US v. Xayver Warner

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cr-00252-RJC-2. [999805498]. [15-4316]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4316

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
XAYVER JERVONTE-MARQUI WARNER,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:13-cr-00252-RJC-2)
Argued:

January 28, 2016

Decided:

April 27, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Sentence vacated and case remanded by published opinion. Judge
Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Duncan
joined.

ARGUED: Ann Loraine Hester, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Amy
Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Ross Hall Richardson,
Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INC.,
Charlotte,
North
Carolina,
for
Appellant.
Jill
Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
Xayver

Warner,

who

pleaded

guilty

pursuant

to

a

plea

agreement to one count of aiding and abetting the theft of a
firearm,

contends

agreement.

that

the

government

breached

the

plea

We agree.

In the plea agreement, the government agreed to advise the
district court at sentencing that the parties had agreed that
the

4-level

enhancement

under

U.S.S.G.

§

2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

(increasing a defendant’s offense level for use or possession of
a firearm in connection with another felony offense) did not
apply.

The government’s agreement on the inapplicability of the

enhancement was based, at least in part, on its view that a
North

Carolina

conviction

for

breaking

and

entering

a

motor

vehicle did not constitute a felony offense for a defendant with
Warner’s criminal history.
At sentencing, however, the government advised the court
that it had changed its position on whether a North Carolina
breaking and entering offense constituted a felony, concluding
that

it

did,

regardless

of

a

defendant’s

criminal

history.

Nonetheless, the government asked the court to honor the plea
agreement and not apply the enhancement to Warner.

The court,

however, chose to apply the enhancement and sentenced Warner to
48 months’ imprisonment.

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Because we conclude that the government, although acting in
good faith, breached its undertaking in the plea agreement by
stating

that

the

enhancement

did

apply,

we

vacate

Warner’s

sentence and remand for resentencing before a different district
judge, as required by Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263
(1971).

I
After Warner and an accomplice broke into 19 motor vehicles
in a parking deck in Charlotte, North Carolina, and stole a .40
caliber pistol from one of the vehicles, a federal grand jury
returned

an

indictment

against

Warner,

charging

him

with

stealing a firearm that had moved in interstate commerce and
aiding

and

abetting

§§ 924(l) and 2.
discussed

the

negotiations,
government

the

same,

violation

of

18

U.S.C.

The government and Warner’s counsel thereafter
possibility

Warner’s

that

in

a

of

a

counsel

plea

plea

stated

agreement

agreement.
in

“would

an

email

obviously

During
to

the

have

to

include dismissal of all state charges[,] . . . [and] [w]e would
also

need

a

stipulation

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

[for

that

using

the

or

4-level

possessing

enhancement
‘any

under

firearm

or

ammunition in connection with another felony offense’] does not
apply.”

In

a

responding

email,

the

Special

Assistant

U.S.

Attorney stated, “[A]t this time[,] I do not have information

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that would implicate [Warner] under [§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)].”

She

added that “[t]he investigation and talks with witnesses and the
co-Defendant are ongoing[,] but I can as of now agree that this
[enhancement] does not apply.”
The next day, on December 13, 2013, Warner signed a plea
agreement with the government in which he agreed to plead guilty
to the charge that he had aided and abetted the theft of a
firearm.

The agreement included the following provision:

7.

Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the parties agree
that they will jointly recommend that the Court
make the following findings and conclusions as to
the U.S.S.G.:
*

*

*

d.

The parties agree that the 4-level increase
under 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) does not apply.

e.

The
the
to
any

United States will inform the Court and
probation office of all facts pertinent
the sentencing process and will present
evidence requested by the Court.

The agreement also included a provision by which Warner waived
his right to appeal “whatever sentence [was] imposed,” except to
raise

claims

of

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel

or

prosecutorial misconduct.
Following
Warner’s

guilty

probation
In

the

that

a

plea
plea

officer

§

pursuant

report,

2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

the

to

subsequently

presentence

the

colloquy,

district

the

prepared

the

a

probation

4-level
4

plea

court

accepted

agreement,

presentence
officer

enhancement

and

a

report.

recommended
be

applied,

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concluding

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that

Warner

had

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used

or

possessed

a

firearm

in

connection with another felony offense -- namely, the 19 counts
of breaking or entering a motor vehicle with which Warner had
been

charged

in

a

North

Carolina

state

court.

With

the

enhancement, the probation officer calculated Warner’s offense
level

to

history

be

23,

category

which,
of

when

II,

combined

resulted

in

with
a

range of 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment.
noted

that

if

the

district

court

Warner’s

Guidelines

criminal

sentencing

The probation officer

accepted

the

government’s

position, as stated in the plea agreement, that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)
did not apply, Warner’s Guidelines range would instead be 33 to
41 months’ imprisonment.
Warner objected to the presentence report’s recommendation
to

apply

§

inapplicable

2K2.1(b)(6)(B),
for

two

arguing

distinct

that

reasons;

the

“enhancement

first,

because

is

[he]

neither ‘used’ nor ‘possessed’ the firearm, and second, because
there was no ‘connection with another felony offense.’”
The government filed a response entitled “Objections to the
Presentence Report,” in which it noted that it had agreed with
Warner in his plea agreement that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) did not apply
and requested that the district court therefore not apply the
enhancement.

In

the

same

filing,

however,

the

government

proceeded to state that it had revised its position regarding
when certain types of North Carolina felony offenses count as
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felonies

for

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federal

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sentencing

purposes,

and

it

clearly

indicated that, under its new position, the enhancement would
properly apply to Warner.

It stated:

The probation office correctly notes in paragraph 19
of the Presentence Investigation Report that in the
course of the crime of conviction a firearm was
possessed in connection with another offense, that
being breaking and entering multiple motor vehicles in
violation of North Carolina General Statute 14-56, a
class I felony.
However, at the time that the plea
agreement was made, the Government’s position on how
to treat a North Carolina class I offense for purposes
of United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir.
2011), resulted in a finding that 14-56 was not a
felony for federal purposes because it was not a crime
punishable by imprisonment in excess of a year as
applied to this Defendant and his criminal history.
The Government’s approach to Simmons analysis at the
time the plea agreement was made treated a North
Carolina class I offense committed on or after
December
1,
2011
as
a
felony
punishable
by
imprisonment in excess of a year, only where the
defendant was a North Carolina criminal history
category V or higher.
On June 5, 2013, the date of
the offense conduct, Warner was a North Carolina
criminal history category II. Thus, Warner’s criminal
history was not sufficient to pass Simmons analysis as
applied at the time of the plea agreement and his
conduct was not considered “another felony offense”
for purposes of 2K2.1.
On December 1, 2011 the North Carolina Justice
Reinvestment
Act
increased
North
Carolina
state
penalties such that all felonies could be punishable
by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Despite
these December 1, 2011 changes, concerned that the
changes may not satisfy the Appellate Courts, the
Government maintained the conservative position that
the changes were not a cure to the Simmons issue. As
of August 4, 2014, the Government has taken the new
position, in light of United States v. Valdovinos,
2014 WL 3686104 (4th Cir. July 25, 2014), that the
December 2011 North Carolina Justice Reinvestment Act
cured any infirmity in the class H and I North
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Carolina state felonies such that these offenses are
felonies for federal purposes regardless of the
criminal history category of the offender.
(Emphasis of “felony” or “felonies” in original; other emphasis
added).
made

The government explained, however, that “[b]ecause [it]

its

agreement

with

Warner

prior

to

this

new

official

position on Simmons, [it] [was] not seek[ing] the 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)
enhancement.”

Instead, it “respectfully ask[ed] that the Court

honor the agreement of the parties.”
Arguing

that

the

government’s

statement

to

the

court

breached the plea agreement, Warner filed a motion for specific
performance of the agreement, requesting that the district court
(1)

declare

the

agreement;
docket;

(2)

(3)

agreeing

government
strike

direct

with

the

the

defense

to

be

in

breach

government’s

government
counsel’s

to

of

objection

file

arguments

a
as

new
to

the

plea

from

the

objection
why

the

enhancement was inapplicable; and (4) transfer Warner’s case to
a different district judge for sentencing.

Warner explained

that the parties’ agreement that the enhancement does not apply
“was based on the facts of the case, not on any kind of legal
issue involving Simmons or Valdovinos.”
At

the

sentencing

hearing,

the

district

court

denied

Warner’s motion for specific performance, concluding that the
government
agreement.”

had

“complied

with

the

conditions

of

the

plea

The court thereupon concluded that the enhancement
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was applicable and therefore that Warner’s advisory Guidelines
range was 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment.

After hearing from

Warner and his family, the court imposed a downward-variance
sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment.
From

the

district

court’s

judgment,

Warner

filed

this

appeal, seeking specific performance of his plea agreement and
resentencing
challenges

before
two

a

different

aspects

of

the

district

judge.

district

court’s

He

also

Guidelines

calculations.

II
Warner contends that the government breached its promise in
the plea agreement to inform the sentencing court “that the 4level

increase

under

2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

does

not

apply”

when

it

submitted a filing that informed the court that it no longer
agreed with this position.

According to Warner, even though the

government “asked the court not to apply the enhancement,” it
nonetheless

indicated

at

the

same

time

that

it

“viewed

that

request as factually and legally wrong,” “mak[ing] clear that
the government would have recommended the 4-level enhancement
but for its agreement with Warner.”
that

the

government’s

breach

was

Warner contends further

material

because

“[e]mails

between Warner’s counsel and the prosecutor demonstrate[] that

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the agreement depended on the government’s recommendation that
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) did not apply.”
The government argues that it agreed to “recommend against
application of [the] four-level increase” and that it did so
“unequivocally

and

consistently.”

It

acknowledges

that

its

discussion of the Simmons issue “provided the district court
with new and relevant legal authority that tended to support
application of the enhancement,” but it contends that it “had a
responsibility to inform the district court of that authority,”
maintaining that, “[a]s an officer of the court, the prosecutor
could not object to the probation officer’s recommendation that
the

enhancement

be

applied

without

grappling

with

the

legal

authority that might support application of the enhancement.”
Finally, the government argues, even if it breached the plea
agreement,

the

breach

would

not

be

material

because

“[b]oth

Warner and the district court recognized the position of the
United States as recommending that the four-level enhancement
under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) should not apply to Warner.”
When interpreting plea agreements, “we draw upon contract
law as a guide to ensure that each party receives the benefit of
the bargain,” and to that end, we “enforce a plea agreement’s
plain language in its ordinary sense.”

United States v. Jordan,

509 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

Although we employ traditional principles of
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contract law as a guide, we nonetheless give plea agreements
“greater scrutiny than we would apply to a commercial contract”
“[b]ecause a defendant’s fundamental and constitutional rights
are implicated when he is induced to plead guilty by reason of a
plea agreement.”
citation

Id. at 195-96 (internal quotation marks and

omitted).

At

bottom,

“when

a

plea

rests

in

any

significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor,
so

that

it

can

be

said

to

be

part

of

the

consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”

inducement

or

Santobello, 404

U.S. at 262.
In the plea agreement before us, the government agreed that
it would, jointly with the defendant, “recommend that the Court
make

the

following

U.S.S.G.: . . .

The

findings
parties

and

agree

conclusions
that

the

as

4-level

to

the

increase

under 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) does not apply [and] [t]he United States
will

inform

the

Court

sentencing process.”
the

verb

“recommend”

.

.

.

of

all

(Emphasis added).
in

the

context

facts

pertinent

to

the

The agreement’s use of
of

what

the

government

promised to advise the court is, to be sure, somewhat awkward,
but the substance of the promise that the government made is
clear:

The

government

agreed

to

advise

the

court

of

its

position that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) does not apply in this
case.

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That the government clearly understood the precise nature
of this promise -- i.e., to represent its position, not simply
to make a recommendation -- is demonstrated by both the email
exchanges leading to the plea agreement and the government’s
filing with the court after execution of the plea agreement.
Before

the

agreement

was

signed,

the

government

acceded

to

Warner’s demand for a stipulation that the enhancement did not
apply, stating that it “[did] not have information that would
implicate [Warner] under [§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)]” and that it could
agree with the position that “[the enhancement] does not apply.”
Similarly,

after

execution

of

the

agreement

and

before

sentencing, the government recognized that it had not agreed in
the plea agreement simply to make a recommendation, but that it
had agreed to state its position that the enhancement did not
apply.

The nature of its promise was confirmed when it advised

the court that since signing the agreement, it “ha[d] taken the
new

position”

that

the

enhancement

would

apply,

although

it

urged the court to honor the agreement despite the government’s
“new

position.”

(Emphasis

added).

Thus,

in

giving

this

explanation, the government again recognized that it had agreed
to represent its position on the enhancement, not to recommend
whether

to

apply

the

enhancement.

significant.

11

The

difference

is

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The
applies

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government’s
but

that

advice

the

court

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to

a

court

should

that

an

nonetheless

enhancement

not

apply

the

enhancement in the particular circumstances of the case, for
whatever reason, is substantively different from a statement by
the government to the court that it holds the position that the
enhancement does not apply.
court

would

feel

free

On receiving the former advice, the

to

reject

the

advice

as

a

mere

recommendation.

But on receipt of the latter advice, the court

would

so

not

feel

free

to

reject

the

government’s

position,

unless and until it conducted a careful review of the record and
the law and determined that it disagreed with the government on
the applicability of the enhancement.
It is true, as the government argues, that even as the
government

announced

applicability

to

its

Warner,

“new

position”

on

it

repeatedly

the

enhancement’s

requested

that

the

sentencing court “not apply the enhancement” on the ground that
the court should “honor the agreement of the parties.”
government’s

plea

agreement

obligation

was

more

But the

than

simply

recommending that the court not impose the enhancement; it had
promised

to

enhancement

advise
“does

not

the

court

apply.”

of
And

its

position

thus,

even

that

the

though

the

government did recommend to the district court that it should
not apply the enhancement, the government breached its promise
to tell the court that the enhancement did not apply.
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We also conclude that the government’s breach was material.
“Central to [the] determination of the materiality of a breach
is ‘the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of
the benefit which he reasonably expected.’”
Scruggs,

356

F.3d

539,

543-44

(4th

United States v.

Cir.

2004)

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981)).

(quoting

In this case,

the record amply demonstrates that the government’s willingness
to agree that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) was inapplicable was critical to
Warner’s acceptance of the plea agreement, as manifested by the
negotiations.

The government nonetheless argues that any breach

cannot be material because “[b]oth Warner and the district court
recognized the position of the United States as recommending
that

the

four-level

Warner.”

But

this

enhancement
argument

.

again

.

.

should

overlooks

not

the

apply

to

distinction

between requesting that the court not impose the enhancement
because of the parties’ plea agreement, as opposed to jointly
advising the court of the parties’ position that the enhancement
was inapplicable.
We therefore conclude that the government breached its plea
agreement with Warner, albeit with a pure motive, and that the
breach

was

material,

leaving

open

only

the

issue

of

the

appropriate remedy.
When a court of appeals finds a material breach of a plea
agreement and the defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea,
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the court should remand the case to the district court to assess
whether,

in

the

appropriate

to

circumstances

grant

that

of

relief

the
or

specific performance of the agreement.
at

263.

If,

performance,

however,

then

the

the

court

the

it

lesser

would

be

relief

of

See Santobello, 404 U.S.

defendant
should

case,

honor

seeks
that

only

specific

election,

see

United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 1974), and
remand with direction that the defendant “be resentenced by a
different judge,” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263.
In

this

case,

Warner

specific performance.

has

unequivocally

elected

to

have

Accordingly, we vacate Warner’s sentence

and remand the case for resentencing before a different district
judge.
Because of Warner’s election for specific performance, we
must,

of

course,

also

enforce

the

provision

agreement by which he waived his appeal rights.

in

his

plea

Therefore, we

do not reach his challenges to the district court’s calculations
under the Sentencing Guidelines.

SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED

14