IV,

which

alleges

a

conspiracy

to

commit

the

constitutional violations in Counts I-III, is ripe for the same
reason the events supporting those counts are ripe. While it may
not be necessary that the object of the alleged conspiracy has
been achieved for the claim to be ripe, the claim certainly is
ripe when the object of such conspiracy, here, the enactment of
the ordinances, has been accomplished.
Finally, Counts V, VI, and VII are ripe because they allege
state

law

enactment

violations
of

the

or

three

seek

injunctive

ordinances.

relief

While

based

on

the

district

the

court

found the claims were not ripe because Talbot County had “not
yet reached any final decision,” J.A. 72, Clayland Farm suffered
concrete injury when the three ordinances were enacted, even if
the ordinances may later be modified.
III.
We
Clayland

therefore
Farm’s

reverse

claims

for

the

district

lack

of

court’s

ripeness

dismissal

and

remand

of
for

further proceedings.
REVERSED

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FLOYD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I

agree

with

the

majority’s

conclusion

that

Counts

III

through VII of Clayland Farm’s complaint are all ripe--as is
Count I to the extent that it contests the validity of Talbot
County’s

alleged

taking.

Nonetheless,

because

Clayland

Farm

failed to exhaust available state remedies, I would hold that
Counts I and II are unripe to the extent that they seek a just
compensation remedy.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s

contrary conclusion as to these counts.
I.
A.
The

Fifth

Amendment

prohibits

takings

compensation and takings for non-public use. 1

without

just

I read Count I as

presenting both a claim contesting the validity of an allegedly
non-public use taking and, in the alternative, a claim for just
compensation.
regulations

on

See J.A. 34–35 (seeking to enjoin the contested
the

theory

that

they

“bear

[no]

substantial

relationship to any legitimate police power,” but also seeking
compensatory damages for an alleged taking done “without just
compensation”).

1

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
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With
Supreme

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respect

Court

to

has

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federal

just

instructed

compensation

that

“if

a

claims,

State

the

provides

an

adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property
owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause
until

it

has

used

compensation.”

the

procedure

Williamson

Cty.

and

been

Reg’l

denied

Planning

just

Comm’n

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985).
exhaustion requirement makes sense.
not

proscribe

the

taking

of

v.
This

“The Fifth Amendment does

property;

it

proscribes

taking

without just compensation,” id. at 194, and so an adequate state
remedy for a public use taking eliminates the possibility of a
Fifth Amendment violation.
Recognizing

this

point,

we

have

held

that

when

a

state

“opens its courts to inverse condemnation claims arising from
regulatory
compensation

takings,”
through

and
such

a

plaintiff

procedures,

fails

the

satisfied [the exhaustion] requirement.”

to

plaintiff

seek

just

“has

not

Holliday Amusement Co.

of Charleston, Inc. v. South Carolina, 493 F.3d 404, 407 (4th
Cir.

2007)

Maryland

(discussing

has,

without

Williamson
question,

inverse condemnation claims.

Cty.,

opened

473

its

U.S.

at

195).

courts

for

state

See, e.g., Litz v. Md. Dep’t of

Env’t, 131 A.3d 923, 930-31 (Md. 2016).

Nonetheless, Clayland

Farm failed to advance such a claim in its complaint.

As such,

Count I’s federal just compensation claim is clearly unripe.
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B.
The

majority

precedent.

holds

based

on

a

misreading

of

It does so by first announcing that “Count I is a

facial challenge.”
County’s

otherwise,

Maj. Op. at 7.

exhaustion

argument

Then, in response to Talbot

against

Clayland

Farm’s

just

compensation claim, the majority cites Holliday Amusement for
the

proposition

takings
validity

claims
of

a

that

“the

state-litigation

‘does

not

apply

to

state

regulation.’”

Holliday Amusement, 493 F.3d at 407).
true, is irrelevant.

facial
Id.

requirement

challenges
at

8

n.6

to

for
the

(quoting

This statement, although

It offers no suggestion whatsoever that a

facial claim seeking just compensation for a valid taking--as
opposed to a facial claim challenging the validity of a taking-is excused from the exhaustion requirement.
Thus, in my view, even if Count I states a facial just
compensation claim, its facial nature would not exempt it from
the exhaustion requirement.

This view finds extensive support

in the case law, both within and outside this Circuit.

See,

e.g., Wilkins v. Daniels, 744 F.3d 409, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“With respect to just-compensation challenges, while Williamson
County’s first requirement may not apply to facial challenges,
its

second

compensation

requirement--that
through

state

plaintiffs

must

procedures--does.”

seek

just

(citations

omitted)); Alto Eldorado P’ship v. Cty. of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d
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1170,

1176-77

(10th

Cir.

Pg: 14 of 20

2011)

(“Courts

considering

claims

alleging a . . . taking without just compensation, even when
characterized

as

facial

claims,

have

applied

the

second

Williamson County requirement [of exhaustion.]” (citing Equity
Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Cty. of San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d
1184, 1190 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2008); Holliday Amusement, 493 F.3d
at 407; Cty. Concrete Corp. v. Twp. of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159,
168 (3d Cir. 2006))).
Indeed,

there

is

good

reason

to

treat

facial

claims

challenging the validity of a taking and facial claims for just
compensation

differently

in

sensible

exempt

former

to

the

the

exhaustion
category

context.

from

any

It

is

exhaustion

requirement, because “no amount of compensation would render the
taking

constitutional

government’s

authority

[when]
to

it

take

Eldorado, 634 F.3d at 1176 n.3.

was
private

in

excess
property.”

of

the
Alto

In contrast, this justification

does not apply to the latter category, because a state remedy
can obviate the need for a facial, federal just compensation
claim in the same way that it can obviate the need for an asapplied one.

Thus, it is entirely proper to require Clayland

Farm to exhaust its state remedies before allowing it to proceed
with its federal just compensation claim--regardless of whether
the claim is labeled facial or as-applied.

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C.
The majority attempts to further side-step the exhaustion
requirement by asserting that if it does apply, Talbot County
has waived its right to invoke it by removing this case to
federal court.

According to the majority, Clayland Farm did

what it needed to do by filing its complaint in state court.
Therefore, “any claimed noncompliance with the state-litigation
requirement would be excused because it was the County’s removal
of

the

case

that

prevented

the

state

court

from

addressing

Clayland Farm’s ‘inverse condemnation’ type claim contained in
this case.”

Maj. Op. at 8 n.6 (citing Sansotta v. Town of Nags

Head, 724 F.3d 533, 544 (4th Cir. 2013)).
With respect to my colleagues in the majority, the waiver
principle that we recognized in Sansotta is inapplicable here.
In Sansotta, we waived the exhaustion requirement following the
removal of a suit that alleged both a state inverse condemnation
claim and a federal just compensation claim.
47.

724 F.3d at 544-

We reasoned that because the filing of such joint suits in

state court was “exactly what San Remo Hotel[, L.P. v. City &
Cty. of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323 (2005)] permits,” we
would be “judicially condon[ing] manipulation of litigation” if
we

subjected

removal.

such

suits

to

the

exhaustion

Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 544-45.

15

requirement

post-

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scope

of

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complaint

in

Sansotta’s

this

Pg: 16 of 20

case,

waiver

however,

reasoning.

falls

It

outside

alleges

no

the

state

inverse condemnation claim, and is thus not the type of joint
suit authorized by San Remo Hotel.

Whereas the plaintiff in

Sansotta alleged a state inverse condemnation claim that could
have obviated the need for a court (federal or state) to reach
its federal just compensation claim, Clayland Farm failed to do
so.

Thus, Clayland Farm’s federal just compensation claim is

just as unripe in federal court as it was in state court, and so
Clayland Farm should not be entitled to a waiver defense.
D.
Although I conclude that the just compensation claim of
Count

I

is

unripe,

I

agree

with

the

majority

that

the

alternative claim in Count I--a public use claim contesting the
alleged

taking’s

facial

validity--is

ripe.

See

Holliday

Amusement, 493 F.3d at 407 (“[T]he state procedures requirement
does not apply to facial challenges to the validity of a state
regulation.” (citations omitted)).
As

explained

above,

there

is

no

need

to

attach

an

exhaustion requirement to a claim that a taking was not for
public use, because no amount of state compensation can cure the
illegality of such a taking.

With this understanding in mind,

at least three circuits have classified a public use claim as
ripe even while classifying an adjoined just compensation claim
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as unripe for failure to exhaust.

See Carole Media LLC v. N.J.

Transit Corp., 550 F.3d 302, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008); Rumber v.
District of Columbia, 487 F.3d 941, 943–45 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
Montgomery v. Carter Cty., Tenn., 226 F.3d 758, 768 (6th Cir.
I would follow these courts’ approach here. 2

2000).

II.
Next, I would dispose of Clayland Farm’s two due process
claims

in

a

manner

similar

to

my

recommended

disposition

of

Count I.
A.
To elaborate, the substantive due process claim in Count
III is analogous to the public use claim in Count I, in that
both

contest

the

validity

of

Talbot

County’s

regulations.

Therefore, the former is exempt from the exhaustion requirement
to the same extent that the latter is.

See Kurtz v. Verizon

N.Y., Inc., 758 F.3d 506, 514 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Substantive due
process

claims

require

only

of
a

arbitrary

showing

of

and

capricious

finality--there

requirement.” (citations omitted)).
2

conduct,
is

no

however,

exhaustion

As such, I agree with the

Although the typical remedy for a non-public use taking is
an injunction, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475-76
(2005), I would also approve compensatory relief designed to
remedy any past injuries resulting from such a taking.
See
Theodorou v. Measel, 53 F. App’x 640, 642 (3d Cir. 2002)
(affirming award of compensatory damages for property damage and
emotional distress flowing from a township’s completed private
taking).
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majority that Count III is ripe, notwithstanding Clayland Farm’s
failure to exhaust its state remedies.
B.
In contrast, I would hold that the procedural due process
claim in Count II is unripe.
Indeed,
Williamson

I

am

“persuaded

by

County”--including

those

its

courts

holding

exhaustion

that

requirement--

“applies to due process claims arising from the same nucleus of
facts as a takings claim.”

Kurtz, 758 F.3d at 515–16 (citing,

inter alia, B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. BNSF Ry. Corp., 531 F.3d
1282,

1299

n.19

(10th

Cir.

2008);

Greenfield

Mills,

Inc.

v.

Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 961 (7th Cir. 2004)).

“Such a rule finds

support

the

in

Williamson

County

itself:

if

only

process

guaranteed to one whose property is taken is a post-deprivation
remedy, a federal court cannot determine whether the state’s
process

is

constitutionally

deficient

until

pursued

the

available

remedy.”

Id.

omitted).

Additionally,

“circumvent[ing]
simply

by

complaint.”

state

the

attaching

this

ripeness
a

rule

procedural

at

prevents

requirement
due

the

for

process

516

owner

(citation

plaintiffs
takings
claim

has

to

from

claims
their

Bigelow v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 970 F.2d 154,

160 (6th Cir. 1992).
In this case, the procedural due process claim in Count II
mirrors the just compensation claim in Count I, in that both
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seek identical compensation for Clayland Farm’s deprivation of
development rights.

Thus, applying the rule discussed above, I

would hold that the exhaustion requirement governing the just
compensation

claim

in

Count

I

should

likewise

govern

the

procedural due process claim in Count II.

Therefore, Clayland

Farm’s

requirement

non-compliance

with

the

exhaustion

renders

Count II unripe.
III.
Despite my disagreement with the majority on the abovedescribed points, I am happy to concur in their holding that
Counts V and VI--Clayland Farm’s state law claims--are ripe.
I

also

agree

that

Count

IV’s

conspiracy

claim

and

Count VII’s injunctive relief claim are ripe, albeit only to the
extent that they are premised on remedying legal violations that
underlie claims that are themselves ripe.
IV.
The

majority

compensation
alleged

and

today

remands

procedural

government

takings

due
for

to

the

district

process
which

court

claims

premised

on

has

no

Maryland

had

just

opportunity to offer redress.

In doing so, the majority leaves

the

unenviable

district

court

with

the

task

claims premised on incomplete government action.
Cty.,

473

U.S.

at

195

(explaining,

in

the

of

entertaining

See Williamson

just

compensation

context, that “the State’s action is not ‘complete’ in the sense
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of causing a constitutional injury ‘unless or until the State
fails

to

provide

an

adequate

postdeprivation

remedy

for

the

property loss’” (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532
n.12 (1984))).

Because I cannot agree that such claims are

ripe, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition of
Clayland

Farm’s

just

compensation

claims.

20

and

procedural

due

process