The Muhler Company, Inc. v. Ply Gem Holdings, Inc.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:11-cv-00862-SB Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999752719].. [15-1843]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1843

THE MUHLER COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PLY
GEM
HOLDINGS,
INC.;
AWC
HOLDING
MANUFACTURERS, INC.; PLY GEM INDUSTRIES,
HOLDING CORPORATION; MWM HOLDINGS, INC.,

COMPANY;
MW
INC.; ALENCO

Defendants – Appellees,
and
PLY GEM
WINDOWS,

WINDOW

GROUP;

MW

WINDOWS

&

DOORS;

GREAT

LAKES

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Sol Blatt, Jr., Senior District
Judge. (2:11-cv-00862-SB)

Submitted:

January 26, 2016

Decided:

February 10, 2016

Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Andrew K. Epting, Jr., ANDREW K. EPTING, JR., LLC, Charleston,
South Carolina; M. Dawes Cooke, Jr., Bradley B. Banias, BARNWELL
WHALEY PATTERSON & HELMS, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for

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Appellant.
Steve M. Pharr, Stacey Bailey Pharr, Matthew M.
Pagett, PHARR LAW, PLLC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
The Muhler Company, Inc. (“Muhler”), appeals the district
court’s orders granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants—
Ply Gem Holdings, Inc.; Ply Gem Industries, Inc.; AWC Holding
Company; Alenco Holding Corporation; MWM Holdings, Inc.; and MW
Manufacturers, Inc. (collectively, “Ply Gem”)—on Muhler’s claims
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116, 1125(a) (2012), under
the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (“SCUTPA”), S.C.
Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a), and for common law unfair competition. *
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo.

Foster v. Univ. of Md.-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 248

(4th Cir. 2015).

“Summary judgment is appropriate when there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
760

F.3d

352,

omitted).

370

(4th

Cir.

2014)

Bostic v. Schaefer,

(internal

quotation

marks

In making this determination, we “view[] all facts

and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to

the

nonmoving

party.”

Building

Graphics,

Corp., 708 F.3d 573, 578 (4th Cir. 2013).
party

must

rely

on

more

than

*

conclusory

Inc.

v.

Lennar

“[T]he nonmoving
allegations,

mere

Because the parties agree that Muhler’s common law unfair
competition claim rises and falls with its Lanham Act claim, we
have not conducted a separate analysis of this issue.
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speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.”

Dash v. Mayweather,

731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
The

Lanham

Act

creates

a

private

right

of

action

for

victims of “false or misleading” representations or descriptions
in commercial promotion, labeling, or advertisement.
§ 1125(a) (2012).

15 U.S.C.

Similarly, SCUTPA prohibits “[u]nfair methods

of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce.”
(1985 & Supp. 2015).
plaintiff

must

S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a)

To prove a claim under either statute, the

establish

that

his

injuries

were

proximately

caused by the defendant’s unfair trade practice.

See Lexmark

Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377,
1389-90

(2014); Charleston Lumber Co. v. Miller Housing Corp.,

458 S.E.2d 431, 438 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
In

the

Lanham

Act

context,

proximate

cause

ordinarily

requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “economic or reputational
injury

flowing

directly

defendant’s advertising.”

from

the

deception

wrought

by

the

Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1391.

In

Lexmark, the Supreme Court held that Static Control Components
had

adequately

practices

alleged

proximately

that

Lexmark

caused

Static

International’s
Control’s

lost

trade
sales,

despite the absence of direct competition between the parties,
because of the roughly “1:1 relationship” between the sales of
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Lexmark’s product and lost sales of Static Control’s component
part.

134 S. Ct. at 1394.

Under this “unique” set of facts,

there was no “discontinuity between the injury to the direct
victim and the injury to the indirect victim,” such that the
indirect victim’s injury was “surely attributable to the former
(and thus also to the defendant’s conduct),” rather than to “any
number of other reasons.”

Id. (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted).

These facts distinguish Lexmark from the

typical

by

case

brought

an

indirect

victim,

in

which

the

calculation of damages proximately attributable to the alleged
misconduct is complex and uncertain.
Steel

Supply

Corp.,

547

U.S.

451,

See, e.g., Anza v. Ideal
459-60

(2006);

Holmes

v.

Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992).
Under state law, “[p]roximate cause is the efficient or
direct cause of an injury.”

Vinson v. Hartley, 477 S.E.2d 715,

721 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996).

It “requires proof of both causation

in fact and legal cause.”

Hurd v. Williamsburg Cty., 579 S.E.2d

136, 144 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).

Causation in fact requires a

showing that the plaintiff’s “injury would not have occurred
‘but for’ the defendant’s” misconduct, while “[l]egal cause is
proved by establishing foreseeability.”
Mental

Health,

“Foreseeability

502
is

S.E.2d

determined

by

78,

Bishop v. S.C. Dep’t of
88-89

looking

to

(S.C.
the

probable consequences of the act complained of.”
5

1998).

natural

and

Vinson, 477

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S.E.2d at 721.

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Thus, misconduct “is a proximate cause of injury

if, in a natural and continuous sequence of events, it produces
the injury, and without it, the injury would not have occurred.”
Hurd, 579 S.E.2d at 144.
Proximate cause generally is an issue of fact for the jury,
to be decided as a matter of law only in “rare or exceptional
cases”

where

inference.”
79

(S.C.

“the

evidence

is

susceptible

to

only

one

Cody P. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 720 S.E.2d 473, 478-

Ct.

App.

2011)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

Additionally, the proximate cause of an injury need not be its
sole cause, as “[t]he defendant’s conduct can be a proximate
cause if it was at least one of the direct, concurring causes of
the injury.”

Hurd, 579 S.E.2d at 145.

However, “where the

cause of plaintiff’s injury may be as reasonably attributed to
an act for which defendant is not liable as to one for which he
is

liable,

establishing

plaintiff

has

that

injuries

his

defendants’ [misconduct].”

failed

to

were

carry

the

the

proximate

burden

of

result

of

Messier v. Adicks, 161 S.E.2d 845,

846 (S.C. 1968).
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Muhler, we conclude evidence of proximate cause is lacking.

The

undisputed evidence established that retail pricing of windows
produced

by

Ply

Gem,

a

window

manufacturer,

results

from

multiple factors beyond the cost of production, many of which
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are controlled by Muhler and its competitor window dealers.

The

affidavit

attributing

his

price,

did

not

had

the

decision
establish

proffered
to

by

purchase

that

a

local

Ply

Muhler

Gem

would

contractor,
products

have

to

obtained

the

sale

contractor not selected a Ply Gem product.

While Muhler also

provided

sales

affidavits

from

members

of

its

staff

who

testified that they lost specific sales to Ply Gem products,
these witness’ testimony is based on unattributed hearsay or
speculation.

See

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

56(c)(1),

(2),

(4).

Additionally, even if these affidavits could be used as evidence
that Muhler lost the identified sales due to the retail price
offered for the Ply Gem windows, its evidence did not establish
that

the

retail

prices

were

attributable

to

Ply

Gem’s

mislabeling, as opposed to pricing decisions made by the dealer
or other intervening factors.
The sworn declaration of Muhler’s president regarding the
manufacturing and certification process—like the affidavits of
several

building

inspection

officials—did

not

provide

a

nonspeculative basis to conclude that any reduced manufacturing
costs

were

reflected

in

retail

prices

or

that

mislabeling

resulted in any appreciable increase in Ply Gem’s market share.
Viewed in the aggregate, these facts are readily distinguishable
from those of Lexmark, in that the evidence presented fails to
establish that Muhler’s alleged losses are attributable to any
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discernable degree to Ply Gem’s alleged mislabeling, rather than
decisions of unrelated actors.

Additionally, given the numerous

factors involved in window pricing and sales decisions, Muhler
has

not

demonstrated

that

its

losses

were

the

natural

and

probable consequence of Ply Gem’s purported mislabeling of its
windows.

Thus,

the

district

court

properly

concluded

that

Muhler failed to provide evidence sufficient to establish the
proximate cause necessary to sustain its Lanham Act or SCUTPA
claims.
Similarly, we find no error in the court’s conclusion that
the

evidence

ascertainable

failed,

as

damages

a

matter

necessary

to

of

law,

support

to

a

establish

SCUTPA

claim.

“Recoverable damages” under SCUTPA “include compensation for all
injury to plaintiff’s property or business which is the natural
and probable consequence of defendant’s wrong.”

Collins Holding

Corp. v. Defibaugh, 646 S.E.2d 147, 149 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

While the plaintiff need

not establish “proof, with mathematical certainty, of the amount
of

loss

permit

or

damage,”

the

reasonable

he

factfinder
certainty

must

“to
and

present

determine
accuracy.

sufficient
the

amount

Neither

evidence
thereof

the

to

with

existence,

causation[,] nor amount of damages can be left to conjecture,
guess[,] or speculation.”
(S.C.

1991)

(internal

Baughman v. AT&T, 410 S.E.2d 537, 546
quotation
8

marks

omitted).

Despite

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multiple requests to do so during deposition, Muhler’s president
did not articulate a clearly reasoned, nonspeculative basis for
his conclusion that Muhler lost 50% of its sales to Ply Gem.
Muhler provided no evidence from which a jury could reasonably
ascertain
alleged
conclude
failed

the

amount

mislabeling,
the

of
as

damages
opposed

court

provide

to

district

evidence

attributable
to

other

properly

to

causes.

determined

sufficient

to

Ply

Gem’s

Thus,
that

we

Muhler

support

a

nonspeculative damages calculation.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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