US v. James Bragg

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:14-cr-00111-F-2. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999791414]. [15-4289]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4289

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES BRAGG,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:14-cr-00111-F-2)

Submitted:

March 28, 2016

Decided:

April 8, 2016

Before KING, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, Warrenton,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
James Bragg appeals the district court’s judgment imposing
a

24-month

term

of

incarceration

and

a

10-year

term

of

supervised release following Bragg’s guilty plea to distribution
of a quantity of cocaine base.
supervised

release

term

is

Bragg argues on appeal that his
procedurally

and

substantively

unreasonable and that his 24-month sentence of incarceration is
substantively unreasonable.

We affirm.

We generally review a sentence for reasonableness, applying
“a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”

Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); United States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d
106, 111-12 (4th Cir. 2015).

However, because Bragg did not

object to the term of supervised release in the district court
or argue for a term of supervised release different than the one
imposed

by

the

district

court,

we

review

the

procedural

reasonableness of the supervised release term for plain error.
See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576—8 (4th Cir. 2010).
Under the plain error standard, Bragg must show (1) an error;
(2) that is plain; (3) that affects his substantial rights; and
(4) that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.”

United States v. Webb, 738

F.3d

(alteration

638,

640-41

(4th

Cir.

2013)

quotation marks omitted).

2

and

internal

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Bragg

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asserts

that

his

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term

of

supervised

release

is

procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to
adequately explain its reasons for imposing the 10-year term.
In evaluating a sentencing court’s explanation of a selected
sentence,

the

district

court

“must

make

assessment based on the facts presented.”

an

individualized

Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.

While the “individualized assessment need not be elaborate or
lengthy,

. . .

particular

it

case

must

at

appellate review.”

provide

hand

and

a

rationale

adequate

to

tailored
permit

to

the

meaningful

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court explained its reasons for imposing
the 10-year supervised release term.

Specifically, the district

court discussed Bragg’s lengthy criminal history, including nine
drug-related convictions and eight misdemeanor infractions, as
well as his previous failure to complete supervision without a
violation.

The district court also considered the appropriate

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors before imposing the sentence.

We

therefore conclude that there was no procedural error in the
district court’s imposition of the 10-year term.
We

next

review

the

term

of

supervised

release

for

substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality
of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from
the Guidelines range.”

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
3

Bragg challenges

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the substantive reasonableness of the 10-year term on the ground
that it is greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of
sentencing.

Because Bragg “simply challeng[es] the substantive

reasonableness

of

his

[supervised

release

term]

due

to

its

length or non-specific considerations,” our review is for abuse
of discretion rather than plain error.

See United States v.

Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2010).
A district court, “in determining the length of the term
and the conditions of supervised release, shall consider the
factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),
(a)(2)(D),
§ 3583(c).

(a)(4),

(a)(5),

(a)(6),

and

(a)(7).”

18

U.S.C.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 10year term of supervised release given Bragg’s extensive criminal
record and repeated prior violations of probation and supervised
release.

See

18

U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(1),

(a)(2)(B)

(identifying

“nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant” and “adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct” as factors for determining proper sentence).
Thus,

the

above-Guidelines

term

of

supervised

release

is

substantively reasonable.
Finally, we turn to the substantive reasonableness of the
within-Guidelines-range sentence of incarceration.

We presume

that

Sentencing

a

sentence

within

a

properly
4

calculated

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Guidelines range is reasonable.

United States v. Louthian, 756

F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
A defendant can rebut this presumption only “by showing that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)

factors.”

Guidelines-range

Id.

sentence

We
of

conclude

that

incarceration

Bragg’s
is

within-

substantively

reasonable and that Bragg has not made the showing necessary to
rebut the presumption of reasonableness.

See id.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

5