Richard Martin v. The State's Attorney's Office

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion--denying Motion to compel [999704277-2]; denying Motion to seal [999704266-2] Originating case number: 8:15-cv-02429-PWG Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999719947]. Mailed to: Martin. [15-2139]

Appeal: 15-2139

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Filed: 12/17/2015

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2139

RICHARD MARTIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
THE STATE’S ATTORNEY’S OFFICE OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY; STATE’S
ATTORNEY JOHN MCCARTHY; ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY CHRISTINA
FAVRETTO; ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY KAREN MOONEY,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paul W. Grimm, District Judge. (8:15cv-02429-PWG)

Submitted:

December 15, 2015

Before GREGORY
Circuit Judge.

and

FLOYD,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

December 17, 2015

and

DAVIS,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard Martin, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Richard

Martin

appeals

the

district

court’s

order

dismissing his civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
(2012).

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On

appeal,

Martin

challenges

the

district

court’s

conclusion that his claims were untimely and barred by quasijudicial immunity.

As the district court properly concluded,

however, the named prosecuting attorneys were subject to quasijudicial immunity “for conduct intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process.”
79

F.3d

372,

376

(4th

Cir.

1996)

See Lyles v. Sparks,

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
The district court also properly concluded that Martin’s
action was untimely.
state

law

longest,

or

a

42

Martin’s claims, whether brought under

U.S.C.

three-year

§ 1983

statute

of

(2012),

were

limitations.

subject
See

to,

Md.

at

Code

Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (2013) (general civil statute of
limitations); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
(actions
State’s

for

assault

Attorneys

and

Office,

defamation);
767

F.3d

379,

§ 5-105 (2013)

Owens

v.

Balt.

City

388

(4th

Cir.

2014)

(§ 1983 claims), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1893 (2015).

While

Martin’s malicious prosecution claim has not yet accrued, this
claim

is

barred

by

his

termination requirement.

inability

to

meet

the

favorable

See Heron v. Strader, 761 A.2d 56, 59
2

Appeal: 15-2139

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(Md. 2000).

Filed: 12/17/2015

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Contrary to Martin’s assertions, the facts alleged

in the complaint demonstrate that his remaining claims accrued,
at the latest, by the time he was released from prison, and the
limitations period was not subject to tolling.

A Soc’y Without

a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011) (accrual
under § 1983); Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 43 A.3d 1029,
1034-34,

1039-41

(Md.

2012)

(discussing

accrual

and

tolling

under state law); see also Nat’l Advert. Co. v. Raleigh, 947
F.2d

1158,

violations

1166-67

(4th

doctrine).

Cir.

Finally,

1991)

(describing

because

Martin’s

continuing
claims

were

properly dismissed, the district court committed no error in
denying as moot Martin’s request to file electronically.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
deny Martin’s motions to seal and to compel.
oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

and

materials

legal
before

We

We dispense with
contentions
this

court

are
and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

3