US v. William McLaughlin

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:14-cr-00097-F-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999711181].. [15-4067]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4067

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM EARL MCLAUGHLIN,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00097-F-1)

Submitted:

October 30, 2015

Decided:

December 3, 2015

Before KING, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
William

Earl

McLaughlin

challenges

the

reasonableness

of

the 30-month sentence imposed by the district court following
his conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, for bank theft, in
violation

of

18

U.S.C.

§

2113(b)

(2012).

In

imposing

the

sentence, the district court departed upward from the Sentencing
Guidelines range, concluding that McLaughlin’s criminal history
category

“substantially

underrepresent[ed]

the

seriousness

of

[his] criminal history or the likelihood that [he] will commit
other crimes.”
(2013).

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3, p.s.

We affirm.

We “review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.”
38, 41 (2007).
procedural

totality
“whether

Where, as here, the defendant does not assert

sentencing

substantive

error,

reasonableness

of
the

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

the

of

we
the

circumstances,”

sentencing

turn

court

our

attention

sentence,
id.

at

abused

51,
its

to

considering
and

the
“the

determining

discretion

in

concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards
set forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)],” United States v.
Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation
marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 305 (2014), and cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 384 (2014).

“An appellate court owes ‘due
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deference’ to a district court’s assessment of the § 3553(a)
factors,

and

mere

disagreement

with

the

‘insufficient

to

justify

reversal

of

United

v.

Howard,

773

519,

States

F.3d

sentence

the

below

district

531

(4th

is

court.’”

Cir.

2014)

(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
McLaughlin
discretion

by

contends
upwardly

that

the

departing

district
under

court

USSG

§

abused

4A1.3,

its

p.s.,

because his criminal history, though lengthy, primarily included
misdemeanor convictions and non-violent offenses.
that

the

history.

court

relied

too

heavily

upon

his

He contends

early

criminal

The district court noted, however, that McLaughlin,

currently age 51, began his criminal conduct at age 16, and “has
consistently stolen from, robbed, and burglarized others since
that time.”

The court noted McLaughlin’s history for violent

offenses, including robbery with a dangerous weapon, breaking
and

entering,

and

assault

on

a

female.

The

court

also

considered that McLaughlin had been convicted of driving while
impaired

and

failure

to

stop

for

a

involve a risk of danger to others.

blue

light—offenses

that

Although the majority of

McLaughlin’s convictions were for misdemeanor offenses, we note
that nothing in the language of USSG § 4A1.3, p.s., prevented
the district court from relying on these unscored convictions in
assessing McLaughlin’s criminal history, and we conclude that it
did not abuse its discretion by doing so.
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McLaughlin also argues that the district court failed to
properly consider all the sentencing factors, particularly the
nature

and

circumstances

sentencing

court

is

of

the

required

instant

to

offense.

consider

all

the

While

the

sentencing

factors, it “need not ‘explicitly discuss’ each factor ‘on the
record’

or

‘robotically

subsection.’”

tick

through

§

3553(a)’s

every

United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105

(4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339,
345 (4th Cir. 2006)).

Although the court did not expressly

discuss each of the sentencing factors, it is evident from the
record that the court considered all the factors, including the
nature and circumstances of the instant offense.
McLaughlin next argues that his departure sentence creates
unwarranted

sentencing

disparities

between

him

and

other

defendants who received within-Guidelines sentences after being
convicted of bank theft and having the same total offense level
and criminal history category as McLaughlin.

He supports this

argument with the fact that the Government recommended that the
court depart upward to 24 months, rather than the 30 months to
which

the

court

Commission’s
renders
and

his

the

departed.

adoption
resulting

putative

of

We

the

disagree.

USSG

sentencing

comparators

§ 4A1.3,

disparity
warranted.

§ 3553(a)(6); cf. Gall, 552 U.S. at 54.
4

The
p.s.,

between
See

Sentencing
departure
McLaughlin
18

U.S.C.

Although a sentencing

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disparity based on a USSG § 4A1.3, p.s., departure might be
unwarranted

if

the

departure

is

inappropriately

applied,

the

imposition of the departure, by itself, cannot be grounds for
concluding that the resulting disparity is unwarranted.
Because McLaughlin has offered no meritorious reason why we
should not defer to the district court’s judgment, we conclude
that

the

sentence

reasonable.
sentence.
legal
before

imposed

Accordingly,

on
we

McLaughlin
affirm

is

substantively

McLaughlin’s

30-month

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

contentions
this

court

are

adequately

and

argument

presented

would

not

in
aid

the
the

materials
decisional

process.
AFFIRMED

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