Adris Abdus-Shahid v. Mayor & Cty Council Baltimore

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:15-cv-01972-JFM Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999997422].. [15-2181]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2181

ADRIS ABDUS-SHAHID; BAIYINA JONES,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE,
Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:15-cv-01972-JFM)

Submitted:

October 6, 2016

Decided:

January 4, 2017

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jennifer S. Lubinski, LAW OFFICE OF JENNIFER S. LUBINSKI,
Columbia, Maryland, for Appellants.
Nicholas C. Sokolow,
Assistant
Solicitor,
BALTIMORE
CITY
DEPARTMENT
OF
LAW,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Idris

Abdus-Shahid

and

Bayina

Jones

appeal

the

district

court’s dismissal of their claims against the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore (“the City”).
alleged
City’s

violations
policy

of

of

state

requiring

and
its

Abdus-Shahid’s 1 Complaint

federal
employees

law

based

to

submit

upon
proof

the
of

their recorded civil marriage certificate in order to establish
a spouse as eligible for health insurance coverage.

For the

reasons

district

that

follow,

we

affirm

the

judgment

of

the

court dismissing the Complaint.

I. 2
In 1998, Abdus-Shahid and Jones were married in an Islamic
ceremony performed in Baltimore, Maryland.

They are Muslims

who, as part of their faith, “believe that their relationship is
governed by Islamic law and that a civil, or secular, marriage
license is both unnecessary to their union and contrary to their
1

For simplicity, when referring to Abdus-Shahid and Jones
as parties in this case, the opinion will refer to them
collectively as “Abdus-Shahid.”
2

Because the district court decided the case on a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we “assum[e]
all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the”
Complaint and attached exhibits are true.
Burnette v. Fahey,
687 F.3d 171, 180 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Tallabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)
(discussing use of exhibits attached to a complaint).

2

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religious beliefs.”
obtain

a

civil

Pg: 3 of 21

App. 6, ¶ 7.

marriage

Accordingly, they did not

license

prior

to

their

religious

ceremony, nor have they obtained a civil marriage certificate.
In 2008, Abdus-Shahid began working as a civil engineer for
the

City’s

employment,

Department

of

Transportation.

Abdus-Shahid

was

provided

As
the

part

of

his

opportunity

to

participate in the City’s health insurance program, including
coverage for his spouse and children.

He enrolled Jones and

their children without objection for several years.
In 2013, after a city-wide audit of the City’s employee
health insurance program, the City revoked Abdus-Shahid’s family
health

insurance

coverage.

Although

Abdus-Shahid

was

subsequently allowed to re-enroll his children, the City refused
to allow him to re-enroll Jones because he could not “provide an
‘Official

Court-Certified

State

Marriage

Certificate

(must

be

Certified and dated by the appropriate state or County official,
such as the Clerk of Court) From [sic] the court in the County
or City in which the marriage took place’” (“the policy”).
7-8,

¶

16.

Abdus-Shahid

attempted

to

file

his

App.

religious

marriage certificate with the Clerk of the Baltimore Circuit
Court, but the Clerk refused to accept it for recording because
it was not a civil license and had not been obtained from the
Clerk prior to the ceremony.

In

August

2014,

Abdus-Shahid

filed a charge of religious discrimination with the Baltimore
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Community

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Relations

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Commission,

the

City’s

equivalent

of

the

federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and also
with

the

EEOC

(“EEOC

charge”).

Abdus-Shahid

listed

the

“particulars” of his charge as follows:
I.
. . . In or about July 2013, an audit
was conducted which resulted in my family
being dropped from my health insurance
without explanation. . . . When I completed
the forms to [re-enroll] my family, I was
informed
my
Islamic
marriage
is
not
recognize[d]; therefore, I have been unable
to reinstate my wife to my health insurance
plan. . . . I am aware of another employee
who is experiencing the same issue.
II.
I have been given no explanation for
the employer’s actions.
III.
I believe I have been discriminated
against in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
regarding benefits because of my religion,
Muslim.
App. 18.
After

receiving

a

letter

from

the

EEOC

dismissing

the

investigation and informing Abdus-Shahid of his right to sue, he
filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The

City removed it to the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland.

The Complaint alleges three claims:

(1)

infringement of the free exercise of religion, in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution;
(2)

deprivation

of

religious

freedom

and

due

process,

in

violation of Articles 24 and 36 of the Maryland Constitution’s
4

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Declaration

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of

Rights;

and

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(3)

religious

discrimination

with

respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment, in violation of Title VII, as amended.
The Complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the City’s
refusal to recognize Abdus-Shahid’s marriage violates the U.S.
Constitution

and

Maryland

Declaration

of

Rights,

an

order

directing the City to recognize his marriage (“and the lawful
marriages of other Muslims whose marriage certificates have not
been recorded by a clerk of the court”), and other monetary
damages, costs, and fees.

App. 8-13.

The City moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure
should

be

12(b)(6),
dismissed

arguing

that

because

the

the

constitutional

City’s

policy

was

claims
facially

neutral and did not prohibit the free exercise of religion; the
state-law claims should be dismissed because Abdus-Shahid failed
to follow the requisite statutory notice provisions to bring
suit; and the Title VII claim should be dismissed because the
Complaint

did

not

allege

any

evidence

of

intentional

had

sufficiently

discrimination.
In

response,

pled each claim.
marry

and

to

Abdus-Shahid

contended

he

Citing the fundamental constitutional right to

exercise

his

religious

beliefs,

he

argued

the

City’s policy served no legitimate purpose and was not a neutral
law of general applicability.

Furthermore, Abdus-Shahid claimed
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the policy imposed an unfair burden on religious adherents of
any faith who sought religious rather than civil marriages.
also

asserted

his

state-law

claims

were

not

subject

to

He
the

statutory notice provisions because he only sought declaratory
relief.
with

In the alternative, he asserted substantial compliance

any

state-law

requirements.

Lastly,

Abdus-Shahid

maintained that his Title VII claim alleged disparate impact
discrimination rather than intentional discrimination and thus
should be allowed to proceed.
The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss as
to all claims.
its

face,”

and

standard

by

afforded

health

concluded
Maryland

It held that the City’s policy “is neutral on
“is

which

reasonable
to

determine

insurance

Abdus-Shahid’s
Local

since

it

whether

coverage.”

state-law

Government

Tort

provides
spouses

App.

claims

Claims

common

should

39.

were

Act

a

It

barred

applied because he sought more than declaratory relief.

also

by

(“LGTCA”),

be

the

which
And it

held Abdus-Shahid’s Title VII claim based on disparate impact
could

not

proceed

because

he

had

not

exhausted

his

administrative remedies as to that claim.
Abdus-Shahid

noted

a

timely

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

6

appeal,

and

we

have

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II.
On appeal, Abdus-Shahid challenges the dismissal of each of
his claims.
the

We address each issue in turn, reviewing de novo

district

dismiss.

court’s

grant

of

the

Rule

12(b)(6)

motion

to

Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 315, 320

(4th Cir. 2012).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must “provide enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551
F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009), 3 meaning that it must “plead[]
factual content [that] allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference
alleged.”

that

the

defendant

Ashcroft

v.

is

Iqbal,

liable
556

U.S.

for

the

662,

misconduct

678

(2009).

“[P]laintiffs may proceed into the litigation process only when
their complaints are justified by both law and fact.”

Francis

v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
A.
Abdus-Shahid

Federal Constitutional Claim
contends

the

district

court

erred

in

dismissing his claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Pointing to Maryland and federal case law discussing civilly
recognized

marriages

and

the

fundamental

right

to

marry,

he

asserts that the City’s policy contradicts state law concerning

3

We have removed internal alterations, citations, and
quotations throughout this opinion, except as otherwise noted.

7

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what

it

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means

to

be

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married

and

it

impermissibly

divides

marriage into two tiers, marriages that are entitled to coverage
and marriages that are not.
not,”

the

City

has

He submits that “intentionally or

“unconstitutionally

burdened

his

free

exercise of religion” by failing to recognize his religiousbased marriage and that the district court’s dismissal of this
claim should be reversed.
We disagree with Abdus-Shahid; the district court did not
err in dismissing this claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

The

arguments Abdus-Shahid makes do not address the proper analysis
for a Free Exercise claim.
law

concerning

when

Instead, he points to Maryland case

individuals

are

deemed

to

be

“married.”

Those cases simply have no bearing on the matter before the
Court,

which

is

Exercise Clause.

whether

the

City’s

policy

violates

the

Free

Similarly, his arguments relying on case law

concerning same-sex civil unions and marriages ignore that those
discussions occurred within the context of civil marriages.

Yet

again, these cases have no applicability to the Free Exercise
claim Abdus-Shahid pursues.
Reviewed in light of the applicable Free Exercise Clause
case

law,

Abdus-Shahid

failed

to

articulate

a

constitutional

claim based on his right to free exercise of religion.

The

First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.
8

U.S. Const. amend.

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I.

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This provision applies to states and localities through the

Fourteenth Amendment.
(4th

Cir.

2003)

Amendment,

See Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 380

(“The

applicable

Free
to

Exercise
states

Clause

through

of

the

the

First

Fourteenth

Amendment, forbids the adoption of laws designed to suppress
religious beliefs or practices unless justified by a compelling
governmental

interest

interest.”).

The

and

Free

narrowly

Exercise

tailored

Clause

to

“does

meet

not,”

that

however,

“relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the
law

proscribes

(or

prescribes)

prescribes (or proscribes).”
872,

879

(1990).

certificate

The

before

conduct

that

his

religion

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.

City’s

requirement

recognizing

any

for

marriage

a

for

court-issued
purposes

of

health insurance coverage eligibility is just such “a valid and
neutral law of general applicability.”
Abdus-Shahid
requiring

a

does

civil

not

dispute

marriage

that

the

certificate

City’s
to

policy

demonstrate

eligibility for spousal health insurance coverage is generally
applicable to City employees.

Instead, he maintains that the

City’s policy is not neutral toward religion because it has the
effect

of

insurance
Islamic

prohibiting
coverage

marriage

Abdus-Shahid

despite
ceremony.

her

from

being

But
9

enrolling

his

that

is

spouse
not

Jones

based
the

on

test

for
an
for

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neutrality.

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The

Supreme

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Court

has

held

that

a

law

lacks

neutrality if it “target[s] religious beliefs” or if its “object
. . . is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation.”

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.

City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).

The City’s policy is

silent as to religion or religious practice and thus is facially
neutral.
of

no

See id.

specific

presenting

a

The City allows individuals of all faiths or

faith

civil

to

enroll

marriage

a

spouse

for

certificate.

coverage

In

so

upon

doing,

it

simultaneously bars all employees from enrolling an individual
as

his

or

her

spouse

if

that

employee

cannot

required documentation, regardless of the reason.

provide

the

See Liberty

Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 99 (4th Cir. 2013) (observing
that a neutral law of general applicability will have “no object
that

infringes

upon

or

restricts

religious

motivation

and

motivated

[only]

religious

neutrality

does

by
not

end

impose[]

the

practices
no

because

of

burden . . . on

belief”).
analysis,

And

while

Abdus-Shahid

their

conduct
facial
did

not

allege any facts from which it could be inferred that the policy
was implemented with an improper motivation.

See Lukumi Babalu

Aye, 508 U.S. at 534 (observing that the Free Exercise Clause
forbids
treatment”

“target[ing]
through

religious

“subtle

conduct

departures

from

for

neutrality”

“covert suppression of particular religious beliefs”).
10

distinctive
and

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Because
neutral

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City’s

the

toward

Pg: 11 of 21

is

policy

religion

it

“need

generally
not

be

applicable
justified

and

by

a

compelling governmental interest even if [it] has the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”
531.

Id. at

Thus, as the Complaint failed to state a claim for the

violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the district
court did not err in dismissing the claim.
B.
Abdus-Shahid

State Constitutional Claim

next

asserts

the

district

court

erred

in

dismissing his state constitutional claims for failure to comply
with the notice provisions of Maryland’s LGTCA.
Leopold,

962

A.2d

1025,

1030-31

(Md.

Ct.

See Ransom v.

Spec.

App.

2008)

(observing that the LGTCA’s requirements apply to all torts,
including

constitutional

ones).

He

contends

that

the

LGTCA

notice provisions do not apply to his claim because he only
sought declaratory relief for the alleged violations of state
law.

Alternatively, he alleges he substantially complied with

the LGTCA’s requirements.
Under the version of the LGTCA applicable to Abdus-Shahid’s
claim, before suing the City for “unliquidated damages” he was
required

to

provide

the

municipality

written

claimed injury within 180 days of that injury.
Jud. Proc. § 5-304 (2013).

notice

of

his

Md. Code, Cts. &

That notice must “state the time,

place, and cause of the injury,” “be given in person or by
11

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certified

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mail,

return

Pg: 12 of 21

receipt

requested,

bearing

a

postmark

from the [post office],” and, in the case of the City, be given
to the City Solicitor.

Id.

Abdus-Shahid does not allege that

he, in fact, fulfilled these specific requirements.
The
LGTCA’s

district

claims
part,

notice
because

“that

remedies of

the

not

err

apply

Complaint

Court

the

the

did

provisions

the

constitutional
Elsewhere,

court

to

hereto

claim.

App.

Complaint

the

with
11,

plainly

concluding

that

Abdus-Shahid’s

specifically

determine

parties

in

asks,

respect
¶

33

state-law

in

respective

relevant

rights

to

the[]”

(emphasis

contemplated

an

the

and
state

added).
award

of

damages to compensate for the sums Abdus-Shahid was having to
pay

for

out-of-pocket

medical

expenses.

See

App.

8,

¶

18

(“Plaintiffs are currently expecting and, as a result of the
City’s refusal to recognize their marriage, Baiyina Jones is
without health insurance coverage.
incurring

out-of-pocket

healthcare

As a result, Plaintiffs are
expenses

and

expect

to

continue to incur such expenses until Baiyina Jones is properly
insured.”);

App.

10,

¶

30

(expressly

incorporating

the

allegation in paragraph 18 into the state law claim); see also
App. 12-13 (plea for relief, containing a free-standing request
for

“[a]

judgment

for

monetary

damages”).

Moreover,

as

the

district court correctly surmised from these allegations, AbdusShahid is “requesting that the City reinstate Jones’s health
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insurance and pay the City’s portion of Jones’s premiums,” a
request that also involves more than “solely . . . declaratory
relief.”

App. 38.

Based

on

the

foregoing,

the

Complaint

contemplates

the

possibility of more than solely declaratory relief related to
the state law claim.

As such, the district court did not err in

concluding that Abdus-Shahid was required to comply with the
notice provision of the LGTCA prior to bringing his state law
claim and

that

he

did

not

do

so.

Cf.

Rounds

v.

Md.-Nat’l

Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 109 A.3d 639, 646 n.10 (Md.
2015) (concluding plaintiffs sought unliquidated damages –- and
thus fell “under the purview of the LGTCA” -– despite labelling
their claim as one for “Declaratory Judgment” -- because they
sought

compensatory,

statutory,

and

punitive

damages

arising

from the alleged violation).
Abdus-Shahid does not contend he strictly complied with the
LGTCA’s provisions.

Instead, Abdus-Shahid argues the district

court

considering

erred

by

not

whether

he

had

substantially

complied with the LGTCA’s provisions.

He asserts that had the

district

have

court

done

so,

it

would

concluded

he

had

substantially complied by filing the EEOC charge and therefore
could proceed with the state law claim.
To

be

sure,

Maryland

courts

do

not

compliance with the LGTCA’s notice provisions.
13

require

strict

See Faulk v.

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808

1262,

Ewing,
claimant

A.2d

provides

the

1275

local

Pg: 14 of 21

(Md.

2002)

government,

(“[W]here . . . [a]

through

the

unit

or

division with the responsibility for investigating [such] claims
against

that

local

government,

or

the

company

with

whom

the

local government or unit has contracted for that function, the
information required by § 5-304(b)(3) to be supplied, who thus
acquires actual knowledge within the statutory period, the . . .
claimant has substantially complied with the notice provisions
of

the

LGTCA.”).

That

because

Maryland

however,

legal

principle

courts

also

has

no

require

effect

here,

plaintiffs

to

plead their strict or substantive compliance with the LGTCA as
part of their state-law claims.

See Hansen v. City of Laurel,

25 A.3d 122, 137 & n.16 (Md. 2011).

Failure to do so makes the

claim “subject to a motion to dismiss . . . based on a failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Here,
LGTCA.

the

Complaint

fails

to

plead

any

Id. at 137.

compliance

with

the

Although Abdus-Shahid attached a copy of the EEOC charge

to his Complaint, he failed to allege any facts directly in the
Complaint

from

which

his

compliance

with

the

LGTCA

-–

substantial or otherwise -- could be gleaned.
In any event, we readily conclude that the documentation
Abdus-Shahid

attached

substantial

compliance

compliance

exception

to

is

the

under

Complaint
Maryland

“narrow,”
14

does

law.

Huggins

not
The

v.

constitute
substantial

Prince

George’s

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County,

683

Filed: 01/04/2017

F.3d

525,

538

Pg: 15 of 21

(4th

Cir.

2012),

and

must

be

demonstrated with respect to each of the LGTCA’s requirements,
see Moore v. Norouzi, 807 A.2d 632, 643 (Md. 2002).
Here, the EEOC charge alleges religious discrimination in
employment practices, in violation of Title VII, but it does not
necessarily follow that claim adequately alerted the City to a
potential claim based on violations of Maryland’s constitutional
guarantees of religious freedom and due process.
A.2d

at

1272

(observing

that

substantial

Faulk, 808

compliance

requires

fulfillment of the notice requirement’s purpose, which is “to
apprise [the] local government of its possible liability” such
that it can, among other things “ascertain the character and
extent of [its] responsibility”).
alleges

discrimination

that

Moreover, because the charge

began

in

November

2013

and

the

charge was not filed until August 12, 2014, it was not provided
to the City until well after the 180-day period in which notice
is to be provided under the LGTCA.

Abdus-Shahid does not offer

any explanation for this delay, nor does he claim he should be
excused from the statutory deadline requirement.
109

A.3d

at

652-54

(analyzing

whether

“good

Cf. Rounds,

cause”

excused

plaintiff’s failure to comply with the LGTCA’s notice deadline).
On this record, the EEOC charge was not sufficient to constitute
substantial compliance with all of the LGTCA’s requirements.

15

As

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such,

the

Filed: 01/04/2017

district

court

did

Pg: 16 of 21

not

err

in

dismissing

Abdus-

Shahid’s state-law claims for failure to comply with the LGTCA.
C.

Title VII Claim

The final issue Abdus-Shahid raises on appeal challenges
the

district

court’s

dismissal

of

his

Title

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
“the

City’s

policy

disparately

impacts

VII

claim

for

He maintains that
[him],

and

other

religiously observant employees and their families, by requiring
that they either engage in conduct that interferes with their
religious beliefs or forego the privileges ordinarily accorded
to married people.”
this

claim

was

Appellants’ Opening Br. 16.

adequately

alleged

in

his

He argues that

EEOC

charge,

which

referred to “religious discrimination,” and he urges that it
requires too much of the non-lawyers filling out EEOC charges to
require

more

than

a

layman’s

explanation

of

the

conduct

at

issue.
Title

VII

authorizes

two

causes

of

action

against

employers: disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) and
disparate impact.

EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575

U.S.

Ct.

__,

135

S.

2028,

2032

(2015).

Although

they

are

similar in their objectives, each cause of action has different
elements.

A

disparate

treatment

claim

requires

proof

of

discriminatory motive, “although [that impermissible motive] can
in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences
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in treatment.”

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431

U.S.

n.15

324,

335

(1977).

A

disparate

impact

claim,

contrast, does not require proof of discriminatory motive.

in
Id.

Instead, disparate impact claims “involve employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business necessity.”
In

order

to

promote

voluntary

Id.

compliance

with

the

law,

Title VII claimants must pursue their administrative remedies
before filing a lawsuit.

Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus.,

711 F.3d 401, 406-07 (4th Cir. 2013).

They do so by filing a

“charge” with the EEOC “notif[ying] the charged party of the
asserted violation” and “bring[ing] the charged party before the
EEOC.”

Id. at 407.

“[A] federal court may only consider those

allegations included in the EEOC charge.”

Id.

Any other claims

that “would naturally have arisen from an investigation” are
procedurally barred and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider
them.

Id.

On appeal, as he did in opposing the motion to dismiss,
Abdus-Shahid repeatedly disavows raising a disparate treatment
claim

in

his

(“Abdus-Shahid’s
discrimination,

Complaint.
claim
not

E.g.,
is

Appellants’

based

disparate

upon

treatment

Opening

disparate

Br.

9

impact

discrimination.”);

Appellants’ Opening Br. 16 (“Appellants do not allege that the
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City deliberately targeted Islam for attack.”).
maintains

that

he

discrimination.
impact

is

relying

solely

on

Instead, he

disparate

impact

E.g., App. 33 (“This is a case of disparate

discrimination.”);

Appellants’

Opening

Br.

16

(“Appellants . . . allege that the City’s policy disparately
impacts them[.]”).

In light of Abdus-Shahid’s clear position

from the opposition to motion to dismiss stage and through to
appeal, we will not address any arguments related to a disparate
treatment claim because that is a cause of action he represents
he is not seeking to bring.
Turning

to

whether

Abdus-Shahid’s

disparate

impact

claim

can survive the motion to dismiss stage, we conclude it cannot.
Even

construing

the

EEOC

charge

broadly,

we

agree

with

the

district court that it fails to assert a disparate impact claim.
“Central to proof of a prima facie case under th[at] theory” is
proof of a policy or practice, “which, though facially neutral
or

even

benign

substantially

in

actual

purpose,

disproportionate

nevertheless

burden

upon

a

imposes

a

claimant’s

protected group as compared to a favored group within the total
set of persons to whom it is applied.”

Wright v. Nat’l Archives

& Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711 (4th Cir. 1979).

Abdus-

Shahid’s allegations in the EEOC charge sound as a disparate
treatment

or

intentional

disparate impact claim:

discrimination

claim

rather

than

a

he claims he has been denied insurance
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and

Doc: 35

believes

Filed: 01/04/2017

that

he

is

Pg: 19 of 21

being

“discriminated

because of [his] religion, Muslim.”

App. 18.

against

.

.

.

Critically, the

EEOC charge does not identify any policy (neutral or otherwise)
being challenged as discriminatory in its effect, and, in fact,
it asserts Abdus-Shahid had “been given no explanation for [his]
employer’s action.”

App. 18 (emphasis added).

Abdus-Shahid also did not assert any facts that would allow
a conclusion that Muslims were being disproportionately impacted
by

the

City’s

actions.

While

he

claims

another

employee

experienced the “same issue,” that allegation is vague and does
not

suggest

E.g.,

anything

Wright,

609

more
F.2d

than
at

discrete

712

(“The

discriminatory
policy

or

acts.

practice

contemplated by disparate impact doctrine consists of more than
the mere occurrence of isolated or . . . sporadic discriminatory
acts,

having

reference

instead

to

an

employer’s

standard

operating procedure[; it concerns] the regular rather than the
unusual practice.”). 4

Lastly, in his brief on appeal, Abdus-

4

Abdus-Shahid’s brief goes even farther in suggesting that
the City’s policy does not disparately impact Muslims, but
rather affects anyone who elects not to obtain a civil marriage
certificate for whatever reason.
E.g., Appellants’ Opening Br.
15 (“Any religious person who chooses [to forego the state
licensing
requirement
for
marriage]
will,
upon
accepting
employment with the City of Baltimore, be impacted by the City’s
discriminatory health insurance coverage policy.”).
Even
assuming that Abdus-Shahid could assert a disparate impact claim
on behalf of “devout religious adherents” of multiple faiths,
Abdus-Shahid offered no contentions in his EEOC charge as to any
(Continued)
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Shahid contends that the “heart” of his disparate impact claim
is a failure to accommodate, Appellants’ Opening Br. 17, but the
EEOC charge does not provide any information suggesting that to
be the case.

To be clear, the problem is not –- as Abdus-Shahid

incorrectly suggests the district court held –- that his EEOC
charge lacked any specific legal terminology.

Abdus-Shahid is

correct that “the exhaustion requirement should not become a
tripwire

for

hapless

plaintiffs

[and

that]

we

may

not

erect

insurmountable barriers to litigation out of overly technical
concerns.”
2012).

Sydnor v. Fairfax Cty., 681 F.3d 591, 594 (4th Cir.

Rather, the problem is that the words used in the EEOC

charge do not correlate to the sort of assertions and facts from
which a future cause of action based on disparate impact can be
discerned.

See, e.g., Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505,

509 (4th Cir. 2005) (observing “the factual allegations in the
administrative

charge

[must

be]

reasonably

related

to

the

factual allegations in the formal litigation” to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement).
Abdus-Shahid

thus

failed

to

exhaust

his

administrative

remedies with respect to a disparate impact claim under Title
VII and the district court did not err in dismissing this claim.

effect on such non-Muslims
marriage certificate.

who

20

also

do

not

possess

a

civil

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See, e.g., Burgis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63, 71
(2d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of disparate impact claim
for failure to exhaust where the EEOC charge “complain[ed] of
individualized

disparate

treatment”);

Pacheco

v.

Mineta,

448

F.3d 783, 792 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding plaintiff failed to
exhaust remedies as to a disparate impact theory where the EEOC
charge

“facially

alleged

disparate

treatment,”

“identified

no

neutral employment policy,” and “complained of past incidents of
disparate treatment only”).

III.
For

the

aforementioned

reasons,

the

judgment

of

the

district court is
AFFIRMED.

21