Brian Baker v. City of Chesapeake

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:14-cv-00318-RAJ-DEM. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999791342]. [15-2065]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2065

BRIAN BAKER,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHESAPEAKE,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District
Judge. (2:14-cv-00318-RAJ-DEM)

Submitted:

March 17, 2016

Decided:

April 8, 2016

Before KING, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Margaret Mary Looby, Chesapeake, Virginia; Shannon Beth Bayona,
TAYLOR
BAYONA
LAW
GROUP,
PC,
Chesapeake,
Virginia,
for
Appellants. Ryan C. Samuel, Dana E. Sanford, OFFICE OF THE CITY
ATTORNEY, Chesapeake, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Brian Baker appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor
of

the

City

of

Chesapeake,

Virginia

(“the

City”).

Baker

alleged, among other things, that the City discriminated against
him and failed to accommodate his disability, in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213
(2012)

(“ADA”),

discriminated

against

him

on

account

of

his

Caucasian race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012) (“Title VII”), and
wrongfully retaliated against him, in violation of the ADA and
Title VII.

On appeal, Baker argues that the district court

erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of
material fact remain as to whether the City (1) discriminated
against him due to his disability, (2) retaliated against him
for reporting disparate treatment, and (3) failed to accommodate
his disability. 1

We affirm.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing
all

reasonable

inferences

in

favor

of

the

nonmoving

party.

Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 407
(4th

Cir.

2015).

Summary

judgment

is

only

appropriate

when

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

1

As the City observed in its brief, Baker does not pursue
his Title VII claim of race discrimination on appeal.

2

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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).
party

must

Fed. R.

In opposing summary judgment, “the nonmoving

rely

on

more

than

conclusory

allegations,

mere

speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.”

Dash v. Mayweather,

731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
First,

a

plaintiff

has

two

means

of

showing

disability

discrimination under the ADA: (1) “through direct and indirect
evidence,”

or

(2)

“through

burden-shifting framework.”

the

McDonnell

Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the

CT’s., 780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015).
a

strict

evidence
McDonnell

distinction
of

between

discrimination

Douglas

[ 2]

Douglas

claims

and

framework.

proceeding

those
See

We have long observed
with

proceeding

Hill

v.

direct

under

Lockheed

the

Martin

Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (end
banc), abrogated on other grounds by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nasser, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).
Yet before the district court, Baker proceeded only under
the

McDonnell

discrimination.
extraordinary

2

Douglas

framework

seeking

to

prove

Consequently, in the absence of exceptional or

circumstances

McDonnell

in

Douglas

that

Corp.

(1973).

3

would

v.

justify

Green,

411

reviewing

U.S.

792,

the

802

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issue on the merits, Baker has waived his right to contend on
appeal

that

his

summary judgment.

direct

evidence

of

discrimination

precluded

See Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181

F.3d 597, 605 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Generally issues that were not
raised in the district court will not be addressed on appeal.”);
see also Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d
243, 250 n.8 (2015) (holding that discussion of direct-evidence
discrimination claim limited to footnote in opening brief was
insufficient to warrant appellate review).
To make a prima facie showing of disability discrimination
under McDonnell v. Douglas, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
(1) he has a disability, (2) he is qualified for his former
position, and (3) the employer discharged him because of his
disability.

Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 572.

After reviewing the record, we concur with the district
court’s assessment of Baker’s case: he presented insufficient
evidence
While

causally

Baker

linking

disputes

the

his

discharge

City’s

with

proffered

his

disability.

rationale

for

his

termination, he points to no evidence causally connecting his
disability to his dismissal; therefore, this claim fails.
Next,

Baker

asserts

that

the

district

court

granting summary judgment on his retaliation claim.

erred

in

To make out

a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that
(1) he engaged in “protected activity,” (2) the employer “took
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adverse action” against him, and (3) “that a causal relationship
existed

between

employment

the

protected

activity.”

Foster,

activity
787

and

F.3d

at

the
250

adverse
(internal

quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Baker argues that the City “took adverse action”
against him by terminating his employment, which he deems the
final event in a causal chain linking back to a complaint of
disparate treatment.
only

a

letter

of

But before the district court, Baker cited
reprimand

as

the

supporting his claim of retaliation.

City’s

“adverse

action”

His “causal chain” theory

is completely absent from the district court record; therefore,
we hold that Baker has waived the right to present this claim on
appeal.

See Holland, 181 F.3d at 605.

Finally, to establish a claim under the ADA for a failure
to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that (1) he suffered a
disability; (2) his employer knew of the disability; (3) with
reasonable accommodations, he was otherwise qualified to perform
the essential functions of the job; and (4) his employer refused
to make such reasonable accommodations.

Wilson v. Dollar Gen.

Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013).
Our
refused
properly

review
a

of

request
concluded,

the
for

record

reflects

accommodation.

without

evidence

5

that
As

of

the
such

the

City

never

district

court

a

refusal,

we

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cannot

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say

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that

the

City

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failed

to

accommodate

Baker’s

disability.
Accordingly,

we

summary judgment.
facts

and

materials

legal
before

affirm

the

district

court’s

grant

of

We dispense with oral argument because the
contentions

are

adequately

this

and

argument

court

presented

would

not

in

the

aid

the

decisional process.
AFFIRMED

6