Keith Ashe v. PNC Financial Services Group

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:15-cv-00144-PWG Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999850924]. Mailed to: Keith Alexander Ashe. [15-2566]

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ON REHEARING
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2566

KEITH ALEXANDER ASHE,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Paul W. Grimm, District Judge.
(8:15-cv-00144-PWG)

Submitted:

April 21, 2016

Decided:

June 13, 2016

Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Keith Alexander Ashe, Appellant Pro Se. Naresh Kilaru, Mark S.
Sommers, FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Keith

Alexander

Ashe

appeals

the

district

court’s

order

dismissing his civil complaint against PNC Financial Services
Group,

Inc.

collateral

(“PNC”)

for

estoppel.

trademark

In

our

infringement

initial

that

he

district

court,

filed

but

that

a

timely
notice

include the required filing fees.

notice
was

barred

consideration

matter, we dismissed the appeal as untimely.
evidence

as

of

by

this

Ashe has submitted
of

appeal

rejected

for

with

failure

the
to

We agree that, under these

circumstances, Ashe filed a timely notice of appeal.

See Fed.

R. App. P. 3(a)(2) (“An appellant's failure to take any step
other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not
affect the validity of the appeal”); Han Tak Lee v. Houtzdale
SCI, 798 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2015) (“a clerk's office cannot
reject a notice of appeal simply because the filing fee has not
been

paid”).

Accordingly,

we

grant

Ashe’s

petition

for

rehearing.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court did not
err in dismissing Ashe’s case as barred by collateral estoppel.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint on
such grounds.

Tuttle v. Arlington Cty. Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698,

703 (4th Cir. 1999).
Ashe

argues

on

appeal

that

the

district

court

erred

in

dismissing his complaint rather than converting PNC’s motion to
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a motion for summary judgment.

Although a motion to dismiss

generally cannot reach the merits of an affirmative defense,
“where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are
alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion
to

dismiss

filed

under

Rule

12(b)(6).”

Goodman

Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

v.

Praxair,

Moreover, a

district court may properly “take judicial notice of facts from
a

prior

judicial

proceeding

when

the

[collateral

defense raises no disputed issue of fact.”

estoppel]

Andrews v. Daw, 201

F.3d 521, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000).

Because Ashe “does not

dispute

record

the

factual

accuracy

of

the

of

his

previous

suit,” the district court did not err in taking judicial notice
of a prior Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) decision.
Id.
Ashe

next

argues

that

the

district

court

incorrectly

determined that the issue of priority in the TTAB decision was
identical to the issue of priority presented in the trademark
infringement case.

The district court concluded, and PNC argues

on appeal, that the issue of priority in a trademark opposition
case

before

the

TTAB

is

always

identical

to

priority in a federal trademark infringement case.

the

issue

of

In contrast,

Ashe argues that the Supreme Court in B & B Hardware, Inc. v.
Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015), held that the
issue of priority will, at least sometimes, be different.
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Even

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assuming

that

B

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&

B

Hardware

stands

for

the

proposition that, when considering the issue of priority, courts
must determine whether the actual use of a mark is the same as
the use stated in a trademark application, Ashe has alleged no
actual use of the mark other than those uses described in his
trademark application.
priority

decided

by

Consequently, in this case, the issue of

the

TTAB

was

identical

to

the

issue

of

priority presented to the district court.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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