Lakesha Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corporation

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cv-02744-WDQ Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999928050].. [15-2067]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2067

LAKESHA RUFFIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:13-cv-02744-WDQ)

Submitted:

August 30, 2016

Decided:

September 13, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; affirmed in part as modified by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

James C. Strouse, STROUSE LEGAL SERVICES, Columbia, Maryland,
for Appellant. Michael J. Murphy, Denise E. Giraudo, OGLETREE,
DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Lakesha Ruffin appeals from the district court’s August 24,
2015, order granting judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c) to Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed) on her
claims

for

race

discrimination

(count

I),

sexual

harassment

(count II), and a hostile work environment (count III) under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012) (Title VII), dismissing for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction her claim (count IV) for a violation
of

the

Americans

with

Disabilities

Act

of

1990,

as

amended,

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 (2012) (ADA), 1 and denying her motion
for leave to amend the complaint. 2

We affirm in part and affirm

in part as modified.

1

Invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), Lockheed argued in its
motion for judgment that subject matter jurisdiction over count
IV
was
lacking
based
on
Ruffin’s
failure
to
exhaust
administrative remedies.
The district court agreed, relying on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction over count IV that was not
cured by the proposed amended complaint in rendering judgment
with respect to this count.
2

Ruffin’s notice of appeal states that she wishes to appeal
the district court’s August 15, 2015, decision.
The district
court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings, dismissing
Ruffin’s ADA claim, and denying Ruffin’s motion for leave to
amend was entered on the district court’s docket on August 24,
2015.
There is no August 15, 2015, order in this case.
Although “we do not commend the careless formulation of
[Ruffin’s] notice of appeal,” Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548,
555 (4th Cir. 2005), we conclude that intent to appeal the
August 24 order is readily inferable. The district court clerk
(Continued)
2

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We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), applying the same
standard of review as we apply to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
United

States,

702

F.3d

749,

751-52

(4th

Butler v.
Cir.

2012).

Specifically, we look to determine whether the complaint alleges
“facts

sufficient

to

raise

a

right

to

relief

above

the

speculative level, thereby nudging the claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible.”
171,

180

(4th

Cir.

alterations omitted).

2012)

Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d

(internal

quotation

marks

and

In undertaking this review, although we

“must accept the truthfulness of all factual allegations, we
need not assume the veracity of bare legal conclusions.”
(internal

quotation

conclusions

the

marks

plaintiff

omitted).

Rather,

draws

the

from

we

facts

must
“only

Id.

accept
to

the

docketed the notice as appealing the August 24 order, and Ruffin
devotes her brief on appeal to arguing that the district court
reversibly erred in that order. Lockheed had the opportunity to
fully brief relevant issues, including whether any deficiencies
in the notice of appeal deprived this court of jurisdiction over
the August 24 order.
It chose instead to explain why the
district court did not commit reversible error in the August 24
order. Lockheed thus was not prejudiced by this deficiency, and
we may properly consider the August 24 order in this appeal.
See id.

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extent they are plausible based on the factual allegations.”
Id.
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the grant
or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of
the district court.”

Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470,

474 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We thus

review the district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse
of discretion.

Id.

“A district court’s denial of leave to

amend is appropriate when (1) the amendment would be prejudicial
to the opposing party; (2) there has been bad faith on the part
of

the

moving

futile.”

party;

or

(3)

the

amendment

would

have

been

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

After

review

conclude

that

granting

of

the

judgment

the

record

district
on

the

and

court

the

did

pleadings

parties’

not

to

briefs,

reversibly

Lockheed

on

err

we
in

Ruffin’s

counts I, II, and III or in denying Ruffin’s motion for leave to
amend

those

counts.

The

original

and

proposed

amended

complaints did not articulate facts that, when accepted as true,
demonstrate
terminated

a

plausible

Ruffin’s

claim

under

employment

Title

because

of

VII
her

that

Lockheed

race.

See

42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp.,
State

Highway

Admin.,

780

F.3d

582,

cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1162 (2016).

4

584-86

(4th

Cir.

2015),

The original and proposed

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amended

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complaints

also

fail

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to

articulate

facts

that,

when

accepted as true, demonstrate plausible claims under Title VII
for

sexual

harassment

and

a

hostile

work

environment.

See Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277-78
(4th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 385
(4th Cir. 2011); Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766,
771-73 (4th Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s order with respect to its disposition of counts I, II,
and III.

Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 1:13-cv-02744-WDQ

(D. Md. Aug. 24, 2015). 3
With respect to count IV, we review a dismissal for lack of
subject

matter

jurisdiction

de

novo.

Balas

v.

Huntington

Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2013).

The

ADA incorporates Title VII’s enforcement provisions, including
the

requirement

that

a

plaintiff

exhaust

her

administrative

remedies by filing an administrative charge of discrimination
before pursuing a suit in federal court.

Sydnor v. Fairfax

Cty., Va., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012).

3

A plaintiff’s

In this regard, we reject as flatly contradicted by the
record Ruffin’s argument that the district court erred by
imposing on her a pleading standard more rigorous than required
by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), in
requiring her to plead a prima facie case of discrimination and
Ruffin’s other arguments on appeal with respect to counts I, II,
and III.

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failure to exhaust her administrative remedies deprives a court
of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.

Jones v. Calvert

Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009).
whether

jurisdiction

exists,

courts

are

In determining
to

regard

the

allegations in the complaint as “mere evidence” and may properly
consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the
proceeding

into

one

for

summary

judgment.

See

Richmond,

Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d
765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).
We conclude after review of the record that Ruffin failed
to include in her administrative charge of discrimination the
claim

of

termination

disability

leave

from

employment

underlying

count

proposed amended complaint.

IV

while
in

the

on

long-term

complaint

and

The district court thus properly

concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over count
IV, and we reject Ruffin’s arguments on appeal to the contrary.
The court’s dismissal of that count, however, should be without
prejudice.

See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Assoc., Inc.

v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir.
2013).

We

therefore

reflect

that

the

matter

jurisdiction

modify

dismissal

dismissal as modified.

is

the

of

district

count

without

IV

for

prejudice

court’s
lack
and

order
of

to

subject

affirm

the

See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012); MM ex rel.

6

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DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir.
2002)

(“[W]e

alternate

are

entitled

grounds,

if

to

such

affirm
grounds

the

court’s

are

judgment

apparent

from

on
the

record.”).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions

are

adequately

presented

in

the

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART AS MODIFIED

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