Wells Fargo Equipment Finance v. Nabil Asterbadi

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:15-cv-01371-PWG. [999962403]. [15-2182]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2182

WELLS FARGO EQUIPMENT FINANCE, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NABIL J. ASTERBADI,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paul W. Grimm, District Judge. (8:15cv-01371-PWG)

Argued:

September 20, 2016

Decided:

November 4, 2016

Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and Irene M. KEELEY,
United States District Judge for the Northern District of West
Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion.
Judge Niemeyer
opinion, in which Judge Diaz and Judge Keeley joined.

wrote

the

ARGUED: David B. Lamb, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Steven
Neal Leitess, LEITESS FRIEDBERG PC, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
ON BRIEF: David A. Donohoe, Potomac, Maryland, for
Appellant. Gordon S. Young, Pierce C. Murphy, LEITESS FRIEDBERG
PC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we address the enforceability of a judgment
originally

entered

in

the

Eastern

District

of

Virginia

but

registered for enforcement in the District of Maryland under 28
U.S.C. § 1963.

Particularly, we consider the time period during

which the judgment remains enforceable in Maryland.
Collecting on a financing debt incurred by Dr. Nabil J.
Asterbadi,

CIT/Equipment

Financing,

Inc.

(“CIT”)

obtained

a

$2.63 million judgment against Asterbadi in 1993, in the Eastern
District

of

Virginia.

remained

viable

for

Under
years.

20

Virginia
Roughly

law,
10

that

years

judgment
after

the

judgment had been entered, on August 27, 2003, CIT registered
the judgment in the District of Maryland pursuant to § 1963.
Under

Maryland

law,

made

relevant

by

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure 69(a), judgments expire 12 years after entry.
CIT sold the judgment to Wells Fargo Equipment Finance,
Inc.,

and

Wells

Fargo

thereafter,

collection efforts in Maryland.

in

April

2015,

began

Asterbadi filed a motion for a

protective order, contending that the judgment was unenforceable
because the efforts began more than 12 years after the judgment
had originally been entered in Virginia.

Wells Fargo responded

that

judgment

the

registration

of

the

Virginia

in

Maryland

before it had expired under Virginia law became, in effect, a
new judgment that was subject to Maryland law for enforcement.
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Thus, it argued, Maryland’s 12-year limitations period began on
the date that the judgment was registered in Maryland, not on
the date that the original judgment was entered in Virginia, and
therefore the judgment was still enforceable.
The district court agreed with Wells Fargo, concluding that
the time limitation for enforcement of the judgment began with
the date of its registration in Maryland, on August 27, 2003,
and that therefore it was still enforceable against Asterbadi.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I
The

judgment

was

entered

on

October

4,

1993,

against

Asterbadi in the Eastern District of Virginia and arose from a
defaulted debt that Asterbadi incurred to invest in an airplane.
It was entered in the amount of “$2,286,009.97, plus interest
from May 31, 1993 on the sum of $2,184,950 at the rate of 1.5%
per month, and attorney’s fees of $347,742.50.”

Under Virginia

law, the judgment remained enforceable for 20 years, or until
October 4, 2013.

See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-251(A).

While Asterbadi made a number of payments on the judgment
during the period shortly after it was entered, the judgment
has, in substantial part, remained unsatisfied.

In furtherance

of its collection efforts, CIT registered the judgment in the
District of Maryland on August 27, 2003, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

3

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§ 1963.

It

Fairfax

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also

County,

recorded

Virginia;

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the

judgment

Prince

in

George’s

state

courts

County,

in

Maryland;

Montgomery County, Maryland; and the District of Columbia, under
the law of those jurisdictions.

At the time that CIT registered

its judgment in the District of Maryland, Asterbadi still owed
some $1.75 million, much of which represented interest.
Several months later, on October 31, 2003, CIT undertook
collection

efforts

in

Maryland

Asterbadi held in Zachair, Ltd.

to

execute

on

stock

that

To this end, it filed a motion

in the district court for an injunction prohibiting Asterbadi
“from transferring the [stock] Certificates and ordering him to
turn over the Certificates to CIT.”

In response, Asterbadi, who

explained that he was a physician who had made “an ill-fated
investment in an airplane over 15 years ago,” claimed that CIT
had

overstated

the

amount

owed

on

the

judgment.

He

also

asserted that his stock in Zachair was owned with his wife as
tenants

by

execution

the
on

entireties

the

judgment.

and

therefore

Nonetheless,

was
he

not

subject

stated

that

to
he

“ha[d] no intention, and will not transfer, any shares of stock
in which he has any interest” and that he had no objection to
the entry of an order “which would preclude any such transfers.”
He did not, however, agree to an order transferring the stock
certificates to CIT.

No further action was taken on the motion

for more than 10 years.
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Effective June 29, 2007, CIT sold and assigned its judgment
against Asterbadi to Wells Fargo as part of an asset purchase
agreement.
efforts.

Some years later, Wells Fargo renewed collection
In preparation for collection in Maryland, Wells Fargo

filed a notice of the assignment, as well as a copy of the
assignment, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on April
1,

2015.

And

on

April

7,

2015,

it

filed

a

“Notice

of

Assignment” in the district court, although without including a
copy of the assignment.
the

assignment,

it

After Wells Fargo filed the notice of

noticed

the

deposition

of

Zachair,

whose

stock Asterbadi held.
Asterbadi filed a motion for protective order on May 8,
2015, contending that the Virginia judgment was not enforceable,
as Wells Fargo was seeking to enforce a judgment “entered more
than 21 years ago in Virginia,” which was beyond both Virginia’s
and Maryland’s statute of limitations for enforcing judgments.
He concluded that if the judgment was unenforceable, “there can
be no post-judgment discovery.”

He acknowledged that, if the

limitations period began on the date of registration, a judgment
registered

in

the

District

in

Maryland

might

still

be

enforceable under Maryland Rule 2-625, which provides that a
money judgment expires 12 years from the date of entry.

But he

argued that the registration of the judgment in Maryland was
“nothing more” than “ministerial” and that it “does not have the
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effect of entering a ‘new judgment’” with a new enforceability
period.

Thus,

he

reasoned

that

any

applicable

limitations

period began at the time of the judgment’s entry in 1993 and
therefore that the judgment was unenforceable.
In

view

of

Asterbadi’s

arguments,

the

district

court

entered an order requiring Wells Fargo to show cause “why this
matter is not subject to dismissal” for the reasons given by
Asterbadi.

Wells Fargo responded, arguing that “once a [viable]

foreign judgment is recorded in the [District of Maryland], that
judgment remains effective and enforceable for the time period
provided by Maryland law -- 12 years unless earlier renewed for
another 12 year period” -- from the date registered.

Therefore,

it claimed, the judgment was enforceable to August 27, 2015.
Asterbadi filed a reply and shortly thereafter a supplement
to

his

reply,

asserting

in

his

supplement

the

additional

argument that Wells Fargo did not have standing to enforce the
judgment because, while it filed a notice of the assignment of
the judgment in the district court, it did not file a copy of
the assignment itself, as required by Maryland Rule 2-624.

He

attached to his supplement an actual copy of the assignment that
Wells Fargo had filed in Montgomery County, Maryland.
While the proceedings were pending, Wells Fargo filed a
renewal

of

its

registered

judgment

6

in

the

district

court

on

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August 26, 2015, which, it contends, extended the enforceability
of its judgment under Maryland law to 2027.
By

order

dated

September

16,

2015,

the

district

court

rejected Asterbadi’s argument that Wells Fargo lacked standing
to

enforce

the

judgment,

noting

that

Asterbadi

himself

had

provided the court with a copy of the assignment that had been
filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and therefore
that “Wells Fargo ha[d] standing [to] respond to my show cause
order regarding the enforceability of the 1993 Judgment.”
district

court

also

rejected

Asterbadi’s

argument

that

The
when

discovery was commenced in 2015, the judgment was unenforceable
because the Maryland limitation of 12 years had run.

Relying on

Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. International Yachting Group, Inc.,
252

F.3d

399

(5th

Cir.

2001),

the

court

held

that

“the

[Maryland] statute of limitations in this case started to run on
the date that the judgment was registered in this Court, August
27, 2003, and is currently enforceable against the Defendant.”
(Emphasis added).

With respect to the motion for injunction

that had been pending since 2003, the court enjoined Asterbadi
from transferring his stock certificates in Zachair -- relief to
which Asterbadi had earlier consented -- but denied, without
prejudice, Wells Fargo’s request that Asterbadi be required to
turn those certificates over to it.

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Asterbadi

noticed

this

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appeal

September 16, 2015 order.

from

the

district

court’s

After Asterbadi noticed his appeal

from that order, the district court entered a separate order on
October 14, 2015, denying, without prejudice, Asterbadi’s motion
for a protective order against discovery, pending this appeal.

II
Both

parties

raise

jurisdictional

issues.

Wells

Fargo

contends that Asterbadi appealed only the September 16, 2015
order,

which

entered

an

injunction

to

which

Asterbadi

had

earlier consented, and not the court’s denial of the motion for
a protective order, entered on October 14, 2015.

And Asterbadi

contends that Wells Fargo lacks standing to enforce its judgment
against

him

because

Wells

Fargo

filed

only

a

notice

of

assignment in the district court, not a copy of the assignment
itself, and therefore failed to comply with Maryland Rule 2-624,
which

entitles

enforcement

in

parties
their

own

filing
name.

an
We

assignment
address

these

to

pursue

issues

in

order.

A
In its September 16, 2015 order, the district court granted
in

part

and

denied

in

part

CIT’s

original

motion

for

an

injunction, a result to which Asterbadi had consented in his
original

response

to

the

motion
8

for

an

injunction.

After

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Asterbadi filed an appeal from that order, the district court
entered

a

separate

order

dated

October

14,

2015,

denying

Asterbadi’s motion for a protective order to halt Wells Fargo’s
discovery efforts.

Wells Fargo now argues that Asterbadi should

have appealed the second order and that, because he never did
so, his appeal should be dismissed.
The

filing

“jurisdictional

of

a

in

proper

nature

appellate review.”

notice

appeal

.

and

of
is

a

.

.

is

indeed

prerequisite

to

Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992).

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 requires that the notice
of appeal “designate,” among other information, “the judgment,
order,

or

part

3(c)(1)(B).
the

thereof

appealed.”

Fed.

R.

App.

P.

And even though “[c]ourts will liberally construe

requirements

generally

being

of

confine

Rule

our

3,”

review

Barry,

to

the

502

U.S.

order

at

248,

designated

we

in

the

notice of appeal, cf. Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 554 (4th
Cir.

2008)

(“[W]e

are

obliged

to

identify

those

particular

matters over which we possess jurisdiction”).
In

this

case,

however,

Asterbadi

was

justified

in

presenting his issues in connection with his appeal from the
district court’s September 16, 2015 order.
objected

to

maintained

the
that

form
the

of

court

the

injunctive

lacked

the

While he had not
relief

ability

entered,

to

grant

he
any

injunctive relief because, as he argued, the judgment against
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him was unenforceable.

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In the September 16, 2015 order, the

district court explicitly rejected two of Asterbadi’s arguments
-- that Wells Fargo lacked standing to enforce the judgment and
that limitations for enforcement of the judgment had run.
rulings

were

necessary

conditions

precedent

if

the

Those

district

court were to grant any injunctive relief, as it did in the
September

16,

2015

order.

Accordingly,

we

conclude

that

Asterbadi’s appeal of that order allows him to challenge the
district

court’s

rulings

on

these

two

conditions

that

were

necessary for granting injunctive relief.

B
Asterbadi contends that because Wells Fargo did not comply
with Maryland Rule 2-624, it was not entitled to step into the
shoes of CIT, which had obtained the judgment against Asterbadi
in the first place.

That Rule provides that the assignee of a

judgment may enforce the judgment in its own name when it files
“the

assignment

entered.”

.

.

.

in

the

court

where

the

Md. Rule 2-624 (emphasis added).

judgment

was

Accordingly, he

maintains, Wells Fargo has no standing to enforce CIT’s judgment
in its own name.
It is important to note that, while Asterbadi’s argument
raises

a

Procedure

question
69(a)(1)

of

federal

law,

incorporates

10

the

Federal
state

Rule
law

of
of

Civil
the

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jurisdiction where enforcement is sought for the procedure to be
followed in enforcing money judgments.
(incorporating

state

law

for

Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1962

determining

property located in the State).

judgment

liens

on

Accordingly, because federal

law so requires, it is appropriate that we look to Maryland Rule
2-624.
Whether a “notice” of assignment is sufficient to satisfy
the filing of “the assignment,” as provided in Rule 2-624, is
not a question that we need to resolve here.
court

observed,

while

Wells

Fargo

filed

As the district

only

a

notice

of

assignment in the district court, Asterbadi filed the actual
assignment, which had previously been filed in state court, so
that

the

district

court

had

before

it

assignment and the assignment itself.

both

the

notice

of

While the procedure by

which the district court received the assignment might have been
awkward,

that

awkwardness

did

not

deprive

Wells

Fargo

of

standing to enforce the judgment that it had purchased.

III
On
issues.
was

the

merits,

the

parties

agree

on

several

threshold

First, the original $2.63 million judgment in this case

entered

on

October

4,

1993,

in

the

Eastern

District

of

Virginia, and, under Virginia law, it remained enforceable for
20 years from the date of entry.

11

Va. Code. Ann. § 8.01-251.

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Second, roughly 10 years later, on August 27, 2003, CIT, the
judgment

holder

District

of

at

the

Maryland

time,

registered

pursuant

to

28

the

judgment

U.S.C.

in

§ 1963.

the

Third,

Maryland law provides that a money judgment expires 12 years
from the date of entry or from the date of renewal, if it is
renewed

before

its

expiration.

Md.

Rule

2-625.

Finally,

Maryland’s 12-year limitation governs the enforcement of this
judgment in the District of Maryland.
Against
that

even

these

though

undisputed
the

propositions,

Virginia

judgment,

Asterbadi

when

argues

registered

in

Maryland, was governed by Maryland’s 12-year limitation, the 12year

limitation

period

began

to

run

at

the

time

when

the

original judgment was entered in Virginia, i.e., on October 4,
1993.

Under his argument, the enforceability of the registered

judgment in Maryland expired 12 years after 1993, or on October
4, 2005.
Wells Fargo contends that when the Virginia judgment was
registered in Maryland, it became, in effect, a new judgment
governed by Maryland’s 12-year limitations period, which began
running on the date of registration, August 27, 2003.
To resolve the dispute, we begin with § 1963 itself, under
which the Virginia district court judgment was registered in the
Maryland

district

court.

Section

part:
12

1963

provides

in

relevant

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A judgment in an action for the recovery of money
. . . entered in any . . . district court . . . may be
registered by filing a certified copy of the judgment
in any other district . . . .
A judgment so
registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of
the district court of the district where registered
and may be enforced in like manner.
28 U.S.C. § 1963.

The statute was enacted in 1948 as a device

to streamline the more awkward prior practice of bringing suit
on a foreign judgment and thereby obtaining a new judgment on
the

foreign

judgment.

As

then-Circuit

Judge

Harry

Blackmun

observed:
It seems to be conceded that the purposes of § 1963
were to simply facilitate the enforcement of federal
judgments, at least those for money, to eliminate the
necessity and expense of a second lawsuit, and to
avoid
the
impediments,
such
as
diversity
of
citizenship, which new and distinct federal litigation
might otherwise encounter.
Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1965); see also
Home

Port

Rentals,

252

F.3d

at

404

(noting

that

Congress

explicitly enacted § 1963 to spare litigants the inefficiencies
of obtaining a judgment on a judgment); Stiller v. Hardman, 324
F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1963) (noting that § 1963 provides “a
speedier and more efficient mechanism for the enforcement of
federal judgments” than the practice of obtaining a judgment on
a judgment); S. Rep. No. 83-1917 (1954), as reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3142, 3142 (explaining that § 1963 was enacted to
spare

creditors

harassment

of

and

debtors

further

alike

litigation
13

“the
which

additional
would

cost

otherwise

and
be

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required by way of an action on the judgment in a district other
than that where the judgment was originally obtained”).
Thus,

instead

of

requiring

the

holder

of

a

Virginia

judgment to file a complaint in the Maryland district court on
the basis of the Virginia judgment, thereby engaging the federal
process to obtain a new judgment enforceable in the District of
Maryland, § 1963 allows the judgment holder simply to register
the Virginia judgment in Maryland but to retain the benefits of
obtaining a judgment under the former practice of suing on a
judgment to obtain a new judgment.

Indeed, § 1963 explicitly so

provides, stating that a district court judgment registered in
another district court “shall have the same effect as a judgment
of the district court . . . and may be enforced in like manner.”
28 U.S.C. § 1963 (emphasis added).
We thus construe § 1963 to provide for a new judgment in
the district court where the judgment is registered, as if the
new judgment had been entered in the district after filing an
action for a judgment on a judgment.

Accordingly, just as a new

judgment

a

obtained

in

an

action

on

previous

judgment

from

another district would be enforceable as any judgment entered in
the district court, so too is a registered judgment.

The other

courts of appeals that have construed § 1963 have reached the
same conclusion.
Human

Rights

See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos

Litig.,

536

F.3d
14

980,

989

(9th

Cir.

2008)

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(“[R]egistering
equivalent

of

a

judgment

obtaining

Pg: 15 of 19

under

a

new

§

1963

judgment

is
of

the
the

functional
registration

court” (emphasis added)); Home Port Rentals, 252 F.3d at 405
(“[R]egistration truly is the equivalent of a new judgment of
the registration court” (emphasis added)); Stanford, 341 F.2d at
268 (“We feel that registration provides, as far as enforcement
is

concerned,

the

equivalent

of

a

new

judgment

of

the

registration court” (emphasis added)).
With this understanding of § 1963, we apply the principles
applicable to any money judgment entered in a district court.
Under Rule 69(a), the judgment is enforceable in accordance with
state law, and in this case Maryland law provides that “a money
judgment expires 12 years from the date of entry or most recent
renewal.”

Md. Rule 2-625.

Accordingly, the registered judgment

in this case would have expired 12 years from August 27, 2003,
or on August 27, 2015.

And because Wells Fargo renewed the

judgment for another 12 years on August 26, 2015, the registered
judgment remains enforceable in Maryland to August 26, 2027.
Asterbadi argues that registration is merely a “ministerial
act” that is carried out as a matter of procedure to enforce the
Virginia

district

court

judgment,

and

therefore

the

original

Virginia judgment is actually the judgment Wells Fargo seeks to
enforce, even
Maryland

if

12-year

that

judgment

limitation.

is

Thus,
15

admittedly
he

subject

argues,

the

12

to

the

years

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began running when the Virginia judgment was entered, as stated
in Maryland Rule 2-625 (providing that a “judgment expires 12
years from the date of entry” (emphasis added)).

This argument,

however, overlooks the effect of registration under § 1963.
registration

were

merely

a

ministerial

act

to

enforce

If
the

Virginia judgment in Maryland, there would be no need for the
statute to have added the language that the registered judgment
functions the same as a judgment entered in the registration
court.

With

that

language,

§

1963

elevates

the

registered

Virginia judgment to the status of a new Maryland judgment, and
it is accordingly enforced as a new judgment entered in the
first instance in Maryland.
The Stanford court likewise expressly rejected Asterbadi’s
“ministerial act” characterization of § 1963:
We
have
concluded
that
§
1963
is
more
than
“ministerial” and is more than a mere procedural
device for the collection of the foreign judgment. We
feel that registration provides, so far as enforcement
is concerned, the equivalent of a new judgment of the
registration court.
341 F.2d at 268.

And the Stanford court gave the same reasons

that we do in reaching this conclusion:
To
restrict
registration
to
a
procedural
and
collection device for the foreign judgment itself, and
to have it expire with the foreign judgment, would
give the words of the statute a lesser status than
their plain meaning and to make registration something
far inferior to a judgment on a judgment.

16

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Id.

at

Doc: 39

270

Filed: 11/04/2016

(emphasis

added).

Pg: 17 of 19

Again,

as

all

the

courts

of

appeals have noted, the purpose of § 1963 was to give the same
effect achieved by a judgment on a judgment but without the
excessive process.
Asterbadi also argues that we should construe § 1963 in the
same manner as courts have construed the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act, which facilitates the enforcement of one
State’s judgment in the courts of another State.

See, e.g., Md.

Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 11-801 to 11-807.

He claims

that some courts have construed the Uniform Act or similar state
statutes in a manner that distinguishes between registering a
judgment and suing on a judgment, with the former subject to the
limitations

of

the

state

where

the

judgment

was

originally

entered and the latter subject to the limitations of the state
where the new judgment was obtained.

While we do not assume

that this construction is an accurate one, see, e.g., Revised
Unif. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act prefatory note (Unif.
Law Comm’n 1964), we are nonetheless not construing the Uniform
Act, but rather § 1963.

And we construe § 1963 to elevate a

registered money judgment such that it functions in every way as
a new judgment.
functioning

as

It follows that with the registered judgment
a

new

judgment,

the

limitations

enforcement runs from the date of registration.

period

for

This is the

conclusion that every court of appeals that has construed § 1963
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has reached.

Pg: 18 of 19

See, e.g., Home Port Rentals, 252 F.3d at 407

(holding that “the applicable limitation law for purposes of
enforcement

of

the

registered

judgment

in

the

registration

district is that of the registration state . . . and it starts
to run on the date of registration”); see also In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 536 F.3d at 989; Stanford, 341 F.2d
at 268.
Finally, Asterbadi proposed during oral argument numerous
horribles

that

he

envisions

creditors

will

be

able

will

result

repeatedly

to

from

restart

the

fact

that

a

statute

of

limitations through the simple act of registration, defeating
any

purpose

for

the

limitation.

The

posited

consequences,

however, are no different than have always existed under the
more

burdensome

process

of

suing

on

an

original

judgment

obtain a new judgment in the enforcement jurisdiction.

to

When the

new judgment was entered, it carried with it the limitations
period

then

applicable

to

judgments

in

the

State

of

entry.

Moreover, creditors in many States -- including in Maryland -are also able to renew existing judgments indefinitely and thus
extend

enforcement

adversarial process.

with

new

limitations

periods

without

any

See, e.g., Md. Rule 2-625 (requiring only

that the “judgment holder . . . file a notice of renewal” at any
time before expiration of the judgment or a previous renewal,

18

Appeal: 15-2182

without

Doc: 39

any

Filed: 11/04/2016

limit

on

the

Pg: 19 of 19

number

of

renewals

that

might

be

filed).
In

sum,

we

hold

that

the

registration

of

the

Virginia

district court judgment in the District of Maryland at a time
when the judgment was not time-barred by Virginia law functions
as a new judgment in the District of Maryland, and Maryland’s
12-year

limitations

period

for

enforcement

on

the

judgment

begins running from the date of registration.
Accordingly, the district court’s September 16, 2015 order
is
AFFIRMED.

19