Catawba Riverkeeper Foundation v. NC Dept of Transportation
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:15-cv-00029-D. [999985510]. [15-2285]
Appeal: 15-2285
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2285
CATAWBA RIVERKEEPER FOUNDATION; CLEAN AIR CAROLINA,
Plaintiffs − Appellees,
v.
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; NICHOLAS J.
TENNYSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of NCDOT,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION; JOHN F. SULLIVAN,
official capacity as Division Administrator of FHWA,
in
his
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:15−cv−00029−D)
Argued:
September 21, 2016
Decided:
December 13, 2016
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded with instructions by published opinion.
Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge
Keenan joined.
ARGUED: Scott Thomas Slusser, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants.
Kimberley
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Hunter, SOUTHERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Roy Cooper, Attorney
General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North
Carolina,
for
Appellants.
Ramona
H.
McGee,
SOUTHERN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
2
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DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
This
Gaston
appeal
involves
Connector, 1
East-West
Carolina
the
spanning
from
proposed
a
22-mile
southeast
construction
toll
Gaston
of
the
road
in
North
County
to
west
Mecklenburg County with new crossings over the South Fork and
Catawba Rivers.
The Catawba Riverkeeper Foundation and Clean
Air Carolina (collectively, the “Conservation Groups”) brought
suit
against
(“NCDOT”),
the
representing
analysis
the
North
Federal
those
conducted
Carolina
Highway
agencies,
for
the
Department
of
Administration,
challenging
Connector.
the
The
Transportation
and
officials
environmental
district
court
granted the Conservation Groups’ motion for summary judgment.
Before the district court ruled, the North Carolina General
Assembly stripped the Connector of its funding and repealed the
statute that expressly authorized its construction.
And after
the district court entered judgment, state and local authorities
removed the Connector from the various planning models for such
projects.
At
oral
argument,
Connector is no longer viable.
NCDOT
represented
that
the
In light of these developments,
we conclude that this appeal is moot and accordingly vacate the
district court’s judgment.
1
The Connector is known locally as the Garden Parkway.
3
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I.
A.
Local
planners
in
Gaston
County,
North
Carolina
first
considered the need to construct a bypass to improve east-west
mobility between Gaston County and Mecklenburg County in the
late 1980s.
NCDOT began studying the project in 2001, meeting
with other agencies and local authorities to assess the benefits
of the project relative to alternatives such as mass transit or
improvements to existing roadways.
In coordination with these
officials,
building
freeway”
NCDOT
more
“improv[ing]
Gastonia
determined
effectively
east-west
and
that
the
addressed
transportation
Charlotte
a
the
“new
location
goals
mobility
metropolitan
.
.
of
.
area”
(1)
between
and
(2)
“establish[ing] direct access between the rapidly growing area
of southeast Gaston County and west Mecklenburg County.”
J.A.
723.
As
(“NEPA”),
Highway
assessing
required
42
by
U.S.C.
the
§
Administration
the
National
4321,
et
Environmental
seq.,
(collectively,
environmental
impact
2
of
NCDOT
the
the
and
Policy
the
“Agencies”)
project. 2
Act
Federal
began
In
the
This assessment, which includes time for public notice and
comment, ultimately leads to the preparation of a Record of
Decision.
The Record of Decision “identifies the Selected
Alternative, presents the basis for the decision, identifies all
the alternatives considered, specifies the ‘environmentally
(Continued)
4
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meantime,
the
Connector
a
North
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North
Carolina
candidate
Carolina
General
project
Turnpike
Pg: 5 of 21
Assembly
subject
Authority.
to
the
N.C.
designated
control
Gen.
Stat.
the
of
§
the
136–
89.183(a)(2)(b) (2006) (repealed by 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws § 5.1).
The
General
Assembly
also
gave
the
Turnpike
Authority
conditional power to propose additional projects not expressly
authorized in the statute, provided they were “approved by the
General
Assembly
current
State
prior
to
Transportation
construction”
Improvement
and
“shown
Plan.”
in
Id.
the
§
136-
89.183(a)(2) (2006).
In April 2009, the Agencies published for public review and
comment
a
Connector.
draft
Environmental
Impact
Statement
for
the
The draft statement considered twelve alternative
“new location” controlled-access toll roads, ranging from 21.4
to 23.7 miles in length, assessed each alternative’s capacity to
meet the project’s needs, and compared each with a “no-build”
baseline
alternative.
The
Agencies
also
forecasted
traffic
demand and distribution in the geographic area through 2030,
creating
both
a
“build”
forecast
depicting
how
a
network
of
preferable alternative,’ and provides information on the adopted
means to avoid, minimize, and compensate for environmental
impacts.” J.A. 1480.
5
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transportation
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facilities
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would
operate
with
projected
future
traffic volumes and a “no build” baseline forecast.
To develop the traffic forecasts, the Agencies relied on
data
derived
planning
of
from
socioeconomic
study
Statement
Cumulative
that
forecasts
assumed
prepared
by
area
construction
of
the
The Agencies superimposed each alternative onto this
further
Impact
socioeconomic
organizations
Connector.
set
from
projections
on
also
Effects
this
and
basis.
contained
(“ICE”)
The
a
report,
eliminated
draft
qualitative
describing
alternatives
Environmental
Indirect
the
and
Connector’s
estimated effects on growth and land use, wildlife habitat, and
water resources in the geographic area.
In response to requests from environmental advocates and
other agencies, the Agencies also published a quantitative ICE
report that analyzed future land-use change.
a
“build”
forecast
and
then
employed
a
They first created
“gravity
model”
to
reallocate the growth effects to create the “no build” forecast
baseline. 3
The
Agencies determined that construction of the
Connector would result in 3,700 additional households and 300
3
A gravity model produces quantified results that can serve
as the basis for assessing land use change.
The model
“essentially
holds
that
all
other
factors
influencing
development held constant, growth will shift towards areas with
the greatest relative accessibility improvement as a result of
the project.” J.A. 2350.
6
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fewer jobs in the study area when compared to the “no build”
forecast.
The Agencies subsequently published a final Environmental
Impact Statement, addressing public and other agency comments on
the earlier draft statement and identifying the Connector as the
preferred alternative.
They estimated the Connector’s cost to
be about $943 million, to be paid for by toll revenue bonds, an
annual $35 million appropriation of “gap” funding from the North
Carolina
General
February
2012,
Record
of
Assembly,
the
Federal
Decision,
“environmentally
and
other
Highway
identifying
funding
sources.
Administration
issued
Connector
a
as
the
alternative . . . because
preferable
the
In
it
represents the best overall balanced minimization of all impacts
analyzed.”
J.A. 3747.
B.
The Conservation Groups participated in the NEPA process
for
the
meetings
Connector,
to
voice
submitting
their
comments
concerns
about
and
attending
the
integrity
environmental analysis conducted by the Agencies.
public
of
the
Following our
decision in North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. North Carolina
Department of Transportation, 677 F.3d 596 (4th Cir. 2012), 4 the
4
That case concerned the proposed construction of the
Monroe Connector Bypass by the Agencies. 677 F.3d at 598. We
concluded that the Agencies violated NEPA by failing to disclose
(Continued)
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Groups urged the Federal Highway Administration to rescind the
Connector’s
Record
Environmental
of
Impact
Decision
and
Statement.
prepare
The
a
supplemental
Federal
Highway
Administration declined to do so.
The
Western
Conservation
District
of
Groups
thereafter
North
filed
Carolina
suit
pursuant
in
the
to
the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (“APA”),
seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that the Agencies violated
NEPA
by
conducting
a
deficient
environmental
analysis,
(2)
vacatur of the Record of Decision, and (3) injunctive relief.
After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the
court
transferred
the
case
to
the
Eastern
District
of
North
Carolina.
While the motions were pending, the North Carolina General
Assembly
passed
legislation
requiring
a
data-driven
prioritization process to score and rank proposed transportation
projects
based
on
a
number
of
factors,
including
cost
and
to the public that the Bypass’s underlying NEPA analysis relied
on socioeconomic data that assumed construction of the Bypass
and
by
disseminating
erroneous
information
about
that
assumption.
Id. at 603.
Although we did not decide whether
NEPA
permitted
the
Agencies
to
use
data
assuming
the
construction of the Bypass when creating a “no build” baseline,
we noted that “courts not infrequently find NEPA violations when
an agency miscalculates the ‘no build’ baseline or when the
baseline assumes the existence of a proposed project.” Id.
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congestion.
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N.C.
Gen.
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Stat.
§
136-189.11.
The
Connector
received a low score under this new funding formula, ranking
below 1,200th place.
that
portion
of
the
The General Assembly subsequently repealed
statute
giving
the
Turnpike
Authority
express power to build the Connector, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws §
5.1, and rescinded the Connector’s earmarked $35 million annual
funding. 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws § 4.8 (striking funding for the
“Garden Parkway,” previously codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136176(b2)).
Given these developments, the district court directed the
parties
to
brief
whether
the
court
retained
subject
matter
jurisdiction and whether the Turnpike Authority still had the
power to build the Connector.
The parties urged the court to
resolve the pending motions for summary judgment, arguing that
the Turnpike Authority could still build the Connector as an
unspecified project because it remained on the list of approved
projects at both the state and local levels.
The
court
proceeded
to
the
merits
and
granted
the
Conservation Groups’ motion for summary judgment, holding that
the
alternatives
analysis
underlying
the
Connector
“violated
NEPA and the APA by using the same set of socioeconomic data
that
assumed
construction
of
the
[Connector]
to
assess
the
environmental impacts of the Build and No Build alternatives.”
J.A. 324.
The district court also agreed with the Conservation
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that
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the
Agencies
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failed
to
adequately
assess
and
disclose the Connector’s environmental impacts, reasoning that:
[D]efendants'
fundamental
assumption
that
the
[Connector] would have no effect on overall growth in
the Metrolina region, unsupported by any evidence
showing complete saturation of the region, and their
use of the gravity model to reallocate assumed growth
in the No Build condition constitute clear error and
violates NEPA and the APA.
J.A. 325.
The court consequently vacated the Record of Decision
for the Connector. 5
Following the district court’s ruling, the last domino fell
for
the
Connector
when
it
was
removed
from
local
and
state
transportation plans, 6 which in turn meant that it was no longer
eligible for federal funding.
In short, the Connector no longer
has the statutory authority or funding to proceed.
II.
NCDOT appeals the merits of the district court’s decision.
But preliminarily, it also contends that the case is now moot,
and
therefore
seeks
vacatur
of
the
district
court’s
granting summary judgment to the Conservation Groups.
order
Because
we agree with NCDOT that developments subsequent to the district
5
The Court declined to grant injunctive relief, finding it
unnecessary given its ruling.
6
The project remains on a 2040 horizon year plan prepared
by local authorities, but it now takes the form of a 3.4-mile
long bridge crossing facility.
10
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court’s ruling render the appeal moot, we do not address the
merits of the district court’s ruling.
Article III limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
cases and controversies.
doctrine
of
mootness
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
originates
‘controversy’ language.”
in
Article
III's
“The
‘case’
or
Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286
(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332,
352
(2006))
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
Thus,
“[t]o remain a justiciable controversy, a suit must remain alive
throughout
the
course
appellate disposition.”
of
litigation,
to
the
moment
of
final
Bahnmiller v. Derwinski, 923 F.2d 1085,
1088 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[E]ven if a plaintiff has standing when he or she files a
complaint, subsequent events can moot the claim.”
Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2013).
Pashby v.
“A case becomes moot,
and thus deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction,
when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties
lack
a
legally
cognizable
interest
(internal quotation marks omitted).
in
the
outcome.”
Id.
In other words, a case is
moot when “our resolution of an issue could not possibly have
any practical effect on the outcome of the matter.”
Norfolk S.
Ry. Co. v. City of Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150, 161 (4th Cir.
2010).
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NCDOT contends that this case became moot when local and
state
planners
respective
Connector
the
transportation
“no
construction
appeal.”
removed
longer
regardless
Connector
improvement
eligible
of
the
plans,
for
of
the
from
their
rendering
federal
merits
Appellants’ Br. at 32–33.
project
the
funding
NEPA
issue
or
on
At oral argument, counsel
for NCDOT represented that “the [Record of Decision] is really a
nullity,” and further that “[t]his Project is defunct.
longer moving forward.”
It’s no
See also Appellants’ Br. at 26 (“The
Project . . . is no longer viable”).
In turn, although the Conservation Groups concede that the
Connector
now
lacks
funding,
they
say
that
the
case
still
presents a live controversy because the Record of Decision that
approved the project has not been rescinded and could thus “be
used to allow construction of the Connector at a later date.”
Appellees’ Br. at 24.
As they see it, little more than shifting
political priorities and funding hinder NCDOT from using the
Record of Decision to build the Connector on the basis of an
allegedly flawed NEPA analysis.
We do not agree.
As things now stand, the Connector faces multiple barriers
to construction.
To be built, it must overcome the poor ranking
it received under the new funding formula enacted by the General
Assembly,
local
Connector
into
and
the
state
various
planners
local
12
must
and
reincorporate
state
the
transportation
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improvement
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plans,
and
the
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state
legislature
about $900 million to the project.
events
come
to
pass,
clearing
must
reallocate
Moreover, even if these
the
Connector’s
path
to
construction, we are not persuaded by the Groups’ assertion that
NEPA’s implementing regulations allow the Agencies to conduct
only a “superficial” and cursory reevaluation of the Connector’s
Record of Decision.
See 23 C.F.R. § 771.129(b) (requiring a
written evaluation of the final Environmental Impact Statement
if “major steps to advance the action . . . have not occurred
within
three
years
after
the
approval
of
the
final
EIS”).
Instead, the regulatory regime under which the Agencies operate
renders the likelihood that NCDOT would proceed immediately to
construct the Connector pursuant to a now four-year-old Record
of Decision exceedingly remote.
Under
these
circumstances,
we
decline
the
Conservation
Groups’ request to issue “an opinion advising what the law would
be upon a hypothetical state of facts.”
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422
U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S.
244, 246 (1971)).
the
real
world,”
Conservation
NEPA
“[W]e may only decide cases that matter in
and
Groups
analysis,
as
because
deficient
speculative harm.
such,
or
the
can
offer
Connector
not,
pose
no
and
only
relief
its
to
the
underlying
hypothetical
and
Norfolk, 608 F.3d at 161 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Preiser, 422 U.S. at 402 (a request for
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declaratory relief survives a mootness challenge where the facts
“show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties
having
adverse
reality
to
legal
warrant
(internal
interests,
the
of
of
issuance
quotation
marks
sufficient
a
immediacy
declaratory
omitted);
and
judgment”)
Connecticut
v.
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931) (An injunction “will not
be granted against something merely feared as liable to occur at
some indefinite time in the future.”).
In sum, given the remote possibility that the Connector
could
proceed
pursuant
to
the
allegedly
deficient
Record
of
Decision, and given NCDOT’s representations on appeal that the
Connector
is
no
longer
viable,
we
cannot
agree
with
the
Conservation Groups that “[r]evival of the Connector is a real
possibility.”
Appellants’ Br. at 28.
This case is moot.
III.
We
turn
now
court’s judgment.
to
whether
we
should
vacate
the
district
The Conservation Groups contend that even if
the case is moot, vacatur is improper because the circumstances
that
deprive
us
product
of
NCDOT’s
lobbying
of
subject
“happenstance,”
and
matter
but
decisions.
jurisdiction
rather
In
the
other
are
direct
words,
not
result
the
the
of
Groups
argue that NCDOT contributed to the Connector’s demise, mooting
this case.
But as we explain, we do not think it proper to
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impute the actions of state legislators and local planners to
NCDOT.
Accordingly,
we
shall
vacate
the
district
court’s
judgment.
A.
Our “customary practice when a case is rendered moot on
appeal
is
to
judgment.”
vacate
the
moot
aspects
Norfolk, 608 F.3d at 161.
of
the
lower
court's
In such circumstances,
the equitable remedy of vacatur “‘clears the path for future
relitigation of the issues between the parties.’”
Alvarez v.
Smith,
States
558
U.S.
87,
94
(2009)
(quoting
United
v.
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950)).
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized exceptions to
this general practice in instances where mootness occurs through
the voluntary action of the losing party, rather than through
happenstance.
P'ship,
See
513
settlement
U.S.
does
U.S.
18,
not
29
Bancorp
(1994)
justify
Mortg.
Co.
(“[M]ootness
vacatur
of
a
v.
by
Bonner
Mall
reason
judgment
of
under
review.”); Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82–83 (1987) (vacatur
inappropriate when losing party fails to pursue its appeal).
Consistent with that precedent, we too have said that “‘vacatur
normally
is
deliberate
not
appropriate
actions
controversy.’”
have
.
.
rendered
.
when
moot
the
an
losing
party's
otherwise
live
United States v. Springer, 715 F.3d 535, 541
(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Remus Joint Venture v. McAnally, 116
15
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Filed: 12/13/2016
F.3d 180, 185 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Pg: 16 of 21
“The rationale for this rule is
that appellants should not be allowed to escape the preclusive
effect of an adverse district court judgment simply by taking a
unilateral action during the pendency of their appeal to moot
the matter.”
Id. at 542.
However, where “appellate review of the adverse ruling was
prevented by ‘the vagaries of circumstance,’” vacatur remains
available,
“subject
.
.
.
to
considerations
of
the
public
interest.”
Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112,
117–18
Cir.
Thus,
(4th
when
appeal,
determining
our
entirely,
decision
by
interest.”
2000)
the
(quoting
the
is
twin
Bancorp,
propriety
“informed
513
of
vacatur
almost
considerations
U.S.
at
in
entirely,
of
fault
and
25)).
a
moot
if
not
public
Id. at 118.
B.
The
Conservation
inappropriate
because
Groups
NCDOT
contend
“contributed
that
to
the
vacatur
is
mootness
of
which they now complain,” by lobbying the General Assembly for
the
enactment
formally
of
approving
the
the
new
transportation
Connector’s
transportation improvement program.
funding
removal
from
statute
the
and
state’s
Appellees’ Br. at 30.
We
do not agree.
We dispel first the Groups’ assertion that NCDOT’s support
of transportation funding reform—characterized by the Groups as
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an
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“intentional
sufficient
NCDOT.
to
Id.
intercession
impute
the
Pg: 17 of 21
in
the
actions
of
legislative
the
General
process”—is
Assembly
to
To the contrary, our precedent counsels against
conflating the actions of a state executive entity with those of
a state legislature.
Valero, 211 F.3d at 115.
In Valero, the appellant corporation brought suit against
various
West
Virginia
constitutionality
of
certain
provisions
West
enforcement.
Virginia
Id.
permanent
management
Virginia
The district court declared the provisions constitutionally
a
and
the
the
Id.
issued
disposal
of
challenging
pertaining
and
waste
agencies,
Code
invalid
to
executive
injunction
regulation.
prohibiting
their
Shortly after judgment was entered, the West
Legislature
revised
the
enjoined
provisions,
mooting
the case and prompting the executive agencies to seek vacatur of
the adverse decision.
Id.
On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s vacatur of its
decision, distinguishing explicitly between the actions of the
state legislature in amending the statutory provisions at issue,
thereby
state
mooting
executive
the
case,
from
officials,
the
holding
actions
that
of
the
defendant
“defendant
state
executive officials are in a position akin to a party who finds
its case mooted by ‘happenstance,’ rather than events within its
control.”
Id. at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17
As a
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result, we concluded that the principal consideration of “fault”
Id. 7
counseled in favor of vacatur.
Similarly,
here,
NCDOT,
a
state
executive
agency,
separate entity from the North Carolina General Assembly.
NCDOT
lobbied
transportation
distinction,
“caused”
the
funding
nor
the
General
does
Assembly
reform
does
it
warrant
Connector’s
demise.
in
not
the
support
alter
See
Chem.
a
That
of
this
conclusion
is
the
central
that
NCDOT
Producers
&
Distribs. Ass'n v. Helliker, 463 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“Lobbying Congress or a state legislature cannot be viewed as
‘causing’
subsequent
inquiry.
Attributing
parties
rather
than
legislation
the
to
actions
the
for
of
purposes
a
legislature
of
the
legislature
itself
is
vacatur
to
of
third
dubious
legitimacy . . . .”).
In sum, to the extent that the enactment of transportation
funding reform helped to render this case moot, we view it as
7
Our sister circuits have also distinguished the actions of
an executive entity from those of the legislature for purposes
of the “voluntary action” presumption against vacatur.
See,
e.g., Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 195 (3d
Cir. 2001) (vacating a lower court’s judgment as mooted by
legislative amendment and rejecting the appellee’s assertion
that the appellant Federal Aviation Association “misuse[d] . . .
the legislative process” to encourage Congress to amend the
challenged statute “to frustrate an unfavorable judgment”);
Nat'l Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346,
353 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (presumption against vacatur “is usually
inapplicable when legislative action moots a case and the
government seeks vacatur”).
18
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the
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consequence
of
actions
Assembly, not NCDOT.
Pg: 19 of 21
of
the
North
Carolina
General
See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of
Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1131 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he acts
of
the
legislature
are
not
the
acts
of
executive
branch
agencies, states, or private parties.”).
We
turn
next
to
the
Groups’
assertion
that
vacatur
is
inappropriate because NCDOT intentionally mooted the case when
it
approved
the
removal
of
the
Connector
transportation improvement program.
with
this
argument:
discretion
over
(1)
planners
which
projects
from
the
state’s
Two points readily dispense
at
the
to
local
level
retain
in
their
include
transportation improvement plans, 23 C.F.R. § 450.326(a), and
(2)
federal
regulations
require
that
an
approved
local
transportation plan be included in the state’s transportation
improvement program without change.
See 23 C.F.R. § 450.218(b).
As such, although NCDOT approved the Connector’s removal from
its statewide plan, that result was a fait accompli following
the local planning agency’s decision to remove the Connector
from its transportation plan.
Put simply, NCDOT did not act
voluntarily to moot this case.
C.
Finally,
recognized
we
that
consider
“there
judicial judgments.”
is
the
a
public
interest.
substantial
public
Valero, 211 F.3d at 118.
19
We
have
interest
in
This is because
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“[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to
the legal community as a whole.”
U.S. at 26).
public
Id.
(quoting Bancorp, 513
In Bancorp, the Supreme Court’s concern for the
interest
led
the
Court
to
withhold
the
remedy
of
appellate vacatur from the losing party who had mooted the case
through settlement, thereby “voluntarily forfeit[ing] his legal
remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari.”
U.S. at 25.
vacatur
in
The Court reasoned that employing the remedy of
that
collateral
513
attack
instance
on
the
constituted
judgment”
“a
that
refined
would
form
“disturb
of
the
orderly operation of the federal judicial system,” and therefore
did not serve the public interest.
Id. at 27.
This concern, however, did not prevent the Court in Bancorp
from
“stand[ing]
by”
the
proposition
that
“mootness
by
happenstance provides sufficient reason to vacate.”
Id. at 23,
25 n.3 (citing Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40–41).
We see no
reason
to
events
beyond
leaving
depart
the
the
from
that
general
principle
parties’
control
have
district
court’s
decision
here.
mooted
Because
this
undisturbed
appeal,
would
not
serve the public interest.
IV.
For
the
reasons
given,
we
vacate
the
district
court’s
judgment and remand the case with instructions that the district
20
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court dismiss the action.
Pg: 21 of 21
See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355,
364 (4th Cir. 2003) (“If a claim becomes moot after the entry of
a district court's final judgment and prior to the completion of
appellate review, we generally vacate the judgment and remand
for dismissal.”).
VACATED AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS
21
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