US v. Tyrone William
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 4:14-cr-00043-BO-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999970749].. [15-4121]
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
Filed: 11/18/2016
Pg: 1 of 15
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4121
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TYRONE MAURICE WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville.
Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (4:14-cr-00043-BO-1)
Argued:
September 20, 2016
Decided:
November 18, 2016
Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded with instructions
by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Stephen Clayton Gordon, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Barbara
Dickerson Kocher, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara,
Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V.
Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
Filed: 11/18/2016
Pg: 2 of 15
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
Filed: 11/18/2016
Pg: 3 of 15
PER CURIAM:
Tyrone Maurice Williams was indicted and pled guilty to
Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (“Count 1”);
using
and
carrying
a
firearm
during
and
in
relation
to
and
possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (“Count 2”); possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(1)
(“Count
violation
of
Williams’
convictions,
18
3”);
and
U.S.C.
§
robbery
2113(a)
vacate
his
of
a
credit
4”).
We
(“Count
union,
sentence,
and
in
affirm
remand
for
resentencing before a different district judge.
I.
Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment in this case arose out of
Williams’ robbery of a Dollar General store in New Bern, North
Carolina, on July 24, 2012.
During the robbery, Williams shot
the store cashier and store manager, inflicting serious physical
injuries
upon
both
men.
cashier to open the safe.
Williams
then
forced
the
injured
He fled with $600 in currency.
Count
3 involved an incident occurring in Winterville, North Carolina,
in August 2012.
Police officers responding to a noise complaint
found Williams and others loitering around a vehicle.
When the
officers approached the group, Williams pulled a handgun from
his waistband and fled on foot.
the gun was recovered.
Williams was apprehended and
Count 4 arose out of Williams’ armed
3
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
Filed: 11/18/2016
Pg: 4 of 15
robbery of the First Flight Federal Credit Union in New Bern,
North Carolina, in February 2014.
Williams passed a threatening
note demanding money to a teller.
The teller put $4,373 in
currency into an envelope and gave it to Williams.
Subsequent
to his arrest, Williams confessed to robbing the credit union,
robbing
the
Dollar
General
store,
and
shooting
the
Dollar
General employees.
Williams pled guilty as charged to all counts without a
plea agreement.
Counts 1 and 4 each carried a maximum statutory
term of imprisonment of 20 years, and Count 3 carried a maximum
statutory term of imprisonment of 10 years.
The statutory range
for Count 2 was 10 years to life imprisonment.
The
presentence
Williams’
included
adjusted
a
offense
10-level
life-threatening
report
level
increase
bodily
grouped
for
for
injury
and
Counts
Count
1,
1
3
was
and
30,
of
permanent
or
abduction
of
a
to
person
The adjusted offense
levels for Counts 3 and 4, respectively, were 14 and 24.
grouping
rules,
the
highest
which
infliction
facilitate the commission of an offense.
the
4.
offense
level
of
Under
30
was
increased by 1, resulting in a combined adjusted offense level
of 31.
A 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility
reduced the total offense level to 28.
With a criminal history
category of IV, Williams’ advisory Guidelines sentencing range
was
110
to
137
months’
imprisonment.
4
Count
2
required
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
Filed: 11/18/2016
Pg: 5 of 15
imposition of a consecutive sentence and was excluded from the
grouping rules.
The advisory Guidelines sentence for Count 2
was the statutory minimum 10-year term of imprisonment.
Neither
Williams nor the government objected to the presentence report.
The district court held a sentencing hearing on January 21,
2015.
The district court began the hearing by asking Williams
if he “want[ed] to say anything about the punishment [he would]
receive,” to which Williams simply responded, “No, Sir.”
24.
J.A.
What followed can only be described (at best) as a testy
exchange between the district court and Williams about Williams’
crimes
and
the
remorseful.
district
court’s
view
that
Williams
was
The district court began by demanding to know why
Williams “tr[ied] to murder” the Dollar General employees.
24.
not
J.A.
and
When Williams stated that he “didn’t try to murder them”
that
“it
wo[uld]n’t
happen”
again,
the
district
court
informed Williams that “[i]t won’t happen because I’m going to
put you in jail forever.”
J.A. 25.
When Williams acknowledged
that he could not “change what happened,” but did “have the
opportunity to apologize” and “grow from it and become . . . a
better person,” the district court told Williams that there were
“some
things
you
can’t
apologize
for”
and
that
societies they would just eliminate you. . . .
to worry about getting better, you would be gone.”
5
“[i]n
some
You won’t have
J.A. 27.
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
The
Filed: 11/18/2016
district
court
then
Pg: 6 of 15
heard
from
the
Dollar
General
victims about the effect the incident had upon their lives and
the lives of their families.
The district court stated that in
more than three decades it had “never heard an allocution as
powerful” as those offered by the victims and that, in contrast,
Williams had been “brazen enough to look at these people whose
lives he has crushed and driven into the ground with virtually
no remorse.”
J.A. 41.
The district court further stated that
it could not “see any justification for a sentence below the
maximum that the statute and law would permit,” and suggested
that
the
“appellate
courts
c[ould]
listen
to
and
read
the
testimony of the witnesses and the lack of contrition on the
part of the defendant.”
At
the
conclusion
J.A. 42.
of
the
hearing,
the
district
imposed a total term of imprisonment of 480 months.
and
4
(the
concurrent
two
robbery
statutory
charges),
maximum
the
sentences
district
of
240
court
On Counts 1
court
imposed
months.
The
district court also imposed the statutory maximum sentence of
120 months for Count 3 (the felon-in-possession charge), but
ordered that it run consecutively to the other counts in the
group.
This resulted in a sentence of 360 months on the three
grouped counts.
The district court then added the mandatory
minimum sentence of 120 months on Count 2, raising the total
term of imprisonment to 480 months.
6
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
Filed: 11/18/2016
Pg: 7 of 15
The next day, however, the district court sua sponte gave
notice to the parties of its intent to reopen the sentencing
proceeding, and the court scheduled a hearing for January 27.
At
the
inception
of
the
hearing,
the
district
court
sought
agreement from the government and Williams’ counsel that it had
the
power
to
reopen
Williams’ sentence.
After
said
the
sentencing
and
change
Both agreed that it did.
“incorporat[ing]
including
proceeding
the
by
reference
allocution
everything
participation
at
that
the
was
last
hearing,” the district court stated that, “after thinking about
how [it] imposed [the 480-month] sentence[,] [it] want[ed] to go
back and remove that and consider a different approach to it.”
J.A. 51.
The district court, upon “reflection,” then imposed a
total prison term of 360 months.
1,
3,
and
4,
the
district
sentence of 120 months.
court
J.A. 52.
imposed
For grouped Counts
a
within-guidelines
For Count 2, the district court varied
upward and imposed a consecutive sentence of 240 months (double
the mandatory minimum and well below the statutory maximum of
life imprisonment).
The
district
court
480-month sentence.
explained
its
reconsideration
of
the
First, the district court judge advised
that he had been under the mistaken impression at the initial
sentencing
hearing
that
the
maximum
sentence
impose for Count 2 was 10 years’ imprisonment.
7
that
he
could
Second, the
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
Filed: 11/18/2016
Pg: 8 of 15
district court judge observed that “under the guidelines and
under sentencing law and taking 3553(a) into account,” Count 2
was “the place where I should [have] upwardly depart[ed],” J.A.
52, because “the use of the firearm [was] the salient object in
this case that caused all the damage,” J.A. 54.
Finally, the
district court explained that “[i]n the fast moving way in which
the hearing went dominated by the allocution there wasn’t enough
time to think about what an appropriate upward departure would
be.
And I believe after reflection this is what I should do.”
J.A. 53.
On appeal, Williams challenged his convictions on Counts 1
and 2, and his 360-month sentence as substantively unreasonable.
The government did not appeal.
supplemental
district
briefs
court
had
We directed the parties to file
addressing
the
jurisdiction
question
to
reopen
of
whether
the
the
sentencing
proceeding and reduce Williams’ sentence to 360 months.
We also
requested the parties to supplement their briefs to address the
question
of
whether
the
480-month
sentence
imposed
by
the
district court was substantively reasonable.
II.
Williams challenges his convictions on Counts 1 and 2 on
the
basis
that
the
Hobbs
Act
is
unconstitutional
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
under
As Williams
acknowledges, this argument is foreclosed by precedent.
8
the
See
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
Filed: 11/18/2016
Pg: 9 of 15
United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 354 (4th Cir. 2003).
Accordingly, we affirm his convictions.
III.
With regard to Williams’ sentence, we conclude that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to modify Williams’ sentence
from 480 months to 360 months, and thus it is the 480-month
sentence that we review.
Because we hold that the 480-month
sentence was unreasonable, we vacate that sentence and remand
for resentencing.
A.
Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure–the
provision upon which Williams relies to support the district
court’s
jurisdiction-provides
that
“[w]ithin
14
days
after
sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from
arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”
Fed. R. Crim.
P. 35(a).
“‘[S]entencing’ means the oral announcement of the
sentence.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c); United States v. Layman, 116
F.3d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1997).
The
district court’s authority
to modify a sentence under Rule 35(a) is “severely limited.”
Id.
“The rule ‘is not intended to afford the opportunity to
reconsider the application or interpretation of the sentencing
guidelines or for the court simply to change its mind about the
appropriateness of the sentence.’”
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Crim.
P. 35, Advisory Committee Notes on 1991 Amendments); see also
9
Appeal: 15-4121
United
Doc: 68
Filed: 11/18/2016
States
v.
Fields,
552
Pg: 10 of 15
F.3d
401,
405
(4th
Cir.
2009)
(“Congress limited the reach of Rule 35(a) because it wanted to
promote openness and finality in sentencing.”).
Here, the district court orally announced Williams’ prison
sentence on January 21, 2015, and resentenced Williams six days
later because the court, “upon reflection,” changed its mind
about the ground for the upward departure and the appropriate
extent of the departure.
the power to do so.
F.3d at 108.
J.A. 52.
The district court lacked
See Fields, 552 F.3d at 404-05; Layman, 116
Because the 360-month sentence was issued without
jurisdiction, we therefore deem it to be of no effect and not
subject to appellate review.
The operative sentence for our
review is the 480-month sentence imposed on January 21, 2015.
B.
Williams
contends
that
the
district
court
discretion in imposing the 480-month sentence.
abused
its
We agree.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), district courts must consider
“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics
of
the
defendant,”
and
“impose
a
sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the
statutory purposes of sentencing.
need
for
the
sentence
imposed
Those purposes include “the
.
.
.
(A)
to
reflect
the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to
provide
just
punishment
for
10
the
offense;
(B)
to
afford
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
adequate
Filed: 11/18/2016
deterrence
to
Pg: 11 of 15
criminal
conduct;
(C)
to
protect
the
public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical
care,
or
effective manner.”
Generally
other
correctional
treatment
in
the
most
begin
the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).
speaking,
the
district
court
must
sentencing process with a correct calculation of the applicable
Guidelines range.
(2007).
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49
“[T]he district court should then consider all of the §
3553(a) factors to determine whether they support [a particular]
sentence.”
sentence,
Id. at 49-50.
[the
district
“After settling on the appropriate
court]
must
adequately
explain
the
chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to
promote the perception of fair sentencing.”
Id. at 50.
“The
farther the court diverges from the advisory guideline range,
the more compelling the reasons for the divergence must be.”
United States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
When
reviewing
the
substantive
reasonableness
of
a
sentence, we “examine the totality of the circumstances to see
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding
that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).”
(4th
Cir.
United States v. Gomez–Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 383
2014)
(internal
quotation
11
marks
and
alteration
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
omitted).
a
Filed: 11/18/2016
Pg: 12 of 15
And where, as here, the sentencing court has imposed
sentence
that
varies
upward
from
the
advisory
Guidelines
sentence, we must determine “whether the sentencing court acted
reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose such a
sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from
the sentencing range.”
United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d
938, 944 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Gall,
552
district
U.S.
at
court’s
50.
We
decision
“must
that
give
the
§
due
deference
3553(a)
whole, justify the extent of the variance.”
to
factors,
the
on
a
United States v.
Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-74 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
“This deference is due in part because the
sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and
judge their import and the judge sees and hears the evidence,
makes
credibility
determinations,
has
full
knowledge
of
facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.”
States
v.
Diosdado-Star,
630
F.3d
359,
366
(4th
Cir.
the
United
2011)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
No
crimes.
one
can
doubt
the
breadth
and
severity
of
Williams’
And we cannot say at this juncture that a district
court’s decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines sentence
in some way and in some measure could not be justified by the §
3553(a)
factors.
However,
it
is
our
duty
to
consider
the
totality of the circumstances that led to the district court’s
12
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
Filed: 11/18/2016
Pg: 13 of 15
decision to impose a specific variant sentence, along with the
reasoned
basis
decision.
articulated
by
the
district
court
for
its
Having taken these things into consideration, we must
conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
First, the extent of the variance was significant.
The
Guidelines sentencing range for grouped Counts 1, 3, and 4 was
110-137
render
months’
the
imprisonment.
sentence
Although
unreasonable,
we
it
note
would
that
not
the
alone
adjusted
offense level for Count 1, which carried the highest adjusted
offense level for the group, had already taken into account the
fact
that
Dollar
Williams
General
inflicted
victims.
By
serious
bodily
injury
the
statutory
imposing
upon
the
maximum
sentences on Counts 1 and 4, removing Count 3 from the group,
and
imposing
a
consecutive
instead
of
concurrent
statutory
maximum sentence on Count 3, the district court imposed a total
sentence (360 months) for the grouped counts that was more than
2 1/2 times the top of the advisory range, before adding the
mandatory minimum 10-year term on Count 2.
40-year
sentence
that
was
more
than
18
The end result was a
1/2
years
above
the
maximum advisory Guidelines sentence for all offenses.
Second, while we would normally be required to give due
deference to a district court’s application of the § 3553(a)
factors
and
its
concomitant
determination
that
the
variant
sentence imposed was sufficient, but not greater than necessary,
13
Appeal: 15-4121
to
Doc: 68
comply
Filed: 11/18/2016
with
the
purposes
Pg: 14 of 15
set
forth
in
§
3553(a),
such
deference is largely unwarranted under the unusual circumstances
of this case.
ostensibly
affected
Here, the district court’s determination, while
grounded
by
other
in
the
§ 3553(a)
matters.
The
factors,
record
of
was
the
clearly
sentencing
proceeding clearly conveys an unusually high degree of emotion,
no
doubt
Williams’
ignited
by
decision
the
not
district
to
court’s
allocute,
and
displeasure
then
fueled
with
by
the
allocutions that were offered by the Dollar General victims.
And contrary to the district court’s belief at the time, our
reading of the record does not automatically cause us to reject
Williams’ professed remorse for his actions.
As the district
court would later admit, the sentencing hearing was at least in
some
measure
tainted
by
“the
fast
moving
way
in
which
the
hearing went[,] dominated by the allocution,” so as not to allow
“enough time to think about what an appropriate upward departure
would
be,”
J.A.
53,
and
by
its
misinterpretation
of
the
presentence report and failure to understand that it could have
varied on the count that most troubled the court – Williams’ use
of the firearm to shoot the victims.
Although the district
court’s change of heart alone does not suffice to establish the
unreasonableness
of
the
sentence,
the
events
that
occurred
during the “resentencing” hearing do confirm our concerns about
the sentence that was imposed at the first sentencing hearing.
14
Appeal: 15-4121
Doc: 68
Filed: 11/18/2016
Pg: 15 of 15
To conclude, we are unable to say on the existing record
that the district court “acted reasonably both with respect to
its decision to impose [the variant] sentence and with respect
to
the
extent
of
the
divergence
from
the
sentencing
range.”
Washington, 743 F.3d at 944 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nor
would
our
doing
so
in
these
perception
of
fair
sentencing.”
circumstances
Gall,
552
“promote
U.S.
at
the
50.
“Inherent in the concept of reasonableness is the notion that
the rare sentence may be unreasonable, and inherent in the idea
of discretion is the notion that it may, on infrequent occasion,
be abused.”
Cir.
2014)
United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 536 (4th
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
“This
case
presents an example of that rare sentence presented to us on
those infrequent occasions.”
480-month
sentence
Id.
imposed
substantively unreasonable.
Accordingly,
by
the
we
district
vacate
the
court
as
In light of the circumstances, we
also think a fresh start is in order.
Accordingly, we will
remand the case to a different district judge for resentencing.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Williams’ convictions,
vacate his sentence as unreasonable, and remand for resentencing
before a different district judge.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART
AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?