US v. Kamau Wright

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 4:07-cr-00002-FL-2 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999707744].. [15-4163]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4163

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
KAMAU SUVINER WRIGHT,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (4:07-cr-00002-FL-2)

Submitted:

November 13, 2015

Decided:

November 30, 2015

Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Kamau

Suviner

Wright

appeals

the

district

court’s

order

revoking his supervised release and imposing a 32-month term of
imprisonment.
unreasonable

Wright
because

claims
the

that

district

his

sentence

is

plainly

failed

to

address

court

arguments raised at sentencing and did not adequately explain
the chosen sentence.

We affirm.

Because Wright did not raise this issue in the district
court, our review is for plain error.

See United States v.

Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).

Under plain error

review, Wright must show that the court erred, the error was
clear or obvious, and the error affected his substantial rights.
Id. at 640-41.

Even if Wright meets this burden, “we retain

discretion whether to recognize the error and will deny relief
unless the . . . error seriously affects the fairness, integrity
or

public

reputation

of

judicial

proceedings.”

Id.

at

641

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
“A

district

court

has

broad

discretion

when

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.”
We

“will

statutory

affirm
maximum

a

revocation
and

is

a

Id. at 640.

sentence

if

‘plainly

unreasonable.’”

not

it

imposing

is

within

the
Id.

(quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir.

2

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2006)). 1
plainly

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“When

reviewing

unreasonable,

unreasonable at all.”
546

(4th

Cir.

we

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whether

must

a

first

revocation
determine

sentence

whether

it

is
is

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544,

2010).

“This

initial

inquiry

takes

a

more

deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise
of

discretion

sentences.”

than

reasonableness

review

for

United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
if the sentence is not unreasonable.
Only

if

a

guideline

sentence

is

found

We will affirm

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.

procedurally

or

substantively

unreasonable will we “decide if it is plainly unreasonable.”
Id.
A

revocation

district

court

sentence

expressly

is

procedurally

considered

the

reasonable

Chapter

Seven

if

the

policy

statement range and the applicable statutory sentencing factors.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.

A revocation sentence is substantively

reasonable if the court stated a proper basis for concluding
that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to
the statutory maximum.

Id.

“A court need not be as detailed or

specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when
imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still ‘must provide
1

Wright does not contend that the 32-month sentence was
above the statutory maximum. We note that the maximum sentence
that could have been imposed was five years.

3

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a

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statement

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of

reasons

for

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the

sentence

imposed.’”

United

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (quoting United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657).
Here,

the

court

properly

calculated

a

policy

statement

range of 30-37 months and imposed a sentence within that range.
Although

the

court

did

not

specifically

address

mitigating

factors when imposing sentence, those factors were discussed at
sentencing during the court’s colloquy with both defense counsel
and

Wright.

A

court

need

not

directly

defendant’s arguments at sentencing.
551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).

address

each

of

a

See Rita v. United States,

The court took note of Wright’s long

history of drug offenses and observed that he had committed a
Grade A release violation.

The court also stated that Wright’s

repeated criminal conduct while on release constituted a breach
of the court’s trust.

Finally, the court stated that it had

taken into consideration statutory sentencing factors, including
the need to afford adequate deterrence and promote respect for
the law. 2

2

Wright correctly states that promoting respect for the law
is not among those sentencing factors to be considered when
imposing a revocation sentence.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e),
3553(a)(2)(A).
However, considering this non-enumerated factor
does not constitute plain error requiring resentencing. We have
found that, “[a]lthough § 3583(e) enumerates the factors a
district court should consider when formulating a revocation
sentence,
it
does
not
expressly
prohibit
a
court
from
referencing other relevant factors omitted from the statute.”
(Continued)
4

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We conclude that the 32-month revocation sentence was not
plainly unreasonable.
oral

argument

adequately

Accordingly, we affirm.

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

and

materials

legal
before

We dispense with
arguments

are

the

and

court

argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. Thus, if the revocation
sentence is not predominately based on non-enumerated factors,
“mere reference to such considerations does not render a
revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors
are relevant to, and considered in conjunction with, the
enumerated § 3553(a) factors.
Id. at 642.
Given the court’s
reliance on other, permitted statutory factors, we find no plain
error in the court’s consideration of the need for the sentence
to promote respect for the law.

5