US v. Bernardo Lloyd
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:12-cr-00354-RWT-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999799127]. [15-4272]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4272
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BERNARDO AUGUSTINE LLOYD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:12-cr-00354-RWT-1)
Argued:
March 1, 2016
Decided:
April 20, 2016
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Jennifer L. Mayer, Richard Alan Finci, HOULON, BERMAN,
FINCI, LEVENSTEIN & SKOK, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellant.
Sujit Raman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein,
United States Attorney, Hollis Raphael Weisman, Assistant United
States
Attorney,
OFFICE
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
ATTORNEY,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Bernardo
zagging
through
Lloyd
traffic
(“Appellant”)
on
the
was
speeding
and
Baltimore-Washington
zig-
National
Parkway (“Parkway”) when his Lexus sedan struck the back of a
pickup truck being driven by Juan Lopez Sanchez.
careened
off
flipped
and
scene.
On June 25, 2012, a grand jury indicted Appellant for
involuntary manslaughter.
the
Parkway.
Sanchez
The truck
died
at
the
He was not arrested until 15 months
later, on September 23, 2013.
Eventually, his case proceeded to
trial and a jury found him guilty.
Appellant maintains that the
15-month delay between indictment and arrest violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial.
He also argues that an
expert witness was improperly allowed to testify at trial as to
the cause of the accident, and he maintains he was entitled to a
sentence reduction because he accepted responsibility for his
offense.
We affirm Appellant’s conviction and sentence.
His
Sixth Amendment rights were not violated because the 15-month
delay
between
his
indictment
and
his
arrest
extraordinary and did not impair his defense.
ample
support
for
the
district
court’s
decision
was
not
We also find
to
allow
an
experienced accident reconstructionist to testify, consistently
with
the
accident.
opinion
of
another
expert,
about
the
cause
of
the
And, given Appellant’s testimony at trial, during
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which he did not accept responsibility for the accident but,
rather, testified that he was not driving recklessly, we have no
quarrel with the district court’s decision not to impose a more
lenient sentence.
I.
On
January
pickup truck.
31,
2012,
Appellant
rear-ended
Sanchez’s
The front end of Appellant’s vehicle underrode
the pickup with enough force that material from the car’s bumper
was
wrapped
around
the
flipped off the road.
truck’s
rear
axle.
Sanchez’s
truck
Sanchez was killed.
Police took statements from witnesses at the scene,
made measurements of the wreckage, photographed the crash site,
and then impounded the two vehicles.
About six months later, on
June 25, 2012, a grand jury in the District of Maryland issued
an
indictment
charging
Appellant
with,
among
other
things,
involuntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). 1
A
warrant
for
Appellant’s
arrest
issued
the
following
day.
However, he was not arrested until September 23, 2013, roughly
15 months later.
Appellant raised the issue of the delay soon
after being arrested.
Just under a year later, he moved to
1
Appellant was also charged with one count of reckless
driving in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.2, but the jury was
instructed not to consider that offense if it convicted on the
involuntary manslaughter charge.
3
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dismiss
the
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indictment,
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alleging
a
violation
of
his
Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial.
Specifically, he claimed
that,
crash
due
to
the
delay,
his
expert
reconstructionist,
Wendell Cover, had been unable to inspect the wrecked vehicles
and, therefore, could not present a theory about the cause of
the
accident.
impound
Although
and
nevertheless
the
were
indeed
denied
the
vehicles
had
unavailable,
motion,
been
the
reasoning
released
district
that
from
court
Appellant’s
defense would not be impaired.
The ensuing three-day trial focused on the cause of
the accident.
to
the
The evidence showed Appellant was speeding prior
collision.
He
testified
that
he
saw
a
car
rapidly
approaching in his rearview mirror and, thinking it might be a
police cruiser, moved into the right-hand lane.
The car, a
Nissan, sped by; Appellant pulled in behind the Nissan and hit
the gas.
At that point, according to Appellant, he was driving
fast enough to pass the other cars in the right-hand lane, but
not as fast as the Nissan, which quickly disappeared into the
distance.
At some point, though, Appellant caught up with the
Nissan.
Both
cars
zig-zagged
around
another
driver,
Joseph
McCann, in short succession: the Nissan passed on McCann’s left,
straddling two lanes; Appellant’s Lexus then zipped by on the
right, driving partially on the shoulder.
4
And Appellant himself
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testified that, shortly before the accident, he saw the Nissan
behind him in his side-view mirror.
McCann estimated that Appellant and the driver of the
Nissan were traveling over 100 miles per hour.
David Feser, an
off-duty police officer trained in speed detection, was also on
the road that day and testified as a fact witness.
Appellant’s
Lexus
was
traveling
90
to
100
He estimated
miles
per
hour,
characterized Appellant’s driving as reckless, and thought it
likely the car would be involved in an accident.
Unfortunately,
he was right.
Two experts testified for the Government.
Charles
Russell,
an
experienced
accident
Corporal
reconstructionist,
analyzed data from the Lexus’ airbag control module, examined
photographs and measurements taken at the scene, and reviewed
witness statements about the crash.
From this information, he
extrapolated that Appellant was driving approximately 100 miles
per hour before the crash and saw no evidence that Sanchez’s
actions contributed to the wreck.
As a result, Corporal Russell
opined, over Appellant’s objection, that the single likely cause
of the accident was “the excessive speed of the Lexus.”
J.A.
252. 2
2
Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix
filed by the parties in this appeal.
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Officer
Ken
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Bentivegna
of
the
United
States
Police (“Park Police”) also testified as an expert.
Park
He was
present at and documented the crash scene, and also examined the
vehicles in a Park Police impound lot at some point after they
were
removed
conclusion
from
about
the
roadway.
Appellant’s
He
speed,
reached
but
he
no
saw
specific
nothing
in
pictures of the tire marks and other impressions on the road
that indicated aggressive pre-impact braking by either Appellant
or Sanchez.
Therefore, he concluded, “[T]he operator of the
Lexus was going too fast to control his vehicle, failed to brake
appropriately
to
avoid
the
collision
and
was
driving
in
a
reckless manner which is what led to the collision between the
Lexus and” Sanchez’s pickup truck.
S.J.A. 446. 3
Appellant, for his part, claimed that he rounded a
bend in the Parkway and moved into the far-right lane.
As he
did so, he observed Sanchez’s truck also move “suddenly” into
that lane, so Appellant began to drift back into the center
lane.
J.A. 307.
He says he then saw the Nissan in his side-
view mirror “pushing its way into the center lane,” id. at 307,
so
he
returned
to
the
right-hand
lane.
At
that
according to Appellant, Sanchez applied his brakes.
3
moment,
Appellant
Citations to the “S.J.A.” refer to the Supplemental Joint
Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
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“tried
to
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go
the
to
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fast
right
as
as
[he
could],”
collided with the truck, sending both off the road.
09.
Appellant
presented
no
denied
expert
that
he
testimony
was
of
driving
his
but
Id. at 308-
recklessly.
own
he
to
counter
He
the
Government’s. 4
The
jury
was
thus
presented
straightforward theories of the case:
with
two
relatively
In the Government’s view,
the evidence indicated that Appellant’s reckless speed caused
him to rear-end Sanchez’s truck.
Appellant allowed that he was
speeding, but denied driving recklessly and maintained he was
simply
brakes.
unable
to
avoid
the
truck
when
Sanchez
applied
the
The jury, which found Appellant guilty of involuntary
manslaughter, evidently credited the Government’s account.
At sentencing, the district court denied Appellant’s
request
for
responsibility
a
downward
and
adjustment
imposed
a
based
63-month
term
on
of
acceptance
of
imprisonment.
This timely appeal followed.
4
Although Appellant presented Cover’s expert testimony at
the hearing on his motion to dismiss the indictment, he chose
not to present Cover’s testimony at trial.
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II.
A.
Speedy Trial Challenge
Appellant
first
challenges
the
district
court’s
decision denying the motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy
trial grounds.
We review the district court’s factual findings
for clear error, see United States v. Perry, 757 F.3d 166, 171
(4th Cir. 2014), and its legal conclusion about the effect of
the delay de novo, see United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 266
(4th Cir. 2009).
The
Sixth
Amendment
guarantees
the
accused
criminal prosecutions the right to a speedy trial.
Const. amend. VI.
United
States,
all
See U.S.
Some delays in bringing a defendant to trial
are simply too brief to violate the Constitution.
v.
in
505
U.S.
647,
651-52
(1992).
See Doggett
But
delays
approaching -- or, as here, exceeding -- one year presumptively
surpass the bare minimum required to trigger a constitutional
inquiry.
See id. at 651-52 & 652 n.1.
So, like the district
court, we must “engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing
process” that assesses the length of the delay, the reason for
the delay, how vigorously Appellant asserted his speedy trial
rights, and the extent to which Appellant was prejudiced by the
delay.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972).
“[N]one
of the four factors . . . [is] either a necessary or sufficient
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condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy
trial.”
See id. at 533.
But if those factors, considered
collectively, weigh in Appellant’s favor, then we must dismiss
the indictment lodged against him.
See Vermont v. Brillon, 556
U.S. 81, 93 (2009) (“The factors identified in Barker have no
talismanic qualities” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
1.
Length and Reason for Delay
We consider the first two factors -- length and reason
for the delay -- together.
The pertinent delay is the 15-month
gap between indictment and arrest.
That period of time is long
enough to merit inquiry into the remaining factors, but not an
“extraordinary” delay.
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657-58 (eight-and-
a-half year delay was extraordinary); Barker, 407 U.S. at 533
(delay of over five years extraordinary).
And the delay is
attributable solely to the Government -- the authorities knew at
all times where to find Appellant; arresting him simply was not
a priority.
Being simply dilatory does not weigh as heavily
against the Government as a “deliberate attempt to delay the
trial in order to hamper the defense . . . .”
Barker, 407 U.S.
at
reason
531.
However,
even
a
“more
neutral
such
as
negligence,” id., still “falls on the wrong side of the divide
between
acceptable
and
unacceptable
9
reasons
for
delaying
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criminal prosecution once it has begun,” Doggett, 505 U.S. at
657.
2.
Assertion of the Speedy Trial Right
As for the third factor, the Government makes much of
the fact that Appellant waited nearly a year after his arrest to
move to dismiss the indictment.
Yet there is no denying that
Appellant promptly raised the issue at his arraignment.
See
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 (“[The defendant] is not to be taxed
for
invoking
his
speedy
trial
right
only
after
his
arrest,”
where it was unrebutted that defendant was unaware of indictment
until his arrest.).
3.
Prejudice
That leaves the question of prejudice.
over
a
sufficiently
long
period
can
“Negligence
establish
a
general
presumption that the defendant’s ability to present a defense is
impaired,
meaning
that
a
defendant
can
prevail
despite not having shown specific prejudice.”
on
his
claim
United States v.
Velazquez, 749 F.3d 161, 175 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Doggett,
505 U.S. at 658.
held
that
an
In Doggett, for example, the Supreme Court
eight-and-a-half
year
delay
caused
by
the
Government’s negligence violated the Sixth Amendment because the
presumed prejudice to the defendant was “neither extenuated, as
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by
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the
defendant’s
rebutted.”
But
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acquiescence,
. . .
nor
persuasively
Id. at 658 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
significantly
negligence,
defendant
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like
from
shorter
the
delays
15-month
showing
actual
arising
delay
from
here,
prejudice.
do
government
not
See,
excuse
e.g.,
a
United
States v. Parker, 505 F.3d 323, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2007) (17-month
delay does not obviate need to inquire into prejudice); United
States v. Clark, 83 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam)
from”
(17-month
showing
delay
prejudice);
“insufficient
United
to
States
excuse
v.
a
Beamon,
defendant
992
F.2d
1009, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Although the government did not
pursue Beamon and McMillin with due diligence, if the delay in
this case -- only a few months longer than the minimum -- were
sufficient as a matter of law to relieve the defendant of the
burden of coming forward with any showing of actual prejudice,
the presumption of prejudice would be virtually irrebuttable.”).
Instead
impaired
we
Appellant’s
consider
defense. 5
whether
See,
the
e.g.,
delay
United
actually
States
v.
Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have held
that when the government has been negligent and the delay does
5
Other forms of prejudice, such as pretrial incarceration
and the anxiety caused by living under threat of prosecution,
are not relevant here because the delay in this case preceded
Appellant’s arrest and he did not know about the indictment
until he was arrested.
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not far exceed the minimum time required to trigger the full
Barker inquiry, we must consider the amount of delay in relation
to
particularized
omitted)).
the
Park
before
(internal
quotation
marks
Appellant argues his defense was impaired because
Police
he
prejudice.”
was
released
arrested.
the
wrecked
As
a
vehicles
result,
from
impound
Appellant’s
expert,
Wendell Cover, was unable to inspect the vehicles and testified
at
a
pre-trial
hearing
that
he
could
not
reconstruct
the
accident or come to a conclusion about what caused the accident.
We
struggle,
however,
Appellant’s defense.
to
identify
any
actual
prejudice
to
The competing theories of this case, as we
have explained, are that Appellant was driving too fast to avoid
the truck, or that Appellant had no opportunity to avoid the
collision when Sanchez hit the brakes.
Yet a closer examination
of Cover’s testimony simply does not establish how inspecting
the wrecked vehicles would have allowed him to prove or disprove
either of those theories.
Like
examine
the
Appellant’s
vehicles
expert,
involved
in
Corporal
the
Russell
accident.
did
not
And
the
information on which Corporal Russell based his opinion as to
speed
was
likewise
available
to
Cover,
Appellant’s
expert.
Further, Cover testified during the pre-trial hearing that “a
simple speed calculation” was the sort of conclusion that could
be reached by examining data from the airbag control module,
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even without physically inspecting the vehicles.
81.
It
is
Appellant’s
true
that
Corporal
Russell’s
conclusions
speed
were
based
in
part
on
the
Lexus’
tire
size
and
gear
ratios,
presumably
could
about
inspecting
these
the
have
vehicles.
limitations
of
been
Corporal
defense
Moreover,
Corporal
consistent
eyewitness
testimony
and,
in
fact,
Appellant
did
not
made
variables
that
established
ably
testimony
Russell’s
about
deny
about
he
counsel
Russell’s
examination.
with
assumptions
definitively
But
See J.A. 79-
explored
on
cross-
opinion
Appellant’s
speeding,
by
was
speed,
contradict
Corporal Russell’s estimate, or even object to the validity of
his calculations.
the
vehicles
We therefore fail to see how an inspection of
would
have
allowed
Appellant
to
contest
the
Government’s considerable proof as to his pre-accident speed.
Nor does Cover’s testimony explain how access to the
vehicles would have bolstered Appellant’s theory that Sanchez’s
braking contributed to the cause of the crash.
Cover emphasized
that “when you have a case of who crossed the center line or who
was within their lane of travel at the time of impact, you must
have a factual and scientific basis as to the point of impact
and the vehicle’s relationship to those lane lines, you must
[inspect the damage to the actual vehicles].”
enough.
collision
J.A. 79.
Fair
But the position of the vehicles prior to the fatal
in
this
case
was
never
13
seriously
in
dispute.
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Appellant did not testify that Sanchez collided with him while
changing lanes.
As Appellant explained, he saw Sanchez move
ahead of him into his lane of travel.
But, even crediting his
version of events, Appellant still had time to begin to move
back into the center lane, realize that option was not available
to him, and drift back behind the truck before Sanchez allegedly
applied his brakes.
The relevant question, then, was whether Appellant was
simply traveling too fast to avoid the collision, or whether
Sanchez braked too aggressively.
Cross-examination of Officer
Bentivegna suggested that it may have been possible to examine
the pickup truck’s brake filaments for evidence of braking.
Bentivegna
did
not
rule
out
the
possibility
that
the
But
truck
braked; he testified that there were no skid marks suggestive of
aggressive
pre-contact
braking,
while
allowing
that
normal
application of the brakes would not have left such marks.
And
Cover did not explain how examining the actual vehicles involved
in
the
accident
would
have
enabled
him
to
contradict
Bentivegna’s observation that the tire marks left on the Parkway
did not indicate that Sanchez braked aggressively prior to the
crash. 6
6
We also note that nothing in the record establishes that
the vehicles were destroyed after they were released from the
Park Police impound.
Instead, Detective Wayne Humberson
(Continued)
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At the end of the day, the Government’s case turned on
Corporal
that
Russell’s
Appellant
was
estimate
(corroborated
travelling
upwards
of
by
other
testimony)
90
miles
per
hour,
together with Officer Bentivegna’s testimony that there was no
indication Sanchez braked aggressively before impact.
Cover’s
testimony simply does not establish how examining the wrecked
vehicles would have allowed him to contradict those opinions.
And Appellant’s trial counsel ably pointed out the potential
weaknesses
examination.
in
the
Government’s
expert
opinions
on
cross-
We therefore fail to see how Appellant’s defense
was impaired in anything more than a speculative manner, and
speculative prejudice will not do.
See United States v. Loud
Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986) (“Th[e] possibility of prejudice
is not sufficient to support respondents’ position that their
speedy trial rights were violated.” (emphasis supplied)).
We are thus left with an unremarkable delay, caused by
the Government’s negligence, to which Appellant objected, but
testified that the Lexus and the truck were turned over to the
owners’ respective insurance companies.
Appellant did not
establish that those insurers thereafter destroyed the vehicles
or refused to make them available for inspection.
And
strikingly, given the asserted importance of inspecting the
wreckage, neither Appellant nor his expert, Cover, testified
that they made any effort to contact the insurers to inquire
after the vehicles.
For all the record discloses, then, the
vehicles may not have been truly lost at all.
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which did not impair his defense.
agree
with
the
district
Under those circumstances, we
court’s
conclusion
that
Appellant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated.
See
Beamon, 992 F.2d at 1014 (“On balance, we cannot say that the
government’s
negligence,
months],
light
tenuous
in
showing
of
of
which
the
caused
a
presumption
actual
prejudice,
delay
of
less
than
[24
and
the
Beamon
and
prejudice
entitles
McMillin to relief.”).
B.
Appellant’s
remaining
challenges
can
be
readily
dispatched.
1.
Admission of Expert Testimony
Appellant
first
argues
Corporal
Russell
should
not
have been permitted to testify that “the excessive speed of the
Lexus”
was
accident.
“the
See
single
J.A.
thing”
252.
We
that
most
review
likely
the
caused
district
the
court’s
decision to admit expert testimony for abuse of discretion.
See
United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 495-96 (4th Cir. 2015).
Corporal Russell’s calculation of the Lexus’ likely speed was
based on observations of data and mathematical calculations to
which Appellant did not object.
that
the
Lexus
struck
the
And Appellant did not dispute
truck.
We
take
it,
then,
that
Appellant objects to Corporal Russell’s implication that speed,
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rather
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than
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Sanchez’s
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braking,
was
the
primary
cause
of
the
wreck.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert
qualified
by
“knowledge,
skill,
experience,
training,
or
education” may give opinion testimony if it “will help the trier
of
fact
to
understand
the
evidence
or
to
determine
a
fact
issue,” so long as the “testimony is based on sufficient facts
or data” produced by reliable principles and methods that have
been reliably applied to the facts of the case.
Evid.
702(a)-(d).
Corporal
Russell
experience investigating crashes.
has
See Fed. R.
over
20
years’
He based his speed estimate
on a series of calculations using the airbag control module data
downloaded from Appellant’s Lexus.
He also reviewed Officer
Bentivegna’s report and conclusion, as well as “all the evidence
that the [P]ark [P]olice had,” including the same photographs
and
diagrams
based
his
of
the
crash
testimony.
scene
See
photographs of the vehicles.
J.A.
on
which
227
Officer
(“I’ve
Bentivegna
looked
at
the
I’ve looked at the data they have.
I have seen the diagrams, the witness statements.
You know, so
I examined all the evidence that the [P]ark [P]olice had.”).
Given
that
Corporal
Appellant
Russell’s
did
speed
not
object
estimate
or
to
to
the
admissibility
Officer
of
Bentivegna’s
testimony that Sanchez did not brake aggressively, we fail to
see
any
abuse
of
discretion
in
17
admitting
Corporal
Russell’s
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opinion
Filed: 04/20/2016
that
Appellant’s
Pg: 18 of 20
speed
caused
the
accident.
See
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 134 F.3d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1998)
(observing that an expert’s opinion may be “based, not only on
data
and
direct
observations,
but
also
on
the
opinions
and
observations of others”).
2.
Sentencing
Finally,
have afforded
him
Appellant
a
argues
two-level
the
district
reduction
in
should
base
offense
his
court
level at sentencing for three reasons: he cooperated with law
enforcement
at
the
scene
of
the
accident
and
thereafter
willingly gave a statement; he never denied his involvement in
the accident or that he was speeding; and he went to trial only
to contest the speedy trial issue and the legal issue of whether
the
federal
conduct.
involuntary
manslaughter
statute
applied
to
his
We review the district court’s sentencing decision on
this point for clear error.
See United States v. Jeffery, 631
F.3d 669, 678 (4th Cir. 2011).
Section
3E1.1
of
the
United
States
Sentencing
Guidelines provides that a defendant who “clearly demonstrates
acceptance
of
responsibility”
is
entitled
to
reduction in the calculation of his offense level.
§ 3E1.1.
a
two-level
See U.S.S.G.
“Conviction by trial . . . does not automatically
preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction.”
18
Appeal: 15-4272
Doc: 51
Filed: 04/20/2016
Id. cmt. n.2.
Pg: 19 of 20
“This may occur, for example, where a defendant
goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate
to factual guilt . . . .”
In
district
this
case,
court’s
factual guilt.
question
Id.
however,
conclusion
that
required
testified.
denial
of
attempting
the
to
evidence
Appellant
supports
the
dispute
his
did
As the district court explained, the statute in
the
Government
conduct was willful and wanton.
and
the
Clearly
willful
in
changing lanes.”
the
and
effect
prove
that
Appellant’s
Yet Appellant “took the stand
thrust
wanton
blame
J.A. 325.
to
of
his
nature
the
testimony
of
victim
his
in
was
in
conduct
in
this
case
for
Indeed, Appellant testified “the
pickup truck went in front of [him] suddenly,” id. at 307; “the
brake lights of the truck went on and that’s when the accident
occurred,” id. at 308; and he was not driving recklessly, see
id. at 311 (Q: Was the manner in which you were driving reckless
--
A.
No,
responsibility
sir.).
for
Clearly,
the
accident.
Appellant
did
Accordingly,
not
the
accept
district
court did not clearly err in denying Appellant credit for doing
so.
See United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir.
2007) (“We must give great deference to the district court’s
decision because the sentencing judge is in a unique position to
evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).
19
Appeal: 15-4272
Doc: 51
Filed: 04/20/2016
Pg: 20 of 20
III.
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
the
judgment
of
the
district court is
AFFIRMED.
20
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