US v. Vaschon Brown

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:14-cr-00032-CCB-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999630973].. [15-4157]

Appeal: 15-4157

Doc: 27

Filed: 07/30/2015

Pg: 1 of 9

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4157

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
VASCHON ANDREA BROWN,
Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Catherine C. Blake, Chief District
Judge. (1:14-cr-00032-CCB-1)

Submitted:

July 2, 2015

Decided:

July 30, 2015

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Byron L.
Maryland,
Attorney,
OFFICE OF
Appellee.

Warnken, Matt McKenzie, WARNKEN, LLC, Pikesville,
for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Peter J. Martinez, Assistant United States Attorney,
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 15-4157

Doc: 27

Filed: 07/30/2015

Pg: 2 of 9

PER CURIAM:
In

January

2014,

a

federal

grand

jury

indicted

Vaschon

Brown for (1) possession with intent to distribute heroin, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) possession of a firearm
and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1); and (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug

trafficking

Brown moved
vehicle.
motion.

to

crime,

in

suppress

violation

evidence

of

seized

18

U.S.C.

from

his

§ 924(c).
person

and

Following a hearing, the district court denied the
Brown then entered a conditional guilty plea, expressly

reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress.

Brown now appeals that denial.

For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.
A.
At approximately 1:10 am on September 16, 2013, Officer
James Morrison of the Howard County Police Department observed
Vaschon Brown driving thirteen miles per hour over the speed
limit, and initiated a routine traffic stop.

Morrison entered

Brown’s license plate number into the National Crime Information
Center (“NCIC”) database, which showed an active arrest warrant
for

Brown

issued

by

the

Maryland

Transportation

(“MTA”) for failure to appear in traffic court.
2

Authority

Morrison asked

Appeal: 15-4157

his

Doc: 27

Filed: 07/30/2015

dispatcher

to

contact

Pg: 3 of 9

the

MTA

to

determine

whether

the

warrant was indeed active, and the MTA confirmed that it was.
Then,

Morrison

(“MJCS”)

accessed

website

discovered

that

to

the

Maryland

research

Brown

had

Judiciary

Brown’s
a

prior

Case

criminal

Search

history

narcotics

and

conviction.

Morrison did not access the portion of the website dealing with
traffic-related cases.
Morrison told Brown there was an active warrant for his
arrest.

Brown responded that the warrant had been quashed, and

provided the name of his lawyer.
Morrison
Brown

his

new

providing

executed

the

trial

date,

that

information.

arrest

warrant

but

Brown argues he also told

and

Morrison

in

does

Morrison
the

not

remember

nevertheless

subsequent

search

Brown’s person found $1,900 in cash and two cellphones.

of

Brown

was in fact correct that the warrant had been recalled.
Based on the evidence from Morrison’s search and Brown’s
criminal history, Morrison detained Brown’s vehicle until a K-9
unit arrived to scan it.

The scan indicated the presence of

narcotics, which led Morrison to search Brown’s vehicle.

During

the search, Morrison found a loaded .45 caliber handgun, 38 bags
of heroin, and a duffel bag containing $20,000 in cash.
B.
Brown moved to suppress the evidence seized from his person
and vehicle as a result of Morrison’s searches.
3

He argued, in

Appeal: 15-4157

Doc: 27

Filed: 07/30/2015

Pg: 4 of 9

relevant part, that the exclusionary rule applied because (1)
Morrison

unreasonably

relied

on

the

representation

that

the

warrant was valid, and therefore his actions constituted police
misconduct to which the good faith exception should not apply;
and

(2)

Morrison

lacked

reasonable

suspicion

to

detain

the

vehicle for longer than the time reasonably required to issue a
citation.
The

district

court

denied

Brown’s

motion

to

suppress,

finding that although Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights had been
violated because the warrant was, in fact, invalid, the good
faith

exception

to

the

exclusionary

rule

applied

because

Morrison had reasonably relied on the information from the NCIC
database and the MTA.

The court also held that Morrison had

lawfully detained Brown’s vehicle.

II.
“We

review

factual

findings

regarding

[a]

motion

suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.”

United

States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 2014).
construe

the

prevailing
Foster,

evidence

party

634

in

F.3d.

in

the

243,

the

light

district
246

(4th

most

court.
Cir.

favorable
United

2011).

to

to

States

Because

We
the
v.
the

district court denied Brown’s motion, we construe the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government.
4

Appeal: 15-4157

Doc: 27

Filed: 07/30/2015

Pg: 5 of 9

III.
Brown makes two arguments on appeal.

First, he argues that

the good faith exception should not be applied to these facts
because to do so would run counter to the exclusionary rule’s
goal of deterring police misconduct.

He so contends because

Morrison (1) relied on a systemically incorrect database and (2)
failed to further investigate the warrant’s validity after Brown
informed him the warrant had been quashed.

Second, he argues

that the evidence seized from Brown’s vehicle must be excluded
because

Morrison

lacked

reasonable

suspicion

to

detain

the

vehicle for an additional 20-30 minutes after the arrest.

We

find both arguments to lack merit.
A.
We

first

address

Brown’s

claim

that

the

exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply.

good

faith

The purpose

of the exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unlawful searches and seizures is “to deter wrongful
police conduct.”
(2009).

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137

Because excluding evidence exacts a “costly toll upon

truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives,” the exclusionary
rule

is

not

automatically

Amendment is violated.
it

applies

only

when

triggered

every

time

the

Id. at 141 (quotation omitted).
the

police
5

conduct

is

Fourth
Rather,

“deliberate,

Appeal: 15-4157

Doc: 27

Filed: 07/30/2015

Pg: 6 of 9

reckless, or grossly negligent,” or when there is evidence of
“recurring or systemic negligence.”

Id. at 144.

We apply an

objective standard to that inquiry and ask “whether a reasonably
well

trained

officer

would

have

known

that

the

search

‘illegal’ in light of ‘all of the circumstances.’”

was

Id. at 145

(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)).
If

an

officer

incorrect

acted

database

with

objectively

information,

we

reasonable

conclude

that

reliance
the

on

officer

acted in good faith, and the exclusionary rule does not apply.
See id. at 142.

We find that to be the case here, for the

reasons that follow.
Brown contends, in essence, that Morrison’s reliance was
not objectively reasonable.

Brown argues that because the NCIC

database is known to be frequently incorrect, Morrison should
not have relied on its information.

To the contrary, however,

this court has concluded that the NCIC database generally is
accurate and that widespread use of its reports indicates they
may be trusted.
(4th

Cir.

United States v. McDowell, 745 F.3d 115, 121–22

2014).

Further,

Morrison

did

not

rely

solely

on

NCIC’s information in concluding that Brown’s arrest warrant was
valid.

As we have noted, he asked his dispatcher to confirm

with the MTA that the warrant was active.

That Morrison took

that additional step places his precautions beyond those of the
officer in Herring, on which both parties rely.
6

In Herring, the

Appeal: 15-4157

Doc: 27

Filed: 07/30/2015

Pg: 7 of 9

Supreme Court held that the officer’s execution of an arrest
warrant based only on information from a neighboring county’s
clerk’s office that the warrant was active did not trigger the
exclusionary rule.

See Herring, 555 U.S. at 137, 147–48.

In addition to Brown’s challenge to the NCIC database’s
accuracy,

Brown

argues

that

Morrison’s

failure

to

check

the

traffic portion of the MJCS website or further investigate the
warrant’s validity after Brown informed him the warrant had been
quashed indicates willful blindness.

Willful blindness is a

high standard to meet, requiring, as it does, evidence that the
actor “deliberately shield[ed] [himself] from clear evidence of
critical

facts

circumstances.”

that

are

strongly

suggested

by

the

United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 478

(4th Cir. 2012).

We have no difficulty finding that standard

was not met here.
Morrison accessed the MJCS website to investigate Brown’s
criminal history after having confirmed with the MTA Brown’s
warrant was active.

Thus, since the authenticity of the warrant

was already confirmed, he was under no obligation to utilize the
MJCS site further. *

*

We also reject Brown's argument that Morrison's failure to
infer that the warrant against Brown was inactive from the sole
fact that Brown's driver's license was valid triggered the
exclusionary rule.
Although Brown asserts that, in Maryland,
the issuance of an arrest warrant against a person automatically
(Continued)
7

Appeal: 15-4157

Doc: 27

Nor
warrant

Filed: 07/30/2015

does

Morrison’s

because

blindness.

of

Pg: 8 of 9

failure

Brown’s

to

further

statements

investigate

indicate

the

willful

Brown’s statement that the warrant had been quashed

is not “clear evidence” of that fact, especially when contrasted
with

Morrison’s

specific

information

regarding its validity.

from

the

NCIC

and

MTA

The circumstances thus indicated the

warrant was active; therefore Morrison proceeded reasonably.
B.
We

next

turn

to

Brown’s

claim

that

Morrison

reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop.

lacked

To detain a

driver and vehicle beyond the course of a routine traffic stop,
an officer must have reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.
United

States

(citing

v.

Branch,

Florida

v.

537

Royer,

F.3d
460

328,

U.S.

336
491,

(4th

Cir.

500-01

2008)

(1983)).

Reasonable suspicion need not amount to probable cause, but the
officer does need to identify specific facts supporting this
suspicion.

Id.

objectively,
guessing”

of

An officer’s reasonable suspicion is evaluated

and
the

we

may

not

officer’s

engage
decision.

in

“unrealistic

second-

Id.

(citing

at

337

triggers suspension of that person's driver's license, Brown
cites no Maryland authority for that assertion, and presents no
evidence that a typical Maryland police officer would rely on
the validity of a driver's license to determine the status of an
arrest warrant.

8

Appeal: 15-4157

Doc: 27

Filed: 07/30/2015

Pg: 9 of 9

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686–87 (1985)).
Morrison knew that Brown had a prior narcotics conviction,
and

discovered

person.

two

These

cellphones

specific

and

facts

$1,900

were

in

cash

sufficient

on

to

Brown’s
raise

a

reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, authorizing Morrison
to order a K-9 scan and detain Brown’s vehicle.

Brown has

offered only conclusory statements to argue that those facts do
not amount to reasonable suspicion.

IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district
facts

court.

and

materials

legal
before

We

dispense

with

oral

argument

contentions

are

adequately

this

and

argument

court

because

presented

would

not

the

in

the

aid

the

decisional process.
AFFIRMED

9