US v. Martin Barcenas-Yanez

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:14-cr-00005-RJC-1. [999860685]. [15-4363]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4363

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARTIN BARCENAS-YANEZ, a/k/a Juan Yanaee Cruz, a/k/a Ricardo
Rocha-Gusman,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:14-cr-00005-RJC-1)

Argued:

May 11, 2016

Decided:

June 21, 2016

Before MOTZ and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion.
Senior Judge Davis
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Floyd joined.

ARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anthony Joseph Enright, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Ross Hall
Richardson, Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN
NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge:
Having
States

pled

in

violation

Barcenas-Yanez
district

appeals

court.

significant

violence”

§

of

illegally

8

U.S.C.

the

length
the

of

reentering

the

United

1326,

Appellant

Martin

sentence

imposed

§

60-month

by

part

Code

to

The

Barcenas-Yanez’s
Penal

guilty

the

district

sentence
court’s

was

by

the

driven

conclusion

in

that

1997 aggravated assault conviction under Texas
22.02(a)

under

the

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).

constituted

reentry

a

predicate

sentencing

“crime

guideline,

of

U.S.S.G.

We hold, to the contrary, that a conviction

under § 22.02(a) is not categorically a crime of violence.

We

therefore vacate the judgment and remand for resentencing.
Barcenas-Yanez, a native and citizen of Mexico, illegally
entered the United States during the early 1990s and spent the
majority of the decade living and working in Texas.

While in

Texas, Barcenas-Yanez was convicted of several state offenses
including,

of

relevance

to

the

present

appeal,

aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Texas Penal Code
§ 22.02(a)(2), stemming from a bar fight.
Under

the

terms

of

the

Texas

statute

relevant

to

this

appeal, Barcenas-Yanez committed the Texas offense of aggravated
assault

in

that

he

committed

“simple

assault”

when

he

“intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury
to

another,”

Tex.

Penal

Code

§
2

22.01(a)(1),

and

that

simple

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assault

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offense

was

elevated

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to

aggravated

assault

because,

during the assault, he “use[d] or exhibit[ed] a deadly weapon.”
§

22.02(a)(2). 1

Barcenas-Yanez

After
was

serving

deported

to

three

years

Mexico.

in

As

state

early

prison,

as

2003,

however, he illegally reentered the United States, making his
way to North Carolina.
In 2006, Barcenas-Yanez was convicted of driving under the
influence

and

assault

December

2013,

while

in

a

North

Carolina

Barcenas-Yanez

was

state

serving

court.
a

In

term

of

probation, the Department of Homeland Security discovered his
presence in North Carolina.

A grand jury returned the instant

indictment charging him with knowingly and unlawfully reentering
the United States while under a preexisting order of deportation
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).
In due course, Barcenas-Yanez pled guilty as charged in the
indictment.

In preparation for sentencing, a probation officer

prepared

Presentence

a

Investigation

Report

(“PSR”),

which

concluded that, because Barcenas-Yanez “was previously deported
after being convicted of a crime of violence, Aggravated Assault
with a Deadly Weapon,” his offense level should be increased by
1

The actual charging document alleged that Barcenas-Yanez
“intentionally and knowingly cause[d] serious bodily injury to
[the victim] by beating him about the face and head with a cue
stick, that by the manner of its use and intended use was
capable of causing death and serious bodily injury.” J.A. 46.

3

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16 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).
level

enhancement,

Barcenas-Yanez’s

advisory

With the 16-

guidelines

range

was 77 to 96 months’ imprisonment.
Barcenas-Yanez objected to the PSR’s conclusion that his
1997 conviction for aggravated assault qualified as a “crime of
violence”

for

purposes

of

U.S.S.G.

§

2L1.2(b)(1)(A),

arguing

that, because the mens rea element of Texas’s aggravated assault
statute

sweeps

more

broadly

than

that

of

the

“generic”

definition of aggravated assault (by permitting a conviction for
“reckless[ly] caus[ing] bodily injury to another”), a conviction
under § 22.02(a) does not categorically constitute a crime of
violence.

The government did not oppose the objection, and the

probation officer revised the PSR, replacing the recommended 16level enhancement with a recommended 4-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G.

§

2L1.2(b)(1)(D).

Under

the

new

calculation,

the

advisory guidelines range was significantly reduced to 24 to 30
months; the government did not object to the revised PSR.
At

the

sentencing

hearing,

somewhat

to

the

parties’

surprise, the district court stated that it had “a hard time
figuring out why a 16-level adjustment” was not appropriate.
J.A.

28.

Relying

on

an

unpublished

Tenth

Circuit

decision,

United States v. Arellano-Sandoval, 506 F. App’x 827 (10th Cir.
2013), and its own determination that § 22.02(a) is divisible,
the district court applied the modified categorical approach and
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concluded that, because Barcenas-Yanez was specifically charged
with

“intentionally

and

knowingly

caus[ing]

serious

bodily

injury,” the applicable elements of § 22.02(a) matched those of
the generic aggravated assault offense enumerated as a “crime of
violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii).

J.A. 27–35;

see id. at 31 (observing that the charging document in the 1997
case

“seems

After

to

read

determining

enhancement

was

reckless
that

right

the

appropriate,

out

16-level
the

of

the

conviction”).

crime

district

of

court

violence
calculated

Barcenas-Yanez’s advisory guidelines range at 77 to 96 months.
Ultimately,

the

court

sentenced

Barcenas-Yanez

to

a

variant

sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment.
Barcenas-Yanez
the

district

filed

court

erred

this
in

timely
using

appeal,
the

contending

modified

that

categorical

approach to determine that his 1997 conviction for aggravated
assault under § 22.02(a) constituted a crime of violence for
purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).

We

review

de

novo

whether a district court erred in determining that a defendant’s
prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes
of the reentry guideline.

United States v. Aparicio-Soria, 740

F.3d 152, 154 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2, the reentry guideline,
“advises

federal

district

judges

to

increase

by

twelve

or

sixteen the offense level of a defendant convicted of unlawfully
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entering or remaining in the United States if that defendant has
a

prior

felony

conviction

(quoting

U.S.S.G.

reentry

guideline

enumerated

§

[and]

a

‘crime

2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).
defines

offenses,

kidnapping,

for

“crime

such

aggravated

The

of

as

of

violence.’”
commentary

violence”

“[m]urder,

assault,”

or

as

to

Id.
the

certain

manslaughter,

“any

other

offense

under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another.”

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii).

At sentencing, the district court correctly determined that
a violation of § 22.02(a) could potentially qualify as a crime
of

violence

because

“aggravated

listed

in

the

assault”

is

commentary

to

one
the

of

the

enumerated

offenses

reentry

guideline.

Consequently, the court correctly viewed its task as

determining whether “the elements of [a § 22.02(a) violation]
‘correspond[] in substance’ to” those of the generic definition
of aggravated assault.

United States v. Cabrera-Umanzor, 728

F.3d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 2013) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990)).
In so doing, courts must look exclusively to “the elements
of the prior offense rather than the conduct underlying the”
particular

conviction.

Id.

This

categorical

analysis

is

tweaked, however, if the statute of conviction is “divisible”-meaning

that

the

statute’s

elements
6

are

set

out

in

the

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alternative, providing for multiple versions of the same crime.
Id.

In the case of a divisible statute, the court employs a

modified

categorical

approach

and

is

permitted

to

“consult

certain approved ‘extra-statutory materials . . . to determine
which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction.’”
(quoting

Descamps

(2013)).

The

v.

United

Supreme

States,

Court

has

133

S.

explained

Ct.

that

Id.

2276,
the

2285

modified

categorical approach “serves a limited function” and that the
approved

extra-statutory

materials,

or

only

consulted

a

“list[s]

be

when

statute

Shepard

documents,

potential

may

offense

elements in the alternative, render[ing] opaque which element
played a part in the defendant’s conviction” and not when the
statute

merely

defines

the

offense

broadly.

Id.

(quoting

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283).
Here, like the district court, the parties first focus on
whether

the

inclusion

of

recklessness

as

a

mental

state

sufficient to satisfy § 22.02(a)’s mens rea element takes the
statute out of the ambit of the “generic” aggravated assault
offense, which is a categorical crime of violence.

We think

that the district court and the parties are correct on that
score; inclusion of a mere reckless state of mind renders the
statute broader than the generic offense.

See United States v.

Garcia-Jimenez, 807 F.3d 1079, 1086 (9th Cir. 2015) (“That a
substantial

majority

of

U.S.

jurisdictions
7

require

more

than

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extreme indifference recklessness to commit aggravated assault
is a compelling indication that the federal generic definition
of

aggravated

state.”).

assault

also

requires

more

than

that

mental

Therefore, and again as the district court correctly

perceived, the dispositive question becomes whether the Texas
legislature, in setting out alternative means of satisfying the
mens

rea

element

of

the

Texas

statute,

rendered

the

statute

divisible such that the state law can be said to have created
two

offenses,

one

involving

a

reckless

mens

involving a knowing or intentional mens rea.

rea,

the

other

We hold, applying

settled Circuit precedent, that the answer to this latter query
is “no.”
Texas law prohibits simple and aggravated assault.
Penal Code §§ 22.01, 22.02.

Tex.

As relevant here, 2 a person commits

simple “bodily injury” assault if he “intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the
person’s spouse.”

§ 22.01(a)(1).

A violation of § 22.01(a)(1)

generally qualifies as a Class A misdemeanor.

§ 22.01(b).

On

the other hand, a person commits aggravated assault, a felony,
§ 22.02(b), if he commits simple assault, as defined in § 22.01,

2

The Texas Penal Code also prohibits two other “distinct
assaultive crimes,” Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 536 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008), but neither is relevant to the present appeal,
§ 22.01(a)(2)–(3).

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and “uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of
the assault,” § 22.02(a)(2).
In

arguing

that

the

Texas

statute

is

divisible,

the

government contends, unremarkably, that we may consider the text
of the statute, together with state court opinions interpreting
the statute.

But the government goes much further to argue that

we may also consider, in light of state court practice, any
charging documents it is able to obtain from the state courts,
such as the charging document relied on by the district court in
this case.
suggested

In still another giant leap, the government even
at

oral

argument

that

we

may

take

account

of

the

description of charging documents contained in unrelated state
court

opinions. 3

We

decline

the

government’s

invitation

to

embark on such a journey, for we have already settled on our
preferred path to divisibility determinations.
Indeed,

we

have

explained

this

Circuit’s

approach

to

divisibility analysis with unmistakable clarity:
A statute is indivisible when the jury need not agree
on anything past the fact that the statute was
violated.
Any statutory phrase that—explicitly or
implicitly—refers to multiple, alternative means of
3

At oral argument the government acknowledged that under
its approach to divisibility analysis, a statute would sometimes
be deemed divisible and sometimes not, depending on how a local
prosecutor elected to word the charges. We find little in such
a rule to commend itself to us, even were we free to adopt it,
which we are not.

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commission must still be regarded as indivisible if
the jurors need not agree on which method of
committing the offense the defendant used. Thus, mere
use of the disjunctive “or” in the definition of a
crime does not automatically render it divisible.
Only when [the] law requires that in order to convict
the defendant the jury must unanimously agree that he
committed a particular substantive offense contained
within the disjunctively worded statute are we able to
conclude
that
the
statute
contains
alternative
elements and not alternative means.
United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 498 (4th Cir. 2015)
(alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also United States v. Vinson, 805 F.3d 120, 125
(4th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hether a statute or criminal offense is
divisible depends on the existence of alternate elements and a
matching category—that is, the alternate elements must create at
least one category or form of an offense that matches up to the
elements of the generic federal offense in question.”); Cabrera–
Umanzor, 728 F.3d at 350 (“Where the statute defines the offense
broadly rather than alternatively, the statute is not divisible,
and the modified categorical approach simply ‘has no role to
play.’” (quoting Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285)).
In a holding imbued with an equal measure of unmistakable
clarity, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that
jury unanimity as to mens rea is not required for an aggravated
assault conviction under § 22.02(a)(1), (2).

Landrian v. State,

268 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Texas

aggravated

assault

offense
10

created

Accordingly, the
in

§

22.02(a)

is

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broader than the federal generic “aggravated assault” offense
qualifying under the reentry guideline as supporting an enhanced
sentencing range, is not divisible, and therefore cannot support
the

application

guideline.

of

a

16-level

enhancement

under

the

reentry

In so holding, we respectfully disagree with the

contrary, pre-Descamps opinion (and its progeny) of the Fifth
Circuit.

See United States v. Guillen–Alvarez, 489 F.3d 197,

199 (5th Cir. 2007).
We

acknowledge

that

it

is

understandably

tempting

to

examine Shepard-approved documents earlier rather than later in
the sentencing process.

As this case demonstrates, however,

when such documents are examined too early, a risk arises that
the

divisibility

analysis

required

Circuit precedent may be skewed.

under

Descamps

and

our

It should be clear that the

modified categorical approach may not be employed to determine
whether the modified categorical approach may be employed. 4

VACATED AND REMANDED

4

We have fully considered and find no merit in the
government’s alternative arguments that (1) a § 22.02(a)
conviction for aggravated assault constitutes a categorical
crime of violence under the force clause of the reentry
guideline and (2) even with a reckless mens rea element,
violation of the Texas statute constitutes a crime of violence.

11