US v. Robert McDonnell

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:14-cr-00012-JRS-1. [999618374]. [15-4019]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4019

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ROBERT F. MCDONNELL,
Defendant – Appellant.
-----------------------------------FORMER VIRGINIA ATTORNEYS GENERAL; ANDREW P. MILLER; ANTHONY
FRANCIS TROY; J. MARSHALL COLEMAN; MARY SUE TERRY; STEPHEN
DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL; MARK L. EARLEY; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS; NANCY GERTNER, Law Professor;
CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., Law Professor; JOHN C. JEFFRIES,
JR., Law Professor; BENJAMIN TODD JEALOUS; REPUBLICAN
GOVERNORS PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE; FORMER STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL (NON-VIRGINIA); BUSINESS LEADERS AND PUBLIC POLICY
ADVOCATES;
VIRGINIA
LAW
PROFESSORS;
FORMER
FEDERAL
OFFICIALS; MEMBERS AND FORMER MEMBERS OF THE VIRGINIA
GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
Amici Supporting Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
James R. Spencer, Senior
District Judge. (3:14-cr-00012-JRS-1)

Argued:

May 12, 2015

Decided:

Before MOTZ, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

July 10, 2015

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Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Motz and Judge King joined.

ARGUED: Noel J. Francisco, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant.
Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: John L.
Brownlee, Daniel I. Small, Christopher M. Iaquinto, Elizabeth N.
Jochum, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, Washington, D.C.; Henry W. Asbill,
Charlotte H. Taylor, James M. Burnham, Ian Samuel, JONES DAY,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, Ryan S. Faulconer, Assistant United States Attorney,
Raymond
Hulser,
Acting
Chief,
Public
Integrity
Section,
Alexandria, Virginia, Michael S. Dry, Assistant United States
Attorney, Jessica D. Aber, Assistant United States Attorney,
David V. Harbach, II, Criminal Division, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
William H.
Hurd, Stephen C. Piepgrass, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Richmond,
Virginia, for Amici Former Virginia Attorneys General Andrew P.
Miller, Anthony Francis Troy, J. Marshall Coleman, Mary Sue
Terry, Stephen Douglas Rosenthal, and Mark L. Earley. David B.
Smith, SMITH & ZIMMERMAN, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia; John D.
Cline, LAW OFFICE OF JOHN D. CLINE, San Francisco, California,
for Amicus National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
William W. Taylor, III, ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP, Washington, D.C.,
for Amici Nancy Gertner, Law Professor, Charles J. Ogletree,
Jr., Law Professor, and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Law Professor.
Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr., Barrett E. Pope, Robert Rae Gordon,
DURRETTECRUMP PLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Amicus Benjamin Todd
Jealous.
Charles J. Cooper, David H. Thompson, Peter A.
Patterson, John D. Ohlendorf, COOPER & KIRK, PLLC, Washington,
D.C., for Amicus Republican Governors Public Policy Committee,
a/k/a RGPPC. Brian D. Boone, Emily C. McGowan, Charlotte, North
Carolina, Edward T. Kang, ALSTON & BIRD LLP, Washington, D.C.,
for
Amici
Former
State
Attorneys
General
(Non-Virginia).
Gregory N. Stillman, Norfolk, Virginia, Edward J. Fuhr,
Johnathan E. Schronce, Richmond, Virginia, William J. Haun,
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Business
Leaders and Public Policy Advocates.
Timothy M. Richardson,
POOLE MAHONEY PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Amici Virginia
Law Professors. William J. Kilberg, Thomas G. Hungar, Helgi C.
Walker, David Debold, Katherine C. Yarger, Jacob T. Spencer,
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Former
Federal Officials.
John S. Davis, Joseph R. Pope, Jonathan T.
Lucier, WILLIAMS MULLEN, Richmond, Virginia, for Amici Members
and Former Members of the Virginia General Assembly.

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THACKER, Circuit Judge:
Over

the

course

of

five

weeks

of

trial,

federal

prosecutors sought to prove that former Governor of Virginia
Robert

F.

McDonnell,
efforts

McDonnell
accepted

to

university
developed.

money

assist
testing

(“Appellant”)

a
of

and

lavish

Virginia
a

and

gifts

company

dietary

his

wife,
in

in

supplement

Maureen

exchange

securing
the

for

state

company

had

The jury found Appellant guilty of eleven counts of

corruption

and

not

guilty

of

two

counts

of

making

a

false

statement. 1
Appellant
multitude of errors.

appeals

his

convictions,

alleging

a

Chiefly, Appellant challenges the jury

instructions -- claiming the district court misstated the law -and the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him.

He

also argues that his trial should have been severed from his
wife’s trial; that the district court’s voir dire questioning
violated his Sixth Amendment rights; and that the district court
made several erroneous evidentiary rulings.

Upon consideration

of each of Appellant’s contentions, we conclude that the jury’s

1

The jury also found Mrs. McDonnell guilty of eight counts
of corruption and one count of obstruction of an official
proceeding.
The jury found her not guilty of three counts of
corruption and one count of making a false statement.
Her
appeal is not at issue here, as it is pursued separately.

3

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verdict must stand and that the district court’s judgment should
be affirmed.
I.
A.
On

November

3,

2009,

Appellant

seventy-first Governor of Virginia.

was

elected

the

From the outset, he made

economic development and the promotion of Virginia businesses
priorities of his administration.
The economic downturn preceding the election had taken
a personal toll on Appellant.

Mobo Real Estate Partners LLC

(“Mobo”), a business operated by Appellant and his sister, was
losing

money

Virginia

on

Beach.

a

pair

When

of

beachfront

Appellant

became

rental

properties

Governor,

sister were losing more than $40,000 each year.

he

loan

balance

increased,

and

by

2012,

his

By 2011, they

owed more than $11,000 per month in loan payments.
their

and

in

the

Each year
outstanding

balance was nearing $2.5 million.
Appellant was also piling up credit card debt.

In

January 2010, the month of his inauguration, Appellant and his
wife
Eight

had

a

months

combined
later,

credit
in

card

September

exceeded $90,000.

4

balance
2010,

exceeding

the

combined

$74,000.
balance

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B.
While

Appellant

was

campaigning

on

promises

of

economic development in Virginia, Virginia-based Star Scientific
Inc. (“Star”) and its founder and chief executive officer Jonnie
Williams were close to launching a new product: Anatabloc.
years,

Star

had

been

evaluating

the

curative

potential

For
of

anatabine, an alkaloid found in the tobacco plant, focusing on
whether

it

Anatabloc

could

was

one

be
of

used
the

to

treat

chronic

anatabine-based

inflammation.

dietary

supplements

Star developed as a result of these years of evaluation.
Star

wanted

the

Food

and

Drug

classify Anatabloc as a pharmaceutical.

Administration

to

Otherwise, it would

have to market Anatabloc as a nutraceutical, which generally has
less profit potential than a pharmaceutical.
a

pharmaceutical

trials,

and

wherewithal

would

studies.
to

conduct

studies on its own.

require
But

Star

the

Classification as

expensive
did

not

necessary

testing,
have

testing,

the

clinical
financial

trials,

and

It needed outside research and funding.
C.

Appellant and Williams first met in December 2009 -shortly

after

Appellant’s

before his inauguration.

election

to

the

governorship

but

Appellant had used Williams’s plane

during his campaign, and he wanted to thank Williams over dinner

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in New York. 2

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During dinner, Williams ordered a $5,000 bottle of

cognac and the conversation turned to the gown Appellant’s wife
would wear to Appellant’s inauguration.

Williams mentioned that

he knew Oscar de la Renta and offered to purchase Mrs. McDonnell
an expensive custom dress. 3
In October 2010, Appellant and Williams crossed paths
again.

This time, the two were on the same plane -- Williams’s

plane -- making their way from California to Virginia.

During

the six-hour flight, Williams extolled the virtues of Anatabloc
and explained that he needed Appellant’s help to move forward
with the product:
[W]hat I did was I explained to him how I
discovered it. I gave him a basic education
on the -- on smoking, the diseases that
don’t happen with smokers and just tried to
make sure he understood, you know, what I
had discovered in this tobacco plant and
that I was going to -- what I needed from

2

Williams was one of several individuals who offered the
use of a private plane to Appellant during his campaign on an
as-needed basis.
Although Appellant had used Williams’s plane
during his campaign, the two men did not meet until December
2009.
3

In the end, Williams did not purchase an inauguration
dress for Mrs. McDonnell.
According to Williams, Appellant’s
chief counsel, Jacob Jasen Eige, called Williams, saying, “I
understand that you’re getting ready to purchase [Mrs.]
McDonnell a dress for the inauguration. I’m calling to let you
know that you can’t do that.”
J.A. 2208 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint
Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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him was that I needed testing and I wanted
to have this done in Virginia.
J.A. 2211.
By

the

end

of

the

flight,

the

two

agreed

“independent testing in Virginia was a good idea.”

that

J.A. 2211.

Appellant agreed to introduce Williams to Dr. William A. Hazel
Jr., the Commonwealth’s secretary of health and human resources.
In April 2011, Mrs. McDonnell invited Williams to join
the first couple at a political rally in New York.

“I’ll have

you seated with the Governor and we can go shopping now,” Mrs.
McDonnell

said,

according

quotation marks omitted).

to

Williams.

J.A.

2222

(internal

So Williams took Mrs. McDonnell on a

shopping spree; they lunched and shopped at Bergdorf Goodman and
visited Oscar de la Renta and Louis Vuitton stores on Fifth
Avenue.

Williams

bought

Mrs.

McDonnell

dresses

and

a

white

leather coat from Oscar de la Renta; shoes, a purse, and a
raincoat from Louis Vuitton; and a dress from Bergdorf Goodman.
Williams spent approximately $20,000 on Mrs. McDonnell during
this shopping spree.

That evening, Williams sat with Appellant

and Mrs. McDonnell during a political rally.
A
Appellant
Governor’s
Anatabloc

few
and

weeks
Mrs.

Mansion.
and

the

later,

McDonnell
The
need

for

on
for

April
a

discussion

private
at

independent

7

29,

Williams
dinner

dinner
testing

joined
at

centered
and

the
on

studies.

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Appellant, who had campaigned on promoting business in Virginia,
was “intrigued that [Star] was a Virginia company with an idea,”
and he wanted to have Anatabloc studies conducted within the
Commonwealth’s borders.

J.A. 6561.

Two

this

days

after

private

dinner

--

on

May

2011 -- Mrs. McDonnell received an email via Williams. 4

1,
The

email included a link to an article entitled “Star Scientific
Has Home Run Potential,” which discussed Star’s research and
stock.
12:17

Mrs.
p.m.

McDonnell
Less

than

forwarded
an

hour

this

email

later,

to

Appellant

Appellant

texted

at
his

sister, asking for information about loans and bank options for
their Mobo properties.

Later that evening, Appellant emailed

his daughter Cailin, asking her to send him information about
the payments he still owed for her wedding.
The next day, May 2, Mrs. McDonnell and Williams met
at the Governor’s Mansion to discuss Anatabloc.
McDonnell

began

explaining

her

family’s

However, Mrs.

financial

woes

--

thoughts about filing for bankruptcy, high-interest loans, the
decline in the real estate market, and credit card debt.

Then,

according to Williams, Mrs. McDonnell said, “I have a background
4

Williams did not send the email to Mrs. McDonnell.
However, the sender wrote, “Please give to the governor and his
wife as per Jonnie Williams.”
G.S.A. 3.
Citations to the
“G.S.A.” refer to the Supplemental Appendix filed by the
Government.

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in nutritional supplements and I can be helpful to you with this
project, with your company.

The Governor says it’s okay for me

to help you and -- but I need you to help me.
help me with this financial situation.”
marks

$50,000.

Williams agreed to loan the money to the McDonnells.

McDonnell

also

Mrs.

J.A. 2231 (internal

quotation

Mrs.

omitted).

I need you to

mentioned

McDonnell

that

she

and

$15,000 for their daughter’s wedding reception.
agreed

to

provide

the

money.

Before

asked

her

to

borrow

husband

owed

Again, Williams

cutting

the

checks,

Williams called Appellant to “make sure [he] knew about it.”
J.A. 2233.
Maureen.
help.

“I called him and said that, you know, ‘I met with

I understand the financial problems and I’m willing to

I just wanted to make sure that you knew about this,’”

Williams

recounted

“Thank you.”

at

trial.

Id.

Appellant’s

response

was

Id.

Three days later, on May 5 at 11 a.m., Appellant met
with Secretary Hazel and Chief of Staff Martin Kent to discuss
the strategic plan for the state’s health and human resources
office.

Shortly

after

the

meeting,

Appellant

directed

his

assistant to forward to Hazel the article about Star that Mrs.
McDonnell had earlier brought to Appellant’s attention.
Williams returned to the Governor’s Mansion on May 23,
2011, to deliver two checks for the amounts discussed on May 2:
a $50,000 check made out to Mrs. McDonnell and a $15,000 check
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that was not made out to anyone but was going to the wedding
caterers.

After

Williams

delivered

these

checks

to

Mrs.

McDonnell, Appellant expressed his gratitude in a May 28 email
to Williams:
Johnnie.
Thanks so much for alll your help
with my family.
Your very generous gift to
Cailin was most appreciated as well as the
golf round tomorrow for the boys.
Maureen
is excited about the trip to fla to learn
more about the products . . . .
Have a
restful weekend with your family. Thanks. 5
G.S.A. 20.

The next day, as mentioned in the email, Appellant,

his two sons, and his soon-to-be son-in-law spent the day at
Kinloch

Golf

Club

in

Manakin-Sabot,

Virginia.

During

this

outing, they spent more than seven hours playing golf, eating,
and

shopping.

Williams,

who

was

not

present,

covered

the

$2,380.24 bill.
Also

as

mentioned

in

the

email,

Mrs.

McDonnell

traveled to Florida at the start of June to attend a Starsponsored event at the Roskamp Institute. 6

While there, she

addressed the audience, expressing her support for Star and its
research.

She

also

invited

the

audience

to

the

launch

Anatabloc, which would be held at the Governor’s Mansion.

for
The

5

Text messages and emails are quoted verbatim without
identifying any mistakes in the original. Alterations have been
made only when necessary for clarification.
6

The Roskamp Institute is a private research institute that
studies Alzheimer’s disease.
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same day -- June 1, 2011 -- she purchased 6,000 shares of Star
stock at $5.1799 per share, for a total of $31,079.40.
Weeks later, Williams sent Appellant a letter about
conducting Anatabloc studies in Virginia.

Williams wrote, “I am

suggesting that you use the attached protocol to initiate the
‘Virginia study’ of Anatabloc at the Medical College of Virginia
and

the

University

emphasis

on

of

Virginia

endocrinology,

gastroenterology.”

School

of

cardiology,

G.S.A. 29.

Medicine,

with

osteoarthritis

an
and

Appellant forwarded the letter

and its attachments to Secretary Hazel for review.
Appellant’s political action committee -- Opportunity
Virginia (the “PAC”) -- hosted and funded a retreat at the Omni
Homestead Resort in Hot Springs, Virginia.

The retreat began on

June 23, 2011, and was attended by the top donors to Opportunity
Virginia.
campaign

Williams,
and

the

“a

PAC,”

$100,000
was

in-kind

invited,

and

children to the resort for the retreat.

contributor
he

flew

to

the

Appellant’s

J.A. 6117.

Appellant

and Williams played golf together during the retreat.

A few

days later, Williams sent golf bags with brand new clubs and
golf shoes to Appellant and one of his sons.
From
vacationed

at

July

28

to

Williams’s

July

there

free

of

Appellant

multi-million-dollar

Mountain Lake in Virginia.
stay

31,

charge.

and

his

home

at

family
Smith

Williams allowed the McDonnells to
He
11

also

paid

$2,268

for

the

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McDonnells to rent a boat.

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And Williams provided transportation

for the family: Appellant’s children used Williams’s Range Rover
for the trip to the home, and he paid more than $600 to have his
Ferrari delivered to the home for Appellant to use.
Appellant drove the Ferrari back to Richmond at the
end of the vacation on July 31.
Mrs.

McDonnell

snapped

several

with the Ferrari’s top down.
photographs
returning

to
from

Williams
the

at

Smith

During the three-hour drive,
pictures

of

Appellant

driving

Mrs. McDonnell emailed one of the
7:47

p.m.

Mountain

At

Lake

11:29

p.m.,

vacation,

after

Appellant

directed Secretary Hazel to have his deputy attend a meeting
about Anatabloc

with Mrs. McDonnell at the Governor’s Mansion

the next day.
Hazel sent a staffer, Molly Huffstetler, to the August
1 meeting, which Williams also attended.

During the meeting,

Williams discussed clinical trials at the University of Virginia
(“UVA”) and Virginia Commonwealth University (“VCU”), home of
the Medical College of Virginia (“MCV”).

Then Williams and Mrs.

McDonnell met with Dr. John Clore from VCU, who Williams said
was “important, and he could cause studies to happen at VCU’s
medical school.”

J.A. 2273.

Williams -- with Mrs. McDonnell at

his side -- told Dr. Clore that clinical testing of Anatabloc in
Virginia was important to Appellant.
Mrs.

McDonnell

noticed

the

Rolex
12

After the meeting ended,
watch

adorning

Williams’s

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wrist.

She

Appellant.

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mentioned

that

Pg: 13 of 89

she

wanted

to

get

a

Rolex

for

When Williams asked if she wanted him to purchase

one for Appellant, she responded affirmatively.
The

next

day

--

August

2,

2011

--

Mrs.

McDonnell

purchased another 522 shares of Star stock at $3.82 per share,
for a total of $1,994.04.
Appellant and one of his sons returned to Kinloch Golf
Club on August 13, 2011.

The bill for this golf outing, which

Williams again

$1,309.17.

paid,

was

The

next

day,

Williams

purchased a Rolex from Malibu Jewelers in Malibu, California.
The Rolex cost between $6,000 and $7,000 and featured a custom
engraving:

“Robert

F.

McDonnell,

71st

Governor

J.A. 2275 (internal quotation marks omitted).

of

Virginia.”

Mrs. McDonnell

later took several pictures of Appellant showing off his new
Rolex -- pictures that were later sent to Williams via text
message.
Over

the

next

few

weeks,

Governor’s

Mansion

staff

planned and coordinated a luncheon to launch Anatabloc -- an
event

paid

for

by

Appellant’s

PAC.

Invitations

bore

the

Governor’s seal and read, “Governor and Mrs. Robert F. McDonnell
Request the Pleasure of your Company at a Luncheon.”
104.

G.S.A.

Invitees included Dr. Clore and Dr. John Lazo from UVA.

At the August 30 luncheon, each place setting featured samples
of

Anatabloc,

and

Williams

handed
13

out

checks

for

grant

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applications

Filed: 07/10/2015

--

each

for

Pg: 14 of 89

$25,000

--

to

doctors

from

various

medical institutions. 7
Appellant also attended the luncheon.

According to

Lazo, Appellant asked attendees various questions about their
thoughts about Anatabloc:
So I think one question he asked us was, did
we think that there was some scientific
validity to the conversation and some of the
pre-clinical studies that were discussed, or
at least alluded to.
He also, I think,
asked us whether or not there was any reason
to explore this further; would it help to
have additional information.
And also, he
asked us about could this be something good
for the Commonwealth, particularly as it
relates to [the] economy or job creation.
J.A.

3344.

According

to

Williams,

Appellant

was

“[a]sking

questions like . . . ‘What are the end points here?

What are

you looking for to show efficacy with the studies?
going to proceed with that?’”

Id. at 2283.

How are you

Appellant also

thanked the attendees for their presence and “talked about his
interest in a Virginia company doing this, and his interest in
the product.”

Id. at 3927.

supportive. . . .

Overall, “[Appellant] was generally

[T]hat was the purpose.”

7

Id. at 2284.

In
total,
Williams
provided
$200,000
for
grant
applications. All of the checks were distributed to researchers
either at or about the time of the Anatabloc launch luncheon at
the Governor’s Mansion.

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Despite the fanfare of the luncheon, Star’s President,
Paul L. Perito, began to worry that Star had lost the support of
UVA and VCU.

In the fall of 2011, Perito was working with those

universities to file grant applications.
call

with

UVA

unprepared.
this

officials,

Perito

During a particular

felt

the

officials

were

According to Perito, when Williams learned about

information,

understand it.

“[h]e

was

furious

and

said,

‘I

can’t

[Appellant] and his wife are so supportive of

this and suddenly the administration has no interest.’”

J.A.

3934.
D.
Prior to the beginning of 2012, Mrs. McDonnell sold
all of her 6,522 shares of Star stock for $15,279.45, resulting
in a loss of more than $17,000.
disclosure

of

the

stock

This allowed Appellant to omit

purchases

on

a

required

financial

disclosure form known as a Statement of Economic Interest.

Then

on January 20, 2012 -- four days after the Statement of Economic
Interest had been filed -- Mrs. McDonnell purchased 6,672 shares
of Star stock at $2.29 per share, for a total of $15,276.88.
In the meantime, on January 7, 2012, Appellant made
another golf visit to Kinloch Golf Club, running up a $1,368.91
bill

that

Williams

again

paid.

Appellant

omitted

this

golf

outing and the 2011 golf trips from his Statements of Economic
Interest.

See J.A. 723 (noting Appellant’s “deliberate omission
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of his golf-related gifts paid by Jonnie Williams”).

Appellant

also omitted from his Statement of Economic Interest the $15,000
check for the caterers at his daughter’s wedding.
Also

in

January

2012,

Williams

discussed

the

properties with Mrs. McDonnell, who wanted additional loans.
a result, Williams agreed to loan more money.

Mobo
As

At the same time,

he mentioned to Mrs. McDonnell that the studies with UVA were
proceeding slowly.

Mrs. McDonnell was “furious when [Williams]

told her that [they were] bogged down in the administration.”
J.A. 2308.
that

Later, Mrs. McDonnell called Williams to advise him

she

“want[ed]

had
the

relayed
contact

this

information

information

[was] dealing with at [UVA].”

of

the

to

Appellant,

people

that

who

[Star]

Id. at 2309 (internal quotation

marks omitted).
Appellant followed up on these discussions by calling
Williams on February 3, 2012, to talk about a $50,000 loan.
Initially, Appellant wanted a cash loan, but Williams mentioned
that he could loan stock to Appellant.

Williams proposed “that

he could loan that stock either to [Appellant’s] wife or he
could

loan

it

to

[Mobo].”

J.A.

6224.

This

conversation

continued to February 29, when Williams visited the Governor’s
Mansion.

During this meeting, Appellant and Williams discussed

the potential terms of a stock transfer.

However, Appellant and

Williams did not move forward with this idea because Williams
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discovered

he

Securities

Filed: 07/10/2015

would

and

have

to

Exchange

Pg: 17 of 89

report

a

stock

Commission.

transfer

At

trial,

to

the

Williams

testified that he did not want to transfer Star stock because he
“didn’t want anyone to know that I was helping the Governor
financially with his problems while he was helping our company.”
Id. at 2333-34.
Appellant,

When asked what he expected in return from

Williams

testified,

“I

expected

what

had

already

happened, that he would continue to help me move this product
forward in Virginia” by “assisting with the universities, with
the

testing,

or

help

with

supporting the product.”

government

employees,

Id. at 2355.

or

publicly

In the end, Williams

agreed to make a $50,000 loan, writing a check in this amount to
the order of Mobo on March 6.
Also
responded

to

on
Mrs.

February

3,

McDonnell’s

one
request

of

Williams’s

for

a

list

employees
of

doctors

Williams wished to invite to an upcoming healthcare industry
leaders

reception

at

the

Governor’s

Mansion.

emailed the list of doctors to Mrs. McDonnell.
--

on

February

7

--

Mrs.

McDonnell

sent

a

The

employee

Four days later
revised

list

of

invitees for this event, a list that now included the doctors
identified

by

Williams.

The

next

day,

Sarah

Scarbrough,

director of the Governor’s Mansion, sent an email to Secretary
Hazel’s assistant, Elaina Schramm.

Scarbrough informed Schramm

that “[t]he First Lady and Governor were going over the list
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night

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for

the

healthcare

Pg: 18 of 89

industry

event.

The

Governor

wants to make sure [head officers at UVA and VCU, along with
those of other institutions,] are included in the list.”

G.S.A.

146.
Mrs.
requested

McDonnell

by

Appellant,

received

an

containing

email,
the

as

names

officials with whom Star had been working.

previously

of

the

UVA

She forwarded this

list to Appellant and his chief counsel, Jacob Jasen Eige, on
February 9.

The next day, while riding with Appellant, Mrs.

McDonnell followed up with Eige:
Pls call Jonnie today [and] get him to fill
u in on where this is at. Gov wants to know
why nothing has developed w studies after
Jonnie gave $200,000.
I’m just trying to
talk w Jonnie. Gov wants to get this going
w VCU MCV. Pls let us know what u find out
after we return . . . .
G.S.A. 154. 8
Less than a week later -- on February 16, 2012 -Appellant

emailed

certificates
providing

for

and

Williams
documents

Mobo.

Six

to

check

relating
minutes

8

to

after

on

the

loans

status
Williams

Appellant

sent

of
was
this

The $200,000 mentioned in Mrs. McDonnell’s email to chief
counsel Eige referred to checks that Star distributed to
researchers either at or about the time of the Anatabloc launch
luncheon at the Governor’s Mansion.

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email, he emailed Eige: “Pls see me about anatabloc issues at
VCU and UVA.

Thx.”

G.S.A. 157.

The healthcare industry leaders reception was held on
February 29 -- the same day as Appellant’s private meeting about
securing

a

loan

from

Williams.

Following

the

reception,

Appellant, Mrs. McDonnell, Williams, and two doctors went out
for

a

$1,400

dinner

on

Williams’s

diners discussed Anatabloc.

dime.

During

dinner

the

Mrs. McDonnell talked about her use

of Anatabloc, and Appellant asked one of the doctors -- a Star
consultant -- “How big of a discovery is this?”
(internal quotation marks omitted).

J.A. 2728

At one point during the

dinner Mrs. McDonnell invited the two doctors to stay at the
Governor’s

Mansion

for

the

evening

--

an

offer

the

doctors

accepted.
On

March

21,

2012,

Appellant

met

with

Virginia

Secretary of Administration Lisa Hicks-Thomas, who oversaw state
employee health plans and helped determine which drugs would be
covered by the state health plan.

At one point during the

meeting, Appellant reached into his pocket, retrieving a bottle
of Anatabloc.

He told Hicks-Thomas that Anatabloc was “working

well for him, and that he thought it would be good for . . .
state employees.”

J.A. 4227.

He then asked Hicks-Thomas to

meet with representatives from Star.

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Almost

two

months

Pg: 20 of 89

later

--

on

May

18,

2012

--

Appellant sent Williams a text message concerning yet another
loan:

“Johnnie.

Per voicemail would like to see if you could

extend another 20k loan for this year.
I’ll ask mike to send instructions.

Call if possible and
Thx bob.”

G.S.A. 166.

Twelve minutes later, Williams responded, “Done, tell me who to
make it out to and address.

Will FedEx.

Jonnie.”

Id. at 168.

Later the same month -- from May 18 to May 26 -Appellant and his family vacationed at Kiawah Island in South
Carolina.

According to Appellant, the $23,000 vacation was a

gift from William H. Goodwin Jr., whom Appellant characterized
as a personal friend.

Appellant did not report this gift on his

2012 Statement of Economic Interest.

He said he did not need to

report it because it fell under the “personal friend” exception
to the reporting requirements.
Between
texted

Williams

April

and

about

Star

July

2012,

stock

on

Appellant
four

coinciding with a rise in the stock price.
text

sent

on

July

3,

Williams

clinical trials report on aug 8.

said,

emailed

occasions,

and
each

In response to a

“Johns

Hopkins

human

If you need cash let me know.

Let’s go golfing and sailing Chatham Bars inn Chatham mass labor
day weekend if you can.
Jonnie.”

Business about to break out strong.

G.S.A. 170.

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Appellant and his wife took Williams up on his Labor
Day weekend vacation offer.

Williams spent more than $7,300 on

this vacation for the McDonnells.

Williams paid the McDonnells’

share of a $5,823.79 bill for a private clambake.

Also joining

in on the weekend excursion was one of the doctors who attended
the February healthcare leaders reception, whom Williams invited
in an attempt “to try to help get the Governor more involved.”
J.A. 2371.
Appellant said he learned in December 2012 that Mrs.
McDonnell had repurchased Star stock in January 2012 -- despite
having sold her entire holding of Star stock the previous year.
Appellant testified that he “was pretty upset with her.”
6270.

This

revelation

led

to

a

tense

conversation

J.A.
about

reporting requirements:
[I]t was her money that she had used for
this.
But I told her, you know, “Listen.
If you have this stock, you know, this is”
-- “again, triggers a reporting requirement
for me. I can do it, but I need” -- “I just
don’t” -- “I really don’t appreciate you
doing things that really” -- “that affect me
without” -- “without me knowing about it.”
Id. at 6271.

That Christmas, Mrs. McDonnell transferred her

Star

her

stock

to

children

as

a

gift.

This

again

allowed

Appellant to file a Statement of Economic Interest that did not
report ownership of the stock.

That same month -- December 2012

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-- Williams gave Appellant’s daughter Jeanine a $10,000 wedding
gift.
E.
Eventually, all of these events came to light.
January

21,

2014,

a

grand

jury

indicted

McDonnell in a fourteen-count indictment.

Appellant

And on

and

Mrs.

Appellant and Mrs.

McDonnell were charged with one count of conspiracy to commit
honest-services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349;
three counts of honest-services wire fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1343; one count of conspiracy to obtain property under
color of official right, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; six
counts of obtaining property under color of official right, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; two counts of making a false
statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014; and one count of
obstruction of official proceedings, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c)(2).
Ultimately,

the

jury

verdict

of

September

4,

2014,

found Appellant not guilty of the false statements counts but
guilty of all eleven counts of corruption. 9

9

The corruption counts include one count of conspiracy to
commit honest-services wire fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1349;
three counts of honest-services wire fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343; one count of conspiracy to obtain property under color
of official right pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1951; and six counts
of obtaining property under color of official right pursuant to
(Continued)
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At sentencing the Government requested a sentence of
78 months -- or six and a half years -- of imprisonment, which
was

at

range.

the

low

end

However,

of

the

the

applicable

district

Sentencing

court

departed

Guidelines

downward

and

sentenced Appellant to two years of imprisonment, followed by
two years of supervised release.

Appellant now challenges his

convictions, asserting a litany of errors.
II.
A.
Motion for Severance
To
erred

when

begin,
it

Appellant

denied

both

argues

his

that

motion

the

for

district

severance

request for ex parte consideration of this motion.
these rulings for an abuse of discretion.
Lighty,

616

F.3d

321,

348

(4th

Cir.

court

and

his

We review

See United States v.

2010)

(severance);

RZS

Holdings AVV v. PDVSA Petroleo S.A., 506 F.3d 350, 356 (4th Cir.
2007) (ex parte proceeding).
1.
Appellant contends that he was entitled to a trial
separate from the trial of Mrs. McDonnell.
joint

trial

precluded

him

from

calling

Mrs.

18 U.S.C. § 1951.
Only Mrs. McDonnell
obstruction of official proceedings.

23

He argues that a
McDonnell

was

charged

as

a

with

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witness

and

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introducing

thus

Pg: 24 of 89

exculpatory

district

court

denied

Appellant

claims

this

Appellant’s
decision

was

testimony.

motion
an

abuse

for
of

The

severance.
the

court’s

discretion.
In

general,

tried together.”

“defendants

indicted

Lighty, 616 F.3d at 348.

together

should

be

This is especially

true when, as in this case, the defendants are charged with
conspiracy.

See United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 779 (4th

Cir. 1983).

So a defendant seeking severance based on the need

for a co-defendant’s testimony must make an initial showing of
“(1) a bona fide need for the testimony of his co-defendant, (2)
the likelihood that the co-defendant would testify at a second
trial and waive his Fifth Amendment privilege, (3) the substance
of his co-defendant’s testimony, and (4) the exculpatory nature
and effect of such testimony.”

Id.

After the initial showing

is made, a district court should
(1)
examine
the
significance
of
the
testimony in relation to the defendant’s
theory of defense; (2) assess the extent of
prejudice caused by the absence of the
testimony;
(3)
pay
close
attention
to
judicial administration and economy; (4)
give
weight
to
the
timeliness
of
the
motion[;] and (5) consider the likelihood
that the co-defendant’s testimony could be
impeached.
Id.

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Appellant failed to satisfy even the initial showing
requirements of United States v. Parodi.
denied

Appellant’s

offered

only

motion

vague

and

for

The district court

severance

conclusory

because

statements

Appellant

regarding

the

substance of Mrs. McDonnell’s testimony.

As we expressed in

Parodi,

regarding

vague

and

conclusory

statements

potential

testimony are not enough to establish the substance of a codefendant’s testimony.

See 703 F.2d at 780.

Appellant’s motion to sever paints a picture of Mrs.
McDonnell’s potential testimony in broad strokes without filling
in any details:
First, her testimony would disprove the
Government’s
primary
claim
that
the
McDonnells
acted
in
concert
through
a
criminal
conspiracy
to
corruptly
accept
gifts
and
loans
in
exchange
for
Mr.
McDonnell
using
his
office
to
benefit
Williams and his company.
Second, her
testimony
would
refute
the
Government’s
allegation that Mr. McDonnell agreed or
promised to use his office to improperly
“promote” Star’s products or to “obtain
research
studies
for
Star
Scientific’s
products.”
Third, Mrs. McDonnell would
refute the Government’s allegation that she
solicited certain gifts and loans identified
in the Indictment.
Finally, Mrs. McDonnell
would refute the Government’s allegation
that the McDonnells “took steps . . . to
conceal” their supposed scheme.
J.A.

296

Presented

(alternation
with

only

in

these

original)

unadorned

(citations

statements

omitted).

regarding

the

substance of Mrs. McDonnell’s potential testimony, the district
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court appropriately exercised its discretion when it denied the
motion to sever.
2.
Appellant

claimed

he

could

provide

a

more

detailed

account of the substance of Mrs. McDonnell’s potential testimony
-- an account he offered to share with the district court on the
condition that the district court review the evidence ex parte.
The district court denied this invitation, finding an ex parte
proceeding would be inappropriate.
Ex parte proceedings and communications are disfavored
because they are “fundamentally at variance with our conceptions
of due process.”

Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 276 (D.C. Cir.

1977), quoted in Thompson v. Greene, 427 F.3d 263, 269 n.7 (4th
Cir. 2005).

However, such proceedings and communications may be

permissible in limited circumstances.

“[O]ur analysis should

focus, first, on the parties’ opportunity to participate in the
court’s

decision

and,

second,

on

proceedings were unfairly prejudicial.”

whether

the

ex

parte

RZS Holdings AVV, 506

F.3d at 357.
Ex parte proceedings were not justified in this case.
Appellant

sought

to

withhold

from

the

Government

all

of

the

information necessary to establish the necessity of severance.
This proposal would have barred the Government from challenging
whether

Appellant

actually

satisfied
26

the

initial

showing

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required

by

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Parodi.

If

Pg: 27 of 89

the

district

court

proceeded

as

Appellant requested, it would have been the only entity in a
position
court

to

was

challenge

reluctant

to

motion

Appellant’s
assume

evaluating

“a

to

intensive,

multi-factored

the

contentions.
role

of

sever[,

which]

analysis

for

The

an

advocate

requires
which

heightened need for well-informed advocacy.”

district
when

a

there

factis

J.A. 351. 10

a
It

10

In United States v. Napue, the Seventh Circuit elaborated
on the problems presented by ex parte communications between a
court and the Government:
Ex
parte
communications
between
the
government
and
the
court
deprive
the
defendant of notice of the precise content
of the communications and an opportunity to
respond.
These communications thereby can
create both the appearance of impropriety
and the possibility of actual misconduct.
Even where the government acts in good faith
and
diligently
attempts
to
present
information
fairly
during
an
ex
parte
proceeding, the government’s information is
likely to be less reliable and the court’s
ultimate findings less accurate than if the
defendant had been permitted to participate.
However impartial a prosecutor may mean to
be, he is an advocate, accustomed to stating
only one side of the case.
An ex parte
proceeding places a substantial burden upon
the trial judge to perform what is naturally
and properly the function of an advocate.
834 F.2d 1311, 1318–19 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis omitted)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The
reversal of roles in this case does not change the equation.
See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969) (“As the
need for adversary inquiry is increased by the complexity of the
issues presented for adjudication, and by the consequent
(Continued)
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properly

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exercised

its

Pg: 28 of 89

discretion

by

denying

Appellant’s

request.
Appellant also maintains that the district court erred
by failing to defer its ruling on the motion to sever until 14
days prior to trial.

The district court was not obligated to

consider this request because Appellant waited until his reply
to argue this issue.

Cf. U.S. S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC,

580 F.3d 233, 255 n.23 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Ordinarily we do not
consider

arguments

brief . . . .”);

raised

Mike’s

for

Train

the

first

House,

Inc.

time
v.

in

a

reply

Broadway

Ltd.

Imports, LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 527, 535 (D. Md. 2010) (applying
this

principle

to

reply

memoranda).

We

are

satisfied,

therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying this request outright.
Appellant

simply

failed

to

provide

adequate

justification for his claim that a severance was warranted.

He

was not entitled to an ex parte examination of his evidence; he
was not entitled to deferral of the district court’s ruling.
Accordingly,

we

affirm

the

denial

of

Appellant’s

motion

to

sever.

inadequacy of ex parte procedures as a means for their accurate
resolution,
the
displacement
of
well-informed
advocacy
necessarily becomes less justifiable.” (emphasis omitted)).
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B.
Voir Dire
Appellant next argues that the district court failed
to

adequately

question

pretrial publicity.
proceedings,
questioning

the
on

prospective

jurors

on

the

subject

of

He complains that, during the voir dire

court

this

declined

topic.

his

request

Instead,

the

for

court

individual
polled

the

members of the venire as a group, asking whether any of them
believed themselves to be incapable of “put[ting] aside whatever
it is that [they had] heard.”
eight

prospective

jurors

J.A. 1692.
to

the

The court did call

bench

for

one-on-one

questioning, but only after the defense singled them out on the
basis

of

Appellant

their

responses

argues

that

to

such

a

jury

selection

“perfunctory”

questionnaire.

questioning

violated

his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

Appellant’s Br.

65.

necessarily

Because

“[t]he

conduct

of

voir

dire

is

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” United
States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 738 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
we

also review

this

contention

for

abuse

of

discretion,

see

United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 613 (4th Cir. 2010).
Appellant’s
assertion
United

argument

begins

that

the

Supreme

Court’s

States,

130

S.

2896

Ct.

inauspiciously,
decision

(2010),

in

with

an

Skilling

v.

establishes

minimum

requirements for voir dire in “publicity-saturated” cases like
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Appellant’s Br. 22.

In Skilling, he claims, the

Court approved the voir dire procedure “only because” the trial
court

asked

prospective

jurors

to

indicate

whether

they

had

formed an opinion about the defendant’s guilt or innocence and
later examined them individually about pretrial publicity.

Id.

Appellant then reasons that, because the trial court in this
case

took

‘provide

neither
a

of

those

reasonable

discovered if present.’”

steps,

assurance

it

necessarily

that

prejudice

“failed

to

would

be

Id. (quoting Lancaster, 96 F.3d at

740).
Skilling,

however,

does

not

purport

to

hand

down

commandments for the proper conduct of voir dire proceedings.
See 130 S. Ct. at 2918 (explaining that the legal issue under
review

was,

narrowly,

“the

adequacy

of

Skilling’s case” (emphasis supplied)).

jury

selection

in

On the contrary, the

Court in Skilling recommitted itself to the principle that jury
selection is unsusceptible to any “hard-and-fast formula”; as
always,

it

remains

trial judge.”

“particularly

within

the

province

of

the

Id. at 2917 (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936)
(stating that procedures for detecting and rooting out juror
bias cannot be “chained to any ancient and artificial formula”).
Trial judges, as we have repeatedly recognized, retain broad
discretion

over

the

conduct

of
30

voir

dire,

see,

e.g.,

United

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States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 673 (4th Cir. 2011), both as a
general

matter

and

in

the

area

of

pretrial

publicity,

specifically, see, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758,
770 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 73334 (4th Cir. 1991).
“wide

discretion”

The Supreme Court has itself emphasized the
that

trial

courts

enjoy

in

questioning

prospective jurors about pretrial publicity:
Particularly
with
respect
to
pretrial
publicity, we think this primary reliance on
the judgment of the trial court makes good
sense. The judge of that court sits in the
locale where the publicity is said to have
had its effect and brings to his evaluation
of any such claim his own perception of the
depth and extent of news stories that might
influence a juror.
The trial court, of
course, does not impute his own perceptions
to the jurors who are being examined, but
these perceptions should be of assistance to
it in deciding how detailed an inquiry to
make of the members of the jury venire.
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427 (1991).
In his opening brief, Appellant accuses the district
court

of

“limit[ing]

voir

dire

on

this

issue

to

asking

the

prospective jurors en masse to sit down if they felt they could
be fair.”

Appellant’s Br. 65.

The court, though, did a good

deal more than that.
Jury selection in this case commenced with a courtapproved jury questionnaire spanning 99 questions, four of which
pressed prospective jurors for information about their exposure

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to pretrial publicity. 11

Pg: 32 of 89

The questionnaire -- by and large, a

condensed version of a slightly longer proposed questionnaire
that the parties submitted jointly -- asked respondents to state
whether they had “seen, heard or read anything” about the case;
“[h]ow closely” they had followed news about the case; and from
which types of media they had heard about it.

J.A. 592-93.

It

then asked whether each respondent had “expressed an opinion
about this case or about those involved to anyone,” and if so,
to

elaborate

expressed.

on

both

“the

circumstances”

and

the

opinion

Id. at 593.
Appellant

questionnaire

makes

merely

much

asked

of

the

whether

fact

that

prospective

the

jurors

jury
had

“expressed” an opinion about the case, rather than whether they
had formed an opinion about it.

Appellant, however, bears much

of the responsibility for the wording and scope of questions on
that

document.

And

while

the

jointly

proposed

jury

questionnaire from which the final questionnaire was culled did,
indeed, ask whether prospective jurors had “formed” an opinion
about

the

suspect.

case,

the

wording

of

this

proposed

question

was

It asked: “Based on what you have read, heard, seen,

11

Another section of the questionnaire asked prospective
jurors to discuss their news consumption more generally.
Respondents were instructed to list, among other things, the
print and online news sources they read most often and any
websites they visit regularly.

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and/or overheard in conversations, please tell us what opinions,
if any, you have formed about the guilt or innocence of Robert
F. McDonnell.”

J.A. 527.

So worded, this question invites

respondents to deliberate on the defendant’s guilt or innocence
and to stake out a position before even a single juror has been
seated.

The court was justified in rejecting it. 12
Later,

question

the

the

court

prospective

did

exercise

jurors

as

a

its

discretion

group,

individually, on the subject of pretrial publicity.

to

instead

of

See Bakker,

925 F.2d at 734 (“[I]t is well established that a trial judge
may

question

prospective

jurors

collectively

rather

than

individually.”).

During this portion of the in-court voir dire,

the

the

court

asked

members

of

the

venire,

collectively,

to

stand up if they had read, heard, or seen any media reports
about the case.

The court then asked the prospective jurors to

12

Indeed, the court’s decision not to pose Appellant’s
suggested question finds support in the Supreme Court’s guidance
on matters of pretrial publicity.
See Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 430
(explaining that the question for voir dire is “whether the
jurors . . . had such fixed opinions that they could not judge
impartially the guilt of the defendant” (alteration in original)
(emphasis supplied) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (“To hold that the mere
existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or
innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut
the presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be
to establish an impossible standard.
It is sufficient if the
juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a
verdict based on the evidence presented in court.”).

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sit down if, despite this, they believed they were “able to put
aside whatever it is that [they] heard, listen to the evidence
in this case and be fair to both sides.”
still,

the

court

invited

defense

J.A. 1691-92.

counsel

to

Even

identify

any

specific veniremen it would like to question further on this
subject.

In response, Appellant’s counsel brought forward the

names of eight prospective jurors, and the court proceeded to
summon

each

individual

of

those

prospective

questioning.

The

jurors

court

to

the

struck

bench

one

of

for

these

individuals, without objection, based on her responses to its
questions.

When

this

process

was

complete,

the

court

asked

Appellant’s counsel whether there was “[a]nybody else” he wished
to question.

J.A. 1706.

“Not on publicity,” counsel said.

Id.

Appellant, relying on our decision in United States v.
Hankish,

502

F.2d

71

(4th

Cir.

1974),

argues

that

the

prospective jurors’ acknowledgment that they had been exposed to
pretrial publicity obligated the trial court to question every
single one of them -- not merely one at a time, but outside of
the

others’

presence.

however, is inapplicable.
court’s

refusal

to

poll

See

Appellant’s

Br.

65.

Hankish,

The error in that case was a district
jurors,

after

they

had

already

been

seated, to discern whether any of them had read a particular,
“highly prejudicial” article that ran in the local newspaper on
the second day of the trial.

502 F.2d at 76.
34

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then, and have not held since, that individual questioning, out
of earshot of the rest of the venire, is required to alleviate
generalized concerns about the pernicious effects of pretrial
publicity.

On the contrary, we have held that merely asking for

a show of hands was not an abuse of discretion.

See Bailey, 112

F.3d at 769-70 (finding no abuse of discretion where a court
asked prospective jurors to raise their hands if they had heard
or read about the case and, separately, if “anything they had
heard would predispose them to favor one side or the other”).
We are satisfied that the trial court’s questioning in
this case was adequate to “provide a reasonable assurance that
prejudice would be discovered if present.”
at

740

States

(internal
v.

Hsu,

quotation

364

F.3d

marks

192,

Lancaster, 96 F.3d

omitted);

203-04

(4th

see
Cir.

also

United

2004).

And

Appellant does not contend that any actual juror bias has been
discovered.

We

conclude,

therefore,

that

the

court

did

not

made

multiple

abuse its discretion.
C.
Evidentiary Rulings
Appellant
erroneous
evidentiary

asserts

evidentiary
rulings

for

the

district

rulings.
an

abuse

In
of

court

general,
discretion,

substantial deference to the district court.

review

affording

See United States

v. Medford, 661 F.3d 746, 751 (4th Cir. 2011).
35

we

“A district

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abuses

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its

discretion

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if

its

conclusion

is

guided

by

erroneous legal principles or rests upon a clearly erroneous
factual finding.”
261

(4th

Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257,

Cir.

1999)

(citations

omitted).

Reversal

is

appropriate if we have “a definite and firm conviction that the
court

below

committed

a

clear

error

of

judgment

in

the

conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
1.
Exclusion of Expert Testimony
Appellant

objects

to

the

exclusion

of

his

proposed

expert testimony about Williams’s cooperation agreement with the
Government as well as expert testimony about the Statements of
Economic Interest.
decisions

to

We reject these claims, as the trial court’s

exclude

this

evidence

were

not

abuses

of

discretion.
a.
First,
permitted

to

cooperation

Appellant
present

agreement

argues

expert
with

the

that

he

testimony

should

have

about

Williams’s

Government,

Williams with transactional immunity.

which

provided

In a letter dated May 30,

2014, the Government outlined the immunized conduct:
(1) conduct involving his agreement to
provide, and his provision of, things of
value to former Virginia Governor Robert F.
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McDonnell, former First Lady of Virginia
Maureen P. McDonnell, and their family
members;
(2)
conduct
related
to
loans
Williams received from 2009 to 2012 in
exchange for his pledge of Star Scientific
stock; and (3) conduct related to Williams’
gifts of Star Scientific stock to certain
trusts from 2009 to 2012.
J.A.

7918.

White

--

a

Appellant
partner

at

offered

the

Schulte

expert

Roth

&

testimony

Zabel

LLP

of

and

Peter
former

Assistant United States Attorney -- to “explain[] transactional
immunity, its value, and its uniqueness” and to “help[] the jury
understand Williams’s deal so it could assess his credibility.”
Appellant’s Br. 78.
Expert testimony cannot be used for the sole purpose
of undermining a witness’s credibility.

See United States v.

Allen, 716 F.3d 98, 105–06 (4th Cir. 2013).

Here, the defense

wished to present White’s testimony in order to emphasize the
rarity of Williams’s agreement and to imply, as a result, that
Williams had more reason to provide false or greatly exaggerated
testimony.

In

other

words,

the

sole

purpose

testimony was to undermine Williams’s credibility.
matter best left to cross examination.
conclude

that

the

district

court’s

evidence was an abuse of discretion.

of

White’s

This is a

Accordingly, we cannot

decision

to

exclude

this

See Allen, 716 F.3d at 106

(“A juror can connect the dots and understand the implications
that a plea agreement might have on a codefendant’s testimony --

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it is certainly within the realm of common sense that certain
witnesses would have an incentive to incriminate the defendant
in exchange for a lower sentence.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). 13
b.
Second,

Appellant

argues

that

he

should

have

been

permitted to present expert testimony about the Statements of
Economic Interest.

Appellant offered the expert testimony of

Norman A. Thomas -- a private attorney who formerly worked in

13

Appellant also contests the exclusion of his proposed lay
witness testimony about the rarity of Williams’s agreement. At
trial, the court sustained the Government’s objection after
defense counsel asked Williams whether he understood “how
unusual it is . . . to get transactional immunity” and again
after defense counsel asked an FBI special agent whether he had
“ever seen a cooperating witness get the kind of deal that Mr.
Williams got.”
J.A. 2778, 5064.
Appellant claims this
testimony
would
have
helped
the
jury
assess
Williams’s
credibility. In relevant part, Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires that opinion testimony from a lay witness must
be “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony.”
Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); see also United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d
104, 136 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Lay opinion testimony is particularly
useful when . . . the terms and concepts being discussed . . .
are likely to be unfamiliar to the jury.”). Juries are familiar
with the general import and effect of immunity agreements. Cf.
Allen, 716 F.3d at 106 (discussing jurors’ ability to understand
the implications of a plea agreement).
Here, the jury was
informed of the contents of Williams’s agreement, and Williams
testified about the agreement and his understanding of the
immunities from prosecution it afforded him.
The jury did not
need additional testimony regarding what types of agreements are
more common than others to assess Williams’s credibility.
In
other words, the district court reasonably concluded that the
testimony would not have been helpful.

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the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia and served as a
judge

--

to

explain

the

vagueness

Statements of Economic Interest.
also

would

have

explained

and

complexity

of

the

According to Appellant, Thomas

that

Appellant’s

Statements

of

Economic Interest evidenced a reasonable understanding of the
disclosure requirements.
Expert

testimony

must

“help

the

trier

of

fact

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
R. Evid. 702(a).

to

Fed.

“The helpfulness requirement of Rule 702 thus

prohibits the use of expert testimony related to matters which
are obviously . . . within the common knowledge of jurors.”
United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir. 2013)
(alteration in original) (internal quotations marks omitted).
The district court excluded the testimony of Thomas
because it would not be helpful to the jury.

As the court

observed, the jurors were “capable of reading and assessing the
complexity
Generally

of

the

speaking,

[Statements]
one

does

for

not

themselves.”

need

any

special

expertise to recognize that something is complex.
this

matter

jurors.

was

plainly

within

the

common

J.A.

719.

skills

or

Accordingly,

knowledge

of

the

Similarly, the jurors did not need expert assistance to

assess the reasonableness of Appellant’s opinions about what he
did and did not have to disclose.

The district court reasonably

concluded that Thomas’s testimony would not have been helpful.
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we

cannot

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conclude

that

the

district

court’s

decision to exclude this evidence was an abuse of discretion.
2.
Admission of Statements of Economic Interest
Appellant objects to the admission of the Statements
of

Economic

office.

Interest

filed

by

Appellant

during

his

time

in

Appellant moved in limine to exclude evidence relating

to the Statements of Economic Interest, arguing the Statements
of Economic Interest would have little to no probative value and
their admission would confuse the issues and mislead the jury.
The Government, on the other hand, characterized the
Statements

of

Economic

concealment

evidence,

Interest

which

would

and
reveal

intent and consciousness of guilt.”

related

evidence

Appellant’s

J.A. 723.

as

“corrupt

In support of

this proposition, the Government offered four examples of how
the

Statements

of

Economic

Interest

amounted

to

concealment

evidence:
[F]irst, because of [Appellant’s] deliberate
omission of his golf-related gifts paid by
Jonnie
Williams;
second,
because
of
[Appellant’s] deliberate omission of the
$15,000 check from Mr. Williams to pay the
remainder
of
the
catering
bill
the
McDonnells
owed
for
their
daughter’s
wedding; third, as the reason why Mrs.
McDonnell sold and repurchased all Star
stock held in her account on dates flanking
the
due
date
for
[Appellant’s]
2011
[Statement of Economic Interest], and why
the next year, she similarly unloaded Star
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stock to [Appellant’s] children on December
26, 2012, such that less than $10,000 worth
of Star stock remained in her account at
year-end; and fourth, as the reason why
[Appellant] had Mr. Williams direct $70,000
in loan proceeds to [Mobo].
Id. at 723–24 (citations omitted).
Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a
fact

more

or

less

probable

than

it

would

be

without

the

evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the
action.”

Fed. R. Evid. 401(a)–(b).

Relevant evidence may be

excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
a

danger

of

.

.

.

unfair

prejudice,

confusing

the

issues,

misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.”

Id. 403.

The district court admitted the Statements of Economic
Interest because they were relevant “to concealment and may be
probative of intent to defraud” and because “admission . . .
will

not

unfairly

prejudice

[Appellant]

because

there

is

no

suggestion, and there will be none at trial, that [Appellant]
violated
J.A. 760.
individual

Virginia’s

ethics

laws

reporting

requirements.”

Indeed, an attempt to conceal actions may indicate an
has

a

guilty

conscience

unlawfulness of the actions.

Interest

did

not

or

is

aware

of

the

See United States v. Zayyad, 741

F.3d 452, 463 (4th Cir. 2014).
Economic

or

Because the Statements of

include

41

various

gifts,

stock

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transactions, and loans from Williams to Appellant -- omissions
Appellant sought to explain during trial 14 -- the structuring of
the loans and gifts and failures to report could be seen as
efforts

to

conceal

Appellant’s

dealings

with

district court correctly observed as much.

Williams.

The

And the district

court weighed the probative value of this evidence against any
dangers that would accompanying its admission.

Accordingly, we

cannot conclude that the district court’s decision to admit this
evidence was an abuse of discretion.
3.
Admission of Other Gifts Evidence
Appellant objects to the admission of evidence that he
accepted a gift of the Kiawah vacation from Goodwin and that he

14

Appellant testified that he should have reported -- but
did not report -- golf outings provided by Williams in 2011. He
did not report Williams’s $15,000 check for catering at
Appellant’s daughter’s wedding, characterizing the check as a
wedding gift to his daughter. Appellant instructed Williams to
write
loan
checks
to
Mobo,
circumventing
disclosure
requirements.
In both 2011 and 2012, Mrs. McDonnell unloaded
shares of Star stock prior to the filing dates for the
Statements of Economic Interest so her ownership did not have to
be reported. But after the 2011 Statement of Economic Interest
was filed, Mrs. McDonnell repurchased shares of Star stock.
Appellant testified that “it was not a big deal” if he had to
report ownership of Star stock. J.A. 6276. He claimed that he
encouraged his wife to sell the stock in 2011 because it was a
risky investment.
He also claimed that Mrs. McDonnell
repurchased and again transferred Star stock in 2012 because she
wanted to give the stock to their children as a Christmas
present.

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did not disclose this gift pursuant to the “personal friend”
exception to Virginia’s reporting requirements.
in

limine

to

exclude

this

evidence

as

Appellant moved

extrinsic

evidence

of

unrelated alleged acts with no probative value of his intent.
The Government responded that this evidence showed Appellant’s
knowledge

of

the

requirements.

“personal

This

friend”

evidence,

the

exception

Government

to

reporting

further

noted,

would be “competent evidence of absence of mistake or lack of
accident
failing

when
to

it

comes

disclose

the

to

assessing

gifts

and

[Appellant’s]

loans

from

Mr.

intent

in

Williams.”

J.A. 731.
As a general rule, “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance

with

the

character.”

Fed.

R.

Evid.

404(b)(1).

However, such evidence “may be admissible for another purpose,
such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”
Id. 404(b)(2).
The district court admitted the evidence of the Kiawah
vacation omission because it was used to show knowledge and lack
of mistake.

The omission of the gift from Goodwin, the district

court determined, “is similar to the act the Government seeks to
prove

--

omission

of

gifts

from
43

Williams

pursuant

to

the

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personal

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friend

established

that

Pg: 44 of 89

exception.”

J.A.

Appellant

about

knew

761.
the

This

evidence

“personal

friend”

exception and omitted certain gifts pursuant to this exception.
Thus,

Appellant’s

knowledge

and

the

absence

of

mistake

was

“relevant to, and probative of, his alleged intent to defraud.”
Id.

Rule 404 permits the admission of evidence of intent and

knowledge, and in our view, the district court could conclude
that the Goodwin evidence was admissible for these purposes.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the district court’s decision
to admit this evidence was an abuse of discretion.
4.
Admission of Email Exchange Regarding Free Golf
Appellant

objects

to

the

admission

exchange about obtaining free rounds of golf.
2013,

Emily

Rabbitt

--

Appellant’s

travel

of

an

email

On January 4,
aide

and

deputy

director of scheduling -- asked Adam Zubowsky for advice about
planning golf trips for Appellant.

Zubowsky -- once Appellant’s

travel aide and later Appellant’s son-in-law -- responded in an
email dated January 4, 2013:
Yes basically this means find out who we
know in these cities, that owns golf courses
and will let me and my family play for free,
or at a reduced cost.
Also finding out
where to stay for free / or reduced cost.
So this means . . . find out about pac
donors, and rga donors, who will host rfm.
J.A. 7921.
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During trial, Appellant objected to the admission of
this email, asserting that this evidence was not relevant and
was extraordinarily prejudicial.
appeal,

however,

inadmissible

Appellant

hearsay

and

In post-trial motions and on

has

claimed

inadmissible

the

exchange

character

was

evidence.

Because Appellant did not object at trial on these grounds, our
review is for plain error.

See United States v. Bennett, 698

F.3d 194, 200 (4th Cir. 2012).
On plain error review, an appellant “bears the burden
of establishing (1) that the district court erred; (2) that the
error

was

plain;

substantial rights.”

and

(3)

that

the

error

affect[ed

his]

Bennett, 698 F.3d at 200 (alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

An error affects

an individual’s substantial rights if it was prejudicial, “which
means that there must be a reasonable probability that the error
affected the outcome of the trial.”

United States v. Marcus,

130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010).

The mere possibility that the

error

the

affected

prejudice.

the

See id.

outcome

of

trial

does

not

establish

“Even then, this court retain[s] discretion

to deny relief, and denial is particularly warranted where it
would not result in a miscarriage of justice.”

Bennett, 698

F.3d at 200 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

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At
discussion

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first,
of

the

the

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district

particular

court

email

refused

exchange

mentioned during the testimony of Rabbitt.

to

when

permit
it

was

Later in the trial,

during cross examination of Appellant, the email exchange was
admitted over Appellant’s relevancy objection.
of

the

exchange

focused

on

whether

The discussion

Appellant

received

information about golf courses where he could play for free or
at a reduced cost.

Upon review of the record, it does not

appear that this exchange was mentioned again, and the parties
have not identified any other discussion of the exchange.
The

use

of

the

email

exchange

was

quite

limited,

especially in light of the voluminous evidence presented during
the course of the five weeks of trial.

We cannot say there is a

reasonable probability that its admission affected the outcome
of

the

trial.

The

indictment,

we

note,

did

not

seek

to

prosecute Appellant for this conduct; indeed, the district court
instructed the jury that Appellant was “not on trial for any act
or conduct or offense not alleged in the indictment.”
7695.

We

presume

instruction.
(2000).

the

jurors

followed

the

district

J.A.
court’s

See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234

Accordingly,

the

claim

that

evidence

of

the

email

exchange affected the outcome of the trial is beyond the realm
of reasonable probability.

The admission of this evidence was

not plainly erroneous.
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5.
Return of Forensic Image of Williams’s iPhone
Appellant also asserts the district court erroneously
ordered

him

Williams’s

to

return

iPhone,

all

which

copies
the

of

a

forensic

Government

of

produced

had

image

to

Appellant pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Appellant’s chief complaint is that the forensic

image may contain evidence to which he is entitled pursuant to
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
However,

Appellant

waives

treatment of it is conclusory.
[Appellant]
evidence,

which

material.
its

receives

almost

new

claim

because

his

Appellant merely argues: “If

trial,

certainly

he

is

entitled

contains

Brady

to

and

this
Giglio

Likewise, if any of that evidence proves material,

confiscation

(citations
citations

a

this

requires

omitted).
to

two

a

new

trial.”

Appellant’s

decisions

of

little

Appellant’s

argument

Br.

85

includes

obvious

bare

relevance

from

other courts of appeals.

Furthermore, Appellant does not make

any

the

effort

violation.

to

establish

elements

of

a

Brady

or

Giglio

See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999)

(“The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that

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evidence

must

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have

been

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suppressed

by

the

State,

either

willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”).
Summary
raise

the

treatment

claim.

See,

of

a

e.g.,

claim

Russell

does
v.

not

sufficiently

Absolute

Collection

Servs., Inc., 763 F.3d 385, 396 n.* (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that
failure

to

present

legal

arguments

and

“record

citations

or

pertinent legal authority supporting . . . a claim” waives the
claim).

Although

Appellant

raised

this

issue

in

an

interlocutory appeal in a related case -- an appeal we dismissed
for want of jurisdiction -- this does not preserve the issue and
is not sufficient to raise the issue now.

To avoid waiver, a

party

over

must

exercise

brief

the

issue

jurisdiction.

in

an

Thus,

appeal

because

which

Appellant

we

may

fails

to

sufficiently raise this issue and has, therefore, effectively
waived it, we do not further address it.
III.
With
arguments

at

these
the

matters

core

of

resolved,

this

appeal.

we

turn

First

to
and

the

two

foremost,

Appellant asserts that the district court’s jury instructions
misstated
Second,

fundamental
he

asserts

principles
that

the

of

federal

Government’s

bribery
evidence

law.
was

insufficient to support his convictions pursuant to the honestservices wire fraud statute and the Hobbs Act.
of these contentions in turn.
48

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A.
Jury Instructions
Appellant’s
instructions
expansively.
instruction

is

claim

that

“We
failed

the

review
to

with
court
de

defined

novo

correctly

respect

the

state

to
bribery

claim
the

the

that

jury

far

too

a

jury

applicable

law.”

United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 351 (4th Cir. 2012).
“[W]e do not view a single instruction in isolation, but instead
consider whether taken as a whole and in the context of the
entire charge, the instructions accurately and fairly state the
controlling law.”

United States v. Woods, 710 F.3d 195, 207

(4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Even if,

upon review, we find that the court misinstructed the jury on an
element of an offense, we may disregard the error as harmless.
See United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 408 n.5 (4th Cir.
2012); United States v. Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir.
2012).

“We find an error in instructing the jury harmless if it

is ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would
have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’” 15

15

Ramos-

Prior to closing arguments in this case, the trial court
conducted a lengthy charge conference, during which Appellant’s
counsel vigorously challenged many of the Government’s proposed
instructions, including instructions that the court ultimately
gave.
The court did not invite the parties to object to the
instructions after the court gave them to the jury -- nor did
either party request to do so.
We remind the district courts
(Continued)
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Cruz, 667 F.3d at 496 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S.
1, 18 (1999)).
1.
We
statutes

begin

our

of

conviction.

analysis
The

with

first

of

an

examination

these

is

the

of

honest-

services wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346. 16
statute

requires

the

Government

to

prove

that

the

the

This

defendant

sought to “carry out a ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ another
of ‘the intangible right of honest services.’”

United States v.

Terry, 707 F.3d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted)
(quoting

18

U.S.C.

§§ 1341,

1346).

The

Supreme

Court

has

and counsel that the proper time for cementing objections to
instructions is after they are given but “before the jury
retires to deliberate.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d); see United
States v. Taglianetti, 456 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (1st Cir. 1972)
(rejecting the “improper practice” of taking objections to the
jury
charge
“in
chambers
before
delivery,
rather
than
afterwards”).
16

The wire fraud statute provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to
devise
any
scheme
or
artifice
to
defraud, . . .
transmits
or
causes
to
be
transmitted
by
means
of
wire . . .
communication
in
interstate
or
foreign
commerce,
any
writings,
signs,
signals,
pictures, or sounds for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be
fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1343.
“[T]he term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’
includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services.” Id. § 1346.

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recognized that § 1346 proscribes two, and only two, types of
activities:

bribery

and

kickback

schemes.

See

United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010).

Skilling

v.

To the extent that

the statute prohibits acts of bribery, the prohibition “draws
content . . . from federal statutes proscribing -- and defining
--

similar

crimes,”

including

the

general

federal

bribery

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), and the statute prohibiting theft
and

bribery

involving

federal

funds,

18

U.S.C.

§

666(a)(2).

Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933.
Here,
wire

services

in

their

fraud,

proposed

both

instructions

parties

sought

for

to

honest-

import

definition of bribery set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2).
statute

provides

demand,

seek,

that
or

public

receive

officials

anything

may

of

not

the
This

“corruptly”

value

“in

return

for . . . being influenced in the performance of any official
act.”

18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2).

The statute defines an “official

act” as “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause,
suit,

proceeding

pending,
official,

or
in

which
such

or

controversy,

may

by

law

official’s

be

which

may

brought

official

court

provided

a

near-verbatim

any

before

capacity,

official’s place of trust or profit.”
district

at

time

any
or

public

in

such

Id. § 201(a)(3).

The

recitation

of

provisions in its honest-services wire fraud instructions.

51

be

these

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A second statute of conviction in Appellant’s case,
the Hobbs Act, prohibits acts of extortion which “in any way or
degree obstruct[], delay[], or affect[] commerce or the movement
of any article or commodity in commerce.”
Though

a

defendant

may

commit

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).

extortion

through

threats

or

violence, it is also possible to commit extortion by obtaining
property “under color of official right.”

Id. § 1951(b)(2).

In

Evans v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that its
construction

of

§ 1951

“is

informed

by

the

common-law

tradition,” under which “[e]xtortion by [a] public official was
the rough equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a
bribe.’”
concluded
official

504 U.S. 255, 260, 268 (1992).
that
right,

prosecutions
like

for

prosecutions

Accordingly, we have

extortion
under

statutes, require proof of a quid pro quo.

other

under

color

of

bribery-related

See United States v.

Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 365 (4th Cir. 1995).
Here, the parties agreed that a charge of extortion
under color of official right has four elements.

The trial

court accordingly instructed the jury that the Government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) was a
public official; (2) “obtained a thing of value not due him or
his [office]”; (3) “did so knowing that the thing of value was
given in return for official action”; and (4) “did or attempted

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in any way or degree to delay, obstruct, or affect interstate
commerce, or an item moving in interstate commerce.”

J.A. 7681.

2.
Official Acts
Appellant
instructions

on

first
the

challenges

meaning

of

alternatively, “official action.”

the

district

“official

court’s

act,”

or,

Appellant argues the court’s

definition was overbroad, to the point that it would seem to
encompass

virtually

any

action

a

public

official

might

take

while in office.
In its instructions on honest-services wire fraud, the
district court defined “official action”:
The term official action means any decision
or action on any question, matter, cause,
suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may
at any time be pending, or which may by law
be brought before any public official, in
such public official’s official capacity.
Official
action
as
I
just
defined
it
includes
those
actions
that
have
been
clearly established by settled practice as
part of a public official’s position, even
if the action was not taken pursuant to
responsibilities explicitly assigned by law.
In other words, official actions may include
acts that a public official customarily
performs, even if those actions are not
described
in
any
law,
rule,
or
job
description. And a public official need not
have actual or final authority over the end
result sought by a bribe payor so long as
the alleged bribe payor reasonably believes
that the public official had influence,
power or authority over a means to the end
sought by the bribe payor.
In addition,
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official action can include actions taken in
furtherance of longer-term goals, and an
official action is no less official because
it is one in a series of steps to exercise
influence or achieve an end.
J.A. 7671-72.

The court later explained to the jury that these

instructions “apply equally to the definition of official action
for the purposes of” the Hobbs Act counts.
In

broad

strokes,

Id. at 7683.

Appellant’s

argument

is

that

the

court’s definition of “official action” is overinclusive.

By

his account, the court’s instructions would deem virtually all
of a public servant’s activities “official,” no matter how minor
or

innocuous.

For

public

figures

such

as

a

governor,

who

interact with constituents, donors, and business leaders as a
matter of custom and necessity, these activities might include
such

routine

meeting,

or

functions
posing

for

as

attending

a

a

photograph.

luncheon,

arranging

Appellant

argues

a

that

activities of this nature can never constitute an official act.
See Appellant’s Br. 28.
We have recognized that the term “official act” “does
not encompass every action taken in one’s official capacity.”
Jefferson, 674 F.3d at 356.
that.

We

are

satisfied,

Its meaning is more limited than
though,

that

the

district

court

adequately delineated those limits when it informed the jury
that

the

term

“official

act”

covers

only

“decision[s]

or

action[s] on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or
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controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by
law

be

brought

official’s

before

official

any

public

capacity.”

official,

J.A.

7671

in

such

public

(paraphrasing

18

U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)).
a.
The Supreme Court has twice expounded on the meaning
of “official act.”

It first did so a little more than a century

ago, in United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223 (1914).

There,

two federal officers responsible for suppressing liquor traffic
in Indian communities challenged their indictments for accepting
bribes in violation of section 117 of the Criminal Code, the
predecessor statute to 18 U.S.C. § 201(b). 17

17

See Birdsall, 233

Section 117 provided:
Whoever, being an officer of the United
States, or a person acting for or on behalf
of the United States, in any official
capacity,
under
or
by
virtue
of
the
authority of any department or office of the
Government
thereof[,] . . .
shall
ask,
accept, or receive any money, . . . with
intent to have his decision or action on any
question, matter, cause, or proceeding which
may at any time be pending, or which may by
law be brought before him in his official
capacity, or in his place of trust or
profit,
influenced
thereby,
shall
be
[penalized
by
fine,
imprisonment,
and
disqualification from office].

Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 117, 35 Stat. 1088, 1109-10.
We have observed that “there is simply no distinction in
substance between an official act as defined by Birdsall” and an
(Continued)
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The indictments alleged that attorney Birdsall

bribed the officers to advise the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
to

recommend

leniency

for

individuals

trafficking offenses involving Indians.

convicted

of

liquor

See id. at 229-30.

The

district court sustained the officers’ demurrers, holding that
their actions were not within the scope of the bribery statute
because

“there

[was]

no

act

of

Congress

conferring

upon

the

Interior Department, or the Bureau of Indian Affairs, any duty
whatever in regard to recommending to the executive or judicial
departments
judicial

of

the

clemency

government
shall

be

whether

or

extended.”

not

executive

United

States

or
v.

Birdsall, 206 F. 818, 821 (N.D. Iowa 1913), rev’d, 233 U.S. 223
(1914).

The Supreme Court, however, reversed.

In doing so, it

declared that an action may be “official” for purposes of a
bribery charge even if it is not prescribed by statute, written
rule, or regulation.

See Birdsall, 233 U.S. at 230-31.

Indeed,

as the Court explained, an official act:
might also be found in an established usage
which constituted the common law of the
department and fixed the duties of those
engaged in its activities.
In numerous
instances, duties not completely defined by
written rules are clearly established by
settled practice, and action taken in the

“official act” under the current bribery
§ 201(a)(3). Jefferson, 674 F.3d at 353.

56

statute,

18

U.S.C.

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course of their performance must be regarded
as within the provisions of the abovementioned statutes against bribery.
Id. at 231 (citation omitted).
Birdsall continues to stand for the proposition that
an

“official

act”

“may

include

acts

that

a

[public

servant]

customarily performs, even if the act falls outside the formal
legislative

process.”

Jefferson,

674

F.3d

at

357;

see

also

United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 192 (4th Cir. 1975).
Importantly, though, Birdsall did not rule, and we have never
held, that every act an official performs as a matter of custom
is an “official act.”

To constitute an “official act” under

federal bribery law, a settled practice “must yet adhere to the
definition confining an official act to a pending ‘question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.’”

Jefferson,

674 F.3d at 356 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)).
By

way

of

dicta

in

United

States

v.

Sun-Diamond

Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398 (1999), the Supreme Court
has clarified this point.
not a bribery case.

Sun-Diamond, it must be noted, was

Its focus, rather, was the federal gratuity

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), which criminalizes gifts given to a
public official “for or because of any official act.”
§ 201(c)(1)(A).

18 U.S.C.

Notably, though, the definition of an “official

act” supplied in § 201(a)(3) applies to the entirety of § 201,
including

the

dual

prohibitions
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on

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and

illegal

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See 18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (providing a definition of

“official act” “[f]or the purpose of this section”).
The

Sun-Diamond

Court

explained

that

the

illegal

gratuity statute requires the Government to demonstrate a link
between the gift and “some particular official act of whatever
identity.”
In

the

526 U.S. at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted).

course

of

its

explanation,

the

Court

stated

that

an

alternative reading would criminalize, for example, “token gifts
to the President based on his official position and not linked
to any identifiable act -- such as the replica jerseys given by
championship
House

sports

visits”;

“a

teams
high

each

school

year

during

principal’s

ceremonial
gift

of

a

White
school

baseball cap to the Secretary of Education, by reason of his
office, on the occasion of the latter’s visit to the school”; or
a

“complimentary

Agriculture

“in

lunch”
connection

provided
with

his

for

the

speech

concerning various matters of USDA policy.”

Secretary
to

the

of

farmers

Id. at 406-07.

The

Court proceeded to explain why it would not do to argue that
these

three

visiting

the

acts
high

--

that

school,

is,
or

receiving
speaking

to

the

sports

farmers

“official acts” in their own right:
The answer to this objection is that those
actions
-while
they
are
assuredly
“official acts” in some sense -- are not
“official acts” within the meaning of the
statute, which, as we have noted, defines
58

--

teams,
were

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“official act” to mean “any decision or
action on any question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy, which may at any
time be pending, or which may by law be
brought before any public official, in such
official’s official capacity, or in such
official’s place of trust or profit.”
18
U.S.C.
§ 201(a)(3).
Thus,
when
the
violation
is
linked
to
a
particular
“official act,” it is possible to eliminate
the absurdities through the definition of
that term.
Id. at 407-08 (emphasis omitted).
We

have

previously

declined

to

read

Sun-Diamond

to

exclude “all settled practices by a public official from the
bribery statute’s definition of an official act.”
674 F.3d at 356 (emphasis supplied).
point,

acknowledging

official

acts.”

that

“some

Appellant’s

Br.

Appellant concedes the

settled
37

Jefferson,

practices

(emphasis

can

omitted).

be
He

argues, though, that under the logic of Sun-Diamond, the kinds
of activities he is accused of -- e.g., speaking with aides and
arranging
because

meetings
they

--

can

“implicate

(emphasis omitted).

no

never

constitute

official

“official

power.” 18

Id.

acts”
at

31

Appellant simply misreads Sun-Diamond.

18

In further support of his argument that an “official act”
necessitates a deployment of “official powers,” Appellant calls
our attention to the First Circuit’s decision in United States
v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290 (1st Cir. 2008).
The appellants in
Urciuoli were hospital executives who allegedly employed a state
senator in a “sham job” in exchange for various efforts to
advance the hospital’s financial interests.
513 F.3d at 292.
In pertinent part, the Government alleged that the senator
(Continued)
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The Sun-Diamond Court did not rule that receptions,
public appearances, and speeches can never constitute “official
acts” within the meaning of § 201(a)(3); the Court’s point was
that

job

functions

of

a

strictly

ceremonial

or

educational

nature will rarely, if ever, fall within this definition.

The

reason is not that these functions cannot relate, in some way,

lobbied municipal officials to comply with Rhode Island law
governing ambulance runs.
See id.
As a result of this act,
among various other actions, the executives were convicted of
honest-services mail fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and
1346. See id. at 293.
There, as in this case, the chief issue on appeal was
whether the court’s instructions were overbroad.
It must be
noted, though, that the instructions in that case were decidedly
different than the instructions here. Instead of borrowing the
bribery definition from § 201(a)(3), as the court here did, the
trial court in Urciuoli instructed the jury to decide whether
the object of the scheme was a deprivation of “honest services,”
defined as follows:
The honest services that an elected official
owes to citizens is not limited to the
official’s formal votes on legislation.
It
includes the official’s behind-the-scenes
activities and influence in the legislation,
and it also includes other actions that the
official takes in an official capacity, not
what he does as a private individual but
what he does under the cloak of his office.
Urciuoli, 513 F.3d at 295 n.2 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The First Circuit ruled that the phrase “under the
cloak of his office” was overbroad under the circumstances
because lobbying mayors to obey state law cannot constitute a
deprivation of honest services.
See id. at 295.
While
Appellant reads Urciuoli to proclaim that acts like lobbying can
never be official acts, the First Circuit made no such
pronouncement.

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to a “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.”
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).

Frequently, they will.

When, as in the

Court's example, the Secretary of Education visits a local high
school, he may proceed to discuss matters of education policy
with the student body.

Surely, though, this discussion does not

have the purpose or effect of exerting some influence on those
policies.

Its function, rather, is to educate an audience of

students.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the

Secretary’s visit is a “‘decision or action on’” the question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy.
526

U.S.

at

407

(emphasis

supplied)

Sun-Diamond,

(quoting

18

U.S.C.

§ 201(a)(3)).
In view of these precedents, we are satisfied that the
reach of § 201(a)(3) is broad enough to encompass the customary
and

settled

purpose

or

practices
effect

of

of

an

those

office,

but

practices

only
is

to

insofar

as

a

influence

a

“question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” that
may be brought before the government.

18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).

It is with this principle in mind that we assess Appellant’s
contentions about the jury instructions in this case. 19

19

Appellant invokes a number of canons of statutory
interpretation that favor a narrow construction of “official
act.” As for his argument that the bribery laws should be void
for vagueness, the Supreme Court has already rejected a
challenge that the honest-services statute is unconstitutionally
(Continued)
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b.
Appellant
jury

an

accuses

“unprecedented

the

and

district

court

misleading”

of

giving

instruction

on

the
the

“official act” element.

Appellant’s Br. 51.

We disagree with

these characterizations.

First, the court’s instruction was not

unprecedented.

To a large extent, the instruction echoed the

“official

instruction

Second,

act”

the

correctly

instruction

stated,

in

here

consistent

United

was

not

with

States

v.

Jefferson. 20

misleading.

Birdsall,

The

that

court

the

term

“official action” “includes those actions that have been clearly
established by settled practice as part of a public official’s
position,

even

responsibilities

if

the

action

explicitly

was

assigned

not
by

taken

law.”

pursuant
J.A.

to

7671-72.

vague as applied to bribery. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928.
And because Appellant has “engage[d] in some conduct that is
clearly proscribed” by the Hobbs Act, he “cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18-19 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Appellant’s remaining
narrowing arguments -- which invoke federalism concerns, the
rule of lenity, and dicta in Sun-Diamond -- all presuppose
inherent ambiguity in the statutory term “official act.”
However, as we have explained, the term is sufficiently definite
as to make recourse to those canons unnecessary.
20

In Jefferson, we held that the following jury instruction
was not erroneous: “An act may be official even if it was not
taken pursuant to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law.
Rather, official acts include those activities that have been
clearly established by settled practice as part of a public
official’s position.” 674 F.3d at 353 (alteration omitted).

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The court then explained that the meaning of “official action”
is

tethered

to

decisions

or

actions

on

a

“question,

matter,

cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy” that may come before
the government.

See id. at 7671.
i.

Appellant
that

an

takes

official

issue

action

with

“‘can

include

furtherance of longer-term goals.’”
J.A. 7672).

the

court’s

instruction

actions

taken

in

Appellant’s Br. 56 (quoting

He argues that this instruction is too sweeping, as

“virtually anything could be in ‘furtherance’ of some goal.”
Id.

For

similar

instruction

that

reasons,
“‘an

Appellant

official

challenges

action

is

no

the

less

court’s
official

because it is one in a series of steps to exercise influence or
achieve an end.’”

Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting J.A. 7672).

We find no error in either of the court’s statements.
We observe, first, that the federal bribery statute,
18 U.S.C. § 201(b), from which the honest-services wire fraud
statute

draws

meaning,

criminalizes

the

act

of

“corruptly

demand[ing], seek[ing], receiv[ing], accept[ing], or agree[ing]
to receive or accept” a thing of value in return for influence.
18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2).

The solicitation or acceptance of the

bribe completes the crime, regardless of whether the recipient
completes, or even commences, the “official act” the bribe payor
sought to influence.

See Howard v. United States, 345 F.2d 126,
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128 (1st Cir. 1965) (“[I]t has been long established that the
crime of bribery is complete upon the acceptance of a bribe
regardless

of

taken.”).

The same is true of a Hobbs Act extortion charge.

See

Evans,

whether

504

U.S.

or

at

not

improper

268

action

(recognizing

is

that

thereafter

the

crime

of

extortion under color of official right is “completed at the
time when the public official receives a payment in return for
his agreement to perform specific official acts”); United States
v. Loftus, 992 F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1993).

In either case,

when prosecuting a bribe recipient, the Government need only
prove that he or she solicited or accepted the bribe in return
for performing, or being influenced in, some particular official
act.

Of importance, the consummation of an “official act” is

“not an element of the offense.”

Evans, 504 U.S. at 268.

We further observe that an “official act” may pertain
to matters outside of the bribe recipient’s control.

See 18

U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (providing that an act may be “official” so
long as the matter to be decided or acted upon “may by law be
brought

before

any

public

official”

(emphasis

supplied)).

Indeed, in Birdsall, the defendant-officers lacked any authority
to grant clemency; all they could provide was advice.
at 229-30.
indictments.

233 U.S.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld their bribery
See id. at 236.

Likewise, in Sears v. United

States, the First Circuit recognized that government inspectors
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were

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performing

an

“official”

Pg: 65 of 89

function,

for

purposes

of

two

shoemakers’ federal bribery charges, when they accepted payoffs
to disregard inadequacies in leather shoes destined for sale to
the Army.

264 F. 257, 261-62 (1st Cir. 1920).

As the court

stated:
The fact that these inspectors acted only in
a preliminary or in an advisory capacity,
and without final power to reject or accept,
does
not
prevent
their
duties
from
being official duties.
Final decisions
frequently, perhaps generally, rest in large
part upon the honesty and efficiency of
preliminary advice. . . .
To sustain the
contention of the defendants that these
inspectors were not performing an official
function would be to rule that the thousands
of inspectors employed to advise and assist
the government under the contracts for the
hundreds of millions of war supplies might
be bribed with impunity.
To state the
proposition is to reject it.
Id.
Our

decision

in

Jefferson

supports

the

proposition

that mere steps in furtherance of a final action or decision may
constitute an “official act.”
former
Trade

Louisiana
and

congressman

Investment

Nigeria,

was

Africa.

674 F.3d at 357.

bribery

and

“largely

Caucus

The defendant in that case was a
who,
and

responsible

honest-services

as
the
for

co-chair

of

the

Congressional
promoting

Africa

Caucus

trade”

on

with

A jury convicted Jefferson of both
wire

fraud,

based

in

part

on

allegations that he asked a telecommunications company to hire

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his

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family’s

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consulting

firm

Pg: 66 of 89

in

return

for

his

promote the company’s technology in Africa.

efforts

to

See id. at 338.

Jefferson’s efforts on the company’s behalf involved a series of
trips

and

performed

meetings.
by

In
in

Jefferson

particular,
exchange

we

for

explained,
the

“acts

various

bribe

payments included, inter alia”: “corresponding and visiting with
foreign

officials”;

certain

business

“[a]ttempting
ventures;

to

facilitate

“[s]cheduling

and

and

promote”

conducting

meetings”; and “seeking to secure construction contracts.”
at 356.

Id.

We were satisfied that these activities were in keeping

with Jefferson’s settled practice of serving constituents and
promoting trade in Africa and that, accordingly, the jury was
“entitled to conclude” that his actions “fall under the umbrella
of his ‘official acts.’”

Id. at 357-58.
ii.

Appellant
instruction

that

next

a

public

challenges
official

the

“need

district
not

have

court’s
actual

or

final authority over the end result sought by a bribe payor so
long as the alleged bribe payor reasonably believes that the
public official had influence, power or authority over a means
to the end sought by the bribe payor.”

J.A. 7672.

argues

law:

that

subjective

this
belief

is

a

cannot

misstatement
convert

66

a

of

a

non-official

Appellant

bribe
act

payor’s
into

an

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official

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one.

See

Pg: 67 of 89

Appellant’s

Br.

55.

Again,

we

are

unpersuaded.
The

first

part

indisputably correct. 21

of

the

court’s

instruction

is

In Wilson v. United States, we held that

a bribery conviction will stand regardless of whether the bribe
recipient “had actual authority to carry out his commitments
under the bribery scheme.”

230 F.2d 521, 526 (4th Cir. 1956).

There, a jury convicted an adjutant general of soliciting bribes
from an insurance salesman in exchange for the right to sell
insurance

at

Fort

Jackson

--

even

though

the

solicitations

occurred while the adjutant general was temporarily relieved of
his post. 22
lack

of

See id. at 523.

actual

authority

We deemed the adjutant general’s

“immaterial”:

“Regardless

of

his

actual authority, it was still within his practical power to
influence the regulation of insurance sales as it had formerly
21

Appellant’s own proposed jury instructions concede the
point, stating that a public official “can perform an ‘official
act’ when it is a settled practice as part of the official’s
position for him to exercise influence over a government
decision even if he does not have authority to make the final
decision himself.” J.A. 753.
22

The statute of conviction in Wilson was 18 U.S.C. § 202,
which authorized penalties for any federal officer or employee
who “asks [for], accepts, or receives” a thing of value “with
intent to have his decision or action on any question, matter,
cause, or proceeding which may at any time be pending, or which
may by law be brought before him in his official capacity, or in
his place of trust or profit, influenced thereby.”
18 U.S.C.
§ 202 (1952) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012)).

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been . . . .”

Pg: 68 of 89

Id. at 526; cf. United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d

460, 470 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that a Department of Justice
attorney committed an “official act” pursuant to § 201(c) when
he

forwarded

an

email

to

another

government

official

in

an

effort to expedite a foreign student’s visa application, even
though the attorney “lacked independent authority to expedite
visa applications”).
As to the second part of the court’s instruction, we
have no difficulty recognizing that proof of a bribe payor’s
subjective belief in the recipient’s power or influence over a
matter will support a conviction for extortion under color of
official right.

See United States v. Bencivengo, 749 F.3d 205,

212-13 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131,
134-35 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116
(6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1027
(8th Cir. 1978) (“The official need not control the function in
question if the extorted party possesses a reasonable belief in
the official’s powers.”).

As the First Circuit explained in

United States v. Hathaway, the phrase “under color of official
right” “includes the misuse of office to induce payments not
due.”

534 F.2d 386, 394 (1st Cir. 1976).

Accordingly, the

“relevant question” when contemplating a prosecution under this
statute is simply whether the government official “imparted and

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exploited a reasonable belief that he had effective influence
over” the subject of the bribe.
Plainly,
court’s

Hobbs

instruction

that

Act
a

Id.
principles

bribe

support

recipient’s

the

lack

district
of

actual

authority over a matter does not preclude “official act” status,
“so long as the alleged bribe payor reasonably believes” that
the recipient had “influence, power or authority over a means to
the end sought.”

J.A. 7672.

We are satisfied, therefore, that

this instruction was not erroneous with respect to the Hobbs Act
extortion charges.
It is less certain that a bribe payor’s subjective
belief in the recipient’s power or influence will suffice to
demonstrate an “official act” for purposes of an honest-services
wire fraud charge.

The “intangible right of honest services,”

after all, is a right held by the public.

See United States v.

Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008).

When a government

official agrees to influence a matter in exchange for money,
that official deprives the public of his “honest, faithful, and
disinterested
omitted).

services.”

Id.

(internal

quotation

marks

The third party who pays the government official may

be a constituent of the official, but he is no victim, and the
honest-services wire fraud statute does not seek to protect him.
Appellant’s argument, therefore, that the subjective
beliefs of a third party in an honest-services wire fraud case
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cannot

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“convert

debatable.

non-official

Appellant’s

Br.

Pg: 70 of 89

acts
55

into

official

(emphasis

omitted).

however, is not an issue that we need to decide.
court’s
would

instruction

be

on

harmless.

this

See

point

were

Ramos-Cruz,

F.3d

is

This,

Even if the

erroneous,

667

ones”

at

the

error

496.

As

Governor of Virginia, Appellant most certainly had power and
influence over the results Williams was seeking.

We have no

doubt that the jury’s verdict on the honest-services wire fraud
charge

would

have

been

the

same

even

if

the

instructions

required a finding that Appellant had the power to influence a
means to the end being sought.
Appellant has thus failed to show that the court’s
“official act” instructions, taken as a whole, were anything
less than a “fair and accurate statement of law.”
v. Smoot, 690 F.3d 215, 223 (4th Cir. 2012).
of

reversible

error

with

respect

to

the

United States

Appellant’s claim
“official

act”

instructions is therefore rejected.
c.
We likewise reject Appellant’s argument that the court
erred

in

refusing

to

give

meaning of “official act.”

his

proposed

instructions

on

the

We review a district court’s refusal

to give a specific jury instruction for abuse of discretion,
“and reverse only when the rejected instruction (1) was correct;
(2) was not substantially covered by the court’s charge to the
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jury;

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and

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(3)

dealt

with

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some

point

in

the

trial

so

important . . . that failure to give the requested instruction
seriously

impaired

the

defendant’s

ability

to

conduct

his

defense.”

United States v. Smith, 701 F.3d 1002, 1011 (4th Cir.

2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Appellant’s

proposed

instruction

contained

the

following passage:
[T]he fact that an activity is a routine
activity, or a “settled practice,” of an
office-holder does not alone make it an
“official act.”
Many settled practices of
government officials are not official acts
within the meaning of the statute.
For
example,
merely
arranging
a
meeting,
attending an event, hosting a reception, or
making a speech are not, standing alone,
“official acts,” even if they are settled
practices of the official.
A government
official’s decisions on who[m] to invite to
lunch, whether to attend an event, or
whether to attend a meeting or respond to a
phone call are not decisions on matters
pending before the government.
That is
because mere ingratiation and access are not
corruption.
J.A. 753.
This

passage

is

problematic

in

a

number

of

ways.

First, it is hardly evident that “[m]any” settled practices do
not qualify as “official acts.”

J.A. 753.

so, it is not a statement of law.

Even if this were

Rather, it seems to us a

thinly veiled attempt to argue the defense’s case.

71

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of

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misleading

the

jury,

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we

cannot

fault

the

justified

court

in

for

declining to give this instruction.
The
Appellant’s

court

was

assertion

likewise

that

“merely

arranging

rejecting
a

meeting,

attending an event, hosting a reception, or making a speech”
cannot constitute an “official act.”

As detailed above, neither

Sun-Diamond nor any other precedent sweeps so broadly.
Moving on, Appellant has also failed to explain why
the court should have instructed the jury that “decisions on
who[m]

to

invite

to

lunch,

whether

to

attend

an

event,

or

whether to attend a meeting or respond to a phone call are not
decisions on matters pending before the government.”

J.A. 753.

Even if we assume that most such decisions would not qualify as
official

acts,

never do so.

we

cannot

accept

the

assertion

that

they

may

Here, again, the proposed instruction goes too

far.
Finally,
refusing

to

we

hold

that

the

the

jury,

in

instruct

court

did

language

not

err

borrowed

in

from

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310,
361

(2010),

corruption.”

that

“mere

J.A. 753.

ingratiation

and

access

are

not

Affording the talismanic significance

Appellant assigns to this language ignores its context; Citizens
United, a campaign-finance case, involved neither the honestservices

statute

nor

the

Hobbs
72

Act.

Moreover,

the

Citizens

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employed

the

Pg: 73 of 89

“ingratiation”

language

only

after

providing a much broader definition of corruption: “The hallmark
of

corruption

is

the

political favors.”

financial

quid

pro

quo:

dollars

for

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

In the case at hand, this broader

definition was “substantially covered by the court’s charge to
the jury.”

Smith, 701 F.3d at 1011 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Thus, the court’s failure to include this language

did not “impair[]” Appellant’s “ability to conduct his defense.”
Id.

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

The

district

court

instructed the jury that “there would be no crime” as long as
Appellant

“believed

in

good

faith

that

he

. . . was

properly, even if he . . . was mistaken in that belief.”
7692.

acting
J.A.

Appellant was thus free to argue that he believed in good

faith that any ingratiation or access he provided Williams was
entirely proper.

If the jury believed that, it would have had

no choice but to acquit him.
Taken as a whole, Appellant’s proposed instruction on
the meaning of “official act” failed to present the district
court with a correct statement of law.

He cannot now argue that

the court’s refusal to give that instruction was an abuse of
discretion.

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3.
Quid Pro Quo
Appellant

also

contests

the

court’s

instructions

on

the “quid pro quo” elements of honest-services wire fraud and
Hobbs Act extortion, maintaining that the court’s gloss on this
term would criminalize the lawful receipt of “goodwill” gifts to
lawmakers.
In this context, the term “quid pro quo” refers to “an
intent on the part of the public official to perform acts on his
payor’s behalf.”
Diamond,

526

specific

intent

Jefferson, 674 F.3d at 358; see also Sun-

U.S.

at

to

404-05

give

(defining

or

receive

“quid

pro

something

quo

exchange for an official act” (emphasis omitted)).

“a

value

of

as

in

Accordingly,

in its instructions on the honest-services wire fraud charge,
the

district

court

explained

that

the

jury

must

find

that

Appellant demanded or received the item of value “corruptly” -i.e., with an “improper motive or purpose.”
United

States

(defining

v.

Quinn,

“[c]orrupt

359

F.3d

intent”

666,

under

J.A. 7669-70; see

674

18

(4th

Cir.

U.S.C.

2004)

§ 201(b)).

Likewise, in its Hobbs Act instruction, the court stated that
Appellant must have “obtained a thing of value to which he was
not

entitled,

knowing

that

return for official action.”

the

thing

of

value

was

given

in

J.A. 7682; see Evans, 504 U.S. at

268.
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contention

that

In particular, Appellant asserts that the court
the

jury

aware

of

a

that

court’s

incomplete.

make

rather,

the

were

to

but,

not

instructions

failed

incorrect

is

critical

they

were

limitation

on

bribery liability when it neglected to state, per his proposed
instructions,

that

“[a]

gift

or

payment

given

with

the

generalized hope of some unspecified future benefit is not a
bribe.”

J.A. 751; accord id. at 756.

Appellant claims that

this omission seriously impaired his defense because “a central
defense theory was that Governor McDonnell believed Williams was
simply trying to cultivate goodwill.”

Appellant’s Br. 59-60.

Appellant’s statement of the law is correct, so far as
it goes.

See United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1013

(4th Cir. 1998).

“It is universally recognized that bribery

occurs only if the gift is coupled with a particular criminal
intent.

That intent is not supplied merely by the fact that the

gift was motivated by some generalized hope or expectation of
ultimate benefit on the part of the donor.”

United States v.

Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted)
(reversing

a

conviction

for

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 656).

misapplication

of

bank

funds

The bribe payor must have more

than a “‘[v]ague expectation[]’” that the public official will
reward his kindness, somehow or other.

Jennings, 160 F.3d at

1013 (quoting United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir.
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1993)).

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He must harbor an intent to secure a “specific type of

official action or favor in return” for his largesse.

Id. at

1014 (emphasis omitted).
The Government never disputed these points.
there

is

little

reason

to

doubt

that

if

the

Indeed,

defense

had

submitted a written instruction relating to goodwill gifts, the
court would have accepted it.
thing.

Instead,

its

However, the defense did no such

proposed

“goodwill

gift”

language

was

tucked into the penultimate sentence of the defense’s proposed
instructions on the definition of “corruptly,” see J.A. 751,
756, a term the court took care to explicate, see id. at 7670
(explaining that bribery requires a corrupt intent -- meaning,
here, that the public official must demand, seek, or receive the
item

of

purpose”).

value

“knowingly

As

outlined

and
above,

dishonestly
the

for

court

a

wrongful

emphasized

the

essentiality of the prosecution’s burden to prove corrupt intent
when it instructed the jury on Appellant’s “good faith” defense.
See J.A. 7692 (charging the jury that “if a defendant believed
in good faith that he or she was acting properly, even if he or
she was mistaken in that belief, and even if others were injured
by his or her conduct, there would be no crime”).

Appellant was

adamant, during the trial conference, about the importance of
his “good faith” defense in this case, referring to it as “our
critical defense.”

Id. at 7360.
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It is not enough, in any event, for Appellant to show
that his proposed instructions contained a correct statement of
law.

If,

as

it

happens,

the

rejected

instruction

was

“substantially covered by the court’s charge to the jury,” there
is no reversible error.

United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207,

221 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Put

succinctly, we are satisfied that the court’s “quid pro quo”
instructions were adequate.

In its Hobbs Act instruction, the

court made clear that extortion under color of official right
requires an intent to have the public official “take specific
official action on the payor’s behalf.”
supplied).

Similarly,

in

its

J.A. 7682-83 (emphasis

instruction

on

honest-services

wire fraud, the court referred to the “quo” in a quid pro quo
exchange as “the requested official action” -- signaling that an
official action necessarily entails some particular type of act
within the parties’ contemplation at the time of the exchange.
Id. at 7669.
In

sum,

we

are

satisfied

that

the

court

properly

instructed the jury on the “quid pro quo” requirement of the
charged offenses.

Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s claim of

instructional error in that respect.

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B.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
This

leads

us

to

was

Appellant’s

claim

support

the

evidence

convictions.

“We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the

279 (4th Cir. 2015).
favorable
evidence

to
to

verdict.
Cir.

the

to

the

Government’s

evidence de novo . . . .”

insufficient

that

United States v. Bran, 776 F.3d 276,

If, viewing the evidence in the light most

Government,

support

the

we

find

conviction,

there

we

will

is

substantial

affirm

the

jury

See United States v. Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 179 (4th

2013).

reasonable

“Substantial
finder

of

evidence

fact

is

could

such

accept

evidence
as

that

adequate

a

and

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.”
To
Williams

review,

and

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
the

Appellant

Government

engaged

in

set
a

out

corrupt

to

prove

quid

that

pro

Williams, we know, supplied the “quid,” and plenty of it.

quo.
Among

other things, he provided Appellant’s family -- generally at the
behest of Appellant or Mrs. McDonnell -- with multiple fivefigure payments and loans, expensive getaways, shopping trips,
golf outings, and a Rolex watch.

The greater challenge for the

Government was persuading the jury that Williams’s payments to
Appellant
Government

and
was

his

family

obligated

were
to

“pro

prove,
78

quo.”

In

first,

that

short,

the

Williams’s

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payments came with a corrupt understanding and, second, that the
key to that understanding was the expectation that Appellant
would perform certain official acts for Williams’s benefit.
1.
Evidence of Official Acts
In the first place, we reject Appellant’s contention
that the Government’s evidence cannot satisfy the “official act”
requirement.
An “official act,” as defined by statute, requires the
existence of some “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
controversy.”
presented

18

U.S.C.

evidence

of

§ 201(a)(3).
three

questions

Appellant’s sphere of influence.
researchers
initiate

a

at

any

study

state-created

of

of

or

the

Government

matters

within

The first of these was whether

Virginia’s

Anatabloc.

Tobacco

Here,

state

The

universities

second

Indemnification

was

would

whether

and

the

Community

Revitalization Commission (“Tobacco Commission”) would allocate
grant money for the study of anatabine.

The third was whether

the health insurance plan for state employees in Virginia would
include Anatabloc as a covered drug.
These were all government matters, and Appellant, as
head of the Commonwealth’s government, was in a prime position
to affect their disposition.

The Constitution of Virginia vests

the

chief

Governor

with

“[t]he

79

executive

power

of

the

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Commonwealth.”

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Va. Const. art. V., § 1.

State law provides

that the Governor “shall have the authority and responsibility
for the formulation and administration of the policies of the
executive branch.”
include

the

provided
level.

Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-103.A.

authority

to

to

approve

public-sector

the

employees

health

at

See id. §§ 2.2-1204.A, -2818.A.

the

These powers

insurance
state

and

plans
local

In addition, among his

myriad other powers, the Governor appoints 12 of the 13 members
of the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, see id.
§ 23-9.3.C.; all members serving on the boards of visitors of
Virginia Commonwealth University and the University of Virginia,
see id. §§ 23-50.6(a), -70.A; and a majority of commissioners on
the Tobacco Commission, see id. § 3.2-3102.A.
With

power

comes

influence.

As

the

witness

Jerry

Kilgore, Star’s lawyer, put it: “[T]he Governor is the Chief
Executive of the Commonwealth.
will,

to

go
at

evidence

out

and

trial

talk

made

He has this bully pulpit, if you

about

clear

issues.”
that

Star

J.A.

4374.

executives

The
wanted

Appellant to use his prominence and influence to the company’s
advantage.

See e.g., id. at 3898 (former Star President Perito

testifying

that

when

“the

Commonwealth . . . embraces

Chief

the

Executive

worthiness

of
of

the
the

product[,] . . . [i]t gives it a type of credibility”); see also
id.

at

2314

(Williams

testifying
80

that

the

opportunity

to

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“showcase” a product at the Governor’s Mansion “automatically”
imbues the product with “credibility”).
To

the

extent,

then,

that

Appellant

made

any

“decision” or took any “action” on these matters, the federal
bribery

laws

“official.”

would

hold

that

decision

18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).

or

action

to

be

As we have explained, it

was not necessary for the Government to prove that Appellant
actually took any such official action.
to

show

was

that

the

allegedly

What the Government had

corrupt

agreement

between

Appellant and Williams carried with it an expectation that some
type of official action would be taken.

See United States v.

Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 973 (7th Cir. 2001).
exceeded its burden.

Here, the Government

It showed that Appellant did, in fact, use

the power of his office to influence governmental decisions on
each of the three questions and matters discussed above.
First, in August 2011, Appellant asked his Secretary
of Health, Dr. Hazel, to send a deputy to a “short briefing”
with Mrs. McDonnell at the Governor’s mansion.

In his email to

Hazel, Appellant made clear that the subject of the briefing
would be “the Star Scientific anatablock trials planned in va at
vcu and uva.”
one

staffer,

G.S.A. 80.
Molly

Naturally, the staff complied.

Huffstetler,

wrote

in

an

email

to

As
her

colleagues: “[W]e will do what we can to carry out the desires
of the Governor and First Lady.”
81

Id. at 81.

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That

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same

month,

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Appellant

and

his

wife

hosted

product launch for Anatabloc at the Governor’s Mansion.

a

Prior

to the event, Mrs. McDonnell explained to a staff member that
one

of

the

universities

purposes
to

do

of

the

research

on

event
the

was

to

“encourag[e]

product.”

J.A.

3608.

Invitees included Dr. Clore, an associate vice president for
clinical research at VCU, and Dr. Lazo, former associate dean
for basic research at the UVA School of Medicine.

Appellant

spoke with Lazo, asking him and other attendees whether they
thought “there was some scientific validity” to the pre-clinical
studies of Anatabloc presented at the event and “whether or not
there was any reason to explore this further; would it help to
have additional information.”

J.A. 3344.

Appellant also asked

whether the development of Anatabloc could “be something good
for

the

Commonwealth,

particularly

economy or job creation.”

as

it

relates

to

[the]

Id.

A series of emails exchanged in February 2012 between
Appellant,

his

wife,

and

chief

counsel

Eige

shows

Appellant

continuing to push for state university research on Anatabloc.
In a February 17 email, Appellant told Eige: “Pls see me about
anatabloc issues at VCU and UVA. Thx.”

G.S.A. 157.

Eige would

later express his discomfort with Appellant’s involvement in the
issue, telling Kilgore: “I’ve been asked by the Governor to call
and put -- you know, show support for this research, and I’m
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just -- I just don’t think we should be doing it.”

J.A. 4374

(internal quotation marks omitted).
Just a week before Appellant’s email to Eige, Mrs.
McDonnell sent a series of emails of her own asking Eige to get
in touch with Williams.

The first email bore the subject line:

“FW: Anatabine clinical studies – UVA, VCU, JHU.”

This email

said that Williams “has calls in to VCU & UVA & no one will
return his calls.”

G.S.A. 147.

The next day, while sitting

right next to Appellant, Mrs. McDonnell emailed Eige again:
Pls call Jonnie today [and] get him to fill
u in on where this is at. Gov wants to know
why nothing has developed w studies after
Jonnie gave $200,000. . . .
Gov wants to
get this going w VCU MCV.
Pls let us know
what u find out after we return.
Id. at 154.

The email included Williams’s cell phone number.

Eige later testified that he understood the emails to mean that
Mrs.

McDonnell

wanted

him

to

“[s]omehow

reach

out

and

see . . . if we couldn’t elicit some type of response from these
two universities.”

J.A. 3214.

Appellant
staffer

to

attend

argues
a

that

these

briefing,

actions

questioning

-a

asking

a

university

researcher at a product launch, and directing a policy advisor
to

“see”

him

about

an

constitute official acts.

issue

--

are

We disagree.

too

insignificant

to

With each of these

acts, Appellant exploited the power of his office in furtherance

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of an ongoing effort to influence the work of state university
researchers.
a

Accordingly, a reasonable juror could find, beyond

reasonable

doubt,

that

the

actions

contemplated

under

Appellant’s agreement with Williams were “official” in nature.
A

jury

could

likewise

conclude

that

Appellant

performed an “official” act when he discussed Anatabloc at the
March

2012

officials:

meeting

with

Secretary

of

two

high-ranking

Administration

administration

Hicks-Thomas

and

Department of Human Resource Management Director Sara Wilson.
There,

amid

a

discussion

about

the

state

employee

health

insurance plan, Appellant pulled a bottle of Anatabloc from his
pocket and showed the pills to Hicks-Thomas and Wilson.

As

Hicks-Thomas recalled, Appellant “said that he had been taking
[the pills] and that they were working well for him, and that he
thought it would be good for . . . state employees.”

J.A. 4227.

Appellant then asked Hicks-Thomas and Wilson if they would be
willing to meet with Star.
that

Appellant

used

his

Here, again, the evidence suggests

position

matter of importance to Virginia.

as

Governor

to

influence

a

This evidence was more than

sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
2.
Evidence of a Quid Pro Quo
Next

we

turn

to

whether

the

Government

presented

evidence sufficient to support a conclusion that there was a
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corrupt quid pro quo, “a specific intent to give or receive
something

of

value

in

exchange

for

an

official

act.”

Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404–05 (emphasis omitted).

Sun-

To establish

the necessary intent, the Government had to present evidence of
“an exchange of money (or gifts) for specific official action.”
Jennings, 160 F.3d at 1014.
not

necessary,

and

“[s]uch

circumstantial evidence.”
At

trial,

Direct proof of a corrupt intent is

the

an

intent

may

be

established

by

Id.
Government

presented

evidence to show Appellant’s corrupt intent.

an

array

of

Critically, the

Government’s evidence demonstrated a close relationship between
Appellant’s

official

acts

and

the

money,

loans,

gifts,

and

favors provided by Williams to Appellant and Mrs. McDonnell.
With respect to the official acts alleged by the Government, a
“quo” came on the heels of each “quid.”

For example:

•

Between July 28 and July 31, 2011,
Williams provided lodging, transportation,
and a boat for the McDonnells’ Smith
Mountain Lake vacation.
Upon returning
home on July 31 -- after a three-hour trip
home in Williams’s Ferrari -- Appellant
directed Hazel to send a deputy to meet
with Mrs. McDonnell about Anatabloc.
On
August 1, Huffstetler, Williams, and Mrs.
McDonnell met at the Governor’s Mansion to
discuss Anatabloc clinical trials at UVA
and VCU.

•

Later that month, on August 31, 2011,
McDonnell hosted the launch of Anatabloc
at
the
Governor’s
Mansion.
State
employees
arranged
the
event,
and
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invitations
to
the
launch
bore
the
Governor’s seal.
UVA and VCU researchers
attended as invited representatives of
their institutions, boxes of Anatabloc
were placed at each place setting, and
Williams and Mrs. McDonnell spoke at the
event.
•

Between February and March 2012, Appellant
and Williams had a series of discussions
regarding a $50,000 so-called loan.
On
February 16, Appellant checked in with
Williams about documents relating to the
monies.
Six minutes later, Appellant
emailed Eige, asking Eige to see him about
the Anatabloc studies.

•

During these payment negotiations, Mrs.
McDonnell
and
Appellant
encouraged
Williams to “invite all the doctors that
[he] want[ed] to invite” to the healthcare
industry leaders reception held at the
Governor’s Mansion on February 29.
J.A.
2312. The list of invitees for the event
was revised to include Williams’s guests
at the direction of Appellant and Mrs.
McDonnell.

•

On the day of the healthcare leaders
event, Appellant met with Williams about a
loan of Star Scientific shares worth
$187,000.
J.A. 6767-72.
Less than five
hours later, Appellant saw Williams at the
event. Appellant’s briefing materials for
the evening specifically identified the
“[p]ersonal doctors of McDonnells,” which
included
Williams’s
guests,
doctors
affiliated with Anatabloc.
J.A. 6775.
Following
the
event,
Williams
took
Appellant, Mrs. McDonnell, and two of
these doctors out to dinner.

•

On March 6, 2012, as a result of the
negotiations, Williams wrote a $50,000
check to Mobo.
Then, on March 21,
Appellant met with Hicks-Thomas to discuss
covering Anatabloc under the state health
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plan.
Appellant also asked Hicks-Thomas
to meet with Star representatives.
The temporal relationship between the “quids” and “quos” -- the
gifts, payments,

loans,

and

favors

and

the

official

acts

--

constitute compelling evidence of corrupt intent.
Throughout the two years during which Appellant was
performing

the

official

acts

alleged,

Williams

lavished

Appellant with shopping sprees, money, loans, golf outings, and
vacations:
•

In April 2011, Mrs. McDonnell contacted
Williams about a political rally and
shopping in New York.
On April 13,
Williams spent approximately $20,000 on
Mrs. McDonnell’s New York City shopping
spree. That evening, Williams sat next to
Appellant
and
his
wife
during
the
political rally.

•

In
May
2011,
Williams
loaned
the
McDonnells $50,000 and provided $15,000 to
cover the McDonnells’ daughter’s wedding
reception.
When she requested the loan,
Mrs. McDonnell said, “The Governor says
it’s okay for me to help you and -- but I
need you to help me.” J.A. 2231 (internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
In
the
meantime, Appellant passed an article
about Anatabloc along to members of his
administration.

•

On May 29, 2011, Williams paid $2,380.24
for Appellant and his sons to enjoy golf
and amenities at Kinloch Golf Club.

•

On January 7, Williams paid $1,368.91 for
another of Appellant’s golf outings.

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During the 2012 Memorial Day weekend,
Williams
footed
the
bill
for
the
McDonnells’ vacation, spending more than
$7,300.

None of these payments were goodwill gifts from one friend to
another.
until

Indeed, Appellant and Williams did not know each other

after

Appellant

was

elected

Governor.

As

Williams

testified with regard to the money he provided, “I was loaning
[Appellant] money so that he would help our company.”
2360.

He

expected

Appellant

“to

help

me

move

Id. at

this

product

forward in Virginia” by “assisting with the universities, with
the

testing,

or

help

with

supporting the product.”

government

Id. at 2355.

employees,

or

publicly

And since at least their

shared cross-country flight in October 2010, Appellant knew what
Williams

wanted

for

his

company:

independent

studies

of

Anatabloc conducted by Virginia universities.
This

evidence

established

that

Appellant

received

money, loans, favors, and gifts from Williams in exchange for
official acts to help Williams secure independent testing of
Anatabloc.

In light of the foregoing, the jury could readily

infer that there were multiple quid pro quo payments, and that
Appellant

acted

in

the

necessary corrupt intent.

absence

of

good

faith

and

with

the

See United States v. Hamilton, 701

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F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[I]ntent can be implied -- and
it is the jury’s role to make such factual inferences.”). 23
In sum, Appellant has thereby failed to sustain his
heavy

burden

inadequate.

of

showing

that

the

Government’s

evidence

was

See United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th

Cir. 2012) (“A defendant bringing a sufficiency challenge must
overcome a heavy burden, and reversal for insufficiency must be
confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.”
(citations

omitted)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted)).

Accordingly, the trial evidence was sufficient to support each
of Appellant’s convictions.
IV.
Appellant received a fair trial and was duly convicted
by a jury of his fellow Virginians.
what has been done.

We have no cause to undo

The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

23

Significantly, the jury found the necessary corrupt
intent despite being instructed extensively on Appellant’s “good
faith” defense and hearing from an array of witnesses who
testified to Appellant’s honesty, integrity, respect for the
law, and good character. The jury was instructed not only that
“if a defendant believed in good faith that he or she was acting
properly . . . there would be no crime,” but also that “evidence
of good character alone may create a reasonable doubt as to a
defendant’s guilt.” See J.A. 7692, 7694. Appellant’s character
witnesses included cabinet members from his time as Governor of
Virginia, as well as longtime friends such as Father Timothy R.
Scully, a Catholic priest and University of Notre Dame professor
who met Appellant in 1972 when they became college roommates.

89