US v. Wilmer Campos-Mejia
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:10-cr-00292-HEH-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency [999662672]. [15-4133]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4133
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILMER NAHUN CAMPOS-MEJIA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:10-cr-00292-HEH-1)
Submitted:
September 10, 2015
Decided:
September 18, 2015
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Acting Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Carolyn V. Grady, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, United
States Attorney, S. David Schiller, Assistant United States
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Wilmer
Nahun
Campos-Mejia
appeals
the
district
court’s
order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 24
months’
imprisonment,
statement range.
above
the
Sentencing
Guidelines’
policy
Campos-Mejia contends that his sentence is
plainly unreasonable.
Specifically, he claims that his sentence
is procedurally unreasonable because the district court relied
on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors not enumerated
in the list of factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3853(e) (2012) to be
considered when imposing a revocation sentence.
Campos-Mejia
also claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable in
light of the Government’s suggestion that increased punishment
was
appropriate
in
order
to
ensure
he
was
punished
for
the
crimes underlying the revocation of his supervised release.
We
affirm.
“[T]he sentencing court retains broad discretion to impose
a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.”
United
States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (ellipsis
and internal quotation marks omitted).
“We will not disturb a
district court’s revocation sentence unless it falls outside the
statutory maximum or is otherwise plainly unreasonable.”
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
“[T]he [same] procedural
and substantive considerations that guide our review of original
sentences inform our review of revocation sentences as well.”
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Id.
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(internal
quotation
Pg: 3 of 5
marks
omitted).
However,
for
this
initial inquiry, “[i]n determining whether a revocation sentence
is unreasonable, we strike a more deferential appellate posture
than we do when reviewing original sentences.”
Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
A
revocation
sentence
is
procedurally
reasonable
if
the
district court considered the advisory policy statement range
and
the
§
3553(a)
revocation.
applicable
to
supervised
release
Id.; United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40
(4th Cir. 2006).
district
factors
court
A sentence is substantively reasonable if the
stated
defendant
should
statutory
maximum.
a
proper
receive
the
Crudup,
basis
sentence
461
F.3d
for
concluding
imposed,
at
440.
up
to
“Only
the
the
if
a
revocation sentence is unreasonable must we assess whether it is
plainly so.”
Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.
We conclude that Campos-Mejia’s challenge to the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence based on the district court’s
reference
to
unenumerated
§ 3553(a)
factors
lacks
merit.
Although the district court referenced unenumerated factors, it
does
not
appear
from
court
the
determining
primarily
See United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641-42 (4th
to
when
the
sentence.
Moreover,
them
that
or
2013).
on
record
considered
Cir.
relied
the
extent
the
Campos-Mejia’s
court
considered
unenumerated factors, we conclude that they were “relevant to,
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and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a)
factors” and, therefore, that reference to the omitted factors
did
not
render
unreasonable.
We
Campos-Mejia’s
sentence
procedurally
Id. at 642.
likewise
conclude
that
Campos-Mejia’s
contentions
regarding the Government’s assertions at his revocation hearing
are meritless.
the
Imposing a sentence for the purpose of punishing
underlying
breaking
conduct
the
court’s
unreasonableness.
pt.
A(3)(b)
as
a
new
trust,
offense,
might
rather
than
constitute
for
plain
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7,
(2014);
United
States
v.
Simtob,
485
F.3d
1063-64 (9th Cir. 2007); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437-38.
1058,
However,
even if the Government’s reasoning at sentencing were taken to
imply that Campos-Mejia should be sentenced for a new offense,
we cannot attribute this reasoning to the district court on the
record before us.
See United States v. Bell, 667 F.3d 431, 447-
48 (4th Cir. 2011).
On the contrary, the record discloses that
the district court based the sentence it imposed on the advisory
policy statements and the factors enumerated in § 3583(e).
Because we conclude that Campos-Mejia’s revocation sentence
is
not
procedurally
unreasonable
and
because
he
does
not
challenge its substantive reasonableness, it is unnecessary to
determine
whether
the
Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.
sentence
is
plainly
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
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of the district court.
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We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials
before
this
court
and
argument
would
not
aid
the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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