US v. Kevin Hall

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:14-cr-00181-JAG-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999793209].. [15-4300]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4300

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KEVIN HALL,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:14−cr−00181−JAG−1)

Argued:

January 28, 2016

Decided:

April 12, 2016

Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Paul Geoffrey Gill, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Richard Daniel
Cooke, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Acting Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Prior to his sentencing for theft of government property,
Kevin Hall submitted a letter of support to the district court,
apparently from his court-ordered Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor.
The district court relied in part on the letter in giving Hall a
sentence well below the advisory Guidelines range.

Days later,

after discovering that Hall had forged the letter, the district
court

vacated

sentence.

the

original

sentence

and

imposed

a

harsher

Hall now challenges the district court’s authority to

modify his sentence.

Because of the constraints Congress has

placed on district courts’ ability to modify sentences, we are
obligated to vacate and remand for the reimposition of Hall’s
original sentence.

I.
Kevin Hall pleaded guilty to theft of government property.
During

the

plea

hearing,

Hall

claimed

not

to

have

alcohol or used illegal drugs for several years.

consumed

Immediately

after the hearing, he declined a urine test and confessed that
just

a

week

marijuana.
the

earlier

he

had

consumed

alcohol

and

smoked

After accepting Hall’s apology for his dishonesty,

district

court

ordered

Hall

to

prevention meetings and obtain a sponsor.

2

attend

substance-abuse-

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Five

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days

before

his

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sentencing

hearing,

Hall

filed

a

letter purportedly from his sponsor indicating that Hall was
attending
J.A. 68.

meetings

regularly

and

“working

the

step

program.”

The district court, believing that Hall’s criminal

behavior was strongly influenced by alcohol abuse, relied on the
sponsor’s letter as proof that Hall was putting his addiction
behind

him.

Accordingly,

Hall

received

a

light

sentence.

Despite an advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of fifteen
to twenty-one months’ imprisonment, the court sentenced Hall to
three years of probation, with a special condition of thirty
days

of

intermittent

confinement

and

three

months

of

home

detention with electronic monitoring.
Within a week of sentencing, the district court discovered
that Hall had forged the letter from his sponsor.

The court

entered an order vacating the sentence and a show-cause order
for

criminal

contempt.

In

a

written

opinion

justifying

the

order to vacate, the district court held that it was authorized
to resentence Hall by both the court’s inherent authority and by
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a).
At the resentencing hearing, held eleven days after the
original

sentencing

hearing,

the

district

court

recalculated

Hall’s Guidelines range, revoking a previously granted reduction
for acceptance of responsibility.

The new advisory Guidelines

range was twenty-one to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment, and
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the court sentenced Hall to twenty-one months’ imprisonment.
the

request

of

defense

counsel,

and

with

the

At

government’s

approval, the court vacated the show-cause order and canceled
the scheduled contempt proceedings.
This appeal followed.

II.
The issue is whether the district court was authorized to
modify Hall’s sentence, either by the court’s inherent authority
to vacate a judgment procured by fraud, or by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure

35(a).

As

we

explain

below,

whether

the

district court had authority to vacate the original sentence is
a question of jurisdiction, thus our review is de novo.

See

United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2008).
Both parties argue that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) forecloses the
district

court’s

exercise

of

inherent

authority.

We

agree.

Section 3582(c) bars a district court from modifying a sentence
“unless [1] the Bureau of Prisons moves for a reduction, [2] the
Sentencing Commission amends the applicable Guidelines range, or
[3] another statute or Rule 35 expressly permits the court to do
so.”
2010).

United States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir.
Accordingly, in Goodwyn, when a district court modified

a sentence without meeting one of these three exceptions, we
held that the district court acted without authority.
4

Id. at

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235-36.

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The

‘inherent

negative

authority’

sentence . . . .”

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implication
for

Id.

a

at

is

clear:

district
235

court

(quoting

“[T]here
to

United

is

no

modify

a

States

v.

Cunningham, 554 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2009)); see also United
States v. Mann, 435 F. App’x 254, 255 (4th Cir. 2011) (“In
United

States

v.

Goodwyn,

we

held

that

§ 3582(c)

divests

a

district court of jurisdiction to modify a sentence except in
those

cases

specifically

authorized

by

statute.”).

Section

3582(c) creates a jurisdictional bar that leaves no room for the
exercise of inherent authority.
Having determined that there was no inherent authority, we
turn to Rule 35(a), the remaining potential source of authority
for the district court’s action.

Under Rule 35(a), “[w]ithin 14

days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that
resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a).

The question here is whether Hall’s

sentence, marred as it was by fraud, “resulted from . . . clear
error.”
We have explained that the scope of “clear error” under
Rule 35(a) is “extremely narrow.”
F.3d 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2009).

United States v. Fields, 552
“Congress limited the reach of

Rule 35(a) because it wanted to promote openness and finality in
sentencing.”

Id. at 405.

Accordingly, the Rule is limited to

“cases in which an obvious error or mistake has occurred in the
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sentence, that is, errors which would almost certainly result in
a remand of the case to the trial court for further action.”
United

States

v.

Ward,

171

F.3d

188,

191

(4th

Cir.

1999)

(quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee’s 1991 note).
This court has not decided whether a fraud on the court
constitutes
question

“clear

error.”

comprehensively.

Here,
It

is

we

need

enough

to

not
say

answer
that

the

Hall’s

forgery is not the type of fraud that we have held in similar
circumstances warrants setting aside a final judgment.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3), a district
court has the power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the
court.”

“Fraud

on

the

court

is . . .

limited

to

the

more

egregious forms of subversion of the legal process . . . that we
cannot necessarily expect to be exposed by the normal adversary
process.”

Great

Coastal

Express,

Inc.

v.

Int’l

Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1357 (4th Cir. 1982).

Bhd.

of

“Perjury and

fabricated evidence,” however, do not fall in this category;
they “are evils that can and should be exposed” by an opposing
party, “and the legal system encourages and expects litigants to
root them out as early as possible.”

Id.; see also Fox ex rel.

Fox v. Elk Run Coal Co., 739 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2014)
(“Fraud

on

the

court

[under

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

60(d)(3)] is not your ‘garden-variety fraud.’” (quoting George
P. Reintjes Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 71 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.
6

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1995))).

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Consequently,

we

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do

not

permit

these

preventable

frauds to override the finality of judgments.
What we have said about fraud on the court in the context
of Rule 60(d)(3) is applicable in this case as well.

While it

would sometimes be impractical for the government to test the
authenticity of every letter of support submitted by a defendant
during sentencing, the government had several reasons to test
this letter.

First, after Hall lied during the plea hearing,

the government was on notice that Hall was prepared to deceive
the

court.

Second,

the

sponsor

was

court

ordered.

The

sponsor’s views were thus likely to be especially important to
the district court.

Third, under the circumstances, the letter

was suspicious on its face.

Though it purported to come from

the owner of a contracting company, it was crudely handwritten
on a plain sheet of paper without letterhead.
letter

was

filed

five

days

before

the

Finally, the

sentencing

hearing,

leaving the government adequate time to contact the sponsor.
Taken

together,

these

could

reasonably

have

facts

demonstrate

discovered

Hall’s

that

the

forgery.

government
We

do

not

believe that “clear error” under Rule 35(a) encompasses this
situation.
We are keenly aware that Hall’s action strikes at the heart
of the district court’s truth-finding function, and it may be
that in a case in which the government could not have reasonably
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discovered the fraud, we would be compelled to reach a different
conclusion.

But

this

is

not

that

case.

Moreover,

as

the

government notes in its brief, it is not left without remedies;
the government may still pursue “a new felony prosecution for
what

defendant

court.”

did

during

the

proceedings

in

the

district

Appellee’s Br. 35.

III.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court
lacked authority to vacate its original sentence.

Accordingly,

we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for Hall’s
original sentence to be reinstated.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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