US v. Glenn Young

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:14-cr-00004-JPJ-PMS-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999842090].. [15-4131]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4131

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GLENN YOUNG,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap.
James P. Jones,
District Judge. (2:14-cr-00004-JPJ-PMS-1)

Submitted:

March 31, 2016

Before MOTZ and
Circuit Judge.

GREGORY,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

and

June 3, 2016

DAVIS,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Barry L. Proctor, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant.
John P.
Fishwick, Jr., United States Attorney, Kevin L. Jayne, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
A

jury

convicted

Glenn

Young

of

bribery

of

a

public

official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A), (C) (2012),
and conspiracy to bribe a public official, in violation of 18
U.S.C.

§ 371

Government

(2012).

failed

On

to

appeal,

present

Young

sufficient

argues

evidence

that
to

the

support

these convictions and that the district court plainly erred in
instructing the jury.

Finding no error, we affirm.
I.

“We review [a] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
de novo” and will “sustain the verdict if there is substantial
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government,
to support it.”
Cir. 2012).
finder

of

United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th

“Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable
fact

could

accept

as

adequate

and

sufficient

support a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Thus,

“[a]

defendant

bringing

a

sufficiency

challenge

to
Id.

must

overcome a heavy burden, and reversal for insufficiency must be
confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
To

convict

Young

of

bribing

a

public

official,

the

Government had to prove that: (1) Kimberlee Crabtree, the nurse
at

the

prison

where

Young

was

incarcerated,

qualified

as

a

public official; (2) Young corruptly gave, offered, or promised
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something of value to Crabtree (directly or indirectly); and (3)
Young did so with the intent “to influence any official act,” 18
U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A), or “to induce [her]. . . to do or omit to
do

any

act

in

violation

of

[her]

lawful

duty,”

18

U.S.C.

§ 201(b)(1)(C).
We

need

not

decide

whether

Crabtree’s

actions—smuggling

contraband into the prison and otherwise violating a variety of
prison regulations to effectuate the scheme—qualify as “official
acts”

under

§ 201(b)(1)(A)

because

the

Government

ample evidence that Young violated § 201(b)(1)(C).

presented
See United

States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 400 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(holding that “district court does not commit reversible error
when

it

submits

unsupported,

a

theory

legally
of

adequate,

liability

to

the

although
jury

factually

along

with

a

factually supported and legally adequate theory of liability”).
The

evidence

viewed

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

Government establishes that Young approached Crabtree in July or
August of 2013 with an offer to pay her for any tobacco products
she could transport into the prison.
scheme

because

she

needed

money

to

Crabtree agreed to the
help

pay

her

daughter’s

medical bills and, between August and October, she delivered
several loads of tobacco products to Young.

During the same

time period, Young arranged for third parties to wire payments
to Crabtree.

We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to
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support Young’s bribery conviction under § 201(b)(1)(C) and his
related conspiracy conviction.

See United States v. Alfisi, 308

F.3d 144, 151 n.3 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that conviction
under § 201(b)(1)(C) is “most appropriate in the case of bribes
to induce actions that directly violate a specific duty, such as
a prison guard’s duty to prevent the smuggling of contraband”).
II.
During deliberations, the jury asked the court whether it
matters who initiated the transaction—Young or Crabtree.

Young

contends that the district court erred when it responded that
the

Government

did

not

have

to

establish

who

initiated

the

transactions so long as it proved the elements of the offenses.
Young suggests that the jury was concerned about the timing of
the payments: did Crabtree provide the contraband first or did
Young provide the payment first?
Because Young did not object to the court’s instruction
until

after

the

jury

returned

its

verdict,

propriety of the instruction for plain error.
Tillery, 702 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2012).
error,

Young

must

demonstrate

that

(1)

we

review

the

United States v.
To establish plain

the

district

court

committed an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error
affected his substantial rights.
133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013).

Henderson v. United States,

Moreover, the correction of such

an error lies within our discretion, which we exercise only if
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the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Id. at 1127 (brackets and

internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that Young has not met this demanding burden.
As we have explained, “the timing of the payment in relation to
the

official

act

irrelevant.”

for

which

it

is

made

is

(in

theory)

United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014

(4th Cir. 1998); see United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 19
(1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he timing of the payment may not provide a
conclusive answer as to whether that payment is a bribe or a
gratuity . . . .”).
promised

to

pay

What matters is whether Young offered or

Crabtree

with

disregard her lawful duties.

the

intent

to

induce

her

See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(C).

to
The

district court, therefore, appropriately turned the jury’s focus
from the timing of the payments to the elements of the crime.
Finally, Young contends that the jury’s question indicates
that it had reason to believe that Crabtree offered to smuggle
contraband

into

the

prison

before

Young

agreed

There is no evidence to support this assertion.
would be no less guilty under this scenario.

to

pay

her.

Moreover, Young

Young would still

be promising to pay a public official with the corrupt intent of
inducing

her

to

§ 201(b)(1)(C).

violate

her

lawful

duties.

See

18

U.S.C.

Notably, Crabtree’s testimony established that

she only agreed to the scheme because Young promised or offered
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to

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pay

her

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the

money

she

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needed

for

her

daughter’s

medical

bills.
III.
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

and

materials

legal
before

We dispense with
contentions
this

court

are
and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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