Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. John Bradley, Jr.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:15-cv-00508-RMG. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999722158]. Mailed to: Appellant. [15-2078]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2078

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN BRADLEY, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston.
Richard Mark Gergel, District
Judge. (2:15-cv-00508-RMG)

Submitted:

December 17, 2015

Decided:

December 21, 2015

Before DIAZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.

John Bradley, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.
Brian Allen Calub,
MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
John

Bradley,

Jr.,

appeals

the

district

court’s

order

adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and remanding a
foreclosure action and a related quiet title action to state court.
Bradley filed a notice of removal of the foreclosure action on
February 3, 2015, and an amended notice of removal on February 17,
adding

the

quiet

title

action.

Nationstar

Mortgage,

(“Nationstar”) filed a motion to remand on March 12.

LLC,

The district

court granted Nationstar’s motion and remanded the actions to the
state court because the notices of removal were untimely and
Bradley’s claims were pending in another district court.
An order remanding a case to state court is generally not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012).

However, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of § 1447(d),
only prohibiting appellate review of remand orders based on a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in the removal procedure
that was raised by a party within 30 days after the notice of
removal was filed.

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S.

706, 711-12 (1996); see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012).
Here, the district court remanded the actions to state court
in part due to a defect in the removal procedure.

We conclude

that we do not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s
remand of the quiet title action, as Nationstar filed its motion
to remand within 30 days of Bradley filing the amended notice of
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We therefore dismiss the appeal of the portion of the

district court’s order remanding the quiet title action.
We may, however, exercise jurisdiction over the portion of
the district court’s order remanding the foreclosure action, as
Nationstar filed its motion to remand more than 30 days after
Bradley filed the original notice of removal. The magistrate judge
recommended remanding the foreclosure action and advised Bradley
that

failure

to

file

timely,

specific

objections

to

this

recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court
order based upon the recommendation.
The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate
judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review
of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been
warned of the consequences of noncompliance.

Wright v. Collins,

766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985).

Bradley has waived appellate review by failing

to file objections after receiving proper notice.

Accordingly, we

affirm the portion of the district court’s order remanding the
foreclosure action.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART

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