UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Gary T. Padussis
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:14-cv-03721-WDQ. [999973092]. [15-2148]
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2148
UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
GARY T. PADUSSIS,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:14-cv-03721-WDQ)
Argued:
October 25, 2016
Decided:
November 22, 2016
Before WILKINSON, KING, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion.
Judge Wilkinson
opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Harris joined.
wrote
the
ARGUED: Francis X. Dee, MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER,
LLP, Newark, New Jersey, for Appellant.
Edward Patrick
McDermott, Sr., LAW OFFICE OF E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT LLC,
Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Margaret L.
Watson, MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP, New York,
New York, for Appellant.
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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant
arbitration
Padussis
court
UBS
Financial
award
over
refused
that,
$900,000
to
Services
in
in
disturb
(“UBSFS”)
practical
effect,
compensatory
the
award,
challenges
granted
damages.
The
and
we
now
an
Gary
district
affirm
its
judgment. Any other result would open arbitration proceedings to
a host of challenges over the very type of subsidiary questions
that Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002),
indicated should be left to the discretion of the arbitral body.
I.
Gary Padussis worked for UBSFS as a financial advisor from
2009 through 2013. When he joined UBSFS, Padussis brought with
him a team of three financial advisors as well as an established
business clientele. As part of his initial compensation, UBSFS
lent Padussis over $2.7 million. Padussis signed a promissory
note,
which
immediately
UBSFS.
provided
come
Padussis
describing
his
due
that
if
also
any
Padussis
executed
compensation
Agreement
governing
the
agreements
provided
that
remaining
ended
a
and
operations
any
his
Letter
a
balance
employment
of
Financial
of
dispute
would
his
would
with
Understanding
Advisor
team.
be
All
subject
Team
the
to
arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(“FINRA”).
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Padussis
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resigned
from
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UBSFS
in
2013,
complaining
that
UBSFS had ruined his team of financial advisors and cost him
valuable clients. Upon his resignation, Padussis owed UBSFS the
remaining balance on the promissory note, nearly $1.6 million.
When he failed to pay that amount, UBSFS initiated arbitration
on June 3, 2013. Padussis responded with counterclaims on July
31, 2013, alleging that UBSFS’s interference with his team was
both tortious and a breach of contractual duties.
Under the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry
Disputes,
responsible
the
for
Director
the
of
process
FINRA
of
Dispute
selecting
the
Resolution
panel
of
is
three
arbitrators required here. First, the Director mails a list of
potential arbitrators for each of the three panel positions to
each party “within approximately 30 days after the last answer
is due.” FINRA Rule 13403. Each “party may strike up to four of
the arbitrators from each list” and rank the remaining ones.
FINRA
Rule
13404.
The
parties
must
return
their
preferences
within twenty days of the lists being sent, and the Director
then combines the rankings sent by the parties to select the
arbitration panel. FINRA Rule 13405.
If a party fails to return its ranked lists within twenty
days, the Director proceeds as if that party has no preferences.
FINRA Rule 13404(d). The Code allows the Director to extend any
deadline set by the Code for good cause. FINRA Rule 13207(c).
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Code
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also
gives
the
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Director
discretion
to
“make
any
decision that is consistent with the purposes of the Code to
facilitate the appointment of arbitrators.” FINRA Rule 13412.
The Director can delegate these duties. FINRA Rule 13100(k).
In this case, FINRA mailed lists of potential arbitrators
to the parties on August 21, 2013. UBSFS did not return its
ranked
lists
by
the
deadline
of
September
10
because,
UBSFS
claims, it never received them.
On September 11, UBSFS received a letter, dated September
3,
that
returning
reminded
their
the
parties
lists.
of
the
Realizing
impending
that
it
deadline
for
missed
the
had
deadline, UBSFS filed a motion to extend the time to submit its
preferences. Padussis opposed this motion. He argued that UBSFS
notified him in mid-August that it was transferring the case to
new counsel but that the new counsel had not yet filed a notice
of
appearance.
confusion
over
Padussis
which
claimed
counsel
that
was
this
transfer
responsible
for
led
to
submitting
UBSFS’s preferences.
FINRA’s
Regional
Director
–
to
whom
the
Director
had
apparently delegated responsibility – denied UBSFS’s motion for
an extension. UBSFS appealed to the Director, who affirmed the
denial.
deadline
The
did
Director
not
ruled
exist
that
because
4
good
FINRA
cause
had
to
extend
the
timely
mailed
the
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initial lists of arbitrators as well as a courtesy reminder, and
had not received any mail returned as undeliverable.
FINRA
proceeded
to
select
a
panel
of
three
arbitrators
based on Padussis’s lists of preferences. At the first panel
hearing, UBSFS challenged the composition of the panel based on
UBSFS’s
lack
arbitrators.
of
The
participation
panel
reviewed
in
the
the
selection
evidence,
denied
of
the
UBSFS’s
challenge, and proceeded with the arbitration.
On October 27, 2014, the panel issued its final decision.
The
panel
$932,887.
awarded
The
UBSFS
decision
$1,683,262
denied
“[a]ny
and
awarded
and
all
Padussis
relief
not
specifically addressed.” J.A. 24. Pursuant to the FINRA Code,
the decision did not explain the panel’s reasoning.
UBSFS was altogether displeased with this outcome. Padussis
insisted
that
due
to
a
statutory
lien
and
the
prospect
of
bankruptcy, he would be financially unable to pay the balance of
the note, which left UBSFS in the position of owing him over
$900,000 for the damage he claimed it had done to his business.
UBSFS then filed this action to vacate the arbitral award. It
argued that the arbitrators were not selected in accordance with
the
parties’
agreement
because
UBSFS
had
not
provided
its
preferences to FINRA. In the alternative, UBSFS sought to have
the
district
court
offset
the
awards,
citing
Padussis’s
admission that he was unlikely to be able to pay his portion of
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the judgment. The district court confirmed the arbitration award
in its entirety and declined to impose an offset. UBSFS now
appeals.
II.
The scope of judicial review of an arbitration award “is
among the narrowest known at law.” Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v.
U.S. Supply Co., Inc., 142 F.3d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1998). Courts
may vacate or modify an arbitration award only under the limited
circumstances listed in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 10-11, or under the common law if the award “fails to draw its
essence from the contract” or “evidences a manifest disregard of
the law.” Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230,
234 (4th Cir. 2006).
This circumscribed scope of review means that “in reviewing
such
an
award,
a
district
or
appellate
court
is
limited
to
determine whether the arbitrators did the job they were told to
do - not whether they did it well, or correctly, or reasonably,
but simply whether they did it.” Three S Del., Inc. v. DataQuick
Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To ensure arbitrators did the job they
were told to do and did not “exceed[] their powers,” 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)(4), courts will resolve certain threshold questions of
arbitrability. For example, a court will decide whether parties
agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute, AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
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Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 651 (1986), or whether
arbitrators were appointed according to the parties’ agreement.
Cargill
Rice
v.
Empresa
Nicaraguense
Dealimentos
Basicos,
25
F.3d 223, 225 (4th Cir. 1994).
Beyond these basic questions of arbitrability, courts defer
to the arbitral panel both on the merits of the final decision
and on procedural questions that “grow out of the dispute,” even
where those questions “bear on its final disposition.” Howsam,
537 U.S. at 84 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,
376
U.S.
standards
543,
of
557
(1964)).
review
discretionary
We
customarily
procedural
need
not
applied
rulings
because
repair
to
fact
that
here
to
the
finding
and
would
simply
constitute us, contrary to the Supreme Court’s admonitions, as a
typical appellate court.
The “widely recognized” policy “to encourage the use of
arbitration”
requires
this
limited
scope
of
judicial
review.
Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994).
Parties agree to arbitration to avoid the time and expense of
litigation. But “to allow full scrutiny of such awards would
frustrate
the
purpose
of
having
arbitration
at
all.”
Apex
Plumbing, 142 F.3d at 193.
Instead, the narrow standard of review acts as a bulwark
against legal ingenuity. Lawyers can easily find one thing or
another in almost any proceeding to which they wish to take
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exception. There are benefits to such legal creativity in many
contexts
but
challenges
not
to
argue
their
costs
and
in
every
the
award
dispute
delays
one
a
would
second
they
before
force
time,
intended
us.
Allowing
parties
incurring
to
avoid
into
the
by
procedural
court
to
litigation
agreeing
to
arbitration in the first place.
In
other
words,
the
rules
that
limit
our
review
of
arbitration awards are meant to avoid exactly what has happened
here, which is a protracted set of judicial proceedings that
have sacrificed the very advantages inhering in the arbitral
forum.
III.
UBSFS seeks to vacate the arbitral award on two grounds. It
first contends that the arbitrators were not selected according
to the parties’ agreement. Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration
Act provides that if the parties’ arbitration agreement includes
a
method
for
followed.”
9
appointing
U.S.C.
§ 5.
arbitrators,
This
court
“such
will
method
shall
generally
be
vacate
“[a]rbitration awards made by arbitrators not appointed under
the method provided in the parties’ contract.” Cargill Rice, 25
F.3d at 226.
The parties here agreed to arbitrate according to the FINRA
Code. UBSFS complains that because it never received the lists
of arbitrators, the process of appointing arbitrators did not
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follow the method in the Code. An examination of the record
shows, to the contrary, that FINRA adhered to the Code.
FINRA Rule 13403(b) requires that the Director create three
lists of potential arbitrators for the panel. FINRA did this.
Rule 13403(c)(1) requires that the Director mail these lists to
the parties. FINRA did this. Rule 13404(d) requires that if the
Director does not receive a party’s ranked lists within twenty
days of sending the lists, “the Director will proceed as though
the party did not want to” provide its preferences. FINRA did
this too. Rules 13405 and 13406 describe how to appoint the
arbitrators after receiving the lists, and FINRA followed these
rules as well.
Unable to find a specific rule FINRA violated, UBSFS argues
that the Code as a whole “ensure[s] that each party ha[s] the
opportunity
to
participate
in
the
selection
of
arbitrators.”
Appellant’s Br. at 23. UBSFS points to the fact that a few rules
describe
the
parties’
participation
in
selecting
arbitrators,
but this is unsurprising in a Code that sets forth a process for
the mutual selection of arbitrators. The Code simply does not
require
the
participation
of
each
party
prior
to
the
valid
appointment of an arbitration panel.
In fact, Rule 13404(d) does the opposite. It requires the
Director to appoint arbitrators without a party’s input if the
Director
does
not
receive
that
9
party’s
preferences
by
the
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deadline. Rule 13404(d) could require the Director to contact
the party before proceeding, or it could allow the party an
opportunity to rebut any presumption that it did not wish to
participate in the selection of the arbitrators. Instead, it
simply instructs the Director to act as if the party did not
intend
to
submit
ranked
lists
and
to
proceed
with
the
appointment of arbitrators. That is exactly what FINRA did here.
This case, then, does not involve the question of whether
FINRA failed to follow the rules for appointing an arbitrator.
FINRA did. Instead, this is a question of whether FINRA properly
applied those rules. UBSFS seems to believe that the Director
erred in not finding good cause to extend the deadline for UBSFS
to
submit
its
preferences
under
Rule
13207
and
in
not
“exercis[ing] discretionary authority” to ensure that UBSFS had
a say in the composition of the arbitration panel under Rule
13412.
These
questions,
though,
are
procedural
questions
and
“are for arbitral, rather than judicial, resolution.” Dockser v.
Schwartzberg, 433 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2006).
While courts decide some questions of arbitrability, the
Supreme
Court
has
directed
that
“‘procedural
questions
which
grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition’ are
presumptively
not
for
the
judge,
but
for
an
arbitrator,
to
decide.” Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84 (quoting John Wiley, 376 U.S. at
557). Thus, whether arbitration rules time-bar a claim is for
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the arbitral body to decide. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85. Likewise,
the arbitral body decides whether arbitration rules require a
panel of one or three arbitrators. Dockser, 433 F.3d at 425.
Here, whether good cause existed to extend the deadline was
for FINRA to decide. UBSFS argues that it did not receive the
lists of arbitrators. Padussis responds that the mailing was
never
returned
to
FINRA
as
undeliverable
and
that
the
whole
problem was due to UBSFS’s negligence – that UBSFS should have
expected the lists shortly after Padussis filed his Answer and
Counterclaim
but
that
the
matter
fell
between
the
cracks
at
UBSFS due to the transfer of the case to different counsel. This
back
and
forth
is
rather
beside
the
point.
As
with
other
procedural questions, the parties would have expected FINRA to
decide
this
issue
because
the
rules
“provide
specific
non-
judicial procedures for its resolution.” Id. at 426. FINRA rules
expressly give the Director the power to “exercise discretionary
authority
and
make
any
purposes
of
the
decision
Code
to
that
is
facilitate
consistent
the
appointment
the
with
of
arbitrators.” FINRA Rule 13412. UBSFS cannot complain that the
Director – rather than the appointed arbitrators – resolved the
issue because the parties expressly granted this authority to
the Director. Dockser, 433 F.3d at 428.
Moreover, this claim concerns “the written rules governing
the
parties’
arbitration
proceeding,”
11
Id.
at
427,
and
the
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arbitral body is “comparatively more expert” in applying those
rules than courts. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85. This is especially
true here, where the Director can better determine whether an
extension of a deadline will help reach a more just outcome or
simply deprive the parties of a timely resolution.
We will not second-guess FINRA’s decision that there was
not good cause to extend the deadline. The parties agreed to
arbitrate their disputes according to rules that clearly gave
the Director the authority to make that decision. To usurp the
Director’s
questions
authority
about
would
whether
be
to
arbitral
open
bodies
courts
to
properly
legions
applied
of
one
rule or another. This would deprive parties of the very benefits
they sought by agreeing to arbitration – relatively prompt and
inexpensive dispute resolution. 1
IV.
UBSFS
arbitration
next
asks
award.
As
this
court
discussed
to
impose
above,
the
an
offset
arbitration
on
the
panel
here found that (1) Padussis owed UBSFS $1.68 million on the
promissory note (which Padussis contends he would be unable to
pay) and that (2) UBSFS was liable to Padussis for $932,000
1
UBSFS also contends that we should vacate the award on the
common law ground that the award “fails to draw its essence from
the contract.” Patten, 441 F.3d at 234. UBSFS relies on its
argument that FINRA disregarded the agreed-upon method of
selecting arbitrators. As discussed above, FINRA followed those
rules. We thus find UBSFS’s common law claim meritless.
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based on his various employment claims. Offsetting the damages
granted to Padussis from the $1.68 million would result in a net
award
to
UBSFS
of
about
$750,000,
entirely
cancelling
out
Padussis’s award and freeing UBSFS of the need to cut a check.
This
court
has
previously
recognized
that
“an
offset
of
arbitration awards might constitute a modification of the award
in
some
circumstances.”
Nat'l
Risk
Underwriters,
Inc.
v.
Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. of N.C., 931 F.2d 1015, 1017 (4th
Cir. 1991). While such circumstances did not exist in that case,
they
do
exist
here.
This
arbitration
award
expressly
denied
“[a]ny and all relief not specifically addressed” by the award,
and the award did not mention an offset. J.A. 24. Thus, applying
an offset to this award would be a modification of the award.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court can modify an
award only under specific, narrow circumstances. Relevant here,
a court may modify an award “[w]here the award is imperfect in
matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.” 9
U.S.C.
§ 11.
Any
order
to
modify
an
award
must
“effect
the
intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.” Id.
Assuming
arguendo
that
imposing
an
offset
would
be
a
“matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy,” an
offset here would not effectuate the intent of the arbitrators,
and we thus decline to impose one. The award itself is silent on
the question of an offset, and there is no evidence in the
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record that would enable us to say that the arbitrators intended
for the award to include one.
UBSFS
contends
that
an
offset
“would
not
change
the
arbitrators’ valuation decision” but would provide a “simple,
fair”
result,
which
must
have
been
the
intent
of
the
arbitrators. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 25-26. An offset, though,
changes
the
practical
effect
of
the
award.
In
a
similar
situation, a FINRA arbitration panel heard arguments for and
against an offset and declined to provide one. UBS Fin. Servs.,
Inc. v. Mann, No. 14-10621, 2014 WL 1746249, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Apr. 30, 2014). We cannot know what the arbitration panel in
this case would have ruled if UBSFS had asked it to provide an
offset. That decision, though, was for the arbitration panel,
and UBSFS should have asked the panel to make it. For whatever
reason, it did not do so, and the question is simply not one for
the courts to answer.
UBSFS
also
argues
that
regardless
of
the
arbitrators’
actual intent, we should recognize a presumption favoring an
offset.
However,
judicial
gloss
imposing
on
the
such
a
arbitration
presumption
award.
would
Such
a
place
gloss
a
is
inappropriate here, where the award expressly limits itself to
the relief specifically addressed and was rendered pursuant to a
detailed set of rules. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, the
“arbitrator’s failure to mention offsets in his ruling means
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that no offset was granted.” Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs,
Local No. 841 v. Murphy Co., 82 F.3d 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1996). 2
V.
When
process
all
and
is
then
said
and
declined
done,
to
UBSFS
abide
by
plainly
the
agreed
result
of
to
a
that
process. It agreed to arbitration; the dispute was within the
scope of that agreement; and the rules by which the arbitration
would proceed were openly declared and followed. The arbitration
here spanned eighteen hearing sessions over nine separate days.
We can find no basis for overturning the arbitral decision. The
district court’s denial of UBSFS’s motion to vacate the award is
therefore
AFFIRMED.
2
In fact, FINRA has since amended its rules to provide for
a presumption of an offset, but that amendment is effective only
for arbitration awards rendered after October 24, 2016. Press
Release, FINRA, Regulatory Notice 16-36: SEC Approves Amendments
to the Codes of Arbitration Procedure Regarding Award Offsets
(Sept. 2016); see also Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change to
Permit Award Offsets in Arbitration, Exchange Act Release No.
78557, 81 Fed. Reg. 54,901 (Aug. 11, 2016). For us to rewrite
that amendment to make it effective for an arbitration award
rendered in October 2014 would be to displace FINRA’s authority
over its own arbitral proceedings. We must therefore observe the
rules in place at the time of the arbitration.
15
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