Randy Byers v. Alamance County, NC

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cv-01102-JAB-JEP. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999755162]. Mailed to: Randy Byers. [15-1923]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1923

RANDY WALTER BYERS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALAMANCE COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:13-cv-01102-JAB-JEP)

Submitted:

January 29, 2016

Decided:

February 16, 2016

Before GREGORY, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Randy Walter Byers, Appellant Pro Se. William L. Hill, FRAZIER
HILL & FURY, RLLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, James Demarest
Secor, III, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Randy

Walter

Byers

appeals

the

district

court’s

order

granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, Alamance
County,
Title

North

VII

Carolina

claim

of

(hereafter,

racially

“the

County”),

discriminatory

on

hiring.

Byers’
For

the

reasons that follow, we affirm.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de

novo,

viewing

the

facts

and

the

reasonable

inferences

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011).

Summary

judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

In making this determination,

we may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations,
and we

“must

disregard

all

evidence

favorable

to

the

party that the jury is not required to believe.”
Sanderson
However,
judgment,

Plumbing
to

survive

the

Prods.,
a

Inc.,

nonmoving

properly
party

530

U.S.

supported
“cannot

moving

Reeves v.

133,

151

(2000).

motion

for

summary

solely

rely

on

mere

allegations or denials of his pleadings” but “must set forth
specific facts that go beyond the mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence.”

Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.

2013) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

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Title VII prohibits employers from failing or refusing to
hire

an

individual

“because

of

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).

such

individual’s

race.”

Where, as here, the plaintiff

does not provide direct evidence of discrimination, he may prove
a

Title

VII

claim

through

the

burden-shifting

framework

set

forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir.
2015).

To

establish

a

prima

facie

case

of

discriminatory

failure to hire, Byers must prove that (1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he applied for the position; (3) he was
qualified for the position; and (4) his application was rejected
“under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.”

Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,

406 F.3d 248, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).

If he meets this burden, the

burden shifts to the County to produce evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for declining to hire Byers.

See Hoyle

v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 336 (4th Cir. 2011).

If the

County makes such a showing, the burden then shifts back to
Byers to prove that the employer’s asserted justification is
pretextual.

See Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780

F.3d 562, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2015).
As

an

initial

matter,

although

Byers

asserts

that

the

district court improperly excluded various documents appended to
his

summary

judgment

pleadings,
3

the

district

court’s

opinion

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states that it considered these documents in making its summary
judgment determination.

Additionally, insofar as Byers raises

new arguments on appeal, these issues are not properly before
the court.

See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir.

2014).
We have reviewed the record and the parties’ submissions
and find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Byers
failed to provide evidence sufficient to support a prima facie
case of discrimination, as he could not demonstrate that he was
rejected from either position under circumstances giving rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination.
at 268.

See Anderson, 406 F.3d

Moreover, we agree that the record does not permit the

conclusion

that

the

County’s

proffered

pretext for intentional discrimination.

justifications

were

See Jacobs, 780 F.3d at

515-16; Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 211 (4th
Cir. 2014).

Thus, the district court committed no reversible

error in granting summary judgment in favor of the County.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument will not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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