US v. Mario Taylor

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cr-00253-MOC-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999774309].. [15-4029]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4029

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MARIO MARQUISE TAYLOR,
Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00253-MOC-1)

Argued:

January 28, 2016

Decided:

March 15, 2016

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Ann Loraine Hester, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Amy
Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Ross Hall Richardson,
Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INC.,
Charlotte,
North
Carolina,
for
Appellant.
Jill
Westmoreland Rose, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Mario Marquise Taylor was charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm after officers found a gun near a car in
which

Taylor

Taylor’s.
obtained

was
He

a

passenger.

moved

during

the

to

The

suppress

encounter

with

DNA

on

evidence
police,

the

gun

of

his

arguing

matched
identity

that

the

officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and question the
car’s occupants.

The district court denied Taylor’s motion in a

decision that Taylor now appeals.

For the reasons explained

below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background
Officers Aaron Skipper and Todd Watson were patrolling on
their motorcycles on November 26, 2012, investigating an area of
Charlotte,
reported.

North

Carolina,

where

a

burglary

was

recently

The officers saw Taylor, Preston Fields, and Marquise

Randolph pass by in a blue Crown Victoria.

The officers noted

that the men “either look[ed] away or look[ed] down” as they
drove past.

J.A. 120.

Finding this suspicious, the officers

turned to follow the car, which rounded a bend and accelerated
from

approximately

35

to

50

miles

per

hour.

The

car

then

“turned into a driveway in an abrupt motion,” braking quickly
such that it “nose dived.”

J.A. 450.

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the

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officers

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approached,

they

saw

that

Taylor’s

passenger side window was rolled down and his hand was extended
outside the car, despite the “very cool” temperature.

J.A. 97.

They drove past the Crown Victoria and parked in a field on the
opposite side of the street, 60 to 75 feet away.

From there,

the officers watched Fields get out of the car and knock on the
front door of the house adjoining the driveway where he had
parked.

No one answered, and Fields returned to the car.

After observing the three men sit in the car for about 45
seconds without moving, the officers pulled their motorcycles
into a gravel area beside the driveway, about 20 feet behind the
rear left of the Crown Victoria.

Officer Skipper approached to

question the driver, while Watson remained about 15 to 20 feet
behind the car and off to the side, so that he could keep an eye
on the scene.
Officer Skipper asked Fields if anyone was home, and Fields
explained that he and his companions had come to meet someone
there but that no one answered.

Skipper asked if anyone had an

ID, and Fields handed over his ID while Taylor and Randolph gave
their names.

Skipper proceeded to question the men and conduct

consensual searches, finding no drugs or weapons.
Meanwhile,

Officer

Watson

received

a

call

from

dispatch

that a bus passenger had seen a firearm lying in the grass near
where two motorcycle officers were talking with some men.
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investigation, Watson found a loaded Taurus .38 caliber revolver
in the grass, about 75 feet away from the Crown Victoria, which
had passed the spot before parking.

The gun was on the side of

the road Taylor’s window had faced.
DNA analysis showed DNA of at least three people on the
gun’s grip, with one strong profile considered a “partial major”
profile.

J.A. 548.

The partial major profile was later matched

to a DNA sample from Taylor that was previously obtained and on
file.
A federal grand jury returned an indictment against Taylor,
charging him with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Taylor unsuccessfully

moved to suppress evidence of his identity obtained during his
encounter with Officers Skipper and Watson.
the

jury

returned

a

guilty

verdict,

and

Following a trial,
the

district

court

sentenced Taylor to 54 months’ imprisonment.
Taylor timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Discussion
A.
Taylor’s primary argument on appeal is that the district
court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence of his
identity.

In his view, the court should not have concluded that
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Officers Skipper and Watson had reasonable suspicion to initiate
the stop that led to their obtaining Taylor’s identity.
We

review

factual

findings

underlying

the

denial

of

a

motion to suppress for clear error and legal determinations de
novo.

United States v. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 2015).

Because the district court denied Taylor’s motion, we construe
the

evidence

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

government.

United States v. Green, 740 F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir. 2014).

We

“accord particular deference to a district court’s credibility
determinations,”
observing

the

because

of

witnesses

“the

and

of

district

weighing

court’s

their

role

of

credibility.”

United States v. Hilton, 701 F.3d 959, 964 (4th Cir. 2012).
Under the Fourth Amendment, “an investigatory detention of
a

citizen

by

an

officer

must

be

supported

by

reasonable

articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal
activity.”

United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 537 (4th Cir.

2013) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1967)).
assume

without

deciding

that

the

encounter

Here, we

constituted

“an

investigatory detention” –- or, in other words, a “seizure” –and we move directly to the issue of whether the officers acted
on a reasonable suspicion.
In

assessing

reasonable

suspicion,

we

“look

at

the

‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the
detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for
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suspecting legal wrongdoing.”

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United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.

266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417-18 (1981)).

An “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or

hunch” is insufficient.
246

(4th

Cir.

United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243,

2011).

Still,

“the

likelihood

of

criminal

activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause,
and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of
the evidence standard.”

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274.

Factors to be

considered include “the context of the stop, the crime rate in
the area, and the nervous or evasive behavior of the suspect.”
United States v. George, 732 F.3d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 2013).
Here, a number of factors would have given an officer an
objective basis to suspect that the men in the Crown Victoria
were up to some illegal activity.

As the district court noted,

the officers saw the men avert their eyes, away both from the
officers and from where on the road the officers testified a
normal

person

would

have

been

looking

while

driving.

This

conduct would have immediately aroused some level of suspicion,
given that the officers were investigating a recent burglary.
At

that

point,

the

officers

may

yet

have

lacked

reasonable

suspicion, but the Crown Victoria proceeded in a matter that
erased that doubt.

That is, after passing the officers, the

driver accelerated rapidly from around 35 to 50 miles per hour,
seemed to speed up even more when out of sight, and then turned
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“abrupt[ly]” to “nose dive[]” into a driveway.
objective

officer

could

view

that

manner

J.A. 450.

of

driving

as

An
an

attempt to get off the road and hide –- an inference that is
further supported by the fact that no one responded when Fields
knocked on the front door of the house.

The overall sequence of

apparently evasive conduct provided Officers Skipper and Watson
with reasonable suspicion to initiate the brief encounter that
led to the evidence of Taylor’s identity. *

The district court

did not err in denying Taylor’s motion to dismiss.

B.
Taylor

raises

two

additional

likewise find unpersuasive.

issues

on

appeal

that

we

First, he asserts that, contrary to

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the government had a
racially discriminatory purpose for using a preemptory strike
against the only remaining black juror, Ms. Robinson.
the

government

had

explained

that

Ms.

Robinson

had

At trial,
a

“meek

voice” and “hearing issues,” “look[ed] lost in the courtroom,
with

a

lost

look

in

her

eyes,”

*

and

when

asked

a

follow-up

Two additional factors the district court cited –- the
open window and the delay in leaving the driveway after knocking
on the door –- are more ambiguous.
While neither of these
factors is particularly indicative of criminal activity standing
alone, they could conceivably bolster the officers’ suspicion
when considered as part of the “totality of the circumstances.”
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. All the same, the circumstances noted
above adequately establish reasonable suspicion such that we
need not rely on these other factors.
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about

guns,

“could

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not

explain

why

district

court

consequently

accepted

found

that

this

Taylor

not
The

explanation

and

race-neutral

that

would

J.A. 335-36.

explain why, and would not make eye contact.”

had

and

not

“established

purposeful discrimination,” as is required for a defendant to
prevail on a Batson challenge.

476 U.S. at 98.

We review a district court’s finding regarding a Batson
challenge for clear error.
(4th

Cir.

1995).

discriminatory

district

Because

intent

credibility,”

Batson,

court’s

Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421
findings

“largely

will

476

U.S.

decision

at

on

turn
98

“great

the

on

n.21,

issue

of

evaluation
we

deference

accord
on

of
the

appeal.”

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991).
Here,
district
The

that

deference

court’s

court’s

rationale.

decision

own

findings

leads
to

us

deny

to

find

Taylor’s

confirmed

the

no

error

Batson

in

the

challenge.

government’s

stated

The court agreed that Ms. Robinson was “somewhat

distracted” and “much more uncomfortable than the rest of the
folks on the panel.”
“[e]ye

contact

is

a

J.A. 338.
big

thing”

Further, it explained that
and

that

“the

reasons for taking that juror off do ring true.”
Taylor

insists

that

the

district

court

failed

government’s
J.A. 339-40.
to

conduct

a

“comparative juror analysis,” see United States v. Barnette, 644
F.3d 192, 205 (4th Cir. 2011), but the district court made such
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a finding: It stated unequivocally that the juror appeared “much
more uncomfortable than the rest of the folks on the panel.”
J.A.

338.

Any

potential

deficiency

in

the

district

court’s

analysis falls far short of clear error.
Second, Taylor asserts that the district court erred in
giving

an

firearm.

instruction

as

to

constructive

possession

of

the

He contends that no evidence supported constructive

possession -- as opposed to actual possession –- and that the
instruction therefore may have confused the jury.

See United

States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d 456, 463 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating
that a jury instruction is proper “only if there is a foundation
in evidence to support” it).

This Court reviews a district

court’s “decision to give or not to give a jury instruction
. . . for an abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Moye, 454

F.3d 390, 397-98 (4th Cir. 2006).
We

find

discretion

by

that

the

giving

district

the

court

constructive

did

not

possession

abuse

its

instruction.

The record provides factual support for the instruction.

Given

the possibility that someone other than Taylor threw the gun
from the car, Taylor’s DNA and position in the car could suggest
he nonetheless had control over the gun.
Blue,

957

constructive
showing

F.2d

106,

107

possession,

ownership,

(4th

the

dominion,

Cir.

1992)

government
or
9

See United States v.

control

(“[T]o

must
over

establish

produce
the

evidence

contraband

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itself or the premises or vehicle in which the contraband is
concealed.”).

As the district court observed, “If [the gun] was

close enough for him to drop sweat on it, it had to be close
enough for him that he could have constructively possessed it.”
J.A. 623.

In any event, we are satisfied that any error would

be harmless.

See United States v. McCoy, 767 F.2d 395, 398 (7th

Cir. 1985) (holding that a constructive possession instruction
constituted

harmless

error).

Taylor

provides

no

reason

to

conclude that the constructive possession instruction, which was
an accurate statement of law, would have confused the jury in
its application of an actual possession theory.

See Dawson v.

United States, 702 F.3d 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2012) (“As in McCoy,
the jury in Dawson’s trial is unlikely to have been confused by
the instruction.”).

III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.

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