US v. Cornelius Wood

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:98-cr-00287-JAB-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999737287].. [15-4285]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4285

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CORNELIUS RAY WOODS, a/k/a Jimmy Corn,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:98-cr-00287-JAB-1)

Submitted:

January 14, 2016

Decided:

January 19, 2016

Before AGEE, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Eric L. Iverson,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Cornelius Ray Woods appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 60 months’
imprisonment.

On appeal, Woods contends that the district court

clearly erred by finding that he committed a Grade A violation of
the terms of his supervised release and that the 60-month term of
imprisonment was plainly unreasonable.

We affirm.

To revoke supervised release, a district court need only find
a violation of a condition of supervised release by a preponderance
of the evidence.

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); United States v.

Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992).

This standard is met

when the court “believe[s] that the existence of a fact is more
probable than its nonexistence.”

United States v. Manigan, 592

F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[W]e review a district court’s factual findings underlying a
revocation for clear error.”

United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d

370, 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
3258 (2015).

S. Ct.

, 84 U.S.L.W.

There is clear error if, after reviewing the record,

we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.”

United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538,

542 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by
finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Woods committed a
Grade A violation of supervised release by committing a violent
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felony.

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The court heard testimony from several witnesses that

Woods lured the victim to a hotel room and, when the victim
entered, Woods aimed a firearm at the victim.

The victim tried to

knock the gun from Woods’ hand and the gun discharged, shooting
the victim in the thigh.

Video footage from the hotel showed the

victim retreating from the room and running down the hall and
Woods, armed with a firearm, chasing the victim.

Although Woods

denied possessing a firearm and challenged the credibility of the
witnesses, we defer to the district court’s decision to credit the
victims’ testimony over Woods’.

See United States v. McInnis, 474

F.

2012)

App’x

917,

919

(4th

Cir.

(holding

that

credibility

determinations made by district court at revocation hearings are
rarely reviewable on appeal) (citing United States v. Cates, 613
F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 2010)).
“A

district

court

has

broad

discretion

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.”
Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).

when

imposing

a

United States v.

We will affirm the

sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and not plainly
unreasonable.
Cir. 2006).

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th

Only if we conclude that the sentence is unreasonable

must we decide whether it is plainly so.
478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Moulden,

We presume that a sentence

within the Chapter Seven policy statement range is reasonable.
Webb, 738 F.3d at 642.
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We have reviewed the record and conclude that Woods’ sentence
is both within the statutory maximum and the policy statement range
for a Grade A violation, and he fails to rebut the presumption
that it is reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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