EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc.

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:15-cv-00869-GLR. [999802663]. [15-1947]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1947

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Petitioner − Appellant,
v.
MARITIME AUTOWASH, INC.,
Respondent − Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, District Judge.
(1:15-cv-00869-GLR)

Argued:

March 24, 2016

Decided:

April 25, 2016

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and David C.
NORTON, United States District Judge for the District of South
Carolina, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Norton joined. Judge Niemeyer
wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.

ARGUED: Paula Rene' Bruner, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
John S. Vander
Woude, ECCLESTON AND WOLF, PC, Hanover, Maryland, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: P. David Lopez, General Counsel, Jennifer S.
Goldstein,
Associate
General
Counsel,
Lorraine
C.
Davis,
Assistant General Counsel, U. S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellee Maritime Autowash, Inc. employed Elmer Escalante,
an undocumented alien, at one of its two full-service carwashes.
Escalante

filed

a

complaint

against

Maritime

with

the

Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging discrimination under
Title

VII

of

the

Civil

Rights

Act

of

1964.

As

part

of

its

investigation, the EEOC issued a subpoena seeking information
from Maritime related to Escalante’s charges, which the employer
opposed. The district court denied the EEOC’s application for
subpoena enforcement.
This matter thus arrives on appeal at a very early stage.
The only issue before us is judicial enforcement of the EEOC’s
subpoena. We cannot yet know whether the agency’s investigation
will uncover misconduct by the employer or ever ripen into a
lawsuit. Nor can we assess what causes of action or remedies
might lie down the road. All that the district court was called
upon to decide was whether the EEOC had authority to investigate
Escalante’s charges. We think the trial court erred in declining
to authorize that very preliminary step.
I.
In May 2012, Maritime hired Elmer Escalante as a vacuumer
at its carwash in Edgewater, Maryland. At the time, Escalante
lacked authorization to work in the United States. Maritime and
Escalante

offer

contrasting

narratives
2

of

his

hiring

and

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termination. According to the employer, Escalante was originally
hired under the name Angel Erazo. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) informed Maritime in May 2013 after inspecting
its

workplaces

that

Erazo

had

no

lawful

work

authorization.

Maritime contends it terminated “Angel Erazo” and hired the same
person under the name “Elmer Escalante” that same month.
For his part, Escalante claims that he was hired in May
2012 under his legal name, not Angel Erazo. The head manager
told him on his second day at work that the name Elmer Escalante
did not match his social security number. The manager allegedly
advised Escalante to obtain new documents bearing a different
name,

which

Escalante

did.

He

went

by

Angel

Erazo

for

the

following year. Escalante describes how, following an inspection
by DHS in May 2013, Maritime’s owner and its general manager met
with

all

the

Hispanic

employees.

They

offered

those

without

proper work authorization $150 each, styled as a one-time bonus,
to help them acquire new documentation with new names. Escalante
obtained
“Elmer

a

different

Escalante.”

social

Maritime

security
then

number

rehired

corresponding

him

and

the

to

other

Hispanic employees with their new papers.
On July 27, 2013, Escalante and other Hispanic employees
complained to Maritime of unequal treatment and discrimination
targeting Hispanics. All of them were terminated the day they
raised the complaint. Escalante then filed charges with the EEOC
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on February 6, 2014 for discrimination on the basis of national
origin and retaliation as prohibited under Title VII. The time
period identified in his complaint was May 2012 to July 2013.
The complaint details the unequal employment conditions facing
Hispanic employees at Maritime, including longer working hours,
shorter breaks, lack of proper equipment, additional duties, and
lower

wages.

Ten

other

terminated

Hispanic

employees

lodged

similar complaints with the EEOC. The Commission served Maritime
with a notice of the charges on February 25, 2014.
In

responding

to

the

charges,

Maritime

denied

all

allegations of discrimination and stated that Escalante had been
terminated for failing to appear for a scheduled work shift. By
Maritime’s account, “Elmer Escalante” had been employed for only
two months, from May 2013 to July 2013. Maritime relegated to a
single

footnote

the

fact

that

Escalante

had

worked

there

previously under the name of Angel Erazo. Maritime claimed that
it had terminated “Angel Erazo” in May 2013 pursuant to a DHS
inspection

that

revealed

Erazo’s

lack

of

work

authorization.

None of Maritime’s submissions to the EEOC touched upon whether
it had assisted Escalante in switching names and obtaining new
documentation, as he alleges it did.
The EEOC served Maritime with a Request for Information
(RFI) on May 27, 2014 seeking personnel files, wage records, and
other employment data related to Escalante, the other charging
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parties, and similarly situated employees dating from January 1,
2012 to the time of the request. Maritime refused to provide
records for any Hispanic employee other than Escalante. It again
insisted that Escalante, as opposed to Angel Erazo, was hired in
May 2013 and accordingly limited its response to May to July
2013. Appellee further objected that certain of the agency’s
requests

were

unduly

burdensome,

overly

broad,

and/or

irrelevant.
Faced with Maritime’s incomplete response to its RFI, the
EEOC

issued

a

subpoena

on

June

10,

2014

focused

only

on

Escalante’s charges. Maritime produced none of the subpoenaed
documents. The EEOC then filed an initial application seeking
enforcement of its subpoena, which the district court dismissed
without prejudice to allow the agency to correct certain factual
errors in its application. A second application for subpoena
enforcement followed on March 26, 2015.
The
order

district

dated

primarily

on

court

denied

June

23,

2015.

this

circuit’s

that

J.A.

application
315-16.

decision

in

The

Egbuna

in

a

letter

court

relied

v.

Time-Life

Libraries, Inc., which held that a “plaintiff is entitled to
[Title VII] remedies only upon a successful showing that the
applicant was qualified for employment” and that being qualified
meant being “authorized for employment in the United States at
the time in question.” J.A. 316 (quoting 153 F.3d 184, 187 (4th
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Cir. 1998) (en banc) (per curiam)). From Egbuna’s reasoning, the
district

court

authorization

concluded

precluded

any

that

Escalante’s

“standing

or

lack

right

of

to

work

seek

the

remedies under Title VII” and thus left no viable basis for his
EEOC complaint. Id. “As the EEOC’s Application [for subpoena
enforcement] is premised solely on Escalante’s complaint, [the
application]

must

be

dismissed.”

Id.

The

EEOC

has

timely

appealed.
II.
A.
We begin by emphasizing what we need not address in this
case. We are not addressing any defenses Maritime might raise
against the EEOC’s subpoena, such as the undue burdensomeness of
certain requests. We are not addressing the viability of any
cause of action that Escalante might eventually assert against
Maritime. We are not addressing the remedies that he might one
day claim. All that is further down the line. The only question
we must consider now is whether the EEOC’s subpoena, designed to
investigate Escalante’s Title VII charges, is enforceable. We
hold that it is.
The EEOC is empowered to enforce Title VII’s provisions
against

employment

Central

to

that

discrimination.
enforcement

42

U.S.C.

authority

is

§
the

2000e-5(a).
power

to

investigate charges brought by employees, including the right to
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access “any evidence . . . that relates to unlawful employment
practices covered by [the statute],” id. § 2000e-8(a), as well
as

“the

authority

to

issue

administrative

subpoenas

and

to

request judicial enforcement of those subpoenas.” EEOC v. Shell
Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 63 (1984) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9).
The

district

court

plays

a

“limited”

role

in

the

enforcement of administrative subpoenas. EEOC v. City of Norfolk
Police Dep’t., 45 F.3d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1995). “The [judicial
review] process is not one for a determination of the underlying
claim on its merits; Congress has delegated that function to the
discretion of the administrative agency. Rather, courts should
look only to the jurisdiction of the agency to conduct such an
investigation.” EEOC v. Am. & Efird Mills, Inc., 964 F.2d 300,
303 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
That
dispute.

jurisdictional
Both

parties

question

agree

on

is
the

central
key

to

the

factual

instant

issue

that

Escalante held no valid work authorization when he was hired by
Maritime. They disagree on how Escalante’s undocumented status
affects

the

EEOC’s

authority

to

investigate

his

charges.

Maritime argues that someone lacking proper work authorization
was never qualified for employment and therefore lacks any cause
of action or remedy under Title VII. According to appellee, “[a]
valid charge of discrimination ‘is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to judicial enforcement of a subpoena issue[d] by the EEOC.’”
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Appellee’s Br. 3-4 (quoting EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287
F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S.
at 65)). Without a valid charge from the employee presenting a
viable

cause

of

action,

the

court

cannot

enforce

the

EEOC’s

subpoena against the employer.
The

Commission

responds

that

it

is

not

obligated

to

demonstrate valid causes of action or remedies under Title VII
when seeking to subpoena information. All it must show is that
an “arguable” or “plausible” basis for its jurisdiction exists
and that its investigative authority is “not plainly lacking.”
Appellant’s Br. 10 (quoting EEOC v. Randstad, 685 F.3d 433, 442
(4th Cir. 2012)). The agency reads Title VII’s definition of
“employee” and related provisions to cover Escalante despite his
undocumented status, which at least authorizes the agency to
investigate

his

charge

of

national

origin

discrimination.

Whether causes of action or remedies ultimately arise from the
investigation,

the

Commission

argues,

has

no

bearing

on

its

subpoena power. In other words, courts may uphold the agency’s
subpoena authority without the need to pass on its view of Title
VII’s coverage of undocumented workers.
B.
The plain language of Title VII provides a “plausible” or
“arguable” basis for the EEOC’s subpoena in this case. Randstad,
685 F.3d at 442. The term “employee” in Title VII is defined
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broadly as any “individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(f).

The

anti-discrimination

provisions

use

similarly

expansive terms, making it illegal to “fail or refuse to hire or
to

discharge

against

any

any

individual,

individual”

and

or

otherwise

listing

to

“national

discriminate
origin”

as

a

protected characteristic. Id. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII allows any
“person claiming to be aggrieved” to file charges with the EEOC.
Id. § 2000e-5(b). Nothing explicitly bars undocumented workers
from filing complaints.
Whether under the name Elmer Escalante or Angel Erazo, the
charging party in this case was employed at Maritime’s carwash,
and his charge of discrimination rests squarely on one of the
protected

grounds.

The

EEOC’s

investigation

of

Escalante’s

charges was therefore at least plausibly and arguably related to
the authority that Congress conferred upon the Commission. Since
Maritime challenged only the agency’s subpoena authority, the
district court should have stopped at that point and enforced
the subpoena accordingly. This is not a case where the agency
went

rogue

or

jumped

the

tracks

and

sought

to

investigate

something unrelated to its statutory charge.
Maritime counters that a reviewing court must ascertain a
valid charge of discrimination, which must incorporate a viable
cause of action or remedy, as a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to
enforcing the agency’s subpoena. In other words, what Maritime
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was asking the district court to do was address Title VII’s
coverage of undocumented workers before deciding the issue of
subpoena

enforcement.

The

district

court

followed

Maritime’s

lead, concluding that no Title VII causes of action or remedies
were open to those lacking proper work authorization, and so the
EEOC had no authority to investigate their charges.
This has it all backwards. A court need not first address
causes

of

action

or

remedies

any

time

it

reviews

an

agency

subpoena. Maritime’s argument is premised on cases, primarily
EEOC

v.

Shell

Oil

Co.,

dealing

with

various

threshold

requirements for filing charges with the EEOC and for providing
notice

to

employers.

466

U.S.

54.

Shell

Oil,

for

example,

addresses how much information must be included in Title VII
charges and provided to the employer before the EEOC can secure
judicial enforcement of its subpoena.
Those requirements are not at issue here. At the heart of
those cases raised by Maritime is § 706 of Title VII, which
provides, for instance, that charges be in “writing under oath
or affirmation,” “contain such information and be in such form
as the Commission requires,” and comply with a statutory filing
period. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (governing the form and content
of charges); id. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (requiring charges to be filed
within 180 days of the alleged unlawful conduct). This circuit
has

routinely

considered

when
10

these

threshold

requirements,

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particularly timeliness, form a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to
the

EEOC’s

investigation

such

that

non-compliance

precludes

subpoena enforcement. See, e.g., City of Norfolk Police Dep’t.,
45 F.3d 80 (considering the EEOC’s authority to investigate an
untimely charge).
Here, Maritime does not contest Escalante’s compliance with
§ 706 or other threshold conditions. His charges are invalid,
Maritime argues, because an undocumented alien cannot present a
viable Title VII cause of action or remedy. That is much harder
to shoehorn into the concept of a “jurisdictional prerequisite”
for enforcing subpoenas. This court has not required the showing
of

a

viable

cause

of

action

or

remedy

at

the

subpoena

enforcement stage, and for good reason. Ensuring that charges
meet the guidelines on form, content, and timeliness is a far
cry from predicting and evaluating what relief on the merits the
charging party might ultimately claim.
Courts

are

warned

not

to

venture

prematurely

into

the

merits of employment actions that have not been brought: “[a]t
the subpoena-enforcement stage, . . .‘any effort by the court to
assess the likelihood that the Commission would be able to prove
the claims made in the charge would be reversible error.’ The
EEOC’s authority to investigate ‘is not negated simply because
the party under investigation may have a valid defense to a

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later suit.’” Randstad, 685 F.3d at 449 (quoting Shell Oil, 466
U.S. at 72 n. 26; United Air Lines, Inc., 287 F.3d at 651).
Maritime’s

approach

would

cram

substantive

questions

of

statutory coverage into the confines of subpoena enforcement.
Any

employer

every

wishing

conceivable

to

dodge

obstacle

a

to

subpoena
a

could

claimant’s

simply
prospects

raise
for

ultimate success. At the point where an investigation has barely
started and no lawsuit has been filed, the EEOC itself is hardpressed

to

determine

the

validity

of

the

charges.

Without

evidence, a record, and appropriate briefing, the court is even
less equipped to conduct full-blown merits review. To do so at
such an early juncture would “serve[] ‘not only to place the
cart before the horse, but to substitute a different driver [the
district court] for the one appointed by Congress [the EEOC].’”
Id. at 449-50 (quoting Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 36
(4th

Cir.

1971)).

Regular

order

suggests

allowing

the

EEOC

investigation to run its course and reserving judgment on the
merits for a later time.
C.
The particular issue that Maritime presses -– whether and
to what extent Title VII covers undocumented aliens -– is a
novel and complex problem especially ill-suited to a premature
and absolute pronouncement. In presenting the issue, Maritime
relies

on

this

circuit’s

decision
12

in

Egbuna

v.

Time-Life

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Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, and the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002),
both

of

which

involve

undocumented

workers.

By

appellee’s

reading, Egbuna and Hoffman not only allow us to decide this
complicated question now, but in fact dictate a clear answer:
the

EEOC

has

no

authority

to

investigate

charges

brought

by

undocumented aliens.
If only our job were that easy. Neither Egbuna nor Hoffman
was presented in the premature posture that we find ourselves in
now. In Egbuna, this court reviewed a grant of summary judgment
against an employee bringing a Title VII action for unlawful
retaliation. Hoffman asked the Court to review an NLRB order
awarding

an

Neither

court

agency’s

employee
had

subpoena

backpay

any

following

opportunity

authority

or

illegal

to

how

consider

it

related

termination.
the

to

relevant

the

relief

available to undocumented aliens. In short, those two decisions
do not control the outcome here.
What

these

cases

do

throw

into

relief

are

the

hard

questions that arise when illegal immigrants invoke statutory
protections

against

illustrative.
award

of

Board’s
employer,

Even

backpay

employment

as
to

authority
including

to

the
an

discrimination.

Supreme

Court

undocumented
impose

cease

other

and
13

reversed

alien,

it

sanctions

desist

Hoffman

orders

the

is

NLRB’s

affirmed

the

against

the

and

notice

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requirements. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152. The lack of monetary
relief for the employee did not foreclose non-monetary remedies
the agency could use to rectify unlawful employment conditions.
The

whole

field

is

more

nuanced

and

less

categorical

than

Maritime suggests.
When laid bare, Maritime’s challenge to the EEOC’s subpoena
envisions a world where an employer could impose all manner of
harsh

working

questions

conditions

could

be

upon

asked,

no

undocumented
charges

aliens,

filed,

and

and

no

no

agency

investigation even so much as begun. The employer is asking the
court for carte blanche to both hire illegal immigrants and then
unlawfully

discriminate

against

those

it

unlawfully

hired.

Maritime would privilege employers who break the law above those
who follow the law. And it would block the EEOC from shining
even the dimmest light upon the employer’s actions.
So the agency must be allowed to do its job, but there are
limits to its powers too. None of this is intended to sanction
subpoena powers over any workplace grievance only speculatively
related to an agency’s statutory authority. We understand the
temptation for agencies to expand rather than contract their
spheres of influence. Subpoenas issued against individuals or
entities beyond an agency’s jurisdiction are ultra vires from
the

start,

and

administrative

courts

overreach.

stand
If

ready

subpoenas
14

to
are

curb

that

unduly

kind

of

burdensome,

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that too has long been subject to court challenge. But when, as
here, the agency is investigating charges plausibly within its
delegated powers, the courts should not obstruct. The district
court’s

judgment

is

hereby

reversed

and

remanded

with

instructions that the EEOC’s subpoena be enforced.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

15

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
I share Judge Wilkinson’s sensible view that a “full-blown
merits review” is premature at the subpoena-enforcement stage.
Ante at 12.

But we have previously explained that an agency

must “show that the exercise of its jurisdiction is supported by
reasonable

cause

[when]

the

person

to

whom

the

subpoena

is

directed raises a substantial question that the court’s process
will be abused by enforcement.”
F.2d

329,

332

(4th

Cir.

EEOC v. S.C. Nat’l Bank, 562

1977)

(emphasis

added).

Here,

the

employer has raised such a question, contending that the EEOC’s
issuance of a subpoena based on a charge filed against it by a
foreign

national

exceeds

the

unauthorized

scope

of

investigative authority.
by

focusing

requirement.

on

the

the

to

work

in

agency’s

the

United

statutorily

States

prescribed

Judge Wilkinson elides this question

formalities

of

the

EEOC’s

jurisdictional

I write separately to emphasize its substantive

component.
In order to obtain judicial enforcement of a subpoena, “the
EEOC

must

show,”

among

other

things,

authorized to make such investigation.”

“that

. . .

it

is

EEOC v. Wash. Suburban

Sanitary Comm’n, 631 F.3d 174, 180 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

In the instant case, the

EEOC asserts that it derives its authority to investigate Elmer
Escalante’s complaint from Title VII, which provides that the
16

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Commission,
charge,”

Filed: 04/25/2016

“[i]n

may

only

connection
access

Pg: 17 of 20

with

evidence

any

investigation

“that

relates

to

of

a

unlawful

employment practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant
to the charge under investigation.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a).

Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned that, under Title VII,
the EEOC’s power to issue subpoenas must be tethered to the
investigation of a “valid charge,” distinguishing the EEOC from
other

agencies

authority.

that

enjoy

more

“plenary”

investigative

EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1984)

(emphasis added).

As the Court has explained,

In construing the EEOC’s authority to request judicial
enforcement of its subpoenas, we must strive to give
effect to Congress’ purpose in establishing a linkage
between the Commission’s investigatory power and
charges of discrimination.
If the EEOC were able to
insist that an employer obey a subpoena despite the
failure of the complainant to file a valid charge,
Congress’ desire to prevent the Commission from
exercising unconstrained investigative authority would
be thwarted.
Accordingly, we hold that the existence
of a charge that meets the requirements set forth in
§ 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to judicial enforcement of a subpoena
issued by the EEOC.
Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
While

Judge

prerequisite”
fulfilled,
substantive

Wilkinson

satisfied

see

ante

at

requirement

as

views
long

10-11,
that

a

Shell
as

Oil’s

certain

§ 706(b)
valid

“jurisdictional
formalities

also

charge

contains

allege

that

are
the
the

employer “has engaged in an unlawful employment practice,” 42

17

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U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

Pg: 18 of 20

Judicial enforcement of a subpoena issued

by the EEOC must therefore insist that the sought-after evidence
relate

to

a

charge

employment practice.”
It

is

not

that

plausibly

alleges

“an

unlawful

Id.

immediately

clear

that

this

component

of

the

jurisdictional prerequisite is satisfied in this case –- where
all parties agree that Escalante is a foreign national who is
unauthorized to work in the United States –- given this court’s
precedent casting doubt on whether Title VII covers employment
relationships expressly prohibited by immigration statutes.

See

Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir.
1998) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that an unauthorized alien
whose former employer refused to rehire him lacked a cause of
action under Title VII because ruling otherwise “would sanction
the formation of a statutorily declared illegal relationship”
“[g]iven Congress’ unequivocal declaration [in the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986] that it is illegal to hire
unauthorized

aliens”).

Where

“the

person

to

whom

[an

EEOC]

subpoena is directed raises a substantial question” that the
subpoena specifically seeks to facilitate the investigation of
alleged

employment

practices

that

are

categorically

excluded

from Title VII, S.C. Nat’l Bank, 562 F.2d at 332, courts must
engage

in

serious

consideration

of

the

agency’s

potential

encroachment before concluding that its enforcement request is
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supported by a “plausible” or “arguable” basis for jurisdiction,
ante at 8.

Such consideration would be consistent with both our

“limited” role at the subpoena-enforcement stage, ante at 7, and
the Supreme Court’s insistence that we not “thwart[]” “Congress’
desire to prevent the Commission from exercising unconstrained
investigative authority,” Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 65.
Moreover,

examining

whether

the

EEOC’s

application

for

subpoena enforcement exceeds its substantive jurisdiction would
not place us in “a world where an employer could impose all
manner of harsh working conditions upon undocumented aliens, and
no questions could be asked, no charges filed, and no agency
investigation even so much as begun.”

Ante at 14.

It would

simply recognize that an investigation of the employer’s alleged
civil and criminal violations of the immigration laws may fall
more appropriately under the purview of other agencies, whose
jurisdictions are defined by other, more applicable statutory
parameters.
Nonetheless,

I

concur

in

the

judgment

to

enforce

the

subpoena in this case because, although the facts pertaining to
Escalante’s immigration status are clear, the record plausibly
suggests that the employer has engaged in a practice or pattern
of discrimination that adversely affects other employees who are
authorized

to

work

in

the

United

States.

See

42

U.S.C.

§§ 2000e-5(f), 2000e-6(e) (permitting the EEOC to bring civil
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actions).

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Pg: 20 of 20

Moreover, the scope of Egbuna has not been fully

delineated where an unauthorized alien is actually working for
an employer covered by Title VII.
EEOC

is

“arguabl[y]”

or

I agree, therefore, that the

“plausibl[y]”

acting

within

its

investigative jurisdiction here, ante at 8, even as I underscore
Judge Wilkinson’s caution that “courts [must] stand ready to
curb . . . administrative overreach” when such jurisdiction is
lacking, ante at 14.

20