Adris Abdus-Shahid v. Mayor & Cty Council Baltimore
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:15-cv-01972-JFM Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999997422].. [15-2181]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2181
ADRIS ABDUS-SHAHID; BAIYINA JONES,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:15-cv-01972-JFM)
Submitted:
October 6, 2016
Decided:
January 4, 2017
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jennifer S. Lubinski, LAW OFFICE OF JENNIFER S. LUBINSKI,
Columbia, Maryland, for Appellants.
Nicholas C. Sokolow,
Assistant
Solicitor,
BALTIMORE
CITY
DEPARTMENT
OF
LAW,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Idris
Abdus-Shahid
and
Bayina
Jones
appeal
the
district
court’s dismissal of their claims against the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore (“the City”).
alleged
City’s
violations
policy
of
of
state
requiring
and
its
Abdus-Shahid’s 1 Complaint
federal
employees
law
based
to
submit
upon
proof
the
of
their recorded civil marriage certificate in order to establish
a spouse as eligible for health insurance coverage.
For the
reasons
district
that
follow,
we
affirm
the
judgment
of
the
court dismissing the Complaint.
I. 2
In 1998, Abdus-Shahid and Jones were married in an Islamic
ceremony performed in Baltimore, Maryland.
They are Muslims
who, as part of their faith, “believe that their relationship is
governed by Islamic law and that a civil, or secular, marriage
license is both unnecessary to their union and contrary to their
1
For simplicity, when referring to Abdus-Shahid and Jones
as parties in this case, the opinion will refer to them
collectively as “Abdus-Shahid.”
2
Because the district court decided the case on a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we “assum[e]
all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the”
Complaint and attached exhibits are true.
Burnette v. Fahey,
687 F.3d 171, 180 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Tallabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)
(discussing use of exhibits attached to a complaint).
2
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religious beliefs.”
obtain
a
civil
Pg: 3 of 21
App. 6, ¶ 7.
marriage
Accordingly, they did not
license
prior
to
their
religious
ceremony, nor have they obtained a civil marriage certificate.
In 2008, Abdus-Shahid began working as a civil engineer for
the
City’s
employment,
Department
of
Transportation.
Abdus-Shahid
was
provided
As
the
part
of
his
opportunity
to
participate in the City’s health insurance program, including
coverage for his spouse and children.
He enrolled Jones and
their children without objection for several years.
In 2013, after a city-wide audit of the City’s employee
health insurance program, the City revoked Abdus-Shahid’s family
health
insurance
coverage.
Although
Abdus-Shahid
was
subsequently allowed to re-enroll his children, the City refused
to allow him to re-enroll Jones because he could not “provide an
‘Official
Court-Certified
State
Marriage
Certificate
(must
be
Certified and dated by the appropriate state or County official,
such as the Clerk of Court) From [sic] the court in the County
or City in which the marriage took place’” (“the policy”).
7-8,
¶
16.
Abdus-Shahid
attempted
to
file
his
App.
religious
marriage certificate with the Clerk of the Baltimore Circuit
Court, but the Clerk refused to accept it for recording because
it was not a civil license and had not been obtained from the
Clerk prior to the ceremony.
In
August
2014,
Abdus-Shahid
filed a charge of religious discrimination with the Baltimore
3
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Community
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Relations
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Commission,
the
City’s
equivalent
of
the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and also
with
the
EEOC
(“EEOC
charge”).
Abdus-Shahid
listed
the
“particulars” of his charge as follows:
I.
. . . In or about July 2013, an audit
was conducted which resulted in my family
being dropped from my health insurance
without explanation. . . . When I completed
the forms to [re-enroll] my family, I was
informed
my
Islamic
marriage
is
not
recognize[d]; therefore, I have been unable
to reinstate my wife to my health insurance
plan. . . . I am aware of another employee
who is experiencing the same issue.
II.
I have been given no explanation for
the employer’s actions.
III.
I believe I have been discriminated
against in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
regarding benefits because of my religion,
Muslim.
App. 18.
After
receiving
a
letter
from
the
EEOC
dismissing
the
investigation and informing Abdus-Shahid of his right to sue, he
filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
The
City removed it to the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland.
The Complaint alleges three claims:
(1)
infringement of the free exercise of religion, in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution;
(2)
deprivation
of
religious
freedom
and
due
process,
in
violation of Articles 24 and 36 of the Maryland Constitution’s
4
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Declaration
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of
Rights;
and
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(3)
religious
discrimination
with
respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment, in violation of Title VII, as amended.
The Complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the City’s
refusal to recognize Abdus-Shahid’s marriage violates the U.S.
Constitution
and
Maryland
Declaration
of
Rights,
an
order
directing the City to recognize his marriage (“and the lawful
marriages of other Muslims whose marriage certificates have not
been recorded by a clerk of the court”), and other monetary
damages, costs, and fees.
App. 8-13.
The City moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure
should
be
12(b)(6),
dismissed
arguing
that
because
the
the
constitutional
City’s
policy
was
claims
facially
neutral and did not prohibit the free exercise of religion; the
state-law claims should be dismissed because Abdus-Shahid failed
to follow the requisite statutory notice provisions to bring
suit; and the Title VII claim should be dismissed because the
Complaint
did
not
allege
any
evidence
of
intentional
had
sufficiently
discrimination.
In
response,
pled each claim.
marry
and
to
Abdus-Shahid
contended
he
Citing the fundamental constitutional right to
exercise
his
religious
beliefs,
he
argued
the
City’s policy served no legitimate purpose and was not a neutral
law of general applicability.
Furthermore, Abdus-Shahid claimed
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the policy imposed an unfair burden on religious adherents of
any faith who sought religious rather than civil marriages.
also
asserted
his
state-law
claims
were
not
subject
to
He
the
statutory notice provisions because he only sought declaratory
relief.
with
In the alternative, he asserted substantial compliance
any
state-law
requirements.
Lastly,
Abdus-Shahid
maintained that his Title VII claim alleged disparate impact
discrimination rather than intentional discrimination and thus
should be allowed to proceed.
The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss as
to all claims.
its
face,”
and
standard
by
afforded
health
concluded
Maryland
It held that the City’s policy “is neutral on
“is
which
reasonable
to
determine
insurance
Abdus-Shahid’s
Local
since
it
whether
coverage.”
state-law
Government
Tort
provides
spouses
App.
claims
Claims
common
should
39.
were
Act
a
It
barred
applied because he sought more than declaratory relief.
also
by
(“LGTCA”),
be
the
which
And it
held Abdus-Shahid’s Title VII claim based on disparate impact
could
not
proceed
because
he
had
not
exhausted
his
administrative remedies as to that claim.
Abdus-Shahid
noted
a
timely
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
6
appeal,
and
we
have
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II.
On appeal, Abdus-Shahid challenges the dismissal of each of
his claims.
the
We address each issue in turn, reviewing de novo
district
dismiss.
court’s
grant
of
the
Rule
12(b)(6)
motion
to
Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 315, 320
(4th Cir. 2012).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must “provide enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551
F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009), 3 meaning that it must “plead[]
factual content [that] allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference
alleged.”
that
the
defendant
Ashcroft
v.
is
Iqbal,
liable
556
U.S.
for
the
662,
misconduct
678
(2009).
“[P]laintiffs may proceed into the litigation process only when
their complaints are justified by both law and fact.”
Francis
v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
A.
Abdus-Shahid
Federal Constitutional Claim
contends
the
district
court
erred
in
dismissing his claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Pointing to Maryland and federal case law discussing civilly
recognized
marriages
and
the
fundamental
right
to
marry,
he
asserts that the City’s policy contradicts state law concerning
3
We have removed internal alterations, citations, and
quotations throughout this opinion, except as otherwise noted.
7
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what
it
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means
to
be
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married
and
it
impermissibly
divides
marriage into two tiers, marriages that are entitled to coverage
and marriages that are not.
not,”
the
City
has
He submits that “intentionally or
“unconstitutionally
burdened
his
free
exercise of religion” by failing to recognize his religiousbased marriage and that the district court’s dismissal of this
claim should be reversed.
We disagree with Abdus-Shahid; the district court did not
err in dismissing this claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
The
arguments Abdus-Shahid makes do not address the proper analysis
for a Free Exercise claim.
law
concerning
when
Instead, he points to Maryland case
individuals
are
deemed
to
be
“married.”
Those cases simply have no bearing on the matter before the
Court,
which
is
Exercise Clause.
whether
the
City’s
policy
violates
the
Free
Similarly, his arguments relying on case law
concerning same-sex civil unions and marriages ignore that those
discussions occurred within the context of civil marriages.
Yet
again, these cases have no applicability to the Free Exercise
claim Abdus-Shahid pursues.
Reviewed in light of the applicable Free Exercise Clause
case
law,
Abdus-Shahid
failed
to
articulate
a
constitutional
claim based on his right to free exercise of religion.
The
First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.
8
U.S. Const. amend.
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I.
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This provision applies to states and localities through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
(4th
Cir.
2003)
Amendment,
See Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 380
(“The
applicable
Free
to
Exercise
states
Clause
through
of
the
the
First
Fourteenth
Amendment, forbids the adoption of laws designed to suppress
religious beliefs or practices unless justified by a compelling
governmental
interest
interest.”).
The
and
Free
narrowly
Exercise
tailored
Clause
to
“does
meet
not,”
that
however,
“relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the
law
proscribes
(or
prescribes)
prescribes (or proscribes).”
872,
879
(1990).
certificate
The
before
conduct
that
his
religion
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
City’s
requirement
recognizing
any
for
marriage
a
for
court-issued
purposes
of
health insurance coverage eligibility is just such “a valid and
neutral law of general applicability.”
Abdus-Shahid
requiring
a
does
civil
not
dispute
marriage
that
the
certificate
City’s
to
policy
demonstrate
eligibility for spousal health insurance coverage is generally
applicable to City employees.
Instead, he maintains that the
City’s policy is not neutral toward religion because it has the
effect
of
insurance
Islamic
prohibiting
coverage
marriage
Abdus-Shahid
despite
ceremony.
her
from
being
But
9
enrolling
his
that
is
spouse
not
Jones
based
the
on
test
for
an
for
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neutrality.
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The
Supreme
Pg: 10 of 21
Court
has
held
that
a
law
lacks
neutrality if it “target[s] religious beliefs” or if its “object
. . . is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation.”
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
The City’s policy is
silent as to religion or religious practice and thus is facially
neutral.
of
no
See id.
specific
presenting
a
The City allows individuals of all faiths or
faith
civil
to
enroll
marriage
a
spouse
for
certificate.
coverage
In
so
upon
doing,
it
simultaneously bars all employees from enrolling an individual
as
his
or
her
spouse
if
that
employee
cannot
required documentation, regardless of the reason.
provide
the
See Liberty
Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 99 (4th Cir. 2013) (observing
that a neutral law of general applicability will have “no object
that
infringes
upon
or
restricts
religious
motivation
and
motivated
[only]
religious
neutrality
does
by
not
end
impose[]
the
practices
no
because
of
burden . . . on
belief”).
analysis,
And
while
Abdus-Shahid
their
conduct
facial
did
not
allege any facts from which it could be inferred that the policy
was implemented with an improper motivation.
See Lukumi Babalu
Aye, 508 U.S. at 534 (observing that the Free Exercise Clause
forbids
treatment”
“target[ing]
through
religious
“subtle
conduct
departures
from
for
neutrality”
“covert suppression of particular religious beliefs”).
10
distinctive
and
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Because
neutral
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City’s
the
toward
Pg: 11 of 21
is
policy
religion
it
“need
generally
not
be
applicable
justified
and
by
a
compelling governmental interest even if [it] has the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”
531.
Id. at
Thus, as the Complaint failed to state a claim for the
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the district
court did not err in dismissing the claim.
B.
Abdus-Shahid
State Constitutional Claim
next
asserts
the
district
court
erred
in
dismissing his state constitutional claims for failure to comply
with the notice provisions of Maryland’s LGTCA.
Leopold,
962
A.2d
1025,
1030-31
(Md.
Ct.
See Ransom v.
Spec.
App.
2008)
(observing that the LGTCA’s requirements apply to all torts,
including
constitutional
ones).
He
contends
that
the
LGTCA
notice provisions do not apply to his claim because he only
sought declaratory relief for the alleged violations of state
law.
Alternatively, he alleges he substantially complied with
the LGTCA’s requirements.
Under the version of the LGTCA applicable to Abdus-Shahid’s
claim, before suing the City for “unliquidated damages” he was
required
to
provide
the
municipality
written
claimed injury within 180 days of that injury.
Jud. Proc. § 5-304 (2013).
notice
of
his
Md. Code, Cts. &
That notice must “state the time,
place, and cause of the injury,” “be given in person or by
11
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certified
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mail,
return
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receipt
requested,
bearing
a
postmark
from the [post office],” and, in the case of the City, be given
to the City Solicitor.
Id.
Abdus-Shahid does not allege that
he, in fact, fulfilled these specific requirements.
The
LGTCA’s
district
claims
part,
notice
because
“that
remedies of
the
not
err
apply
Complaint
Court
the
the
did
provisions
the
constitutional
Elsewhere,
court
to
hereto
claim.
App.
Complaint
the
with
11,
plainly
concluding
that
Abdus-Shahid’s
specifically
determine
parties
in
asks,
respect
¶
33
state-law
in
respective
relevant
rights
to
the[]”
(emphasis
contemplated
an
the
and
state
added).
award
of
damages to compensate for the sums Abdus-Shahid was having to
pay
for
out-of-pocket
medical
expenses.
See
App.
8,
¶
18
(“Plaintiffs are currently expecting and, as a result of the
City’s refusal to recognize their marriage, Baiyina Jones is
without health insurance coverage.
incurring
out-of-pocket
healthcare
As a result, Plaintiffs are
expenses
and
expect
to
continue to incur such expenses until Baiyina Jones is properly
insured.”);
App.
10,
¶
30
(expressly
incorporating
the
allegation in paragraph 18 into the state law claim); see also
App. 12-13 (plea for relief, containing a free-standing request
for
“[a]
judgment
for
monetary
damages”).
Moreover,
as
the
district court correctly surmised from these allegations, AbdusShahid is “requesting that the City reinstate Jones’s health
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insurance and pay the City’s portion of Jones’s premiums,” a
request that also involves more than “solely . . . declaratory
relief.”
App. 38.
Based
on
the
foregoing,
the
Complaint
contemplates
the
possibility of more than solely declaratory relief related to
the state law claim.
As such, the district court did not err in
concluding that Abdus-Shahid was required to comply with the
notice provision of the LGTCA prior to bringing his state law
claim and
that
he
did
not
do
so.
Cf.
Rounds
v.
Md.-Nat’l
Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 109 A.3d 639, 646 n.10 (Md.
2015) (concluding plaintiffs sought unliquidated damages –- and
thus fell “under the purview of the LGTCA” -– despite labelling
their claim as one for “Declaratory Judgment” -- because they
sought
compensatory,
statutory,
and
punitive
damages
arising
from the alleged violation).
Abdus-Shahid does not contend he strictly complied with the
LGTCA’s provisions.
Instead, Abdus-Shahid argues the district
court
considering
erred
by
not
whether
he
had
substantially
complied with the LGTCA’s provisions.
He asserts that had the
district
have
court
done
so,
it
would
concluded
he
had
substantially complied by filing the EEOC charge and therefore
could proceed with the state law claim.
To
be
sure,
Maryland
courts
do
not
compliance with the LGTCA’s notice provisions.
13
require
strict
See Faulk v.
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808
1262,
Ewing,
claimant
A.2d
provides
the
1275
local
Pg: 14 of 21
(Md.
2002)
government,
(“[W]here . . . [a]
through
the
unit
or
division with the responsibility for investigating [such] claims
against
that
local
government,
or
the
company
with
whom
the
local government or unit has contracted for that function, the
information required by § 5-304(b)(3) to be supplied, who thus
acquires actual knowledge within the statutory period, the . . .
claimant has substantially complied with the notice provisions
of
the
LGTCA.”).
That
because
Maryland
however,
legal
principle
courts
also
has
no
require
effect
here,
plaintiffs
to
plead their strict or substantive compliance with the LGTCA as
part of their state-law claims.
See Hansen v. City of Laurel,
25 A.3d 122, 137 & n.16 (Md. 2011).
Failure to do so makes the
claim “subject to a motion to dismiss . . . based on a failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Here,
LGTCA.
the
Complaint
fails
to
plead
any
Id. at 137.
compliance
with
the
Although Abdus-Shahid attached a copy of the EEOC charge
to his Complaint, he failed to allege any facts directly in the
Complaint
from
which
his
compliance
with
the
LGTCA
-–
substantial or otherwise -- could be gleaned.
In any event, we readily conclude that the documentation
Abdus-Shahid
attached
substantial
compliance
compliance
exception
to
is
the
under
Complaint
Maryland
“narrow,”
14
does
law.
Huggins
not
The
v.
constitute
substantial
Prince
George’s
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County,
683
Filed: 01/04/2017
F.3d
525,
538
Pg: 15 of 21
(4th
Cir.
2012),
and
must
be
demonstrated with respect to each of the LGTCA’s requirements,
see Moore v. Norouzi, 807 A.2d 632, 643 (Md. 2002).
Here, the EEOC charge alleges religious discrimination in
employment practices, in violation of Title VII, but it does not
necessarily follow that claim adequately alerted the City to a
potential claim based on violations of Maryland’s constitutional
guarantees of religious freedom and due process.
A.2d
at
1272
(observing
that
substantial
Faulk, 808
compliance
requires
fulfillment of the notice requirement’s purpose, which is “to
apprise [the] local government of its possible liability” such
that it can, among other things “ascertain the character and
extent of [its] responsibility”).
alleges
discrimination
that
Moreover, because the charge
began
in
November
2013
and
the
charge was not filed until August 12, 2014, it was not provided
to the City until well after the 180-day period in which notice
is to be provided under the LGTCA.
Abdus-Shahid does not offer
any explanation for this delay, nor does he claim he should be
excused from the statutory deadline requirement.
109
A.3d
at
652-54
(analyzing
whether
“good
Cf. Rounds,
cause”
excused
plaintiff’s failure to comply with the LGTCA’s notice deadline).
On this record, the EEOC charge was not sufficient to constitute
substantial compliance with all of the LGTCA’s requirements.
15
As
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such,
the
Filed: 01/04/2017
district
court
did
Pg: 16 of 21
not
err
in
dismissing
Abdus-
Shahid’s state-law claims for failure to comply with the LGTCA.
C.
Title VII Claim
The final issue Abdus-Shahid raises on appeal challenges
the
district
court’s
dismissal
of
his
Title
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
“the
City’s
policy
disparately
impacts
VII
claim
for
He maintains that
[him],
and
other
religiously observant employees and their families, by requiring
that they either engage in conduct that interferes with their
religious beliefs or forego the privileges ordinarily accorded
to married people.”
this
claim
was
Appellants’ Opening Br. 16.
adequately
alleged
in
his
He argues that
EEOC
charge,
which
referred to “religious discrimination,” and he urges that it
requires too much of the non-lawyers filling out EEOC charges to
require
more
than
a
layman’s
explanation
of
the
conduct
at
issue.
Title
VII
authorizes
two
causes
of
action
against
employers: disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) and
disparate impact.
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575
U.S.
Ct.
__,
135
S.
2028,
2032
(2015).
Although
they
are
similar in their objectives, each cause of action has different
elements.
A
disparate
treatment
claim
requires
proof
of
discriminatory motive, “although [that impermissible motive] can
in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences
16
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in treatment.”
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S.
n.15
324,
335
(1977).
A
disparate
impact
claim,
contrast, does not require proof of discriminatory motive.
in
Id.
Instead, disparate impact claims “involve employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business necessity.”
In
order
to
promote
voluntary
Id.
compliance
with
the
law,
Title VII claimants must pursue their administrative remedies
before filing a lawsuit.
Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus.,
711 F.3d 401, 406-07 (4th Cir. 2013).
They do so by filing a
“charge” with the EEOC “notif[ying] the charged party of the
asserted violation” and “bring[ing] the charged party before the
EEOC.”
Id. at 407.
“[A] federal court may only consider those
allegations included in the EEOC charge.”
Id.
Any other claims
that “would naturally have arisen from an investigation” are
procedurally barred and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider
them.
Id.
On appeal, as he did in opposing the motion to dismiss,
Abdus-Shahid repeatedly disavows raising a disparate treatment
claim
in
his
(“Abdus-Shahid’s
discrimination,
Complaint.
claim
not
E.g.,
is
Appellants’
based
disparate
upon
treatment
Opening
disparate
Br.
9
impact
discrimination.”);
Appellants’ Opening Br. 16 (“Appellants do not allege that the
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City deliberately targeted Islam for attack.”).
maintains
that
he
discrimination.
impact
is
relying
solely
on
Instead, he
disparate
impact
E.g., App. 33 (“This is a case of disparate
discrimination.”);
Appellants’
Opening
Br.
16
(“Appellants . . . allege that the City’s policy disparately
impacts them[.]”).
In light of Abdus-Shahid’s clear position
from the opposition to motion to dismiss stage and through to
appeal, we will not address any arguments related to a disparate
treatment claim because that is a cause of action he represents
he is not seeking to bring.
Turning
to
whether
Abdus-Shahid’s
disparate
impact
claim
can survive the motion to dismiss stage, we conclude it cannot.
Even
construing
the
EEOC
charge
broadly,
we
agree
with
the
district court that it fails to assert a disparate impact claim.
“Central to proof of a prima facie case under th[at] theory” is
proof of a policy or practice, “which, though facially neutral
or
even
benign
substantially
in
actual
purpose,
disproportionate
nevertheless
burden
upon
a
imposes
a
claimant’s
protected group as compared to a favored group within the total
set of persons to whom it is applied.”
Wright v. Nat’l Archives
& Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711 (4th Cir. 1979).
Abdus-
Shahid’s allegations in the EEOC charge sound as a disparate
treatment
or
intentional
disparate impact claim:
discrimination
claim
rather
than
a
he claims he has been denied insurance
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and
Doc: 35
believes
Filed: 01/04/2017
that
he
is
Pg: 19 of 21
being
“discriminated
because of [his] religion, Muslim.”
App. 18.
against
.
.
.
Critically, the
EEOC charge does not identify any policy (neutral or otherwise)
being challenged as discriminatory in its effect, and, in fact,
it asserts Abdus-Shahid had “been given no explanation for [his]
employer’s action.”
App. 18 (emphasis added).
Abdus-Shahid also did not assert any facts that would allow
a conclusion that Muslims were being disproportionately impacted
by
the
City’s
actions.
While
he
claims
another
employee
experienced the “same issue,” that allegation is vague and does
not
suggest
E.g.,
anything
Wright,
609
more
F.2d
than
at
discrete
712
(“The
discriminatory
policy
or
acts.
practice
contemplated by disparate impact doctrine consists of more than
the mere occurrence of isolated or . . . sporadic discriminatory
acts,
having
reference
instead
to
an
employer’s
standard
operating procedure[; it concerns] the regular rather than the
unusual practice.”). 4
Lastly, in his brief on appeal, Abdus-
4
Abdus-Shahid’s brief goes even farther in suggesting that
the City’s policy does not disparately impact Muslims, but
rather affects anyone who elects not to obtain a civil marriage
certificate for whatever reason.
E.g., Appellants’ Opening Br.
15 (“Any religious person who chooses [to forego the state
licensing
requirement
for
marriage]
will,
upon
accepting
employment with the City of Baltimore, be impacted by the City’s
discriminatory health insurance coverage policy.”).
Even
assuming that Abdus-Shahid could assert a disparate impact claim
on behalf of “devout religious adherents” of multiple faiths,
Abdus-Shahid offered no contentions in his EEOC charge as to any
(Continued)
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Shahid contends that the “heart” of his disparate impact claim
is a failure to accommodate, Appellants’ Opening Br. 17, but the
EEOC charge does not provide any information suggesting that to
be the case.
To be clear, the problem is not –- as Abdus-Shahid
incorrectly suggests the district court held –- that his EEOC
charge lacked any specific legal terminology.
Abdus-Shahid is
correct that “the exhaustion requirement should not become a
tripwire
for
hapless
plaintiffs
[and
that]
we
may
not
erect
insurmountable barriers to litigation out of overly technical
concerns.”
2012).
Sydnor v. Fairfax Cty., 681 F.3d 591, 594 (4th Cir.
Rather, the problem is that the words used in the EEOC
charge do not correlate to the sort of assertions and facts from
which a future cause of action based on disparate impact can be
discerned.
See, e.g., Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505,
509 (4th Cir. 2005) (observing “the factual allegations in the
administrative
charge
[must
be]
reasonably
related
to
the
factual allegations in the formal litigation” to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement).
Abdus-Shahid
thus
failed
to
exhaust
his
administrative
remedies with respect to a disparate impact claim under Title
VII and the district court did not err in dismissing this claim.
effect on such non-Muslims
marriage certificate.
who
20
also
do
not
possess
a
civil
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See, e.g., Burgis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63, 71
(2d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of disparate impact claim
for failure to exhaust where the EEOC charge “complain[ed] of
individualized
disparate
treatment”);
Pacheco
v.
Mineta,
448
F.3d 783, 792 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding plaintiff failed to
exhaust remedies as to a disparate impact theory where the EEOC
charge
“facially
alleged
disparate
treatment,”
“identified
no
neutral employment policy,” and “complained of past incidents of
disparate treatment only”).
III.
For
the
aforementioned
reasons,
the
judgment
of
the
district court is
AFFIRMED.
21
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