Adams Housing, LLC v. City of Salisbury, Maryland

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:15-cv-01011-JFM Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999976685].. [15-2589]

Appeal: 15-2589

Doc: 42

Filed: 11/29/2016

Pg: 1 of 8

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2589

ADAMS HOUSING, LLC,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
THE CITY OF SALISBURY, MARYLAND,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:15-cv-01011-JFM)

Argued:

October 26, 2016

Decided:

November 29, 2016

Before THACKER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Gerald Bruce LEE,
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Victoria
M.
Shearer,
KARPINSKI,
COLARESI
&
KARP,
P.A.,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Luke Americus Rommel,
ROMMEL & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Salisbury, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 15-2589

Doc: 42

Filed: 11/29/2016

Pg: 2 of 8

PER CURIAM:
Adams Housing, LLC (“Adams Housing”) filed this action
against the City of Salisbury, Maryland, (“Salisbury”) pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201(a), alleging a variety of state and federal violations.
Salisbury responded and moved to dismiss all claims.
unusual

posture,

the

district

court

apparently

In an

converted

the

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and granted
judgment to Adams Housing, the nonmovant.
not

receive

notice

and

an

adequate

Because Salisbury did

opportunity

to

argue

its

case, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
I.
In 1997, Salisbury enacted its Occupancy Ordinance “to
establish and maintain basic minimum standards and conditions
essential
welfare

for

of

the

the

protection

public.”

of

health,

Salisbury,

§ 15.24.030(A) (“the Ordinance”). 1

safety

Md.,

Code

and
of

general

Ordinances

The Ordinance limits housing

in certain areas to “one of the following groups”: (1) families
related by blood, marriage, or a “custodial relationship”; (2)
“[u]p

to

a

maximum

of

two

persons

1

who

are

not

so

related,

The Ordinance has been amended on multiple occasions since
1997, and we refer to the version in effect in 2014.

2

Appeal: 15-2589

Doc: 42

hereinafter
group

of

Filed: 11/29/2016

referred
four

to

as

persons

Pg: 3 of 8

‘unrelated

approved

as

persons’”;
a

or

“functional

(3)

any

family.”

§ 15.24.490.
In July 2014, two brothers and their friend -- all
college students -- rented a house at 418 West College Avenue,
Salisbury, Maryland, from Adams Housing.

Shortly thereafter, on

September 26, 2014, Adams Housing received an order to reduce
the

number

of

occupants

from

See J.A. 135-37. 2

(“Order”).

the

Code

Enforcement

Officer

Adams Housing challenged the Order

in a hearing before the Salisbury Housing Board of Adjustments
and Appeals (“HBAA”).

The HBAA found Adams Housing to be in

violation of the Ordinance because the Ordinance “was written
with the idea that two unrelated people would [not] share a
house

unless

functional

they

family

were

a

family

clause.”

Id.

or

they

at

went

214.

through
Adams

[the]

Housing

challenged the HBBA decision in the Circuit Court for Wicomico
County, Maryland.
On

April

The action was stayed on May 26, 2015.
8,

2015,

Adams

Housing

filed

a

complaint

against Salisbury in the Federal District Court for the District
of Maryland alleging: the Ordinance, on its face, violated the
Equal

Protection

and

Due

Process

2

Clauses

of

the

Fourteenth

Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix
filed by the parties in this appeal.

3

Appeal: 15-2589

Doc: 42

Filed: 11/29/2016

Pg: 4 of 8

Amendment; the Ordinance as applied to Adams Housing violated
its equal protection and due process rights pursuant to both the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration of Rights; the
Ordinance was void for vagueness on its face and as applied to
Adams Housing; and Salisbury tortiously interfered with Adams
Housing’s

contracts.

The

complaint

requested

declaratory

relief, costs, and attorney’s fees.
On

June

18,

2015,

Salisbury

moved

to

dismiss

the

action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Adams Housing responded to the motion to dismiss and reiterated
its litany of constitutional challenges.

On September 24, 2015,

the district court conducted a status conference call with all
the parties.

No transcript was kept of the phone call.

According to the district court, on the call, “both
parties
discovery

agreed
was

the

facts

unnecessary.”

of

the
Adams

case

were

Hous.,

undisputed
LLC

v.

and

City

of

Salisbury, Md., 147 F. Supp. 3d 390, 391 n.1 (D. Md. 2015).

At

oral argument before this court, however, Salisbury explained
that, during the call, it had accepted the allegations in the
complaint as true for the purposes of arguing the motion to
dismiss but neither admitted their actual veracity, nor waived
any discovery rights.

See Oral Argument at 12:34, Adams Hous.,

LLC v. City of Salisbury, Md., No. 15-2589 (4th Cir. Oct. 26,

4

Appeal: 15-2589

2016),

Doc: 42

Filed: 11/29/2016

Pg: 5 of 8

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-

arguments.
Indeed, after the phone call, Salisbury sent a letter
to the district court requesting “the Court permit the case to
move forward to discovery” if the court denied the motion to
dismiss.

J.A. 240.

The district court acknowledged receiving

the letter but otherwise ignored its content.

See Adams Hous.,

LLC, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 391 n.1 (“I conducted a call with Adams
Housing and Salisbury’s counsel on September 24, 2015, where
both parties agreed the facts of the case were undisputed and
discovery was unnecessary.

On the call, both parties consented

to the issuance of a final opinion; however, on October 8, 2015,
defendant’s counsel wrote a letter requesting the court move
forward with discovery if I denied defendant’s motion for [sic]
dismiss.”).
On November 30, 2015, the district court entered its
Memorandum

Opinion

dismissed

Adams

Protection

and

and

Housing’s
Due

Final

Order.

facial

Process

The

challenges

Clauses,

the

district
under
facial

the

court
Equal

vagueness

challenge, and the tortious interference with contract claim. 3
However, instead of simply denying the motion to dismiss as it
3

The court did not reach the as-applied due process and
equal protection challenges. See Adams Hous., LLC, 147 F. Supp.
3d at 399.

5

Appeal: 15-2589

Doc: 42

related
court

to

Filed: 11/29/2016

the

as-applied

vagueness

judgment

awarded

Salisbury’s

Pg: 6 of 8

to

Adams

and

enforcement

interpretation

challenge,

the

Housing,
of

district

“declar[ing]
the

Occupancy

Ordinance unconstitutionally vague as-applied to Adams Housing.”
Adams Hous., LLC, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 399.
The district court was cryptic.

Its opinion never

uses the words “summary judgment” nor does it cite any rule of
procedure or precedent to support this unusual disposition.

As

best we can decipher, the district court sua sponte converted
the motion to dismiss into cross-motions for summary judgment
and granted summary judgment to Adams Housing.
LLC, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 391.
the

action

was

“ripe

for

See Adams Hous.,

The district court simply stated

declaratory

judgment”

Salisbury’s occupancy ordinance vague as-applied.
399.

During

interpreted
judgment.

argument
district

the

before
court’s

this

court,

opinion

as

and

declared

Id. at 391,
both

granting

parties
summary

See Oral Argument, Adams Hous., LLC, No. 15-2589, at

12:34, 33:44.

We too classify the declaration as a grant of

summary judgment.
Salisbury
conclude

the

timely

district

filed

court

this

failed

appeal.
to

follow

Because
the

we

proper

procedure for granting summary judgment, we vacate its judgment.

6

Appeal: 15-2589

Doc: 42

Filed: 11/29/2016

Pg: 7 of 8

II.
District courts have inherent power to grant summary
judgment.

See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fritz, 452 F.3d 316, 323

(4th Cir. 2006).

However, before granting summary judgment, a

court must afford the losing party notice and an opportunity to
be heard.

See id.

The court must give notice to ensure that

the party is aware that it must “come forward with all of [its]
evidence.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986).

Once such party has sufficient notice, the party also needs an
“adequate opportunity” to present its case and “demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact.”

U.S. Dev. Corp. v. Peoples

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 873 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1989).
These requirements serve to provide the party with a “full and
fair

opportunity

to

present

its

case.”

aaiPharma

Inc.

v.

Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 235 (4th Cir. 2002).
Here, the district court failed to provide notice and
an opportunity to respond.
was

during

the

status

The only possible attempt to do so

conference

call,

but

that

call

was

inadequate for both tasks.
At that juncture, when the only pending matter was a
motion to dismiss, Salisbury could not have known it needed to
come forward with all of its evidence.

See U.S. Dev. Corp., 873

F.2d at 735 (explaining that the notice must be viewed in the
context of “the procedural, legal, and factual complexities of
7

Appeal: 15-2589

Doc: 42

the case”).

Filed: 11/29/2016

Pg: 8 of 8

Similarly, the call did not provide an adequate

opportunity for Salisbury to present its case.
call,

it

would

have

been

impossible

See id.

for

On the

Salisbury

to

spontaneously marshal all of its evidence and demonstrate its
relevance to the legal allegations.
In

sum,

no

opportunity

hearing

was

conducted,

summary

judgment.

pending,

when

This

no
for
the
was

motion

for

discovery
district
not

a

summary
was

court

fair

judgment

provided,
could

chance

to

and

not

was
no

grant

litigate.

Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was
improper.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate and remand for
further

proceedings

to

allow

an

adequate

opportunity

for

discovery and for each side to argue its case.

VACATED AND REMANDED

8