US v. Misty Grafton

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:13-cr-00034-JPB-JSK-4. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999719974]. [15-4328]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4328

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MISTY AUTUMN GRAFTON,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Elkins.
John Preston Bailey,
District Judge. (2:13-cr-00034-JPB-JSK-4)

Submitted:

November 20, 2015

Decided:

December 17, 2015

Before DUNCAN, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stephen G. Jory, MCNEER, HIGHLAND, MCMUNN & VARNER, L.C.,
Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II,
United States Attorney, Tara N. Tighe, Assistant United States
Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Misty Autumn Grafton appeals the district court’s judgment
sentencing her to 37 months’ imprisonment following revocation
of her probation.
is

plainly

On appeal, Grafton argues that her sentence

unreasonable.

We

vacate

Grafton’s

sentence

and

remand for resentencing.
We

will

probation

if

affirm
it

is

a

sentence

within

“plainly unreasonable.”

the

imposed

after

statutory

revocation

maximum

and

is

of
not

United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,

656-57 (4th Cir. 2007).

When reviewing whether a revocation

sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the sentence
for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and
substantive

considerations

original sentences.”
(4th

Cir.

we

employ

in

our

review

of

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438

2006).

procedurally

that

A

reasonable

probation
if

the

revocation

district

court

sentence

is

considers

the

Chapter Seven advisory policy statement range and the 18 U.S.C.
§

3553(a)

(2012)

factors.

See

18

U.S.C.

§

3565(a)

(2012);

Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657.
Here, although the district court considered the § 3553(a)
factors, it failed to calculate and indicate consideration of
the applicable policy statement range.

We therefore conclude

that Grafton’s sentence is procedurally unreasonable.

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found

the

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sentence

unreasonable,

whether it is plainly unreasonable.
sentence

is

plainly

we

assess

next

“To determine whether a

unreasonable,

this

Court

looks

to

definition of ‘plain’ used in plain-error analysis.”

the

United

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547–48 (4th Cir. 2010).

“For

a sentence to be plainly unreasonable, . . . it must run afoul
of clearly settled law.”

Id. at 548.

The district court’s obligation to consider the advisory
policy statement range is settled law in this circuit.
478 F.3d at 657.
advisory

policy

Moulden,

Thus, the court’s failure to consider the
statement

range

renders

Grafton’s

sentence

plainly unreasonable.
Because Grafton did not preserve this claim for appellate
review, our review is for plain error.
52(b).

See Fed. R. Crim. P.

To establish plain error, Grafton must demonstrate that

(1) the district court committed an error; (2) the error was
plain;

and

(3)

the

error

affected

her

substantial

rights.

Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013).

Even

if

will

these

“exercise

requirements
[its]

are

discretion

met,
to

however,

correct

the

this
error

Court
only

if

it

seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.”

United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d

376, 381 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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As stated, we recognize a sentencing error and find the
sentence to be plainly unreasonable because it runs afoul of
clearly established law.
461 F.3d at 439.

See Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656; Crudup,

Additionally, because the sentence imposed by

the district court was well above the advisory policy statement
range calculated by the probation officer, Grafton’s substantial
rights were affected by the error.
the

district

statement
term.

court

range,

it

calculated
might

have

We cannot tell whether, had
and

given

considered
Grafton

a

the

policy

lower

prison

See Thompson, 595 F.3d at 548.

Accordingly,

we

vacate

remand for resentencing.

Grafton’s

revocation

sentence

and

We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials

before

this

court

and

argument

would

not

aid

the

decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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