US v. Zackary Lull

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:14-cr-00106-BO-1. [999832804]. [15-4216]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4216

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ZACKARY ROBERT LULL,
Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00106-BO-1)

Argued:

March 24, 2016

Decided:

May 25, 2016

Before DUNCAN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Reversed, vacated, and remanded by published opinion.
Judge
Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker joined. Senior
Judge Davis wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.

ARGUED: Joseph Edward Zeszotarski, Jr., GAMMON, HOWARD &
ZESZOTARSKI, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Patrick Benton Weede, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Thomas G.
Walker,
United
States
Attorney,
Jennifer
P.
May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
Zackary Robert Lull (“Lull”) entered a conditional plea of
guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), in which he
expressly

retained

the

right

to

appeal

the

district

court’s

denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search
of

his

omitted

residence.
material

confidential

Because

the

information

informant

who

search

about
was

the

the

warrant

application

reliability

primary

source

of

the

of

the

information used to establish probable cause, we reverse the
district court’s denial of Lull’s motion to suppress, vacate his
conviction and sentence, and remand for further proceedings.

I.
In May 2014, one of the Wake Forest Police Department’s
confidential informants (“the informant”) asserted that he was
able to buy illegal drugs from Lull in Lull’s home, located in
Rolesville, North Carolina.
gave

this

information

to

The Wake Forest Police Department
the

Wake

County

Sheriff’s

within whose jurisdiction Lull’s residence fell.

Office,

The informant

had never worked with the Sheriff’s Office before.
In following up, Investigator E. A. Welch of the Sheriff’s
Office met with the informant.
Lull

from

high

school

and

The informant said that he knew

had
2

previously

purchased

cocaine,

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marijuana, and other illegal substances from Lull.

Investigator

Welch arranged for the informant to purchase an “8-ball,” or
3.5 grams of cocaine, from Lull during a controlled buy.

The

informant was to be paid for his assistance.
The Sheriff’s Office corroborated some of the informant’s
information

prior

to

conducting

the

controlled

buy.

For

example, it confirmed that a woman whose last name was Lull-believed to be Lull’s mother--owned the residence at the address
the informant provided.

Several days later, the informant made

a recorded phone call to Lull in the presence of Investigator
Welch and other officers.

During this call, the informant spoke

with a man who identified himself as “Zack,” who agreed to sell
the informant 3.5 grams of cocaine for $180 at Lull’s home later
that day.
Before initiating the controlled buy, officers searched the
informant and found no contraband on his person.

An undercover

officer then drove the informant to Lull’s residence.

Although

the agreed-upon purchase price for the 3.5 grams of cocaine was
$180, the officer gave the informant $240 because the informant
indicated that he might be able to purchase other illegal drugs
from Lull.

The officer also gave the informant a telephone that

doubled as a recording device and would enable law enforcement
officers to listen to the informant’s interactions during the
controlled buy.
3

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During
positioned

the

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buy,

around

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Investigator

the

Welch

corner

Lull’s

from

undercover officer was parked outside.

and

his

team

residence,

and

were
the

Just after 6:00 p.m.,

the informant entered the home, and the officers listened to the
informant’s interactions through the telephone recording device.
The officers heard the informant engage in a conversation with
another individual, from whom the informant purchased cocaine.
Investigator Welch testified at the suppression hearing that he
could recognize the voice of the other individual as Lull “based
J.A. 84. 1

on [his] knowledge of [Lull].”
After

being

inside

for

approximately

informant left the residence.
undercover
trying
J.A. 85.

officer

to

conceal

observed

five

minutes,

the

As the informant was exiting, the
him

something

behave
in

his

“almost

as

pockets,

if

he

was

underwear.”

The informant entered the undercover officer’s car and

was driven to the Police Department and searched.

At the Police

Department, the informant surrendered four grams of cocaine and
identified Zack Lull as the seller.

He also returned $40 of the

remaining buy money, when he should have returned $60.
Officers questioned the informant about the remaining $20.
The informant first responded that he did not know what the
1

But see J.A. 103 (responding “[y]es, sir,” after being
asked on cross-examination “[y]ou said you couldn’t determine if
that was the defendant’s voice on the tape, correct?”).

4

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officers were talking about, but eventually said that he thought
he

gave

the

detective

money

from

the

to

Lull.

Investigator
Office

Sheriff’s

Welch

strip-searched

then

and

informant, and “$20 dropped out of his underpants.”
The

Drugs

and

Vice

Unit

of

the

Sheriff’s

Office

another
the

J.A. 86.
immediately

determined that the informant was not reliable and terminated
him as a confidential informant.

In Investigator Welch’s words,

they “didn’t think it would be an ethical thing to do, to use
someone as a confidential informant knowing full well [he] had
stolen from” the Sheriff’s Office.

J.A. 100.

8:30

the

p.m.,

the

officers

arrested

At approximately

informant

on

a

felony

charge of obtaining property under false pretenses.
Following this incident, Investigator Welch “immediately”
began working on an affidavit in support of an application for a
warrant

to

search

Lull’s

residence.

J.A.

88.

The

search

warrant was issued at approximately 9:00 p.m. that evening, just
half

an

hour

after

the

officers

had

arrested

the

informant.

Investigator Welch, however, failed to disclose the informant’s
theft and subsequent arrest to the state court magistrate.
Investigator
presented

to

application.

Welch’s

the

affidavit

magistrate

in

was

the

support

only
of

information
the

warrant

In relevant part, the affidavit read as follows:

2. Within the past 72 hours, Information was received
from a confidential source whereby a young white
18 year old male residing at the address identified as
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Zach
Lull,
was
selling
quantities
of
Cocaine,
Marijuana and other illegal drugs from his home
address . . . for money to members of the community.
The information supplied to this affiant by CI# 14-12,
had stated he had recently bought illegal drugs from
this male identified as Zach Lull.
3. A check of the residence in Law Enforcement records
as well as physically going to the venue shows there
to exist such a location and the property owned by a
female with the last name “Lull” being the registered
home owner.
J.A. 39.

The affidavit also recounted the controlled buy and

concluded with Investigator Welch’s statement that, based on his
training and experience, he would expect to find a number of
items in Lull’s home relating to drug trafficking.
because

traffickers

very

readily

items

“drug

accessible

such

businesses.”

often
as

keep

in

the

their

This was

aforementioned
residences

and

J.A. 41.

The affidavit did not, however, include information about
the phone call between the informant and the seller, in which
the

seller

identified

himself

as

“Zack.”

Further,

when

recounting what the officers overheard when the informant was
inside the residence, the affidavit stated only that “through
Investigative
males.”

means,

J.A. 40.

a

conversation

was

heard

between

two

Investigator Welch did not assert in the

affidavit, as he asserted at the suppression hearing, that he
was able to independently identify Lull as the speaker through
his knowledge of Lull’s voice.

Finally, the affidavit contained

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no statement concerning the informant’s reliability or previous
experience

working

as

a

confidential

informant

for

the

Wake

Forest Police Department.
Officers executed the warrant at 10:35 p.m. that night.
When

the

officers

searched

Lull’s

home,

individuals inside, including Lull.
marijuana,
currency

firearms,
during

body

their

armor,

search.

there

were

five

Officers seized cocaine,

and

around

All

five

$3,600

in

U.S.

individuals

were

arrested and charged with state drug charges in connection with
the contraband found at the residence.

II.
On June 4, 2014, a grand jury in the Eastern District of
North Carolina indicted Lull on one count of possession with
intent

to

distribute

a

quantity

of

cocaine

and

marijuana

in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (“Count One”), and one count
of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (“Count Two”).

Before

entering a plea, Lull moved to suppress all evidence obtained
from the search of his residence, arguing that officers obtained
the search warrant in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154 (1978).
In Franks, the Supreme Court developed a two-prong test
clarifying what a criminal defendant must show when challenging
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the veracity of statements made in an affidavit supporting a
search warrant.
be

voided

and

If both prongs are met, the search warrant must
the

438 U.S. at 155-56.

fruits

of

the

search

excluded.

Franks,

Under the first prong--the “intentionality”

prong--the defendant must show that “a false statement knowingly
and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit.”
the

second

prong--the

“materiality”

prong--the

Id.

Under

defendant

must

show that “with the affidavit’s false material set to one side,
the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish
probable cause.”

Id. at 156.

preponderance of the evidence.

Both prongs must be proven by a
Id.

We have since held that the two-pronged Franks test applies
not only to cases in which an agent includes affirmatively false
statements in a warrant affidavit, but also when an agent omits
relevant facts from the affidavit.
899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990).
Lull’s

claims

submitted

here:

to

intentionally

Lull

obtain
and/or

United States v. Colkley,
This provides the basis for

contends

probable

recklessly

that

cause,
omitted

in

the

affidavit

Investigator
information

Welch

that

was

material to the determination of probable cause.
The district court held a Franks hearing on November 20,
2014, and heard testimony from Investigator Welch and Sergeant
Richard

Spivey,

who

had

been

the
8

on-scene

supervisor

of

the

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controlled buy.

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On November 23, 2014, the district court issued

an order denying Lull’s motion to suppress.

The court concluded

that Investigator Welch’s conduct “did not rise to the level of
intentionally misleading or recklessly disregarding whether the
omission made the affidavit misleading.”

United States v. Lull,

No. 5:14-CR-106-BO, 2014 WL 6666811, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 24,
2014).

Because Investigator Welch did not possess the requisite

intent, the court reasoned, there was no Franks violation and no
reason to suppress the evidence.
Furthermore,
Investigator

the

Welch

district

had

court

possessed

concluded

the

requisite

that

even

intent,

if
the

omission would not have satisfied the Franks “materiality” prong
because including details about the informant’s theft, arrest,
and

discharge

cause.

from

service

would

not

have

defeated

probable

The court reasoned that,

[r]egardless of with whom the informant spoke in the
house, from whom he obtained the cocaine, and what he
subsequently did with the buy money, there was clearly
a fair probability that contraband would be found
within the . . . house based on the undisputed fact
that the informant obtained cocaine therein.
Id. at *3.
was

According to the district court, the informant’s tip

“corroborated

by

the

fact

that

he

did,

in

fact,

obtain

contraband in the location identified in the search warrant.”
Id.

Thus, having found that Lull failed to satisfy either prong

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of the Franks test, the district court denied Lull’s motion to
suppress.
In light of this ruling, Lull entered a conditional plea of
guilty to Count Two, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug

trafficking

crime,

reserving

the

right

to

appeal

district court’s order denying his suppression motion.

the

He was

sentenced to the statutory minimum of 60 months’ imprisonment on
Count Two, and the charges in Count One were dismissed.

Lull

timely appealed.

III.
When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, “we review factual findings for clear error and legal
determinations de novo.”

United States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193,

197 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
construe

the

evidence

in

the

light

In doing so, “we must
most

favorable

to

the

prevailing party and give due weight to inferences drawn from
those facts by resident judges and law enforcement officers.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
duty

of

a

reviewing

court

is

simply

to

ensure

“[T]he
that

the

magistrate had a substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that
probable cause existed.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-

39 (1983) (second and third alterations in original) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV.
Lull’s argument on appeal focuses on the affidavit that
Investigator

Welch

application.

submitted

Lull

intentionally

or

in

contends

recklessly

support
that

omitted

of

the

warrant

Investigator

material

facts

Welch

from

the

affidavit and that, had those facts been included, the affidavit
would

not

have

supported

probable

cause.

Based

on

this

omission, Lull argues that, under Franks and its progeny, the
search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Under the Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961), “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause,

supported

amend. IV.

by

Oath

or

affirmation.”

U.S.

Const.

As mentioned above, in Franks, the Supreme Court

addressed the question of whether a criminal defendant has the
right

to

challenge

the

veracity

of

statements

made

in

affidavit supporting an application for a search warrant.

an
The

Court held that the defendant must first “make[] a substantial
preliminary

showing”

of

the

intentionality

and

materiality

prongs; if the defendant does so, “the Fourth Amendment requires
that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.”
438 U.S. at 155-56.

Franks,

If the defendant is able to satisfy both

prongs by a preponderance of the evidence at this hearing, the
search warrant is voided.

Id. at 156.
11

In the context of an

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omission, we have found a Fourth Amendment violation only where
“affiants omit[ted] material facts with the intent to make, or
in

reckless

disregard

affidavit misleading.”

of

whether

they

thereby

made,

the

Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).
Below, we consider whether Lull has satisfied this test,
thus

warranting

two

separate

inquiries, even though they turn on overlapping facts.

We first

consider

whether

suppression.

the

This

affiant

involves

omitted

the

information

either

intentionally or with reckless disregard of whether it would
make

the

affidavit

misleading.

Concluding

that

Investigator

Welch was at least reckless in his omission, we turn to the
“materiality” prong of the Franks test.
that

this

omission

was

indeed

Because we conclude

material,

we

hold

that

the

district court erred in denying Lull’s motion to suppress.
A.
To establish the “intentionality” prong under Franks, Lull
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that Investigator
Welch

omitted

magistrate

information

or

that

he

with

omitted

the
the

intent

to

information

mislead
with

the

reckless

disregard of whether it would make the affidavit misleading.
Understandably,

the

defendant’s

burden

in

showing

intent

is

greater in the case of an omission because “[a]n affiant cannot
be

expected

to

include

in

an
12

affidavit

every

piece

of

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information gathered in the course of an investigation.”

Id.

A

showing that the officer acted negligently, or that the omission
was

merely

an

suppression.

innocent

mistake,

is

insufficient

to

warrant

Miller v. Prince George’s Cty., 475 F.3d 621, 627-

28 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171).
1.
In considering the intentionality prong, the district court
noted that “Investigator Welch testified that he deliberately
chose not to include the information at issue because, given
that the controlled buy was completed prior to the theft, he
believed the theft had no bearing on the purchase of narcotics
from defendant’s house.”

Lull, 2014 WL 6666811, at *2.

Given

this, the court concluded that Investigator Welch’s “testimony
and

the

intended

evidence
to

presented

mislead

omitting the theft.”

the

do

not

suggest

magistrate

Id.

or

that

acted

he

either

recklessly

in

At the “very worst,” Investigator

Welch had acted negligently.

Id. (quoting Colkley, 899 F.2d

at 301).
We

cannot

agree

with

the

district

court.

Contrary

to

Investigator Welch’s contention, the informant’s theft was not
“separate” from the controlled buy.
that

he

was

transaction.

unreliable

during

The informant demonstrated
the

course

of

this

very

Given this, how the informant’s “behavior and his

conduct in stealing that money” could have “absolutely nothing
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with

controlled

that

contends, eludes us.

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purchase,”

as

Investigator

Welch

See J.A. 94.

Although Investigator Welch asserts that the informant was
reliable

for

the

purposes

of

the

controlled

buy,

he

also

testified that the informant was “absolutely” determined to be
unreliable after the informant stole.

J.A. 98-99.

However,

deeming the informant reliable for some purposes but unreliable
for others is an assessment that is for the magistrate, not
Investigator Welch, to make.
is

established

law

that

See Franks, 438 U.S. at 165 (“It

a

warrant

affidavit

must

set

forth

particular facts and circumstances underlying the existence of
probable

make

an

independent evaluation of the matter.”) (citations omitted).

As

an

cause,

experienced

so

as

to

allow

investigator,

the

magistrate

Investigator

Welch

to

would

surely

know that reliability is “key” to a magistrate’s probable cause
analysis
information

when

the

provided

search
by

an

warrant

informant.

application
See

United

contains
States

v.

Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1996).
We acknowledge that Investigator Welch dealt directly with
the

informant,

informant’s

knew

previous

of,

although

experience

not

working

directly
as

a

about,

the

confidential

informant for the Wake Forest Police Department, and listened in
on the conversation during the controlled buy.

However, the

magistrate can only make a probable cause determination based on
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the

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information

that

was

Pg: 15 of 27

actually

provided

to

him,

and

Investigator Welch failed to include any details, impressions,
or limitations related to these events in his affidavit.
For these reasons, we find the district court’s reasoning
as to Investigator Welch’s intentionality unpersuasive.
2.
In reaching our conclusion that Investigator Welch omitted
this information at least recklessly, we find several facts to
be significant.
the

Sheriff’s

informant;

These include: (1) the decisiveness with which
Office

(2)

consequences

acted

in

discharging

Investigator

of

the

Welch’s

informant’s

and

arresting

knowledge

crime;

(3)

of

the

the
the

temporal

proximity of the arrest to the decision to omit information from
the affidavit; and (4) the obvious impact of the informant’s
misconduct

on

any

assessment

of

his

reliability.

Together,

these factors are dispositive under the circumstances of this
case and show that Investigator Welch acted at least recklessly.
First, to the rest of the Sheriff’s Office, the egregious
nature

of

the

demonstrated

by

informant’s
the

actions

informant’s

charges and discharge from service.

was

clear.

immediate

This

arrest

on

was

felony

Second, as discussed above,

Investigator Welch knew at the time he filled out the affidavit
that

the

informant

deemed unreliable.

had

been

discharged

because

he

had

been

Despite this knowledge, Investigator Welch
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decided

for

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himself

that

the

Pg: 16 of 27

informant

was

reliable

for

the

purposes of the controlled buy, usurping the magistrate’s role.
Third, little time passed between the arrest and Investigator
Welch’s decision to omit this information from the affidavit.
These events transpired just minutes before Investigator Welch
drafted the warrant application, and they were undoubtedly fresh
in his mind.
Finally, the omitted information was clearly relevant to
the

magistrate’s

probable

cause

determination.

One

way

of

establishing reckless disregard is by proffering “evidence that
a police officer ‘failed to inform the judicial officer of facts
[he]

knew

would

negate

probable

cause.’”

Miller,

475

F.3d

at 627 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also
United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1234-35 (8th Cir. 1993)
(“[T]he omission occurred at least with reckless disregard of
its effect upon the affidavit. . . . Any reasonable person would
have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish
to know.”).

The relevance of the omission thus comes into play:

the significance--or insignificance--of a particular omission to
the determination of probable cause may inform our conclusion
regarding

the

agent’s

intent. 2

2

The

trustworthiness

of

the

This court has previously noted in dicta that it has
“doubts about the validity of inferring bad motive under Franks
from the fact of omission alone, for such an inference collapses
(Continued)
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confidential

Filed: 05/25/2016

informant

lies

Pg: 17 of 27

at

the

heart

of

the

reliability

determination, and so the relevance of this information should
have been obvious to Investigator Welch.

This is especially so

because the affidavit contained no other statement concerning
the

informant’s

credibility

or

experience

working

as

a

confidential informant.
Given
Investigator

the

unique

Welch’s

set

of

decision

to

circumstances
omit

this

surrounding

information,

we

cannot conclude that Investigator Welch’s omission was an act of
mere negligence or an innocent mistake.

At the very least, Lull

has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Investigator
Welch omitted the information with reckless disregard of whether
it would make the affidavit misleading to the magistrate.

Thus,

we conclude that Lull has satisfied the intentionality prong of
the Franks test.

into a single inquiry the two elements--‘intentionality’ and
‘materiality’--which Franks states are independently necessary.”
Colkley, 899 F.2d at 301. We are mindful in this case to treat
each prong as a distinct inquiry, and we do not base our
conclusion on “the fact of omission alone.” Rather, we consider
this fact along with the broader circumstances in which the
affidavit was drafted.

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B.
We

next

consider

whether

the

omitted

information

is

“material” under Franks: that is, whether it was “necessary to
the finding of probable cause.”
(quoting

Franks,

438

U.S.

at

See Colkley, 899 F.2d at 301
156).

In

Lull’s

view,

“the

credibility of the informant was paramount to the probable cause
analysis,” given that the only evidence identifying Lull as the
seller of the drugs in the affidavit came from an informant who
had been deemed unreliable.
We
prong

assess
by

whether

considering

See Appellant’s Br. at 21.

Lull
the

has

established

“totality

of

the

the

materiality

circumstances,”

evaluating the affidavit as a whole and all circumstances set
forth within.
at

233.

Colkley, 899 F.2d at 301-02; see Gates, 462 U.S.

We

first

information

had

information,

and

on

consider
the

determine

the

effect

reliability
that

the

that

of

the

omitted

the

informant’s

informant’s

demonstrated

unreliability undermined his credibility and the veracity of his
statements presented in the warrant application.

Because the

magistrate did not have the benefit of the omitted information
concerning

the

informant’s

reliability,

the

informant’s

statements were not properly considered as a basis for probable
cause.
there

When these statements are excluded, we conclude that
remains

insufficient

information

18

from

which

to

find

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probable

Filed: 05/25/2016

cause.

Pg: 19 of 27

Therefore,

we

conclude

that

the

omitted

information is indeed “material” under Franks.
1.
Much of the information included in Investigator Welch’s
affidavit came solely from the informant.

When the information

forming the basis for probable cause comes from an informant,
the informant’s “veracity” and “reliability” are critical to the
totality of the circumstances test.
(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 233).
factors
officer’s

to

be

considered,

assessment

of

we

Wilhelm, 80 F.3d at 119

While these are not the only
have

probable

held

that

cause . .

.

“a

must

judicial
include

a

review of the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons
supplying

hearsay

information.”

United

States

v.

Perez,

393 F.3d 457, 461-62 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, that the omitted information seriously calls
into question the informant’s reliability is without doubt: the
Sheriff’s

Office

essentially

admitted

as

much

when,

upon

discovering the theft, it immediately discharged the informant.
Further, as noted above, when Investigator Welch was asked at
the

suppression

decision,

he

hearing

responded

why
that

the

Sheriff’s

continuing

to

Office
work

made
with

this
the

informant after the informant had lied to and stolen from the
Sheriff’s

Office

would

not

be
19

ethical.

Critically,

the

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affidavit

Filed: 05/25/2016

contained

informant’s

no

reliability

Pg: 20 of 27

other
and

information

failed

to

relating

mention

his

to

the

experience

working as a confidential informant for the Wake Forest Police
Department.
Investigator
neutral

Welch’s

magistrate

from

omissions

being

able

therefore
to

prevented

accurately

assess

a
the

reliability and the veracity, and thus the significance, of the
informant’s statements.
811,

814

(7th

“omitted

Cir.

all

See United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d

2014)

(concluding

information

that

regarding

an

affidavit

the

that

informant’s

credibility . . . undermined the issuing magistrate’s ability to
perform

his

Because

of

role

as

a

neutral

this,

we

cannot

now

arbiter
rely

of

on

assessing whether probable cause existed.

probable

these

cause”).

statements

in

See United States v.

Hall, 113 F.3d 157, 158 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a search
warrant based solely upon an informant’s claims lacked probable
cause

where

the

affidavit

omitted

“absolutely

critical”

information calling into question the informant’s credibility).
We therefore set aside the information provided exclusively by
the

informant

and

next

consider

whether

information supports a finding of probable cause.

20

the

remaining

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2.
When the information provided by the informant is removed
from the affidavit, little remains.

We are left only with:

(1) the identification of the residence as belonging to a woman
with the last name “Lull”; (2) the fact of the controlled buy,
that is, that the informant went into the Lull residence without
cocaine

and

emerged

five

minutes

later

with

cocaine;

and

(3) that “through Investigative means, a conversation was heard
between
J.A. 40.

two

[unidentified]

males”

during

the

controlled

buy.

No information remaining in the affidavit identifies

Lull specifically as the seller or otherwise connects him to the
drug transaction. 3
The

district

court

held

that

“there

was

clearly

a

fair

probability that contraband would be found within the . . .
house based on the undisputed fact that the informant obtained
cocaine therein.”

Lull, 2014 WL 6666811, at *3.

We disagree.

While the occurrence of the controlled buy is certainly relevant

3

In evaluating whether probable cause would have existed if
the omitted statements had been included, we only consider “the
information actually presented to the magistrate during the
warrant application process.” Owens ex rel. Owens v. Lott, 372
F.3d 267, 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). We therefore
do not consider any additional facts that Investigator Welch
testified to during the suppression hearing, including that
Investigator Welch recognized the voice of the other individual
heard speaking during the controlled buy as Lull, because this
information was not presented to the magistrate.

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to the probable cause determination, this is just one fact to be
considered

against

the

totality

of

the

circumstances.

See

United States v. Khounsavanh, 113 F.3d 279, 285 (1st Cir. 1997)
(“Because

of

the

importance

of

Fourth

Amendment

freedoms

to

every American, and because of the fact[-]specific nature of the
probable cause inquiry, we reject the government’s contention
that a controlled buy should be per se sufficient to establish
probable cause.”) (citation omitted).
this

case,

this

evidence,

by

In the circumstances of

itself,

is

insufficient

to

establish probable cause.
Our

circuit

has

long

followed

the

rule

that

“the

nexus

between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may
be

established

inferences

of

by

the

where

nature

one

of

would

the

item

and

the

likely

keep

such

normal

evidence.”

United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1582 (4th Cir. 1993)
(quoting United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir.
1988)).

In previous drug trafficking cases, we have found the

nexus requirement satisfied when there was evidence that the
suspect was involved in the crime, coupled with “the reasonable
suspicion

.

.

.

that

drug

traffickers

store

drug-related

evidence in their homes.”

United States v. Williams, 548 F.3d

311,

(collecting

319

above,

(4th

this

Investigator

Cir.

2008)

“reasonable
Welch

relied

suspicion”
upon
22

in

cases).
is

his

As

exactly
affidavit:

mentioned

that
that

which
“drug

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traffickers

very

often

accessible

such

as

keep

in

Pg: 23 of 27

the

their

aforementioned
residences

items

and

readily

businesses.”

J.A. 41.
But this inference is contingent on the connection between
the

drug

trafficker

and

his

or

her

residence.

From

the

remaining information in the affidavit, essentially all we know
is that cocaine was purchased from a man in a residence that may
have

belonged

to

Lull’s

mother.

We

do

not

have

reliable

information about who this man was, whether he resided there, or
if he was alone in the residence.

Although the investigators

personally witnessed the informant go in with money and come out
with drugs, they relied on the informant’s word alone that the
seller was Lull.

This lack of information about the identity of

the seller creates an obvious problem: if a non-resident had
been the individual who had sold drugs to the informant--if Lull
was not the drug trafficker--there would be no reason to believe
that, hours later, there would be drug contraband or financial
records of drug transactions in Lull’s residence.

See United

States v. Suarez, 906 F.2d 977, 984 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Probable
cause

to

search

circumstances[]

exists

are

when

.

sufficient

to

.

.

lead

the
a

totality
prudent

of

the

person

to

believe that the items sought . . . will be present at the time
and place of the search.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

23

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As

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the

Supreme

Court

Pg: 24 of 27

has

repeatedly

emphasized,

the

“physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”

Payton v. New

York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).

Because of

this, when reviewing cases such as the one before us, we must
satisfy ourselves that “the magistrate had a substantial basis
for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.”
462 U.S.

at

238-39

internal quotation

(alterations
marks

in

omitted).

original)
In

this

Gates,

(citation

case,

given

and
the

unusual degree of reliance on the informant and the near-total
lack of corroborating evidence, this standard has not been met.
Cf.

Glover,

criminal

F.3d

background

essential
context

755

to
of

the
a

at

and

818

financial

probable

detailed

(“[O]mission

cause

affidavit

motive

of

determination
that

had

informant’s

not

is

an

necessarily

.

been

.

.

in

the

extensively

corroborated.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The connection between Lull and the drugs is too tenuous to
support a finding of probable cause to search his residence.
3.
In light of the above, the omitted information bearing on
the

credibility

of

the

informant

was

material

to

the

magistrate’s finding of probable cause, and we conclude that

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Lull has established the materiality prong of the Franks test by
a preponderance of the evidence.

V.
Because Lull has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that

Investigator

Welch

omitted

information

from

the

search

warrant affidavit with at least a reckless disregard for whether
these

omissions

made

the

application

misleading,

and

because

these omissions were material to a finding of probable cause,
Lull has established a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
under Franks v. Delaware.
in

denying

Lull’s

Therefore, the district court erred

suppression

motion.

The

ruling

of

the

district court is accordingly reversed, Lull’s conviction and
sentence vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED

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DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
I

concur

in

the

majority

opinion’s

holding

that

the

district court clearly erred in finding that Investigator Welch
did

not

intentionally

or

recklessly

omit

from

the

warrant

affidavit the circumstances surrounding the informant’s attempt
to steal twenty dollars from the funds provided by the Sheriff’s
Office to make the controlled buy.

For the reasons stated by

the district court, however, I cannot join in holding that the
omitted

information

was

“material”

and

therefore

that

its

absence defeated probable cause to search the Lull residence.
Magistrates

and

judges,

state

and

federal,

know

from

experience and common sense that drug abusers who cooperate with
law

enforcement

officers

are

notoriously

unreliable

human

beings, burdened as they typically are with barely manageable
affronts

to

limited

to

their

inherent

addictions,

human

debts

dignity,
incurred

including
to

but

service

not

those

addictions, and criminal convictions, all coupled with dissolved
and dissolving family and personal relationships.

Investigator

Welch should have disclosed the informant’s post-controlled-buy
arrest and the reasons for it; as the majority opinion cogently
explains, his excuse for not doing so cannot be credited.

But

even if he had made the disclosure, no judge with experience
issuing warrants would have refused to issue the search warrant

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in this case.

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Pg: 27 of 27

Cf. United States v. Allen, 960 F.2d 1055, 1057

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that an informant’s controlled buy of
crack
search

cocaine

constituted

warrant),

cited

probable

with

cause

approval

Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 618 (4th Cir. 1994).
Respectfully, I dissent, in part.

27

in

for

issuance

United

of

States

a
v.