Brandon Pegg v. Nathan Klempa

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:13-cv-00173-FPS. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999843405]. [15-1889]

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 1 of 14

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1889

BRANDON PEGG; KRISTINA PEGG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
NATHAN TYLER KLEMPA, individually and in his capacity as
agent and employee of the City of Glen Dale Police
Department; GRANT HERRNBERGER,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.
Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:13-cv-00173-FPS)

Submitted:

March 15, 2016

Decided:

June 6, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, and reversed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.

Robert G. McCoid, MCCAMIC, SACCO & MCCOID, P.L.L.C., Wheeling,
West Virginia; Paul J. Harris, HARRIS LAW OFFICES, Wheeling,
West Virginia, for Appellants. Montѐ L. Williams, Deva A.
Solomon, Robert L. Bailey, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, PLLC, Morgantown,
West Virginia; Keith C. Gamble, PULLIN, FOWLER, FLANAGAN, BROWN
& POE, PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 2 of 14

PER CURIAM:
Brandon Travis Pegg and Kristina Pegg appeal the district
court’s

grant

of

Defendants-Appellees
Herrnberger

on

the

summary
Nathan

basis

judgment

Tyler

of

Klempa

qualified

in
and

immunity.

favor

of

Grant
The

P.
Peggs

raised constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), as
well as related state law claims, against Klempa and Herrnberger
arising from a traffic stop of the Peggs’ vehicle.

The amended

complaint alleged: (1) unlawful arrest of Mr. Pegg; (2) unlawful
detention of Mrs. Pegg; (3) excessive force as to Mr. Pegg;
(4) intentional infliction of emotional distress as to both Mr.
and Mrs. Pegg; (5) battery of Mr. and Mrs. Pegg; and (6) civil
conspiracy to unlawfully detain and search the Peggs.
After the Peggs filed this action, Klempa and Herrnberger
moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to
qualified immunity.

The district court granted the defendants’

motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
In regard to Mr. Pegg’s claims, the court concluded that the
officers had not unreasonably extended the traffic stop and,
once

Mr.

existed

Pegg
to

refused

arrest

him

to

exit

for

his

vehicle,

obstruction.

probable
The

court

cause
also

determined that, because the arrest of Mr. Pegg was lawful, the
force applied by the officers was not excessive.

2

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 3 of 14

As to Mrs. Pegg’s claims of unlawful detention, the court
concluded

that

dangerous

and

Herrnberger
was

reasonably

therefore

justified

believed
in

that

frisking

she

her.

was
The

court determined that, similar to Herrnberger’s frisk of Mrs.
Pegg,

Klempa’s

justified

by

searches

officer

of

safety

her

purse

and

concerns. 1

the

vehicle

Finally,

the

were
court

concluded that Mrs. Pegg had not been the victim of a battery as
a result of the frisk, and that the remainder of the Peggs’
state law claims were also barred by qualified immunity.
On appeal, the Peggs assert three errors in the district
court’s

decision.

First,

they

argue

that

the

officers

unnecessarily extended the duration of the traffic stop and did
not order Mr. Pegg from the vehicle because of safety concerns.
Therefore, they argue, Mr. Pegg’s arrest for failing to exit the
vehicle

was

unlawful.

Second,

they

argue

that

no

facts

establish an objective, reasonable suspicion that Mrs. Pegg was
armed and dangerous, and therefore the search of the vehicle,
frisk of Mrs. Pegg, and search of her purse violated the Fourth

1

The court noted that Mrs. Pegg had consented to the search
of her purse, but concluded that it was “unclear whether Mrs.
Pegg’s consent was voluntarily given.”
Because the court
determined that the search was valid regardless of consent, it
did not reach a determination as to whether consent was
voluntary.

3

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Amendment.

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 4 of 14

Finally, they argue that Herrnberger’s frisk of Mrs.

Pegg constituted battery, as it involved offensive touching.
We “review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, applying the same standard as the district court . . .
[and] construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
[the Peggs], the non-movant[s].”

Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes,

LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2014).

Summary judgment is

appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to material fact and
“the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“Qualified
constitutional
established

(en

protects

violations

law,

were lawful.”
2011)

immunity

could

but

who,

reasonably

officers
in

who

commit

of

clearly

light

believe

that

their

actions

Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir.

banc).

Thus,

to

successfully

avail

themselves

of

qualified immunity, Klempa and Herrnberger must show either that
no constitutional violation occurred or that the right was not
clearly

established

at

the

time it

2

was

violated. 2

Id.

In

West Virginia law similarly follows a two-step inquiry to
determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity:
“(1) does the alleged conduct set out a constitutional or
statutory violation, and (2) were the constitutional standards
clearly established at the time in question?” Hutchison v. City
of Huntington, 479 S.E.2d 649, 659 (W. Va. 1996). Additionally,
an official is not entitled to qualified immunity if his or her
conduct was “fraudulent, malicious, or otherwise oppressive.”
Id.

4

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 5 of 14

evaluating whether the right was clearly established, we look
“not to whether the right allegedly violated was established ‘as
a broad general proposition’ but whether ‘it would be clear to a
reasonable

official

that

situation he confronted.’”
(4th

Cir.)

(quoting

his

conduct

was

unlawful

in

the

Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876, 882

Saucier v.

Katz,

533

U.S.

194,

201–02

(2001), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 503 (2015).
With

regard

to

Mr.

Pegg’s

claim

of

unlawful

arrest,

we

conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the
officers

are

entitled

constitutionality

of

a

to

qualified

traffic

stop

immunity.

is

analyzed

The
under

a

two-prong standard: first, we determine “whether the officer’s
reason

for

the

traffic

stop

was

legitimate”

and,

if

so,

we

examine “whether the officer’s actions during the seizure were
reasonably related in scope to the basis for the traffic stop.”
United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
tolerable

duration

of

police

“Like a Terry stop, the

inquiries

in

the

traffic-stop

context is determined by the seizure's ‘mission’—to address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related
safety concerns.”

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609,

1614 (2015) (internal citations omitted).

The central question

is whether the officer’s action, “viewed objectively and in its
totality, is reasonably directed toward the proper ends of the
5

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

stop.”

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 6 of 14

United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 508 (4th Cir.

2011).
As to the first prong, Mr. Pegg concedes that his vehicle
had an inoperative license plate light and therefore the initial
justification for the traffic stop was valid.

Regarding the

second prong of the inquiry, we conclude the officers’ actions
up to and including ordering Mr. Pegg from the vehicle were
reasonably directed toward the proper purpose of the traffic
stop.
After

stopping

conversation

with

conversation

that

recalcitrance.

the
Mr.
was
Mr.

Peggs’
Pegg

vehicle,

regarding

extended
Pegg

Klempa
the

by

eventually

had

a

traffic

Mr.

stop,

Pegg’s

turned

brief
a

initial

over

his

documentation and Klempa ran checks on the documentation, all of
which was proper.

Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507.

minutes

the

elapsed

by

time

Klempa

returned

to

Only five
Mr.

Pegg’s

vehicle.
Klempa wanted Mr. Pegg to exit the vehicle for two reasons:
(1) because of concerns for officer safety; and (2) to show Mr.
Pegg the burned-out light and issue a verbal warning.

This

directive was not unconstitutional.
As

an

initial

matter,

the

traffic

stop

itself

had

not

concluded as Klempa had not yet issued the warning to Mr. Pegg.
See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008)
6

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 7 of 14

(“once . . . the police officer has issued the requisite warning
or ticket, the driver must be allowed to proceed on his way”).
Moreover, when viewed in context, ordering Mr. Pegg from the
vehicle was reasonably related to the purpose of the traffic
stop.

From the moment the stop began, Mr. Pegg was agitated and

expressed

incredulity

traffic stop.
Klempa

to

notified

of

the

reason

for

the

Therefore, while it was perhaps unnecessary for

order

reasonably

when

Mr.

directed

Pegg

toward

from
the

the

proper

vehicle,
purpose

it
of

was
the

also
stop—

demonstrating to Mr. Pegg that there was a legitimate defect
with his vehicle, and issuing a verbal warning relating to that
defect.

Furthermore, Mr. Pegg confirmed during his deposition

that, at the time he was asked to exit his vehicle, the officers
were standing in or near the lane of traffic.

The stop occurred

in the evening on New Year’s Eve, an evening when, as the Peggs’
expert

testified,

drunk driving.

there

is

a

higher-than-usual

likelihood

of

Thus, ordering Mr. Pegg from his vehicle was

also justified by concerns for officer safety.
Because it was reasonably directed toward the purpose of
the stop, Klempa’s decision to order Mr. Pegg from the vehicle
did

not

unreasonably

detention.

extend

duration

of

Mr.

Pegg’s

The officers therefore maintained authority to order

Mr. Pegg from the vehicle.
111 (1977).

the

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,

When Mr. Pegg refused the lawful command given by
7

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 8 of 14

the officers, they had probable cause to believe that Mr. Pegg
was

obstructing

Botkins,

719

an

officer.

S.E.2d

863,

872

refused

to

comply

[with

officer

may

have

believed

obstruct the officer”).

See

City

(W.

the

Va.

of
2011)

officer’s

the

refusal

Saint

(“Once

order],
to

be

Albans

a
an

v.

Appellee

reasonable
attempt

to

The arrest was lawful, and Mr. Pegg’s

claim for unlawful arrest therefore fails, as do his related
claims.
Turning

to

warrantless

the

search

searches

unreasonable,”

several

of

of

the

a

vehicle

exceptions

Peggs’

vehicle,

are

exist.

“presumptively

United

Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 274-75 (4th Cir. 2004).

although

States

v.

Of relevance to

this case,
the search of the passenger compartment of an
automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon
may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police
officer
possesses a
reasonable
belief
based
on
specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with
the
rational
inferences
from
those
facts,
reasonably warrant the officers in believing that the
suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain
immediate control of weapons.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
such

safety

belief

of

Thus, to conduct a lawful search pursuant to

concerns,

both

(1)

“an

the

officer

suspect’s

must

possess

dangerousness

a

reasonable

and

(2)

the

possibility that the suspect might gain immediate control of any
weapons inside the vehicle.”

United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d
8

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 9 of 14

148, 153 (4th Cir. 2009).

We examine “the totality of the

circumstances

whether

in

determining

suspicion existed.”

the

requisite

reasonable

United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 411

(4th Cir. 2008).
By the time Klempa performed a search of the vehicle, Mr.
Pegg had been handcuffed and placed in the back of Klempa’s
vehicle.

Consequently, any concern for officer safety had to be

based on a threat posed by Mrs. Pegg, rather than Mr. Pegg.

The

district court determined that the officers had a reasonable
suspicion

that

Mrs.

Pegg

was

dangerous

because:

(1) it

was

evening on New Year’s Eve; (2) prior to being arrested, Mr. Pegg
had been agitated and failed to follow officer commands; (3) it
would be “reasonable . . . to believe that . . . Mrs. Pegg[] was
also agitated and a risk” to officer safety; and (4) Mrs. Pegg
had opened her car door and asked why her husband was being
arrested.
Certainly, the fact that the stop occurred at nighttime on
New Year’s Eve supports reasonable suspicion.

Even assuming

that Mr. Pegg’s agitation and failure to comply with officer
commands

is

circumstances

relevant
fall

to

well

Mrs.
short

Pegg’s
of

the

dangerousness,
requisite

reasonable

suspicion needed to believe that Mrs. Pegg was a threat.

9

these

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 10 of 14

No evidence demonstrates that Mrs. Pegg was nervous, angry,
or

irritated. 3

To

the

contrary,

compliant during the traffic stop.

she

was

cooperative

and

When Mr. Pegg was initially

uncooperative with Klempa, Mrs. Pegg encouraged him to comply
with Klempa’s order.

When asked, Mrs. Pegg: (1) produced her

identification; (2) closed her door and stayed quiet; (3) exited
the vehicle to be searched; and (4) lifted her shirt and coat to
expose

her

torso

to

Herrnberger.

During

his

deposition,

Herrnberger was unable to remember or articulate a single fact
that supported a reasonable suspicion that Mrs. Pegg presented a
threat.

3

Contrary to the district court’s determination, it is
entirely reasonable for an individual, upon witnessing her
spouse being handcuffed and placed in a police cruiser, to ask
if and why her spouse was being arrested. Nor is it suspicious
that Mrs. Pegg opened the door to do this, as she did so merely
to gain the attention of one of the officers.
See United
States v.
McCraney,
674
F.3d
614,
621
(6th
Cir.
2012)
(concluding that, where an individual exits the vehicle not to
flee but to get the officer’s attention, such behavior does not
contribute to reasonable suspicion).
Additionally,
we
question
the
district
court’s
determination that it would be reasonable to assume that Mrs.
Pegg was agitated.
There is no indication that Mrs. Pegg was
angry, agitated, or irritated during or after her husband’s
arrest or that the officers believed she was agitated and,
absent such evidence, reaching that assumption on summary
judgment inappropriately ignored the requirement that facts be
viewed in the light most favorable to Mrs. Pegg, and that all
reasonable inferences be drawn in her favor.
Any assumed
agitation cannot, therefore, support a particularized suspicion
that Mrs. Pegg was dangerous.

10

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

The

Filed: 06/06/2016

evidence

establishes

Pg: 11 of 14

that

Mrs.

criminal history or history of violence.

Pegg

had

no

known

At the time the search

was conducted, no individuals were near the officers other than
Mrs. Pegg, and the officers outnumbered Mrs. Pegg three to one.
There is no evidence that the location of the traffic stop was a
high crime area.

Nor is there any evidence that the officers

actually believed that Mrs. Pegg posed a threat; indeed, they
left her entirely unattended, prompting her to open her door
simply to gain an officer’s attention.

We therefore conclude

that no reasonable officer would have believed that Mrs. Pegg
was dangerous.
Moreover, Mrs. Pegg’s right to be free from a search under
these circumstances was clearly established at the time of the
traffic stop.
Cir. 2009).

See United States v. Neely, 564 F.3d 346 (4th
Police may conduct a frisk of a passenger during a

traffic stop where: (1) “it is lawful for police to detain an
automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular
violation;” and (2) the police “harbor reasonable suspicion that
the

person

subjected

to

the

frisk

is

armed

and

dangerous.”

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009).
Reasonable suspicion must be particularized and objective.
“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual
is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety
11

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 12 of 14

or that of others was in danger.”

United States v. Powell, 666

F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 27 (1968)).

This determination must be “based on commonsense

judgments and inferences about human behavior and it is measured
by the totality of the circumstances.”

Id. (quoting Illinois v.

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)).
As

detailed

supports

a

believed

that

above,

conclusion
Mrs.

the

that

Pegg

evidence
no

was

in

this

reasonable
dangerous.

case

officer
Although

strongly

would

have

the

stop

occurred after dark, and Mr. Pegg was somewhat uncooperative but
not threatening during the stop, there is simply no evidence
that Mrs. Pegg presented any threat.
Furthermore, at the time of the search, a number of our
cases

made

clear

that

something

more

than

the

circumstances

facing Klempa and Herrnberger was required to support a belief
that Mrs. Pegg was dangerous.

See Powell, 666 F.3d at 187-88

(knowledge of a past criminal record and providing officers with
false

information

was

insufficient

to

create

reasonable

suspicion); United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 488-91
(4th Cir. 2011) (presence in a high crime area shortly after
police received anonymous tip concerning random gunfire in the
area does not create reasonable suspicion); United States v.
Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246-49 (4th Cir. 2011) (knowledge of a

12

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 13 of 14

suspect’s criminal history, sudden movements, and arm shifting
were insufficient).
We

thus

conclude

that,

at

the

summary

judgment

stage,

Herrnberger is not entitled to qualified immunity for his frisk
of Mrs. Pegg, and Klempa is not entitled to qualified immunity
for his search of Mrs. Pegg’s purse. 4
Finally, in West Virginia, an individual commits the tort
of battery where “(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or
offensive

contact

with

the

person

of

the

other

or

a

third

person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a
harmful

contact

with

indirectly results.”

the

person

of

the

other

directly

or

W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602

S.E.2d 483, 494 (W. Va. 2004) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 13 (1965)).
We

conclude

that

an

unauthorized

battery.

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25 (“Even a limited search
outer

annoying,

clothing

for

frightening,

and

satisfy

weapons
perhaps

.

.

the

.

requirements

an

contact

the

to

constitutes

offensive

of

sufficient

frisk

must

humiliating

surely

be

for

an

experience”).

Moreover, because Herrnberger conducted a frisk that was not
4

As previously noted, the district court did not resolve
the question of whether Mrs. Pegg voluntarily consented to the
search of her purse.
Because the issue of consent was not
decided by the district court and has not been raised on appeal,
we leave resolution of this issue to the district court.

13

Appeal: 15-1889

Doc: 31

Filed: 06/06/2016

Pg: 14 of 14

necessary for officer safety, he was not privileged to create
that offensive contact with Mrs. Pegg.

See Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 10 (2)(b) (1965) (A privilege may be based upon . . .
the fact that its exercise is necessary for the protection of
some interest . . .”).

We therefore conclude that the district

court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Herrnberger
on this claim.
Accordingly,
district

court’s

we

affirm

order,

in

and

consistent with this opinion.

part
remand

and
for

reverse
further

in

part

the

proceedings

We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART

14